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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 

COLLEGE 

PRESENTED  BY 


William  E.  RoLerts 


3  -GoS- 


1^ 


APPERCEPTION 
a  flDonograpb 

ON 

Psychology  and  Pedagogy 

BY 

Dr.   KARL   LANGE 

DiBECTOB  OF  THE  HlOHEB  BCBOUEBaSCHOOL,  PLACEX,  GEB. 


Translated  and  fsbsented  to  American  Teachers  bt  thb 

FOLLOWING-NAMED  MEMBERS  OF  THE  HeRBART  ClUB  : 

ELMER  E.  BROWN,  CHARLES  DE  GARMO,  MRS.  EUDORA  HAlLaLA.NN, 

FLORENCE   HALL,   GEORGE    F.   JAMES,   L.   R.   KLEMM,  OSSIAN 

H.   LANG,   HERMAN  T.  LUKENS,   CHARLES  P.   MC  }IURRY, 

FRANK    MC  MURRY,    THEO.   B.   NOSS,    LEVI  L. 

SEELEY,  MARGARET  K.   SMITH. 

EDITED  BY 

CHARLES   DE   GARMO 


BOSTON,    U.  S.  A. 

D.  C.    HEATH  &   COMPANY,   PUBLISHERS 

1894 


rXINTtO  BV  C.  H.    HEINTZBMANN,   BOSTON. 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS. 


PART  I. 

Page 

The  Doctrine  of  Apperception  —  A  PsycHoiiOaiCAL  In- 
vestigation : 

1.  Nature  and  Kinds  of  Apperception 1 

2.  Conditions  of  Apperception 42 

3.  Significance  of  Apperception  in  the  Spiritual  Develop- 

ment of  Man 53 

PART  II. 

The  Theory  of  Apperception  in  its  Application  to  Ped- 

AGOOY 103 

1.  The  Object  that  is  Apperceived   (Choice  and  Arrange- 

ment of  the  Subject-matter  of  Education)      .        .        .    109 

2.  The  Subject  that  Apperceives  (Investigation,  Extension 

and  Utilization  of  the  Child's  Experience)      .        .        .151 

3.  The  Adequate  Union  of  these  two  Factors  in  Instruc- 

tion (Methods  of  Instruction) 200 

PART  III. 

History  of  the  Term  Apperception. 

1.  Leibnitz 246 

2.  Kant 250 

3.  Herbart 255 

4.  Lazarus .  263 

5.  Steinthal 268 

6.  Non-Herbartian  Psychologists 272 

7.  Wundt 275 

iii 


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,  SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

69036 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


If  we  inquire  into  the  genesis  of  our  present  educational 
ideals,  we  shall  find  that  they  take  their  rise  in  the  hearts  of 
a  few  great  men.  Comenius,  Rousseau,  and  Pestalozzi,  to 
whom  much  that  is  excellent  in  our  American  schools  to-day 
can  be  traced,  were  men  who  wrote  and  taught  because  they 
saw  a  great  need,  because  their  intense  emotional  natures 
were  stirred  to  the  depths  at  the  sight  of  children  growing 
up  in  ignorance  or  wasting  the  precious  time  of  youth  in 
empty  verbalism.  Like  all  great  reformers,  they  were 
governed  more  by  their  feelings  and  instincts  than  by  the 
scientific  spirit,  which  analyzes  everything,  never  taking  a 
step  not  warranted  by  logical  deduction.  Logic  is  too  cold 
and  slow  for  a  man  whose  heart  is  on  fire  with  some  plan 
for  the  regeneration  of  society.  The  initial  impulses  of  our 
educational  advance  have  been  given  by  men  of  this  type. 
Usually  they  have  cared  but  little,  even  in  the  later  years  of 
their  activity,  for  putting  their  ideas  into  scientific  form. 
Where  they  have  done  so,  however,  it  is  evident  that  they 
have  merely  adopted  the  primitive  psychological  conceptions 
current  among  the  people.  Early  attempts  to  reduce  these 
psychological  notions  to  a  system  led  to  the  theory  of  dis- 
parate or  independent  "  faculties,"  out  of  which  at  a  later 


VI  INTRODUCTION. 

period  phrenology  naturally  grew.  Antiquated  as  these 
crude  psychological  notions  may  seem  to  us,  they  have 
nevertheless  left  a  deep,  persistent  impression  upon  our 
whole  system  of  educational  ideas.  They  are  doubtless 
responsible  for  our  faith  in  what  we  call  formal  culture, 
or  discipline  of  the  mind,  through  studies  largely  lacking 
in  knowledge  content ;  to  them  must  be  ascribed  the  dis- 
tinction between  forming  and  informing  studies ;  also 
the  attempts  to  train  these  so-called  "  faculties,"  like  per- 
ception, memory,  imagination,  reason,  will,  by  means  of 
specific  subject-matter  and  methods  of  instruction.  Doubt- 
less even  so  primitive  a  system  has  done  good  service,  for 
any  psychology  of  education  is  better  than  none. 

But  it  now  seems  evident  that  if  we  are  to  make  further 
progress  in  education  we  must  add  to  this  initial  impulse 
(for  which  the  world  can  never  be  too  grateful)  something 
of  the  scientific  spirit  of  the  age  in  which  we  live.  A  num- 
ber of  facts  point  to  this  conclusion.  In  the  first  place,  the 
curriculum  of  studies  is  no  longer  the  simple  thing  it  was 
in  Pestalozzi's  time.  Study  after  study  has  been  added  in 
obedience  to  some  popular  demand  or  because  of  the  eso- 
teric interest  of  the  schoolmaster.  What  now  constitutes 
our  cun'iculum  is  a  chaos  of  isolated  subjects,  which  are 
allowed,  not  from  any  demonstrated  psychological  need,  but 
because  of  some  popular  or  professional  demand.  The 
only  proper  way  to  determine  which  shall  be  eliminated, 
which  abridged,  is  to  submit  the  whole  to  a  thorough  in- 
vestigation according  to  the  well  developed  psychology  of 


INTRODUCTION.  VU 

the  present  time,  since  the  primitive  systems  are  wholly 
inadequate  to  the  task.  Such  an  investigation  will  neces- 
sarily take  into  consideration  the  educational  value  of  each 
subject,  when  it  has  received  the  best  possible  coordination 
with  other  branches ;  it  will  consider  the  natural  interests  of 
the  child,  his  power  of  comprehension,  the  effect  of  his 
present  acquirements,  disposition  and  leading  purposes  upon 
his  acquisition  of  new  knowledge,  for  all  of  these  things 
will  help  to  decide  how  the  curriculum  shall  be  made  up. 
This  is  a  problem  not  to  be  solved  by  efforts  aroused  merely 
by  emotion  or  instinct,  for  the  problem  is  essentially  scien- 
tific in  its  nature. 

We  meet  this  same  need  for  the  scientific  application  of 
psychology  to  education  in  another  direction.  As  long  as 
only  the  well-to-do  classes  were  educated,  there  were  many 
influences  to  which  we  could  appeal  to  obtain  the  desired 
results.  Were  the  child  inclined  to  evade  our  instruction 
in  order  to  follow  his  own  devices,  we  might  appeal  to  his 
ambition,  to  emulation,  to  pride,  to  shame,  to  regard  for  the 
reputation  of  family,  and  the  like ;  but  when  the  streets, 
the  mines,  the  factories,  the  tenement  districts,  send  their 
children  to  school,  these  indirect  means  of  securing  atten- 
tion to  study  are  mostly  futile.  We  stand  face  to  face  with 
naked  ignorance  and  indifference,  and  must  make  our  im- 
pression in  a  few  short  years  or  suffer  defeat.  We  can  no 
longer  rely  on  indirect  means  for  arousing  the  mind  to 
educational  effort,  but  must  contrive  to  awaken  a  deep,  per- 
manent and  growing  interest  m  the  acquisition  and  posses- 


vm  INTRODUCTION. 

sion  of  knowledge  itself.  This  is  a  psychological  pioblem 
involving  the  child's  acquirements,  his  natural  instincts  and 
interests,  the  content  of  the  studies,  together  with  an  in- 
vestigation into  the  time,  order,  and  manner  of  present- 
ing them.  It  appears  self-evident,  therefore,  that  to  the 
primal  inspii'ation  for  the  uplifting  of  humanity,  we  must 
now  add  the  intelligent  direction  of  psychological  science. 

While  our  educational  leaders  were  gathering  their  psy- 
chological ideas  from  the  fireside,  so  to  speak,  philosophy 
and  scientific  psychology  were  being  wrought  out  in  the 
closet.  The  influence  of  the  scientific  spirit  upon  educa- 
tional doctrines  was  consequently  but  slight.  There  was, 
however,  one  of  the  leading  philosophers,  John  Frederick 
Herbart,  who,  foreseeing  the  need  that  education  would  have 
of  scientific  treatment  from  the  standpoint  of  psychology, 
devoted  much  of  his  time  to  the  elaboration  of  a  rational 
system  of  pedagogy.  Under  the  influence  of  his  thought,  a 
vigorous  school  of  educational  thinkers  has  arisen  in  Ger- 
many who  are  known  collectively  as  Herbartians,  but  who 
represent  within  the  school  somewhat  widely  varying  theo- 
ries. Among  the  number.  Dr.  Lange  has  perhaps  exhib- 
ited the  happiest  combination  of  popular  presentation  and 
scientific  insight.  His  book  will  interest  the  simplest  and 
instruct  the  wisest ;  for,  being  on  the  one  side  concrete  and 
readable,  it  is  on  the  other  founded  on  painstaking  research, 
not  only  in  Herbartian,  but  also  in  other  modern  scientific 
psychology.  A  prominent  merit  of  Lange  is  that  he  shows  us 
the  lines  along  which  we  must  work  in  order  to  reach  a  solu- 


INTRODUCTION.  IX 

tion  of  educational  problems  requiring  this  new  element  of 
psychology  scientifically  developed.  Not  only  does  he  point 
the  way,  but  he  pursues  it.  He  leads  us  into  a  funda- 
mental study  of  the  nature,  kinds,  conditions  and  signifi- 
cance of  apperception ;  he  shows  what  influence  it  is  to  have 
upon  the  choice  and  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter  of 
education ;  how  we  can  investigate,  extend,  and  utilize  the 
child's  store  of  experience,  and  how  to  bring  about  an  ade- 
quate union  between  the  growing  mind  of  the  child  and  the 
subject-matter  of  instruction  through  the  development  of 
the  best  methods  of  teaching ;  finally,  in  the  Third  Part  he 
gives  us  a  masterly  survey  of  the  history  of  the  term  as 
explained  by  Leibnitz,  Kant,  Herbart,  Lazarus,  Stein  thai 
and  Wundt.  One  lays  down  the  book,  after  reading  this 
chapter,  with  the  reflection,  that  if  these  men  have  not  said 
the  last  word  upon  apperception,  it  is  still  much  to  have 
said  the  first. 

Believing  that  this  book  above  all  others  is  best  adapted 
to  introduce  the  young  teacher  into  that  realm  of  educational 
thought  in  which  the  results  of  modern  psychology  must 
henceforth  be  an  indispensable  factor,  the  members  of  the 
newly  formed  Herbart  Club  collectively  offer  this  translation 

to  their  fellow  teachers. 

CHARLES  DE  GARMO. 

SWABTHMOKE  COIiliEGE,  Pa.,  Jan.  Ist,   1893. 


PART  I. 
THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION. 

A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  INVESTIGATION. 


I.   Nature  and  Kinds  of  Apperception. 

Man  enters  life  as  a  stranger ;  he  knows  nothing  of  the 
world  that  receives  hiin :  it  is  to  him  a  new,  unknown 
country,  which  he  must  explore,  which  he  must  conquer. 
How  is  this  to  be  done?  Nature  assails  his  senses  with  a 
thousand  allurements ;  she  sends  the  rays  of  light  that  she 
may  open  his  eyes  to  the  innumerable  things  of  the  outer 
world,  she  knocks  upon  the  door  of  the  human  spirit  with 
excitations  of  tone  and  touch  and  temperature  and  all  the 
other  stimulations  of  the  sensitive  nerves,  desiring  admis- 
sion. The  soul  answers  these  stimuli  with  sensations,  with 
ideas ;  it  masters  the  outer  world  by  perceiving  it. 

But  this  is  not  brought  about  by  a  mere  passive  reception 
of  outer  impressions,  as  men  were  once  perhaps  inclined  to 
think,  for  the  soul  is  not  a  tablet  upon  which  the  outer 
world  engraves  its  messages,  not  a  mirror  iu  which  things 
are  reflected,  and  ideas  are  not  mere  images  of  things.^  On 
the   contrary,    in  the  moment  of  perception,    the   mind    is 

1  This  is  a  reference  to  John  Locke,  who  represents  the  soul  as  a  Tabula 
Rasa  on  which  experience  writes  its  messages.  See  Book  II.,  Chap,  i.,  of 
Locke's  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding. 

I 


2  APPERCEPTION. 

thoroughly  active,  since  it  transforms  a  physiological  occa- 
sion into  a  psychical  result :  or,  in  other  words,  since  upon 
occasion  of  a  nerve-activity  it  responds  with  an  action  whose 
content  is  entirely  different.  What  it  is  that  the  outer  world 
effects  in  the  mind,  what  activity  in  harmony  with  its  own 
nature  the  mind  manifests  in  consequence  of  a  certain  sense 
excitation,  can  be  seen  in  the  sensations  that  come  imme- 
diately into  consciousness.  Therefore,  strictly  speaking, 
these  sensations  do  not  tell  us  how  the  things  of  the  outer 
world  really  are,  but  how  they  appear  to  us.  We  think,  in- 
deed, to  recognize  the  true  nature  of  things  through  our 
perceptions,  because  things  are  the  occasion  of  our  percep- 
tions ;  but  what  we  call  the  qualities  and  activities  of  things 
are  only  our  sensations  arising  from  the  nerve  excitations 
caused  by  these  outer  objects.* 

Yet  all  that  we  perceive  is  not  the  mere  appearance ;  the 
outer  world  is  not  the  bare  product  of  our  perception.  For, 
though  the  mind  creates  its  ideas  in  consequence  of  its  own 
nature,  it  does  not  do  so  without  corresponding  outer  stim- 
ulus. That  things  are  external  to  us,  that  they  affect 
us  according  to  certain  laws,  and  occasion  in  the  soul  speci- 
fic reactions  corresponding  to  their  qualities,  that  we  can 
make  them  serviceable  to  our  wills  according  to  those  laws, 
—  to  all  this  our  perceptions  testify  beyond  a  doubt.  Yet, 
for  all  that,  they  do  not  reveal  the  actual  nature  of  things. 
Our  perceptions  through  their  rich  variety  teach  us  to  be  at 

*  For  example :  All  that  a  bell  does  when  it  rings  is  to  set  the  air  vi- 
brating. This  is  not  sound  as  we  experience  it,  but  tlie  vibrations  come 
to  the  ear  and  stimulate  the  auditory  nerve.  This  nerve  excitation  is 
conducted  to  the  brain,  and  the  mind  itself  responds  in  what  we  call 
the  sensation  sound,  which  must  be  considered  as  something  quite  differ- 
ent from  the  vibrations  of  air  set  up  by  the  bell.  The  same  relations  exist 
between  the  vibrations  of  ether,  which  the  physicist  can  measure,  and 
the  resulting  sensation  that  we  call  light.— [Ed.] 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  3 

home  in  the  world  and  to  master  it;  "  but  no  created  spirit 
ever  penetrates  to  the  heart  of  nature." 

Thus,  in  general,  we  master  the  outer  world  through  our 
perceptions,  and  only  through  them ;  yet  in  their  very  na- 
ture there  lies  at  the  same  time  an  important  limit  for  all 
knowing.  Just  because  the  perceiving  mind  does  not  pas- 
sively receive  external  things  or  their  images,  because  nothing 
foreign  can  press  in  upon  it  or  be  communicated  immediately 
to  it,  but  because  it  relates  itself  actively  to  all  outer  excita- 
tions and  responds  to  them  in  its  own  way,  therefore,  in  a 
strict  sense,  our  perceptions  have  only  relative  truth  and 
validity. 

This  activity  of  the  perceiving  mind,  however,  explains 
another  important  fact.  It  is  a  well  known  experience  that 
one  and  the  same  object  seldom  occasions  precisely  similar 
perceptions  in  the  minds  of  different  people.  Of  the  same 
landscape  the  poet's  image  would  differ  greatly  from  that  of 
the  botanist,  the  painter's  from  that  of  the  geologist  or  the 
farmer,  the  stranger's  from  that  of  him  who  calls  it  home. 
In  the  same  way,  one  and  the  same  speech  is  often  under- 
stood in  as  many  different  ways  as  there  are  hearers.  "What 
does  not  the  child  see  in  his  toys,  the  devout  mind  in  the 
objects  of  its  devotions !  What  does  not  the  experienced 
reader  of  human  nature  see  in  the  wrinkles  and  folds,  the 
wilted  and  weather-beaten  features,  of  a  human  face! 
How  much  do  the  gestures,  the  play  of  features,  the  glowing 
or  fading  fire  of  the  eye,  tell  him  of  the  battles  and  storms 
of  the  soul !  And  the  artist,  does  he  not  perceive  in  a  work 
of  art  a  thousand  things  that  escape  the  closest  attention  of 
the  ordinary  observer?  Has  not  each  of  us  the  sharpest 
kind  of  an  eye  for  the  objects  with  which  our  calling  makes 
us  best  acquainted  ?  In  the  voices  of  nature  the  youthful 
lover  of  birds,  like  man  in  the  state  of  nature,  hears  the 


4  APPERCEPTION. 

emotional  and  volitional  utterances  of  related  beings,  while 
the  Malay  says  of  his  bamboo  forests,  from  whose  branches 
the  wind  entices  the  most  manifold  tones  :  ' '  The  forest  organ 
plays  for  each  his  favorite  tune." 

We  see,  therefore,  that  when  two  persons  perceive  the 
same  thing  their  perceptions  are  not  precisely  alike.  There 
are  as  many  different  ideas  of  one  and  the  same  thing  as 
there  are  observers.  Whence  this  variation  in  apprehen- 
sion, with  otherwise  similar  sense  apparatus?  Were  we  in 
perception  chiefly  passive,  could  the  things  of  the  outer 
world  impress  themselves  immediately  upon  our  minds  and 
thus  stamp  their  nature  upon  it,  they  would  necessarily 
always  leave  behind  the  same  ideas,  so  that  a  variety  of 
apprehension  would  be  impossible  and  inexplicable.  The 
fact,  however,  that  every  observer  contributes  something  to 
the  sensation,  and  thus  alters  and  enriches  it,  speaks  unmis- 
takably  for  the  activity  of  the  mind,  which,  upon  occasion 
of  sense-excitations,  must  perform  the  main  office  and  create 
the  perception  in  accordance  with  that  which  occasions  it. 
Xhis  fact  points  to  an  activity  the  strength  of  which  depends 
essentially  upon  the  sum  and  the  kinds  of  psychical  products 
already  present ;  for  precisely  those  spiritual  elements  that 
accompany  the  real  content  of  the  sensation  allow  us  to  con- 
clude as  to  the  causes  to  which  the  perception  owes  its  rapid 
assimilation  as  well  as  its  peculiar  coloring.  The  mind 
apprehends  the  things  of  the  outer  world  with  the  assistance 
of  what  it  has  already  experienced,  felt,  learned,  and 
digested.  And  so  it  comes  about  that  with  nearly  all  new 
perceptions  the  former  content  of  our  minds  makes  itself 
felt,  so  that  we  become  conscious  of  more  than  that  which 
the  objects  themselves  furnish  us,  seeing  the  latter  through- 
out in  the  light  of  similar  ideas  already  present  in  the  mind. 

The  process  of  perception  must  not  therefore  be  regarded 


THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  5 

as  such  a  simple  matter  as  superficial  observation  might 
seem  to  indicate.  It  is  not  merely  becoming  conscious  of 
nerve-excitations. 

In  order  that  a  sensation  may  arise,  there  is,  as  a  rule,  a 
fusion  or  union  of  its  content  with  similar  ideas  and  feelings. 
With  the  assistance  of  the  latter,  the  sensation  is  held  in 
consciousness,  elevated  into  greater  clearness,  properly  re- 
lated to  the  remaining  fields  of  thought,  and  so  truly  as- 
similated. 

We  call  this  second  act,  in  distinction  from  that  of  sim-^ 
pie  perception  or  the  reception  of  a  sensation,  appercep- 
tion, or  mental  assimilation.  This  is  a  psychical  process 
which  has  a  validity  beyond  mere  subjective  perception,  and 
is  of  the  greatest  significance  for  all  knowledge,  yes,  even 
for  our  whole  spiritual  life.^  Let  us  see  therefore,  the  laws 
according  to  which  this  process  is  completed. 

^  The  inquiring  mind  is  likely  to  ask  at  this  point :  Is  it  possible  to 
have  perception  without  apperception?  We  may  say  in  general  that 
knowledge  is  necessary  for  the  assimilation  of  knowledge,  and  this  is  the 
side  of  apperception  of  most  importance  to  us  as  teachers,  but  some  are 
curious  to  know  how,  according  to  this,  knowledge  gets  a  start.  The  au- 
thor has  shown  at  the  beginning  that  a  spontaneous  activity  on  the  part 
of  the  soul  in  accordance  with  its  own  nature  must  be  presupposed  in 
order  that  we  may  have  any  experience  at  all.  In  the  case  of  the  bell, 
for  instance,  the  vibrations  of  the  air  are  contributed  by  the  object,  but 
the  mental  response  that  we  know  as  sound  comes  from  the  mind  itself. 
In  this  way  it  is  possible  for  a  knowledge  of  sounds  to  start,  without  there 
having  been  any  previous  experience  of  sounds  to  serve  as  interpreting 
ideas.  We  have  thus  in  distinction  from  the  apperception  in  which 
knowledge  is  Involved  &  primary  apperception,  without  which  we  should 
never  know  anything.  As  a  rule,  Herbartian  writers  emphasize  the  cog- 
nitive phases  of  apperception,  in  which  new  knowledge  is  assimilated  by 
the  products  of  our  former  experience,  in  the  form  of  knowledge,  feelings, 
purposes,  interests,  etc.,  partly  because  these  are  the  phases  of  the  subject 
of  practical  importance  to  pedagogy,  and  partly  from  the  implications  of 
the  Herbartian  system  of  psychology.  A  careful  study  of  the  historical 
sketch  at  the  close  of  the  volume  will  reveal  to  the  reader  the  attitude  of 
the  various  thinkers  in  respect  to  this  topic.  —  [Ed.] 


6  APPERCEPTION. 

Suppose  we  have  the  rare  phenomeuon  of  an  eclipse  of 
the  sun.  Rays  of  light  of  varying  strength  come  from  the 
lighted  part  of  the  sun's  disk,  and  fall  upon  the  retina  of 
the  eye.  A  physical  process  arising  outside  of  the  body 
aflfects  at  once  our  nei^ves  of  sight.  Hereby  the  peripheral 
ends  of  these  ncr^'cs  are  stimulated  to  an  activity  which 
is  conducted  as  a  nerve-excitation  to  the  central  ends  of  the 
nerves  and  there  causes  a  specific  change  (excitation  of 
the  ganglion  cells),  which  is  characterized  as  the  release  of 
the  ner\'e-excitement.  This  is  a  physiological  process,  which 
in  time  and  cause  seems  bound  up  with  the  physical  one,  but 
which  is  in  its  nature  entirely  distinguished  from  it.  To  these 
external  processes,  and  conditioned  and  occasioned  by  them, 
is  now  added  a  pure  inner  activity,  which  seems  to  have 
nothing  in  common  either  with  vibrations  of  ether  or  with 
nerve  currents ;  it  is  the  reaction  of  the  soul,  a  sight-sensa- 
tion. This  is  the  psychical  act  with  which  the  perception 
closes.  We  naturally  receive  from  the  continually  chang- 
ing disk  a  variety  of  sensations,  which,  united  and  related 
to  the  same  object,  give  us  a  picture  of  the  eclipse  of  the 
sun  ;  this  is  a  subjective  perception.* 

Only  a  new-born  infant,  in  so  far  as  it  may  be  supposed 
to  see  at  all,  could  stop  at  this  stage  in  the  perception  of 
the  outer  impression.  During  the  first  months  of  life  a 
human  being  would  perceive  this  rare  celestial  phenomenon 
with  dullness  and  indifference,  and  without  understanding 
or  interest.  He  will  at  this  stage  have  nothing  to  add  to 
the  given  impression ;  he  will  indeed  not  be  aware  of  all 
that  is  to  be  seen,  so  that  he  can  take  away  no  particularly 

'  A  perception  in  this  sense  of  tlie  term  does  not  differ  from  a  sensation, 
except  perliaps  in  cuinplexity.  We  usually  regard  the  sensation  as  tlie 
simplest  psycliical  reaction  against  the  nerve-current  caused  by  a  ]>)iy9- 
kal  stimulus.  —  [Ed.] 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  7 

clear  and  sharp  image  of  the  object.  Where  the  soul  has 
gained  but  little  content,  it  perceives  only  "according  to  its 
original  nature,"  that  is,  dimly  and  weakly. 

It  is  very  different  with  the  adult.  He  gains  from  the 
same  phenomenon  of  nature  a  far  richer,  sharper,  and 
clearer  perception.  We  notice  not  only  the  gradual  eclipse 
of  the  sun,  but  we  recognize  also  its  cause.  We  see  a  dark 
disk  enter  the  sun's  field  of  light,  and  say  to  ourselves  that 
this  is  the  unilluminated  side  of  the  moon,  which  in  its 
passage  around  the  earth,  is  now  passing  between  us  and 
the  sun,  and  whose  cone  of  shadow  hides  from  us  the  star  of 
day.  To  this  we  add  the  comforting  certainty,  that  all  this 
has  to  do  with  right  things,  that  the  eclipse  is  proceeding 
according  to  known  and  fixed  laws  —  a  thought  that  goes 
far  to  remove  a  large  part  of  the  emotion-stimng  power  of 
this  unusual  occurrence. 

Whence  comes  this  perception,  so  rich  in  content  and  clear 
in  outline?  It  has  evidently  arisen  under  the  influence  of 
the  related  thought  content,  with  which  we  have  met  the 
outer  impressions,  and  under  the  influence  of  the  observa- 
tions and  knowledge  that  we  have  formerly  gained  through 
instruction,  reading,  and  personal  observation  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  and  their  movements.  It  was  with  the  help  of  what 
we  already  knew  of  this  keenly  expected  natural  event,  and 
of  similar  reproduced  ideas,  that  we  created  this  new  percep- 
tion and  placed  it  in  an  orderly  position  in  the  organism  of  our 
knowledge,  so  that  it  now  forms  a  clear  and  definite  part 
of  the  same.  We  apperceived  it.  Not  imessential  is  the 
service  rendered  by  the  will,  which  is  here  led  by  intellectual 
feelings.  As  we  were  viewing  the  astronomical  event  with 
close  attention,  it  not  only  correctly  adjusted  the  sense 
organs  for  the  obsen'ation,  but  it  removed  disturbing  ideas 
as  far  as  possible  from  consciousness  and  admitted  only  such 


8  APPERCEPTION. 

as  were  favorable  for  the  assimilation  of  the  new.  This  was 
accompanied  by  a  corresponding  physical  effort,  viz.,  that  of 
tension,  which  made  itself  felt  in  the  sensation.  At  the 
moment  of  successful  apperception,  as  would  appear  from 
Wundt's  investigations,  the  sensory  ners'e-current  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  central  ends  of  the  nerves  to  a  region  lying  in 
the  front  part  of  the  large  brain,  which  is  reckoned  to  be  the 
apperception  center.  From  here  the  excitation  was  partly 
directed  back  to  the  sensory  centers,  whereby  there  was  a 
strengthening  of  the  perception,  and  partly  conducted  further 
to  the  muscles  of  the  eye,  in  which  certain  feelings  of  ten- 
sion arose. 

Reviewing  now  the  parts  of  the  process  to  be  obser\'ed  in 
the  act  of  perception,  we  find  an  extraordinary  number  of 
them :  sense  and  motor  stimuli,  sensations  of  sight  and  mus- 
cles, reproduced  ideas,  .activities  of  feeling  and  will — all 
these  are  exercised  in  the  production  of  an  apparently  simple 
result  without  our  being  conscious  of  all  the  actions  simulta- 
neously. There  are,  however,  two  chief  activities  to  be  dis- 
tinguished in  the  whole  process.  We  perceive  in  the  eclipse, 
first,  just  what  the  original  constitution  of  our  minds  neces- 
sitates, even  if  they  were  no  more  developed  than  the  mind 
of  the  infant.  In  this  way  a  perception  arises.  But  through 
the  ideas  and  skill  obtained  by  former  experience,  we  observe 
much  that  remains  hidden  to  the  inexperienced,  and  we  add 
to  the  subjective  perception  numerous  psychical  elements 
from  our  well-stored  minds,  which  were  not  immediately  given 
in  the  ob8er\-ation.  The  mind  apprehends  outer  impressions 
in  accordance  with  its  wealth  of  knowledge  gained  through 
former  activity.     The  process  of  perception  becomes  one 

OF    APPERCEPTION. 

The  fact  that  the  act  of  apperception  is  accomplished 
under  the  influence  of  the  present  knowledge  store  of  the 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  9 

mind,  makes  it  comprehensible  how  one  and  the  same 
natural  event  can  find  such  different  interpretations.  What 
we  obeei've  with  such  quiet  self-possession,  and  even  ele- 
vation of  feeling,  has  always  been  a  cause  of  horror  and 
powerful  fear  with  savages  and  other  primitive  peoples. 
They  see  the  sun  threatened  by  demons  who  would  rob  it  of 
light,  by  dangerous  monsters  who  would  devour  it.  These 
ideas  are  perhaps  most  immediate  to  those  whose  existence 
is  filled  with  unceasing  struggle  against  hostile  neighbors 
and  powerful  beasts  of  prey.  And  therefore,  because  the 
eclipse  appears  to  them  as  a  gigantic  war  of  worlds,  as  a  fatal 
event,  threatening  to  destroy  even  themselves,  it  is  natural 
that  their  minds  should  be  moved  by  the  most  powerful  emo- 
tions. When,  however,  the  idea  of  the  heavenly  bodies  and 
their  ceaseless  change  has  gained  a  fixed  place  and  meaning 
in  the  religious  system  of  a  people,  when  the  sun  is  adored  as 
a  sublime  God  of  Light,  who  rules  the  world  and  the  fate  of 
man,  then  this  celestial  phenomenon  must,  in  accordance 
with  ruling  ideas,  be  apperceived  as  a  religious  event. 
Once  when  the  Medes  and  Lydians  stood  opposed,  ready  to 
fight  a  bloody  battle,  the  heavens  suddenly  darkened  and 
the  sun  lost  its  light.  Then  they  recognized  that  their 
gods,  Ormuzd  and  Mithras,  were  angry  at  their  deeds ; 
they  thereupon  lowered  their  weapons,  and  concluded  a  peace 
with  each  other. 

In  the  case  of  the  obsei"vation  described,  we  saw  that  the 
acts  of  perception  and  apperception,  however  clearly  to  be 
distinguished  according  to  their  nature,  were  not  completed 
indifferent  times,  as  if  the  second,  perhaps,  followed  the  first 
in  noticeable  time-distinction.  On  the  contrary  the  act  of 
perception  occurred  simultaneously  with  that  of  apperception 
and  essentially  under  its  influence.  The  question  arises 
whether  this  is  always  so,  whether  apperception  always  ac- 


10  APPERCEPTION. 

companies  perception.     We  will  test  the  question  with  a 
further  example. 

In  the  theater  at  Corinth  the  assembled  multitudes  listened 
to  the  first  drama  that  had  been  played  before  them.  What 
the  furies,  the  dreadful  spirits  of  revenge,  had  revealed  in 
terrible  song  and  dance  had  moved  all  hearts,  and  a  sol- 
emn, secret  dread  rested  upon  every  mind.  Suddenly  in 
the  midst  of  the  deep  stillness,  there  rang  out  the  words : 

See  there !  see  there !  Timotheus, 
The  Cranes,  the  Cranes  of  Ibycus!^ 

Had  these  words  been  uttered  at  another  place  and  before 
people  who  knew  nothing  of  Ibycus  and  his  sad  fate,  it  is 
probable  that  they  would  have  passed  quickly  out  of  con- 
sciousness without  leaving  any  deep  impression  behind. 
The  people  could  have  made  nothing  out  of  the  strange  cry, 
and  would  have  paid  as  little  attention  to  the  two  men  as  to 
the  passing  cranes.  The  impression,  like  many  other  fleet- 
ing, indifferent  ones,  would  have  remained  as  something 
isolated  and  external,  a  mere  perception  easy  to  be  forgot- 
ten. But  it  was  otherwise  in  the  theater  at  Corinth  with 
the  assembled  people.  Here,  the  name  of  the  lamented 
singer  fixed  the  attention  upon  the  few,  and  in  themselves 
innocent,  words  of  the  murderer,  so  that  they  did  not  pass 
by  unheeded.  Here,  the  unwary  exclamation  found  a 
loud  echo  in  the  hearts  of  the  hearers.     True,  they  are  at 

'  The  story  of  the  Cranes  of  Ibycus  is  as  follows  :  While  traveling  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Corinth,  the  poet  Ibycus  was  waylaid  and  mortally 
wounded  by  robbers.  As  he  lay  dying  on  the  ground  he  saw  a  tlock  of 
cranes  flying  oTerhead,  and  called  upon  them  to  avenge  his  death.  The 
murderers  betook  themselves  to  Corinth,  and  soon  after,  while  sitting  in  ' 
the  theater,  saw  the  cranes  hovering  above.  One  of  them  either  in  alarm 
or  jest,  ejaculated :  "  Behold  the  avengers  of  Ibycus,"  and  gave  the  clue  to 
the  detection  of  the  crime.  Tiie  phrase,  The  Cranes  of  Ibycus,  passed  into 
a  proverb  among  the  Greeks.  —  Ency.  lirit. 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  11 

first  led  only  by  an  obscure  feeling,  a  premonition.  They 
do  not  yet  know  what  these  words  signify.  What  should 
these  two  strangers  have  to  do  with  Ibycus ;  —  they,  the 
rough  men,  with  the  cultured  poet?  How  does  it  happen 
they  speak  of  his  cranes?  Such  and  similar  thoughts 
prevent  the  immediate  comprehension  of  the  unusual  words. 
Hence  the  poet  with  his  psychological  tact  allows  a  few 
moments  to  pass,  before  the  hearers  understand.  At  first 
the  flock  of  passing  cranes  claim  the  senses  of  the  observers. 
Then  the  words  about  the  Cranes  of  Ibycus  are  carried  — 
even  if  very  soon —  in  wide  circles  to  the  lowest  seats,  and 
awaken  anew  the  old  song.  And  now  the  excited  multitude 
breaks  out  in  queries  and  suspicions :  "  Ibycus,  whom  we 
bemoan?  The  man  slain  by  the  hand  of  a  murderer? 
What  ails  this  man?  What  can  he  mean?  What  is  the 
meaning  of  this  flight  of  cranes  ?  "^ 

Numerous  ideas  are  now  called  up  by  the  new  perception 
and  placed  in  relation  to  it.  All  the  thoughts  are  collected, 
that  is,  those  which  can  serve  to  give  significance  and  exten- 
sion to  the  perception.  And  in  fact,  of  all  the  ideas  called 
to  consciousness,  two  groups  soon  appear  that  are  able  to 
contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the  obscure  fact  of  the 
observation.  They  are,  first,  vivid  ideas  of  the  ruthless 
murder  of  the  poet,  united  with  feelings  of  deep  sorrow 
and  moral  indignation,  accompanied  by  the  desire  to  find 
the  murderer,  and  the  resolution  to  attend  to  every  suspi- 
cious circumstance.  Awakened  from  its  light  slumber  by  the 
name  of  the  murdered  man,  this  group  of  ideas  breaks  forth 
with  new  power  and  lends  the  attentive  will  a  special  en- 

» 2)er  3bQfu'3,  ben  mir  bemetncn  ? 
®en  fine  aJlBtberfjanb  er|(ftlu9  ? 
ffiaS  ifl'§  nttt  bent,  maS  fann  ex  meinen  ? 
aSaS  ifl'3  mit  biefem  i?rani4jufl  ?  — Schiller. 


12  APPERCEPTION. 

ergy  and  endurance.  In  the  second  place,  all  the  earnest 
thoughts  and  feelings  spring  up,  which  the  song  of  the 
spirits  of  revenge  has  awakened  in  the  hearers :  the  fixed 
certainty  that  nothing  evil  remains  undiscovered  and  una- 
venged, the  feeling  of  solemn  awe  before  the  just,  almighty, 
and  omnipresent  rule  of  the  gods.  Hence  arises  the 
thought :  What  if  the  gods  in  confinnation  of  the  message 
of  the  furies  have  produced  the  murderer  ?  What  if  he  has 
involuntarily  betrayed  himself  through  thinking  aloud? 
Strange  indeed  are  the  ways  of  celestials.  Why  should 
they,  indeed,  not  employ  cranes  for  the  discovery  of  the 
murderer? 

"  Now  with  the  speed  of  lightning  there  flies  through  all 
hearts  the  warning  thought :  Attend  !  This  is  the  power  of 
the  furies !  They  avenge  the  numlercd  poet !  The  mur- 
derer reveals  himself !  "  ^ 

The  murderers  are  seized,  they  grow  pale  and  can  give 
no  satisfactory  explanation,  so  that  men  read  their  wicked 
deed  in  their  unsteady  looks  and  distorted  features ;  that 
single  thoughtless  exclamation  has  become  the  proof  of 
their  guilt.  Apperception  rapidly  accompanies  the  percep- 
tion of  the  outer  events,  which  close  with  the  confession  of 
the  evil  doers. 

Evidently  in  the  present  case  perception  and  appercep- 
tion are  not  completed  simultaneously,  but  the  mental  as- 
similation follows  after  an  appreciable  time.  One  may,  in- 
deed, ascribe  to  apperception  the  apprehension  of  the  sounds 
uttered  by  the  murderer  as  words  and  sentences,  in  so  far 


'Unb  a^nenb  fliegt'd  mit  91i%e§|(f>{aoe 

'Snxif  aUe  ^erjen  :  @ebet  ad)t ! 

tai  tfi  bei  Suntenibtn  3Rai)t ! 

Set  fromme  2>i(^tei  nirb  aexoi)en, 

let  TO6rb«t  bietet  felbfl  fj*  bar.  —  Schillkr. 


THE  THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  13 

as  the  observers  recognize  these  as  familiar  sounds  and 
words  representing  ideas  of  certain  things,  and  in  so  far 
as  they  have  united  these  mental  prbducts  into  a  judgment. 
However,  this  apprehension  is  so  meager  and  indefinite,  so 
external  and  isolated,  that,  in  comparison  with  the  later 
deeper  comprehension,  they  may  well  be  termed  perceptions. 
At  any  rate  they  are  further  apperceived  by  the  aid  of  pres- 
ent ideas,  and  only  after  this  is  done  do  they  attain  the 
proper  content  and  adequate  clearness.  There  may  conse- 
quently be  perceptions  that  are  not  immediately  assimilated ; 
not  every  perception  is  at  the  same  time  an  apperception  in 
the  cognitive  sense  of  the  term.  Desultory  talk  sleeps  in 
deaf  ears.  The  young  retain  many  a  word,  many  a  sen- 
tence purely  mechanically,  without  understanding.  It  may 
be  years  after,  that  the  meaning  of  a  form  of  speech  occurs 
to  us.  Then  we  recognize  and  understand  a  perception  that 
to  our  childish  mind  appeared  a  sphinx's  riddle.  And  even 
to  the  adult,  there  come  occasionally  words  and  sentences, 
perceptions,  or  thoughts  so  strange  and  rare,  that  he  knows 
not  at  first  what  to  make  of  them,  and  catches  himself,  per- 
haps, asking  with  curiosity,  what  sense  or  significance  these 
new  things  may  contain  for  him.^ 

We  undoubtedly  have  perceptfons  that  are  never  apper- 
ceived. In  this  list  we  shall  find  the  earliest,  isolated  sensa- 
tions of  the  child ;  those  perceptions  that  we  do  not  know 
what  to  do  with  ;  and  such  as  on  account  of  flagging  atten- 


1  Lotze  in  his  Psychology  narrates  the  following  interesting  occurrence : 
An  observer  had  tried  the  effect  of  a  narcotic  upon  himself,  for  scientific 
purposes.  When  he  awoke  from  his  stupor,  he  recognized  the  persons 
present  in  the  room,  but  knew  not  what  to  make  of  himself.  Only  after 
his  glance  had  rested  on  the  mirror  opposite  did  he  recognize  himself. 
Only  at  this  point,  in  the  first  instant  of  recognition,  did  perception  be- 
come apperception. 


14  APPERCEPTION. 

tion  or  of  transient  character  sink  rapidly  under  the  threshold 
of  consciousness.*     Yet  these  form  only  the  exceptions. 

In  most  cases  —  the  more  surely,  the  richer  the  mental  life 
is  —  perception  is  accompanied  by  apperception.  Whether 
immediately  or  after  a  shorter  or  longer  period  of  time,  de- 
pends essentially  upon  the  kind  and  intensity  of  the  repro- 
duced ideas  that  come  into  relation  to  the  perception.  If  we 
repeat  a  perception  often  experienced,  as  when,  for  example, 
we  recognize  a  friend,  a  street,  a  tree;  identify  a  sound  or 
the  tone  of  a  voice  as  well  known,  or  read  what  is  written  or 
printed,  then  the. perception  fuses  at  once  with  the  nearly 
identical  or  very  similar  ideas  that  meet  it  in  consciousness. 
Apperception  moves  here  in  known  and  easy  roads,  sup- 
ported by  established  functional  disposition  of  the  nerves 
of  sense.  Even  where  a  new  perception  enters  and  is 
recognized  as  belonging  to  known  conceptions  and  catego- 
ries, as  when  a  botanist  at  the  first  glance  classifies  a  plant 
seen  for  the  first  time,  or  a  judge  classifies  a  pumsluiblc 
offence  under  a  certain  paragraph  of  the  law,  the  process  of 
apperception  goes  on  lightly  and  without  delay.  It  proceeds 
most  rapidly  when  the  new  idea  does  not  need  to  recall 
similar  old  ideas,  but  when  these  already  stand  high  and 
clear  in  consciousness  as  ruling  ideas.'    Apperceiving  notions 

'  This  is  supported  by  a  citation  from  Jean  Paul  Bichter :  "  Ooethe 
apprehends  everything  upon  a  journey ;  I  nothing  at  all.  With  me  every- 
thing dissolves  like  a  dream.  I  travel  through  cities  without  seeing  any- 
thing ;  I  am  stirred  only  by  beautiful  regions.  I  know  and  see  indeed  all  the 
particulars  of  life ;  but  I  inquire  nothing  about  them  and  forget  them." 

*  To  the  lad  who,  with  ghost-stories  in  his  head  and  fear  in  his  heart, 
hastens  homeward  over  the  barren  moorland  at  night,  tlie  harmless  occur- 
rences about  him  become  in  a  trice  the  most  terrifying  specters.  [This 
SQggests  the  story  of  Tchabod  Crane,  by  Irving.]  In  the  rustling  leaves  he 
hears  the  "  graveyard  ghost";  the  rattling  of  the  reeds  is  the  "  unholy 
spinner  " ;  in  the  gurgle  of  the  water  at  his  feet  he  hears  the  melody  of 
the  "false  fiddler";  before  him  he  sees  clearly  "  the  unhappy  woman," 
lamenting  over  her  poor  loet  soul ;  and  shuddering  he  hurries  homeward. 


THE  THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION,  15 

stand  here,  as  Lazarus  remarks,  "like  armed  men  in  the 
strongholds  of  consciousness  ready  to  hurl  themselves  upon 
everything  that  appears  at  the  portals  of  the  senses,  overcom- 
ing and  making  it  serviceable  to  themselves."^  In  all  these 
cases  we  are  hardly  conscious  of  apperception  as  a  specific 
activity.  "VVe  ascribe  to  the  object  of  perception  what  has 
been  added  to  it  by  our  own  minds.  We  think  we  merely 
perceive,  when  we  have  already  assimilated.  Only  in  excep- 
tional cases  (as  where  we  recognize  beloved  friends)  is  this 
sort  of  apperception  attended  by  any  excitement  of  strong 
feeling.  Apperception  seems  to  proceed  of  itself,  without 
our  express  will,  and  not  seldom  even  against  our  will. 
It  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  passive  apperception  :  not, 
however,  in  the  sense  that  the  soul  is  passive,  for  it  is 
active  throughout.  This  chai-acterization,  borrowed  from 
Wundt,  merely  indicates  that  the  process  of  apperception 
in  this  case  follows  the  laws  of  psychical  mechanism,  and 
is  not  determined  by  free- working  causes,  as,  for  example, 
our  will. 

It  is  otherwise,  however,  where  a  new  perception,  on 
account  of  its  content,  awakens  vigorous  feeling,  but  cannot 
at  once  be  related  to  its  most  appropriate  group  of  ideas. 
It  contradicts,  it  may  be,  all  known  experience  so  flatly, 
comes  so  unexpectedly  and  so  strangely,  that  we  can  not 
relate  it  to  what  we  know.  The  new,  therefore,  does  not 
find  its  way  into  our  understanding,  it  remains  outside  —  we 
cannot  grasp  it.  A  certain  unrest,  an  oppressive  feeling  of 
discomfort  possesses  us :  we  know  not  what  to  do  with 
the  unusual  experience,  what  to  say,  what  to  think.  The 
wonder,  the  astonishment  at  the  incredible  phenomenon  may 
under  some  cu'cumstances  increase  to  violent  emotion  :  we 

»  Tlieory  0/ Sense  Illusions,  p.  14  (Zur  Lehre  von  den  SinnestSuschungen). 


16  APPERCEPTION. 

"  lose  our  heads,"  our  presence  of  mind,  and  stand  helpless 
before  the  impression,  or  respond  to  it  with  strange  or  un- 
usual manifestations  of  will.^  The  new  perception,  there- 
fore, at  first  produces  a  check  or  arrest,  a  struggle  in  con- 
sciousness ;  it  stirs  up  thoughts  and  feelings  which  dissolve 
and  supplant  one  another  in  rapid  succession,  and  thus  place 
the  mind  in  a  tense  and  restless  condition.  The  momentary 
state  of  the  mind  is  expressed  in  the  acknowledgment :  "I 
do  not  understand  it  (the  new) ;  it  is  incomprehensible  to 
me. 

If,  during  this  time,  the  new  perception  appears  to  be  the 
only  fixed  point  in  all  the  changing  inner  states,  the  natural 
question  arises :  What  gives  it  power,  in  spite  of  all  oppo- 
sition, to  maintain  its  place  in  consciousness?  Of  course  its 
strength  rests  first  of  all  in  the  continually  active  sense 
stimulus  :  what  enters  through  the  door  of  the  senses  usually 
proves  to  be  stronger  for  the  time  being  than  the  iutensest 
reprotluctions  that  come  to  meet  it.  Soon,  however,  an- 
other factor  makes  itself  felt.  We  remember  that  the  per- 
ception called  forth  lively  feelings.  These  as  messengere 
of  insight  dimly  indicate  the  real  and  subjective  meaning 
or  worth  of  the  new  perception  for  the  remaining  content 
of  the  mind.  Before  every  acquisition  of  knowledge  there 
hastens  a  feeling  that  gives  premonition  rather  than  insight, 
which  indicates  perhaps  the  direction  in  which  the  truth  is 

'  This  once  happened  to  Livingston's  faitlif ul  sen'ant  who  wished  to 
accompany  the  former  on  his  journey  from  South  Africa  to  Euroi>e.  "  In 
his  African  home  he  had  never  become  acquainted  with  any  sheet  of 
water  that  could  at  all  be  compared  to  that  of  the  ocean.  When  lie  saw 
nothing  but  water  round  about  him,  saw  the  high  ship  gliding  over  the 
waves,  he  could  not  master  the  new  and  powerful  impression,  and,  losing 
his  presence  of  mind,  dashed  into  the  depths  of  the  sea,  never  to  rise 
again."—  Olawsky,  The  Idea  in.  the  Mind  of  Man,  p.  71  (Die  Vorttellung 
im  Oeitte  de»  Menachen), 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  17 

to  be  found,  but  reveals  nothing  of  the  desired  clearness 
and  certainty  of  knowledge.^  With  the  assistance  of  un- 
conscious spiritual  elements  standing  near  the  threshold  of 
consciousness  we  feel  dimly  what  relations  exist  between 
the  new  perception  and  our  former  experience,  —  whether 
the  new  wholly  or  partly  contradicts  the  old  in  form  or 
content.  We  recognize  in  the  feeling,  further,  whether  or 
not  to  expect  that  our  inner  life  is  to  experience  promo- 
tion or  retardation  on  the  part  of  the  new  perception.  Not 
only  are  we  dimly  conscious  of  what  it  is  in  itself,  but  also 
in  particular  what  it  signifies  for  us,  what  it  contributes  to 
the  elevation  or  depression  of  our  mental  life.  Its  relation 
to  the  self  is  instinctively  grasped.  Such  feelings  are  well 
calculated  to  awaken  a  vigorous  volitional  effort  on  behalf 
of  the  perception.  These  feelings  give  to  the  perception  an 
appreciable  worth  as  motive  for  the  will.  It  is  the  will  that 
holds  fast  the  perception  on  account  of  the  feelings  united 
with  it,  and  prevents  its  sinking  into  unconsciousness.  This 
happens,  furthermore,  through  the  assistance  of  related 
ideas ;  for  the  will  is  active  amid  the  variegated  flow  of 
ideas  and  feelings,  arresting  those  out  of  relation  to  the 
new,  and  bringing  forward  those  that  are  similar.  By  thus, 
in  a  certain  sense,  establishing  order  among  the  offered  re- 
productions, the  groups  of  ideas  most  favorable  to  the  per- 
ception with  respect  to  their  content  and  emotional  tone 
may  appear  and  unfold.  Now  begins  the  careful  com- 
parison of  the  new  with  the  old,  a  weighing  of  the  reasons 
for  the  union  of  the  former  with  this  or  that  line  of  thought 
—  we  reflect;  form  judgments,  conclusions ;  resolve  contra- 


1  "  A  remarkable  feeling  of  truth  or  falsity  precedes  every  demon- 
stration that  reveals  the  one  or  the  other,  just  as  the  feeling  of  the  sub- 
tlest aesthetic  lack  or  charm  precedes  the  critical  developments  of  either." 
—  Jban  Paul  Bicutsr. 


18  APPERCEPTION. 

dictions,  and  form  new  combinations.  We  test  all  ideas 
lying  close  to  consciousness  to  see  which  of  them  may  most 
appropriately  be  united  to  the  perception,  or  require  a  pre- 
vious transformation  —  we  "  collect  our  thoughts."  When 
such  a  group  of  ideas  is  found,  when  it  occupies  the 
center  of  consciousness,  together  with  its  associated  feelings 
and  strivings,  then  all  opposing  ideas  are  sufficiently  repelled 
so  that  the  perception  may  fuse  with  it  into  a  single  pro- 
duct. The  perception  now  becomes  a  new  and  related  mem- 
ber of  the  old  group,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  isolated,  but 
takes  its  place  within  a  greater,  well-arranged  and  firmly 
grounded  order  of  thought ;  with  the  help  of  the  latter  it  is 
assimilated,  apperceived. 

Instead  of  doubt  and  uncertainty,  we  have  the  conscious- 
ness of  acquired  knowledge.  We  are  no  longer  confronted 
with  a  strange,  puzzling  perception,  but  recognize  in  it 
something  long  known  or  at  least  intelligible ;  now  we  see 
the  new  with  other  eyes,  with  the  inner  eye  of  understand- 
ing, of  apperception.  At  the  same  time  the  feeling  of  dis- 
comfort that  accompanied  the  reflection  gives  place  to  a 
feeling  of  enrichment  and  furthering  of  mental  life.  The 
overcoming  of  certain  difficulties,  the  accession  of  numerous 
ideas,  the  success  of  the  act  of  knowledge  or  recognition, 
the  greater  clearness  that  the  ideas  have  gained,  awaken  a 
feeling  of  pleasure.  We  become  conscious  of  growth 
in  our  knowledge  and  power  of  understanding,  the  success- 
ful mastery  over  an  unusual  perception,  which  at  first 
threatened  to  surpass  our  comprehension,  or  maintain  it- 
self as  an  isolated  fact.  The  significance  of  this  new  im- 
pression for  our  ego  is  now  more  strongly  felt  than  at  the 
beginning  or  during  the  course  of  the  process.  To  this 
pleasurable  feeling  is  easily  added  the  effort,  at  favorable 
opportunity,  to  reproduce  the  product  of  the  apperception, 


THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  19 

to  supplement  and  deepen  it,  to  unite  it  to  other  ideas,  and 
thus  further  to  extend  certain  chains  of  thought.  The  summit 
or  the  sum  of  these  states  of  mind  we  happily  express  with 
the  word  interest.  For  in  reality  the  feeling  of  self  ap- 
pears between  the  various  stages  of  the  process  of  apper- 
ception (inter  esse)  ;  with  one's  whole  soul  does  one  con- 
template the  object  of  attention.  If  we  regard  the  acquired 
knowledge  as  the  objective  result  of  apperception,  inter- 
est must  be  regarded  as  its  subjective  result. 

Here  we  have  a  kind  of  apperception  that  is  sharply 
distinguished  from  the  passive  kind  discussed  above. 
There,  we  saw  perception  and  apperception  enter  simultane- 
ously or  in  rapid  succession  ;  here,  the  two  mental  processes 
are  separated  by  an  appreciable  time.  There,  perception 
and  assimilation  were  completed  involuntarily,  almost  un- 
noted and  without  exertion  of  power.  Here,  the  more 
difScult  the  reflection,  and  the  longer  the  thoughtful,  linger- 
ing contemplation  of  the  idea,  the  more  conscious  of 
the  apperception  do  we  become.  There,  the  activity  of  ap- 
perception .  follows  essentially  the  laws  of  the  psychical 
mechanism.  Here,  on  the  contrary,  freely  working  causes 
assert  themselves  in  the  train  of  thought.  In  feeling,  the 
value  of  the  perception  for  the  ego,  its  significance  for  the 
remaining  life  of  ideas  and  emotions,  is  well  known.  The 
will,  determined  by  feelings  of  a  sensuous,  intellectual,  ais- 
thetic,  or  moral  nature,  appears  as  a  guiding  and  regulating 
force  whose  energetic  activity  comes  into  consciousness  in 
strong  sensations  of  innervation.  It  is  the  active  appercep- 
tion that  we  now  become  acquainted  with.  The  oftener  the 
same  active  apperception  is  repeated,  the  more  easily  does  it 
take  place ;  the  less  expenditure  of  strength  will  it  lay  claim 
to.  The  product  of  the  process  of  thinking  whose  accom- 
plishment  requires  at   first   much   time,  and    a   significant 


20  APPERCEPTION. 

degree  of  strength,  becomes  gradually  condensed  into  notions 
and  general  judgments,  the  apperceiving  force  of  which  be- 
comes of  more  and  more  value,  and  considerably  abridges 
deliberation.  In  this  way  many  phases  of  apperception  are 
established,  which,  originally  active  in  character,  are  now 
hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  passive  apperception. 

According  to  our  previous  discussion,  it  appears  as  an 
essential  characteristic  of  apperception,  that  a  new  isolated 
perception  blends  with  an  old  related  group  of  ideas,  i.e., 
that  it  is  inserted  into  a  larger  and  well-articulated  mass  of 
thought.  This  is  not  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  that 
every  apperceived  idea  is  localized  at  once,  and  united 
with  a  definite  group  of  ideas  with  which  alone  it  may  be 
reproduced  ;  rather,  that  one  and  the  same  perception  may  be 
apperceived  by  the  help  of  different  groups  of  ideas,  and 
may,  therefore,  upon  a  different  occasion,  return  into  con- 
sciousness as  a  member  of  any  one  of  those  different  groups.* 

>  For  example,  why  do  we  after  the  lapse  of  some  time  need  to  read  an 
article  of  our  own  composition  through  again  before  it  is  finally  disposed 
of,  and  why  does  it  then,  to  our  surprise,  often  make  an  impression  quite 
different  from  that  which  we  had  when  first  writing  it?  Because  now 
other  trains  of  thought  come  to  meet  it  which,  during  the  composition, 
were  kept  out  of  consciousness;  because  we  judge  more  freely  and 
impartially  the  work  that  has  become  in  a  measure,  strange  to  us.  For 
this  reason,  it  is  a  well-tried  rule  of  life  in  all  those  cases  where  duty  does 
not  bid  otherwise,  not  to  apperceive  at  once,  thus  coming  to  a  hasty 
decision  upon  all  new,  unexpected,  and  important  facts  of  experience ; 
but  rather  to  give  the  startled  mind  time  to  collect  its  thought,  to  "  sleep 
upon  "  the  matter,  to  deliberate  upon  it  a  second  time.  That  which 
seems  to-day  intolerable,  incompatible  with  one's  honor  and  happiness, 
will  perhaps  be  regarded  to-morrow  with  quite  other  eyes ;  i.  c,  apper- 
ceiving ideas  are  found  which  attach  to  the  new  quite  another  and 
hitherto  undreamed-of  significance.    This  is  expressed  in  Eicbendorf'a 

"  Morgengebet " : 

"  I  am  to-day  as  bom  anew, 
Sadness  and  ])aiii  have  taken  flight. 
Caret  that  o'erwhelmed  in  evcninjt  s  view 
Give  rl5«'  to  shame  l>y  morning  light." 

Just  because  the  apperception  of  one  and  the  same  fact  may  quickly 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  21 

Therefore  to  say  that  a  perception  is  united  with  other 
psychical  products,  only  means  that  it  is  thought  in  close 
connection  with  them ;  and  hence,  the  one  regularly  repro- 
duces the  other. 

But  what  results  from  the  appropriation  of  a  perception 
by  an  older  group  of  ideas?  What  do  they  both  gain  by 
this  event?  Especially,  what  does  the  apperceived  percep- 
tion gain? 

Many  a  weak,  obscure  and  fleeting  perception  would  pass 
almost  unnoticed  into  obscurity,  did  not  the  additional 
activity  of  apperception  hold  it  fast  in  consciousness. 
This  sharpens  the  senses ;  i.e.,  it  gives  to  the  organs  of  sense 
a  greater  degree  of  energy,  so  that  the  watching  eye  now 
sees,  and  the  listening  ear  now  hears,  that  which  ordinarily 
would  pass  unnoticed.  This  supporting  strength  of  apper- 
ception is  also  of  value  with  strong  and  distinct  perceptions. 
It  directs  the  attention  to  such  characteristics  of  the  perceived 
objects  as  stand  out  but  little,  and,  therefore,  are  for  the 
most  part  overlooked.  Again,  it  sharpens  eye  and  ear  so 
that  they  observe  better  and  more  thoroughly.  The  events 
of  apperception  give  to  the  senses  a  peculiar  keenness,  which 
underlies  the  skill  of  the  money-changer  in  detecting  a 
counterfeit  among  a  thousand  bank-notes,  notwithstanding 
its  deceptive  similarity ;  of  the  jeweler  who  marks  the  slight- 
est, apparently  imperceptible,  flaw  in  an  ornament;  of  the 
physicist  who  perceives  distinctly  the  overtones  of  a  vibrating 
string.  According  to  this,  we  see  and  hear  not  only  with 
the  eye  and  ear,  but  quite  as  much  with  the  help  of  our  pres- 
ent knowledge,  with  the  apperceiving  content  of  the  mind. 

However,  apperception  does  still  more.     It  often  enriches 

change,  just  because  the  fact  may  be  adjusted  to  different  apperceptive 
groups  of  ideas,  it  is  a  principle  of  the  man  of  character  not  to  make 
important  decisions  dependent  upon  passing  moods. 


22  APPERCEPTION. 

the  perceptions  with  characteristics  which  are  not  given  at 
all  in  the  sphere  of  perception,  but  which  are  added  on  the 
ground  of  earlier  experiences  or  as  a  result  of  certain  judg- 
ments. Compare  the  above  perception  furnished  us  by  an 
eclipse  of  the  sun,  which  contained  much  that  could  not  be 
seen  directly,  but  which  was  contributed  to  the  perception 
by  our  thinking.  In  nearly  all  perceptions  such  supplemen- 
tary apperception  is  active.  We  meet  it  in  the  practised 
reader  of  newspaper  and  romances,  who  really  perceives 
only  certain  letters  of  individual  word-pictures,  and  only  a 
part  of  the  words  in  each  sentence,  the  rest  being  added  out 
of  the  store-house  of  his  own  thoughts.  We  meet  it  in  the 
geologist,  to  whom  the  rock-strata  of  the  interior  of  the 
earth,  with  their  impressions  of  plants  and  animals,  together 
with  their  fossil  remains,  tell  of  mighty  revolutions  of  nature 
in  the  remote  past.  We  find  it  in  every  one  who  recognizes 
a  person  at  a  distance  by  a  few  individual  characteristics, 
such  as  size,  movement,  clothing,  etc.  In  the  portrait  of 
a  noted  man,  we  recognize  much  more  than  the  painter  with 
all  his  art  was  able  to  represent.  We  view  historic  land- 
scapes and  places  in  the  light  of  ideas  gained  by  our  stud- 
ies or  other  experiences  of  life.  Hence  how  differently  must 
the  eternal  Rome  have  been  mirrored  in  the  mind  of  a  vassal 
of  the  middle  ages,  and  in  the  soul  of  a  Luther,  a  Herder, 
or  a  Goethe!  And  when,  on  the  other  hand,  we  recognize 
in  the  physical  features  of  the  country  a  natural  explanation 
for  certain  historic  peculiarities  of  a  people  or  a  race,  the 
supplementary  apperception  in  such  a  cognition  is  not 
of  less  value.  Especially  is  it  of  great  significance  for  the 
forming  of  space  ideas.  It  has  been  determined  that  at 
fii*st  the  child  perceives  only  surfaces,  and  has  no  notion  of 
the  dimension  of  depth,  or  thickness.  It  grasps  at  every- 
thing (e.^.,  the  moon),  without  regard  to  its  distance;  all 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  23 

objects  are  at  first  equally  near  to  it.  If  it  depended  upon 
the  visual  sensation  alone,  the  child  would  hardly  gain  the 
idea  of  depth.  The  sense  of  touch,  however,  soon  becomes 
associated  with  that  of  sight.  The  peculiar  sensations  of 
touch,  inasmuch  as  they  unite  with  those  of  sight,  teach  us 
to  distinguish  solid  bodies  from  surfaces,  even  when  the 
latter  are  not  in  our  immediate  vicinity.  How  is  this  possi- 
ble? How  can  remote  objects  which  we  cannot  touch  be 
perceived  as  solid  bodies  by  us  whose  eyes  perceive  only 
surfaces?  This  fact  seems  only  explicable  with  the  help  of 
apperception.  Experience  gradually  convinces  a  man  that 
those  objects  of  the  external  world  that  carry  to  the  sense 
of  touch  peculiar  muscular  sensations,  such  as  only  a  solid 
body  can  cause,  furnish  also  to  the  eye  a  visual  image, 
which,  with  regard  to  the  distribution  of  light  and  shade,  to 
the  greater  or  less  sharpness  of  outline,  etc.,  is  distinguished 
from  corresponding  pictures,  such  as  surfaces  reveal.^ 

These  perceptions,  as  often  as  they  enter  simultaneously 
into  consciousness,  unite  into  a  complete  idea,  into  an  idea 
of  a  solid  body.  Let  it  be  granted  that  the  same  or  a  simi- 
lar body  is  shown  at  a  greater  distance  from  us ;  at  first  it 
would  act  only  upon  the  eye,  and  would  reproduce  only 
those  elements  of  the  complete  idea  before  mentioned 
that  owe  their  origin  to  a  visual  sensation  identical  with 
or  similar  to  the  one  just  completed.  These  are  united, 
however,  with  certain  muscular  sensations  which  refer  to 
the  perception  of  a  solid  body,  and  not  of  a  surface ;  conse- 
quently, these  latter  will  enter  consciousness  according  to 
the  law  of  simultaneity,  and,  in  connection  with  that  repro- 

*  The  exposition  of  the  physiological  conditions  under  which  stereo- 
scopic vision  takes  place,  may  be  omitted  here,  where  only  the  phase  of 
apperception  is  treated  that  bears  upon  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  a  solid 
body. 


24  APPERCEPTION. 

duced  visual  sensation,  will  present  a  mass  of  ideas  which 
takes  possession  of  the  perception,  explains  it,  and  by  a  new 
element,  the  characteristic  of  third  dimension,  — completes  it. 
Thus  arises  an  assimilation  of  the  new  idea  by  the  old,  which 
is  expressed  in  the  jud<jment :  That  object  is  also  a  solid 
body.  A  person  to  whom  this  apperceptive  help  is  lacking, 
who  like  the  child  in  its  first  weeks  and  months  possesses  too 
few  space  ideas,  will  in  this  case  perceive  surfaces  only, 
not  solid  bodies.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  appercep- 
tion should  complete  our  space  observation.  It  does  this 
in  so  many  cases  that  we  usually  overlook  its  influence, 
and  believe  that  we  perceive  solid  bodies  directly,  whereas 
apperception  with  the  aid  of  experience  really  explains 
them. 

From  the  foregoing  examples,  it  follows  that,  while  ap- 
perception strengthens  and  holds  weak  perceptions  in  con- 
sciousness, it  also  extends,  adjusts,  and  completes  them, 
and  it  aids  all  these  psychical  products  in  securing  greater 
clearness  and  distinctness.  It  does  this  even  where  the  ap- 
perception would  not  enrich  the  perception  by  a  single  char- 
acteristic. For  example,  if  we  comprehend  an  object  of  ob- 
servation through  a  general  notion  to  which  it  belongs,  a 
new  experience  through  a  law  to  which  it  is  subordinated, 
the  perception  gains  in  clearness  by  subsumption  under  the 
more  generalized  knowledge.  We  distinguish  then  between 
the  essential  and  the  non-essential  in  it,  and  the  most  impor- 
tant characteristics  of  the  new  perception  receive  a  desirable 
strengthening  through  the  apperceiving  notion.  Further- 
more, the  activity  of  the  apperceived  idea  is  increased  with 
growing  clearness.  By  its  insertion  into  a  large,  well- 
ordered  circle  of  thought  accompanied  by  lively  feelings,  it 
enters  into  outer  and  inner  relations  with  so  many  members 
of  this  group  that  a  regular  reproduction  is  assured  to  it.     It 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  25 

can  fall  into  oblivion  only  with  these  ideas  themselves.  Be- 
sides, if  it  belongs  to  more  than  one  group  of  ideas,  then  it 
will  be  favored,  not  only  by  frequent  reproductions,  but  at 
the  same  time  by  those  having  many  significations,  by  which 
its  content  will  be  made  clear  on  the  most  diverse  sides. 

Indeed,  there  are  cases  when  the  reproduction  is  anything 
but  fundamental,  where  it  directly  favors  a  superficial,  fleet- 
ing apprehension  of  external  objects.  Numberless  times  we 
go  through  a  well  known  street  and  pass  imposing  buildings 
without  perceiving  them  better  or  more  distinctly  than  at 
first.  With  the  aid  of  apperception  we  find  our  way  aright 
with  only  a  fleeting  perception,  and  so  are  not  under  the 
necessity  of  observing  more  keenly  or  searchingly.  We 
cannot  say  how  many  times  we  have  recognized  and  re- 
peated the  alphabet  in  our  reading,  and  yet  very  few  among 
us  could  copy  accurately  the  large  letters  of  the  old  English 
type  without  special  preparation  for  the  work ;  through  ap- 
perception we  have  lost  the  habit  of  perceiving  those  pho- 
netic sounds  other  than  vaguely  and  incompletely.  Not 
infrequently  it  even  leads  to  wrong  apprehensions.  We 
imagine  that  we  see  before  us  in  bodily  form  that  which  we 
wish  or  fear.  When  the  boy  in  Goethe's  ballad  mistakes 
a  streak  of  fog  on  the  edge  of  the  meadow  for  the  Erlking, 
a  shining  willow  for  the  Erlking's  daughter,  and  in  the 
whistling  of  the  wind  hears  the  alluring,  coaxing  words  of 
the  water-sprite ;  when  Lessing's  Recha  sees  in  the  Knight- 
Templar  an  angel  sent  from  Heaven,  we  ai'e  not  confronted 
by  erroneous  perceptions  ;  "  The  senses  do  not  deceive,  not 
because  they  always  judge  correctly,  but  because  they  do 
not  judge  at  all."  ^  The  illusion  is  due  rather  to  apperceiv- 
ing  ideas  posted  at  the  threshold  of  consciousness ;  for,  in- 
asmuch as  they  passed  themselves  off  as  identical  with  the 

1  See  Kant's  Anthropology,  pp.  33. 


26  APPERCEPTION. 

new  and  entering  perception,  they  assimilated  it  accordingly 
and  entirely  changed  it  in  accordance  with  their  own  mean- 
ing. 

In  such  cases  we  cannot  affirm  that  apperception  in- 
creases the  objective  truth  and  clearness  of  the  perception. 
We  may  say,  however,  that  the  perceptions  through  their 
insertion  into  other  groups  of  ideas,  even  though  wrong 
ones,  gain  in  activity  and  strength.  In  later  reproductions 
they  may  easily  find  the  right  aid  to  apperception,  which 
subsequently  coiTects  the  defective  apprehension  and  thus 
raises  it  to  greater  clearness. 

Not  only  the  apperceived  idea,  but  also  the  apperceiving 
group  of  ideas,  i.e.,  the  old  reproduced  combination,  suffers, 
for  the  most  part,  a  change  in  the  process  of  assimilation. 
The  oftener  it  returns  into  consciousness,  upon  the  occasion 
of  new  perceptions,  and  undergoes  its  various  changes  in  their 
presence,  so  much  stronger  and  clearer  may  it  become,  so 
much  the  oftener  is  opportunity  offered  it  to  enter  into  new 
combinations,  and  thus  to  increase  its  own  activity.  In  ad- 
dition to  this,  the  new  perception  finally  blending  with  it  in 
many  cases  enriches  and  essentially  completes  it.  The  dis- 
tinct perception  gained  by  observing  a  solar  eclipse  adds  to 
the  apperceiving  ideas  new  characteristics ;  for  instance,  the 
appearances  of  protuberances,  of  the  corona,  of  certain  va- 
riations of  color  during  the  twilight,  etc., without  which  these 
ideas  will  not  appear  again.  The  apperceiving  thoughts  and 
conditions  of  mind  of  the  listening  crowd  in  the  theater  at 
Corinth,  through  the  unexpected,  but  energetically  assimilated 
perception,  received  such  an  extension  as  was  hardly  to 
be  expected  in  its  completeness  and  rapidity.  In  like  manner 
when  the  botanist  puts  a  newly  discovered  plant  into  a 
known  class,  when  the  judge  puts  a  criminal  offense  under  a 
definite  paragraph  of  the  penal  law,  these  subsuming  notions 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  27 

are  extended.  In  this  way — viz.,  that  of  enriching  and 
extending  —  apperceiving  groups  of  ideas  gradually  change 
to  general  images  and  logical  notions ;  singular  and  par- 
ticular judgments  change  to  laws  and  rules.  While  new 
perceptions  thus  promote  the  gradual  logical  transforma- 
tion of  our  thought,  they  richly  repay  the  assimilating  ele- 
ments the  service  which  the  latter  have  rendered  them  in 
the  act  of  apperception. 

If  the  apperceiving  group  of  ideas  have  wrong  character- 
istics, then  the  perception  undertakes  their  correction.  This 
occurs  in  all  cases  where  a  fact  that  has  been  observed 
accurately  and  attentively,  repeatedly  obtrudes  itself  upon 
us.  It  occurs  when  our  perception  corresponds  entirely 
to  the  object  of  sensation,  and  for  this  reason  develops 
such  strength  and  clearness  that,  notwithstanding  the 
presence  of  notions  in  consciousness  contradictory  to  it, 
we  are  not  able  to  deny  its  truth.  Thus,  for  example, 
the  child  learns  from  the  green  seed-capsules  of  the  potato 
stalk  that  the  potatoes  are  not  the  fruit,  as  he  has  hitherto 
supposed,  but  the  root-tubers  of  that  plant.  Then  by  a  visit 
to  the  zoological  garden  he  learns,  to  his  astonishment,  that 
the  otter  is  not,  as  he  imagined,  a  water-serpent ;  or  he 
corrects  his  idea  of  the  sea-lion,  or  of  the  cray-fish,  whose 
name  has  hitherto  had  only  too  much  influence  upon  his 
ideas  of  this  animal. 

If  the  new  perception  is  of  such  a  kind  that  it  corrects  not 
only  one  or  several  old  ideas,  but  important,  far-reaching 
lines  of  thought,  then  the  apperceiving  mass  of  ideas  under- 
goes a  change  which  is  equivalent  to  a  complete  revolution. 
Whole  groups  of  thoughts  then  become  roused,  freeiug 
themselves  from  the  perception  and  forming  themselves 
anew.  We  must  give  up  fixed  combinations  of  ideas 
that  have  become  dear   to  us,   and  must  make  new  asso- 


28  APPERCEPTION. 

ciations  opposed  to  our  previous  notions.  The  process  of 
assimilation  now  becomes  not  so  nmch  an  addition  to  learn- 
ing, as  a  reconstruction  of  learning.  Naturally  such  a  revo- 
lution is  accompanied  by  an  active  exercise  of  the  emotions. 
A  painful  unrest  takes  possession  of  us.  At  first,  we  do 
not  know  whether  we  are  sleeping  or  waking ;  to  whom  we 
should  yield ;  and  a  long  time  elapses  before  the  material  of 
thought,  with  its  disturbed  and  broken  combinations,  gathere 
around  a  new  centre  and  finally  blends  with  it.  Such  ap- 
perceptions often  indicate  significant  progress  in  the  sphere 
of  art  and  science.  From  Archimedes,  Columbus,  and 
Copernicus  to  Galvani,  Volta,  and  the  investigators  and 
discoverers  of  the  present  day,  the  history  of  civilization 
witnesses  how  a  single  new  perception,  a  single  swift  and 
happy  thought,  sometimes  overthrows  whole  systems,  and 
brings  the  investigating  mind  farther  in  a  definite  sphere  of 
knowledge  than  the  thoughtful  work  of  many  centuries  has 
been  able  to  bring  it.  Where  the  adjusting,  upheaving  activity 
of  the  new  perception  is  extended,  however,  into  the  practical 
sphere  of  will  and  action,  to  ethical  and  religious  habits  of 
thought  which  hitherto  ruled  the  soul,  and  from  which  pro- 
ceeded the  deepest  and  strongest  feelings,  the  most  numer- 
ous and  the  most  active  efforts,  then  apperception  will  often 
bring  about  a  thorough  transformation  of  the  moral  dis- 
position, a  new  period  of  the  inner  life,  of  which  the 
conversion  of  Saul,  and  the  awakening  of  Zinzendorf* 
are  sufficient  examples.* 

'  The  painting  of  the  Crucifixion  in  the  Dusseldorf  gallery,  with  the  in- 
scription ;  "  Tliis  I  did  for  thee  ;  what  hast  thou  done  for  me  ?" 

*  We  grant  that  in  weak  and  characterless  natures  the  change  of  ethical 
insight  does  not  necessarily  imply  as  a  result  the  transformation  of  the 
will,  tliat  in  such  natures  a  contradiction  hetween  knowing  and  doing  is 
frequently  to  bo  observed.  But  here  the  above  mentioned  presupposition 
is  wanting,  viz. :  that  hitherto  an  ethical  circle  of  thought  has  determined 


THE  THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  29 

If  in  all  these  cases  the  new  perception  brings  about  so 
wide-reaching  a  change  in  old  habits  of  thought ;  if  it  is  the 
center  of  new  combinations  of  ideas,  then  the  question  arises 
whether  here  the  factors  of  mental  assimilation  do  not 
change  their  r61e,  whether  the  perception  does  not  now  ap- 
pear as  the  apperceiving  idea,  and  whether  the  old  group  of 
thoughts  may  not  be  regarded  as  apperceived.  The  dominating 
force  with  which  the  new  makes  itself  felt  in  consciousness, 
and  necessitates  the  loosening  of  fixed  bands  of  thought, 
appears  indeed  to  favor  this  view.  That  which,  for  the 
moment  at  least,  rules  the  inner  world  and  is  a  standard  for 
other  observations  might  very  well  be  considered  an  apper- 
ceiving power. 

But  however  long  the  new  perception  stands  in  the  fore- 
ground of  consciousness,  however  manifold  are  the  correc- 
tions which  the  old  concepts  undergo  by  it,  and  however 
incompatible  it  may  seem  to  be  with  the  whole  range  of 
previous  experience,  yet  ultimately  it  finds  a  place  where  it 
comes  to  rest  in  a  gi'oup  of  ideas  with  which  it  is  able  to 
blend.  Moreover,  in  so-called  awakenings  and  conversions, 
in  profound  changes  in  a  man's  theoretical  or  practical 
views,  so  many  fast-rooted,  related  notions  remain  un- 
touched by  the  transforming  influence  of  the  perception, 
that  the  latter,  with  all  the  ideas  which  it  has  readjusted,  may 
become  inserted  into  the  old  as  a  new  and  valuable  member. 
Where  active  apperception  takes  place  with  such  intensity 

and  guided  all  willing  and  action,  that  the  strongest  feelings  and  efforts 
have  arisen  from  ethical  views  and  judgments.  He  who  regards  the  good 
only  as  theoretical  knowledge,  and  not  as  a  source  of  noble  inspiration 
and  of  vigorous  resolution,  may  change  his  convictions  repeatedly 
without  his  disposition  being  touched  thereby.  Moreover,  we  may  also 
mention  that  a  fundamental  and  lasting  change  of  mind  demands,  beside 
the  change  of  insight,  also  a  continuous  exercise  of  will  in  other 
directions. 


30  APPERCEPTION. 

and  to  such  extent  that  we  become  actively  conscious  of  an 
internal  emotional  struggle,  then  the  apperceiving  subject  is 
never  an  isolated  group  of  ideas,  that,  for  instance,  suggested 
by  the  perception,  but  all  related  ideas  become  apperceiv- 
ingly  active,  together  with  their  conscious  and  unconscious 
members.  This  is  especially  true  of  such  ideas  as  are 
united  to  the  empirical  ego  through  feelings  and  efforts. 
Then  let  a  perception  act  with  as  much  transforming  power 
as  it  may  in  a  certain  sphere  of  our  knowing  and  thinking, 
it  will  finally,  with  all  its  new  members,  be  united  as  an 
isolated  and  hence  less  powerful  group  to  the  old  stock  of 
thought  now  united  with  the  ego  in  a  thousand  ways.  So 
much  do  we  stand  under  the  ban  of  the  past  that  even  the  most 
unexpected  and  impoi-tant  new  experiences  are  not  able,  under 
normal  conditions,  entirely  to  overturn  the  structure  of  a 
man's  thought,  but  they  must  be  arranged  as  building-stones, 
and  only  as  such  can  they  be  of  any  value  in  it.  As  the 
Lord  suddenly  appeared  in  heavenly  light  to  Paul  on  the 
way  to  Damascus,  and  with  the  mighty,  "  Saul,  Saul,  why 
persecutest  thou  me  ?  "  startled  his  conscience,  a  transforma- 
tion began  to  take  place  in  this  disciple  of  the  Pharisees 
greater  and  more  decisive  than  can  easily  be  conceived.  The 
crucified  Savior  whom  he  believed  to  be  dead  appeai-s  to  him 
in  person  and  convinces  him  that  he  lives.  And  how  does 
he  live !  He  whom  Paul  had  scorned  and  reviled  as  a 
blasphemer  and  an  evil-doer  —  he  reigns  in  Heaven.  Those 
whom  he  had  hitherto  persecuted  and  tormented  as  fanatics 
and  apostates,  the  disciples  and  followers  of  Christ,  are 
innocent,  pious  people,  the  true  Israelites  and  believers  in  the 
Messiah.  And  in  what  a  light  does  his  own  life  and  struggle 
now  appear  to  him  I  That  with  which  he  believed  he  had 
done  God  8er>'ice  was  vain  error.  That  in  which  he  had 
sought  the  highest  glory  had  yielded  him  the  deepest  failure. 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  31 

Now  he  must  hate  what  he  had  before  loved,  and  must  love 
and  reverence  what  he  had  hitherto  hated.  Truly  a  whole 
world  of  new  facts  and  experiences  streams  in  upon  his 
ethico-religious  thoughts  and  convictions.  And  how  is  it 
with  regard  to  his  new  experience?  Had  the  new  satisfied 
itself  in  repressing  the  hitherto  false  and  contradictory  views 
and  struggles  in  him  in  order  to  assert  itself  as  a,  new  center 
of  thought  and  experience  isolated  in  consciousness?  Or 
with  the  help  of  the  new  was  the  whole  remaining  ethico- 
religious  product  of  thought  and  feeling  loosened  from  its  re- 
lations and  newly  arranged ;  in  a  word,  was  it  newly  apper- 
ceived?  We  do  not  believe  so.  For  then  the  new,  because 
it  had  entirely  broken  with  the  past  of  Saul,  could  have  dis- 
played no  especial  activity  and  vigor,  notwithstanding  its 
richness  and  its  high  emotional  value.  Out  of  Saul  would 
have  developed  a  converted,  contrite.  Christian  soul,  but 
never  the  heroic  apostle  to  the  heathen,  who  with  the 
old  strength  sensed  the  new  Lord.  The  comparatively 
short  time  in  which  his  conversion  took  place,  the  victorious 
resoluteness  and  joyousness  with  which  he,  after  a  few  days, 
confessed  the  Christ  and  proclaimed  him,  are  proofs  that  he 
had  comprehended  and  assimilated  the  new  and  important 
facts  with  the  help  of  old  habits  of  thought  which  did  not 
need  a  transformation,  with  the  help  of  a  mental  treasure 
whose  urgent  force  showed  itself  effective  even  in  the  new 
sphere  of  religious  life.  The  pure  and  stern  idea  of  God 
that  he  had  obtained  from  the  writings  of  the  old  Covenant, 
the  longing  for  the  Messiah,  which  he  shared  with  all  believ- 
ing Israelites,  the  honest  faithfulness  and  piety,  the  staunch, 
manly  will,  the  zeal  for  God  and  his  cause,  the  full,  deeply 
religious,  and  morally  earnest  apprehension  of  life  which  dis- 
tinguished him  from  many  others,  — these  were  traits  of  his 
nature,  which  were  in  no  respect  at  variance  with  the  new 


32  APPERCEPTION. 

Gospel.  Added  to  this  came  the  more  recent  startling  experi- 
ences. He  had  seen  the  religious  courage  and  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  disciples,  those  homely,  untaught  men ;  had  looked  into 
the  glorified  face  of  the  dying  Stephen,  and  he  had  perhaps 
carried  away  with  him  impressions  which,  on  the  long,  lonely 
way  to  Damascus,  had  made  themselves  felt  as  reproaches 
and  doubts.^ 

Even  if  he  now  comprehends  rightly  the  Heavenly  mani- 
festations and  turns  himself  to  the  Lord,  it  does  not  hap- 
pen so  because  the  new  perception  has  overpowered  his 
whole  religious  thinking  and  willing,  but  on  the  ground  of 
his  previous  inner  experience,  after  severe  mental  conflict, 
he  decides  upon  a  change  of  view  and  of  will  so  far  as  they 
were  erroneous,  and  upon  the  insertion  of  the  new  experience 
into  the  present  system  of  thought,  into  his  whole  emotional 
life.  He  does  not  give  himself  up  to  the  new  ideas  as  a  cap- 
tive without  a  will,  but  he  has  so  many  ethico-religious  con- 
victions at  command  that  he  is  able  to  test  the  value  of  the 
former  for  his  whole  ego  impartially,  and  to  appropriate  them 
with  a  free  will  —  for  he  might  also  have  closed  his  heart  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  new.  He  apperceived  the  new  with 
the  help  of  ideas  and  states  of  mind  closely  combined  with 
his  ego.^ 

•  In  support  of  this  view,  whose  correctness  has  been  disputed  from  the 
theological  side,  we  have  the  fact  that  Saul  understood  the  words  of  the 
Lord  in  all  their  importance,  while  his  unprepared  companions  i)erceived 
only  a  voice  and  nothing  further.  Accordingly  the  fact  that  Saul  api>er- 
ceived  the  purport  of  the  call,  presupposes  ideas  and  states  of  mind  wliich 
were  favorable  to  the  reception  and  understanding  of  the  new.  Such  sus- 
ceptibility gained  throufrh  internal  struggle  might  be  lacking  in  his  fellow 
travelers,  for  which  reason  they  would  obtain  only  a  dim  perception  of  the 
matter. 

'  Tlie  foregoing  presentation  does  not  claim  to  have  taken  up  and  des- 
cribed the  proces-s  designated  by  theology  as  inner  "  regeneration."  When 
we  referred  to  some  of  the  co-operating  psychical  factors  we  were  fully 
conscious  that  the  heart  of  man  with  it:i  changes  and  its  vicissitudes  still 


THE   THEORY  OF   APPERCEPTION.  33 

Where  this  does  not  occur,  where  new  important  experi- 
ences are  not  joined  to  the  related  old  ones,  but  occupy  an 
isolated  position  alongside  and  out  of  relation  to  them,  thus 
becoming  for  themselves  a  power  of  the  mind,  then  abnor- 
mal conditions  predominate,  which  may  easily  give  rise  to 
mental  disease.  As  here  the  failure  in  apperception  may 
lead  to  division  of  the  ego  ^ ;  so  there  where  for  the  same 
reason  a  man  must  break  with  his  whole  past,  which  has 
become  dear  to  him,  —  viz.  :  in  the  ethico-religious  sphere,  — 

remains  for  psychologists  an  unfathomable  mystery.  Upon  the  ground 
of  experience,  and  in  the  interests  of  moral  freedom,  vre  felt  obliged  to 
emphasize  one  thing,  viz. :  that  the  inner  conversion  is  not  synonymous 
with  a  purely  mechanical  exchange  and  displacement  of  the  old  by  the 
new  man,  but  that  it  presents  an  assimilation  of  the  new  facts  of  experi- 
ence, a  new  formation  of  thought  and  effort  which  does  not  take  place 
suddenly,  but  gradually.  Where  the  ego  decides  freely  upon  the  accept- 
ance of  new  thoughts  and  sentiments,  there  the  new  never  appears  uncon- 
nected nor  as  apperceiving  the  old.  For  the  ego  of  man  is  the  representa- 
tive of  his  previous  inner  experience.  To  be  apprehended  by  it  means  to 
be  joined  to  old  fixed  ideas  and  states  of  mind. 

^  We  cite  the  old  captain  in  Immermann's  "  Munchausen."  He  had 
fought  with  distinction  under  the  French  against  the  Russians,  and  after- 
wards, when  everybody  was  marching  against  France,  he  fought  in  the 
Prussian  service  no  less  bravely  against  his  former  companions  in  arms. 
When  peace  came  and  everything  around  him  was  to  be  adjusted  to  his 
feelings  —  to  the  former  French  sympathies  and  to  the  newly  awakened 
spirit  of  the  F.atherland  —  such  a  union  of  opposing  inclinations  and  senti- 
ments could  not  succeed  with  the  old  soldier:  he  could  not  entertain  the 
idea  that  within  the  period  of  a  year  he  should  have  been  a  brave  French- 
man and  a  brave  Prussian.  The  memories  of  the  war  with  their  sympathies 
and  antipathies  had,  in  consequence  of  the  rapid  change,  encamped  sepa- 
rately side  by  side,  and  his  rigid  though  honorable  character  allowed  no 
reconciliation  between  them.  Finally  after  a  dangerous  sickness  which 
made  him  free,  body  and  soul,  to  a  certain  extent,  he  found  equilibrium 
again.  He  established  military  order  in  his  memories.  He  arranged  two 
rooms,  of  which  one  was  dedicated  to  recollections  of  the  Napoleonic  victo- 
ries, the  other  to  the  memory  of  the  glorious  deeds  of  the  chami)ions  of  free- 
dom. He  always  occupied  them  by  turns  according  to  his  dominating 
political  mood.  Now  he  was  entirely  French  and  exclusively  absorbed 
in  the  splendor  of  tl»e  Napoleonic  time,  and  again  he  was  decidedly  Prus- 
sian and  a  panegyrist  of  the  German  uprising. 


34  APPERCEPTION.      • 

it  may  lead  to  a  weakening  of  the  ego,  to  a  paralyzing  of 
his  feeling  of  selfhood  and  of  his  mental  energy. 

Under  normal  conditions,  on  the  contrary,  even  the  strang- 
est and  most  exciting  perception  will  finally  find  its  resting 
place,  its  apperceiving  subject,  in  fixed  habits  of  thought 
and  feeling.  The  mental  soundness  of  a  man  is  essentially 
determined  by  such  a  union  of  the  present  with  the  past, 
by  the  assimilation  of  new  impressions  with  old  ones. 

Up  to  the  present  time  our  presentation  of  the  process  of 
apperception  has  been  limited  to  cases  where  an  external 
perception  reaches  assimilation.  If  we  recollect  now  that 
the  latter  after  the  cessation  of  the  external  excitation  be- 
comes an  idea,  which  retains  all  the  combinations  that  have 
hitherto  been  entered  into,  the  conjecture  arises  that  an 
apperception  may  come  to  pass  even  between  mere  ideas. 
Indeed,  reproduced  psychical  products  as  well  as  percep- 
tions, internal  as  well  as  external  perceptions,  may  be  in- 
wardly assimilated.  We  have  here,  then,  only  a  special  case 
of  the  general  process  of  apperception,  to  which  we  must 
devote  a  few  words. 

Of  all  the  concepts  which  the  soul  of  man  creates,  many 
are  so  weak  and  fleeting,  many  strike  so  strong  and  so 
numerous  contradictions,  that  they  either  become  obscured 
at  once  or  find  no  circle  of  thought  which  they  can  join. 
We  do  not  notice  them,  or  do  not  know  how  to  make  any- 
thing out  of  them ;  we  are  not  able  to  make  them  agree  with 
tlie  other  ideas.  In  both  cases,  whether  they  rest  apparently 
forever  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness  or  hold  them- 
selves apart  in  consciousness,  no  apperception  has  taken 
place.  Hence  those  ideas,  not  being  fully  understood,  have 
but  a  limited  value  for  the  mental  life  ;  in  case  they  continued 
in  this  condition,  they  would,  finally,  be  entirely  lost.  If  a 
group  of  thoughts  nearly  related  to  those  weak  and  isolated 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  35 

ideas  rises  into  consciousness  (either  spontaneously  or  medi- 
ately reproduced) ,  and  with  a  strength  and  clearness  which 
maintain  it  against  all  opposition ;  if  by  virtue  of  its  mani- 
fold combinations,  which  it  entered  into  with  the  other  masses 
of  ideas,  it  dominates  the  latter  for  a  time,  then  there  will 
be  a  movement  among  the  related  thoughts,  which  till  now 
were  not  rightly  understood.  We  shall  recollect  much  that 
seemed  to  have  fallen  already  into  oblivion  and  much  will 
become  distinct  and  clear  that  was  to  us  until  now  a  "  book 
with  seven  seals."  The  dominating  group  of  ideas  illumin- 
ates the  darkness  and  now  we  cannot  comprehend  how  such  a 
fact  could  escape  us,  how  we  could  not  at  once  understand 
it  or  could  interpret  it  wrongly.  Light  now  appears,  "the 
scales  fall  from  our  eyes,"  we  see  clearly  that  which  was 
hitherto  hidden  from  us  ;  the  isolated  and  scattered  elements 
of  thought  have  now  found  a  fixed  point  with  which  they 
can  unite,  with  reference  to  which  they  can  adjust  them- 
selves ;    the  apperception  is  complete. 

How  often  in  the  soul  of  the  poet  may  such  thoughts  and 
inner  experiences,  await  the  happy  hour  when  a  favorable 
mood  grants  them  the  right  expression,  the  artistic  form! 
For  poetic  creation  is  more  than  a  clever  play  of  the  fancy. 
Lively,  tender,  memories  out  of  the  poet's  own  emotional  life 
must  come  to  the  help  of  the  poetic  fancies,  and  there  must 
come  also  that  formative  force  which,  as  a  regulating  power, 
enters  into  the  variegated  world  of  fancy,  chooses  thoughts 
and  tests  their  worth;  which  unites  and  builds  according 
to  a  fixed  plan ;  and  which  subjects  even  the  creation  itself 
again  to  criticism,  rejecting  the  unessential  disturbing  ac- 
cessories and  supplying  deficiencies.  This  formative  force  of 
the  will,  however,  is  awakened  and  guided  by  certain  aesthetic 
ideas  and  feelings  at  the  root  of  the  artistic  conviction  and 
mental  bias  of  man.     The  latter  stand  in  the  background  of 


36  APPERCEPTION. 

the  stage  and,  themselves  invisible,  work  upon  the  ideas  in 
the  foreground  of  consciousness  so  that  the  latter  attain  a 
right  meaning  and  deeper  significance  in  an  artistic  whole. 
Hence  in  the  act  of  poetic  creation,  habitual  ideas  and 
{esthetic  feeling  appear  as  the  apperceiving  factor. 

The  case  is  similar  with  the  investigator  who  seeks  to 
solve  a  scientific  problem.  From  within  arise  thoughts  of 
possible  solutions,  of  ways  and  means  to  the  end;  but 
likewise  from  within  there  arises  a  system  of  thoroughly 
assimilated  knowledge  with  which  the  newly  obtained  ideas 
must  square  themselves,  opposing  elements  being  repressed 
and  kindred  ones  absorbed.  Here  the  apperception  proceeds 
from  an  acquired  fund  of  knowledge  which  possesses  a  pre- 
dominating activity  and,  as  authenticated  and  firmly  fixed 
opinion,  measures  itself  with  newly  arising  ideas,  thereby 
either  supporting  or  condemning  them. 

Not  always,  as  in  the  foregoing  examples,  is  the  apper- 
ceived  idea  the  less  powerful  factor,  which  adjusts  itself 
according  to  the  content  of  the  combination  of  ideas  already 
present.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  also  upon  occasion  display 
such  strength  that  the  apperceiving  ideas  undergo  correction 
and  change  from  it.  When  the  investigator  in  the  sphere  of 
science,  in  consequence  of  fortunate  combinations  of  ideas, 
unexpectedly  reaches  an  hypothesis  which  throws  an  entirely 
new  light  upon  hitherto  obscure  and  unintelligible  facts,  and 
teaches  him  to  grasp  certain  manifestations  in  another  and 
deeper  significance ;  when  to  the  jealous  man,  harmless 
memories  which  were  to  him  for  a  long  time  indifferent,  or 
perhaps  precious,  suddenly  become  accusers  of  one  who  is 
to  him  dearest  upon  earth  (Othello)  ;  when  his  diseased 
fancy  sees  treachery  everywhere  and  busily  brings  ever  new 
material  to  the  fire  of  his  passion,  —  in  every  such  case,  active 
reproduced  ideas  are  present  which  at  first   arouse  certain 


THE  THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  37 

lines  of  thought,  in  order  finally  to  insert  themselves  into  the 
related  groups,  thus  giving  them  a  new  illumination.  Often 
these  notions  do  not  stop  at  correcting  individual  obsei'va- 
tions,  but  they  not  seldom  break  through  and  transform 
whole  regions  of  thought.  Then  there  arise  in  the  soul  such 
storms  as  we  have  spoken  of  above,  occasioned  by  overpow- 
ering sense-perceptions. 

According  to  the  foregoing,  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt 
that  internal  perceptions  and  reproduced  psychical  products 
may  be  apperceived  just  as  well  as  external  perceptions ;  it 
is  not  necessary  therefore  that  one  of  the  latter  be  present. 
The  first  form  of  assimilation  has  since  the  time  of  Her- 
bart  been  designated  as  internal,  the  second,  as  external  ap- 
perception. Yet  the  names  chosen  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
entirely  suitable.  Others  have  remarked  in  criticism  that  ap- 
perception —  even  the  external  apperception  —  is  always  the 
assimilation  of  an  internal  condition,  and  that  for  this  reason 
there  is,  strictly  speaking,  only  internal  apperception.  In  that 
case  the  expression  "  internal  apperception  "  or  "  appercep- 
tion of  the  inner  perception,"  favors  the  erroneous  assumption 
that  the  second  kind  of  apperception  is  synonymous  with  de- 
signed internal  perception,  or  self-obsei-vation.  It  would 
seem  as  if  the  apperception  of  an  inner  state  or  idea,  always 
includes  an  act  of  self -observation.  This  is,  however,  by 
no  means  the  case. 

In  apperception  as  we  have  hitherto  known  it,  our  conscious- 
ness is  directed  exclusively  to  the  content  of  the  ideas.  We 
give  ourselves  up  so  entirely  to  the  ideas  as  represented  that, 
under  circumstances  of  this  kind,  we  forget  ourselves  and 
our  activity.  As  the  soldier  in  the  midst  of  the  confusion 
of  combat  is  so  completely  taken  captive  by  external  impres- 
sions that  he  does  not  think  of  his  own  condition,  so  the 
person  apperceiving  lives  chiefly  in  the  objective  world  of 


38  APPERCEPTION. 

obsen'atious  and  thoughts.  He  asks  concerning  the  rela- 
tions existing  between  them,  but  not  concerning  the  sub- 
ject to  which  they  belong,  or  the  activity  which  creates 
them.  In  strong  emotion,  in  states  of  passion  or  enthus- 
iasm, the  apperception  often  gains  very  unusual,  even 
though  very  one-sided,  results,  while  the  moral  self-exam- 
ination that  gives  attention  to  one's  own  thinking  and  acting 
is  not  present.  Thus,  for  instance,  tlie  poet  in  the  moment 
of  happy  creation  is  entirely  fettered  by  the  objects  of  his 
fancy.  The  better  the  apperception  succeeds,  the  farther 
is  he  removed  from  observing  himself  in  his  work.  Indeed, 
untimely  reflection  would  hinder  the  progress  of  apper- 
ception. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  observe  ourselves,  our  conscious- 
ness is  directed  especially  to  the  process  of  representing,  will- 
ing and  feeling.  To  the  consciousness  of  ideas  is  associated 
the  consciousness  that  we  produce  them.  That  which  has 
occurred  in  our  minds,  or  is  occurring,  becomes  the  object  of  a 
new  representation.  We  have  then  not  merely  thoughts  and 
ideas;  but,  at  .the  same  time,  we  become  conscious  of  them 
as  of  an  internal  activity,  and  this  activity  proceeds  from 
one  and  the  same  subject,  from  the  ego.  These  ideas 
belong  to  us.  We  become  conscious  of  a  matter.  In  that 
case,  the  ideas  do  not  stand,  as  in  the  case  of  appercep- 
tion, as  objective  images  before  the  soul,  but  they  penetrate 
deeper  within,  until  they  come  into  close  connection  with 
the  germ  of  the  self,  the  ego.  In  apperception,  the  atten- 
tion turns  principally  to  the  object  of  representation ;  in  self- 
observation,  on  the  contrary,  to  the  subject  of  representation. 
In  the  one  case,  we  ask  whether  two  psychical  products  unite 
with  one  another;  in  the  other,  how  this  combination  took 
place  according  to  psychical  laws,  and  how  our  ego-conscious- 
ness presented   itself.     And  we   find,  as  our  own  activity 


THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  39 

becomes  the  object  of  observation,  that  we  have  judged  or 
willed,  thought  or  felt,  imagined  or  calculated,  sought  or 
shunned,  or  whatever  else  the  inner  process  may  be  called. 
"We  recognize  this  inner  activity  not  only  as  ours,  but  we  dis- 
tinguish it  also  from  every  other,  and  thereby  give  it  a  definite 
content.  We  arrange  it  then  into  certain  classes  of  inner 
events,  just  as  in  the  apperception  already  described  we 
arrange  the  perceptions  presented  to  our  senses  into  certain 
categories  of  outer  experience.  Consequently,  self-observa- 
tion is  nothing  but  apperception,  although  of  a  special  and 
higher  kind,  inasmuch  as  here  the  subject  of  apperception  is 
the  ego  itself.  Indeed  we  often  become  conscious,  in  the 
other  kinds  of  apperception,  of  the  inner  relation  in  which 
the  object  assimilated  stands  to  our  ego,  of  the  value  which 
a  perception  has  for  our  whole  inner  life.  But  while  here 
this  consciousness  manifests  itself  in  obscure  feelings,  in  self- 
observation  during  an  act  of  knowledge  it  becomes  incompar- 
ably clearer.  As  the  process  of  apperception  comes  to 
consciousness  chiefly  through  the  feelings  of  tension  accom- 
panying it,  so  in  many  cases  a  kind  of  internal  perception 
awakened  by  those  sensations  may  accompany  the  mental 
assimilation,  only  of  course  in  the  form  of  a  feeling  or  of  the 
general  thought,  "I  think,"  or  "I  perceive."  As  soon, 
however,  as  this  internal  perception  assumes  a  more  active 
character  and  brings  the  individual  psychical  processes 
into  review  before  the  ego,  it  ceases  to  accompany  the 
apperception.  In  this  case  a  second  perception  follows  the 
first,  which  was  directed  to  the  content  of  the  ideas,  and 
this  second  perception  renders  the  process  of  apperception 
itself  an  object  of  observation  and  assimilation  —  an  act  of 
self-observation.  It  follows  apperception,  for  in  reality,  as 
Drobisch  rightly  says,  intentional  self -observation  is  a  con- 
stant failure  :  "  the  observation  always  comes  later  than  the 


40  APPERCEPTION. 

occurrence."  Our  self-observation  is  for  the  most  part,  not 
an  obser^'ance  of  wliat  is  now  going  on,  but  a  contemplation 
that  hastens  on,  after  the  event  to  be  observed  has  gone 
by,  a  tarrying  with  memories.  When  the  process  of  apper- 
ception has  reached  a  conclusion  in  the  judgment  A=Z,  then 
self-obserN'ation  apprehends  the  individual  parts  of  this  oc- 
currence as  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  active  soul,  and 
the  apperceived  idea  as  the  possession  of  the  ego.  This 
latter  recognizes  the  product  of  apperception  as  the  idea  tliat 
is  expressed  in  the  judgment:  /  have  A.  We,  ?'.e.,  our 
empirical  ego,  then  regard  oureelves  as  the  real  subject  of 
apperception.  We  recognize  clearly  the  significance  that 
the  new  perception  has  for  our  mental  development.  The 
more  vigorous  an  active  apperception  is,  the  more  surely 
does  self-observation  seem  to  follow  it.  This  is  explained 
partly  upon  the  ground  of  the  action  of  the  will  in  the  prog- 
ress of  the  ideas  and  feelings,  partly  on  the  ground  of  the 
lively  emotional  and  bodily  excitations  that  accompany 
the  occurrence.  The  latter  are  those  which  continue  after 
the  completed  apperception,  warning  us  of  the  inner  events, 
and  making  us  attentive  to  them.  On  the  contrary,  that 
which  is  easily  and  readil}^  apperceived,  or  is  indifferent  to 
the  ego,  does  not  leave  a  deep  impression  behind  it.  It 
does  not  excite  attention,  and  hence  seldom  arouses  self-ob- 
servation. Consquently  the  latter  is  neither  a  necessary 
characteristic  nor  a  regularly  accompanying  manifestation  of 
apperception.  Self-observation  frequently  goes  on  obscurely 
side  by  side  with  apperception ;  more  frequently  still,  the 
former  follows  the  latter  as  a  new  and  higher  grade  of 
apperception,  or  it  may  be  entirely  lacking. 

Let  us  now  sum  up  the  essentials  in  the  process  of  apper- 
ception. First  of  all,  an  external  or  internal  perception,  an 
idea,  or  idea-complex  appears  in  consciousness,  finding  more 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  41 

or  less  response  in  the  mind,  i.e.,  giving  rise  to  a  greater  or 
less  stimulation  to  thought  and  feeling,^ 

In  consequence  of  this,  and  in  accordance  witli  the  psy- 
chical mechanism  or  an  impulse  of  the  will,  one  or  more 
groups  of  thoughts  arise,  which  enter  into  relation  with  the 
perception.  AVhile  the  two  masses  are  compared  with  one  an- 
other, they  work  upon  one  another  with  more  or  less  of  a 
transforming  power.  New  thought-combinations  are  formed, 
until,  finally,  the  perception  is  adjusted  to  the  stronger  and 
older  thought  combination.  In  this  way  all  the  factors  con- 
cerned gain  in  value  as  to  knowledge  and  feeling ;  especially, 
however,  does  the  new  idea  gain  a  clearness  and  activity  that 
it  never  would   have   gained   for  itself.     Apperception   is 

THEREFORE  THAT  PSYCHICAL  ACTIVITY  BY  WHICH  INDIVIDUAL 
PERCEPTIONS,  IDEAS,  OR  IDEA-COMPLEXES  ARE  BROUGHT  INTO 
RELATION  TO  OUR  PREVIOUS  INTELLECTUAL  AND  EMOTIONAL 
LIFE,  ASSIMILATED  WITH  IT,  AND  THUS  RAISED  TO  GREATER 
CLEARNESS,    ACTIVITY   AND    SIGNIFICANCE.* 

We  are  well  aware  that  this  explanation  does  not  fully 
exhaust  the  nature  of  apperception.  Mental  assimilation 
is  Indeed  an  event  that  unites  in  itself  various  elementary 
processes,  and  in  which  factors  are  acting  that  elude  observa- 
tion. Without  doubt  it  depends  upon  an  interaction  of 
ideas ;  but  it  is  more  than  this,  inasmuch  as  it  also  includes 
the  products  of  thought  and  feeling  arising  through  the  ac- 

*  Yet  it  also  happens  that  apperceiving  Ideas  enter  first,  and  call  up  iso- 
lated ideas  for  apprehension ;  as  when,  for  example,  we  seek  examples 
for  a  known  rule. 

«  The  derivation  of  the  word  apperception  (from  ad  and  percipere,  to 
grasp,  to  perceive)  signifies  that  a  new  perception  is  united  with  another, 
a  new  cognition  is  adjusted  in  proper  order  with  present  psychical  pro- 
ducts. Apperception  is  (according  to  Willmann)  the  "  added  apprehen- 
sion, the  co-operation  of  reception  and  reproduction  of  mental  products," 
"  the  perfected  apprehension  of  an  idea  by  means  of  other  reproduced 
ideas." 


42  APPERCEPTION. 

tivity  of  thinking.  Its  two  principal  kinds  correspond  to 
involuntary  and  voluntary  attention ;  it  is  not,  however, 
merely  an  energy  holding  the  ideas  fast  in  consciousness, 
but  it  embraces  also  the  conditions  and  results  of  conscious- 
ness, the  objective  knowledge  of  the  inner  relations  existing 
between  the  ideas.  Finally,  it  is  always  accompanied  by  a 
fusion  or  blending  of  ideas,  an  accession  of  new,  isolated 
elements  to  older  and  richer  related  thought.  But  it  is  more 
than  a  mere  blending,  more  than  a  receptive  taking-up  of  new 
impressions ;  it  is  rather  their  self -active  apprehension  and 
elaboration.  It  not  only  includes  an  increase  in  theoretical 
or  practical  knowledge,  but  at  the  same  time  it  signifies  an 
elevation  of  our  feeling  and  effort,  the  apprehension  of  a  new 
psychical  product  through  the  emotions.  It  is  the  process  of 
growth  of  the  soul ;  it  is  mental  development. 

2.    Conditions  of  Apperception. 

The  result  of  mental  assimilation,  the  facility  or  difficulty 
of  process,  its  strength  and  power,  are  first  of  all  dependent 
upon  the  nature  of  the  apperceived  as  well  as  of  the  apper- 
ceiving  ideas,  upon  the  elements  of  thought  and  feeling 
accompanying  them ;  i.e.,  upon  the  existing  conditions  of 
mind  and  heart.  AVhile  the  two  latter  important  factors,  in 
consequence  of  their  obscure,  indefinite  character,  are  little 
accessible  to  our  observation,  the  significance  of  the  former 
for  the  process  of  apperception  may  be  more  easily  recog- 
nized. Our  attention  must,  therefore,  be  turned  chiefly 
to  them  so  far  as  we  have  to  do  with  the  psychical  con- 
ditions of  apperception.  For  the  sake  of  brevity  and 
simplicity,  however,  it  is  usual  to  indicate  the  apper- 
ceived and  apperceiving  groups  of  ideas,  including  their 
accompanying  states  of  mind,  as  the  object  and  subject  of 
apperception.     Yet  these  expressions   must  be  understood 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION,  43 

figuratively ;  for  in  reality  the  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing 
soul  is  the  subject  of  apperception,  or,  in  the  case  of  self- 
observation,  the  real  ego  is  the  subject.  The  masses  of 
ideas,  moving  toward  one  another,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
active,  independent  existences,  but  rather  as  means  employed 
by  the  soul  that  knows  and  wills. 

A  perception  or  idea  becomes  the  object  of  apperception, 
if,  upon  its  entrance  into  consciousness,  it  finds  more  or  less 
response ;  i.e.,  if  it  calls  up  other  ideas,  together  with  the  feel- 
ings and  efforts  associated  with  them.  Such  exciting  force, 
however,  is  manifested  by  those  ideas  that  stand  in  relation 
to  old  kindred  groups  of  ideas,  or  to  the  ego.  That  which 
is  entirely  strange  leaves  us  cold ;  the  absolutely  new  is  not 
understood.  That,  however,  which  recalls  the  known  in  its 
form  or  its  content,  often  attains  thereby  a  high  value  for 
the  feelings ;  attention  naturally  turns  to  it.  Well-known 
perceptions  are  assimilated  quickly  and  without  trouble  — 
an,  act  of  apperception  that  is  designated  recognition.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  the  new  agrees  with  earlier  experiences  only 
in  part,  if  it  is  but  partially  similar  to  that  which  we  already 
know,  then  the  assimilation  is  for  the  most  part  completed 
but  gradually,  and  we  become  conscious  of  it  as  mental 
labor.  Such  apperception  includes  an  act  of  learning. 
"Wherever  we  are  concerned  with  the  discovery  of  truth, 
or  the  creation  of  thought  products,  the  present  mental  store 
is  always  confronted  by  that  which  is  relatively  new. 

These  related  perceptions  that  form  the  object  of  apper- 
ception should  consist  neither  of  weak,  wavering  ideas  hav- 
ing no  power  to  effect  reproduction,  nor  of  such  strong, 
overpowering  impressions  as  of  themselves  fill  the  con- 
sciousness and  crowd  out  all  other  thoughts.  A  too  rapid,  as 
well  as  too  slow,  unfolding  of  the  stages  of  a  perception  must 
also  be  avoided.     The  measure  of  time  for  such  unfolding, 


44  APPERCEPTION. 

or  developmeut,  will  have  to  be  adjusted  to  the  greater  or 
less  facility  with  which  the  movement  of  ideas  takes  place 
in  the  individual  in  question.  The  more  we  allow  time  for 
the  various  parts  of  a  perception  to  be  taken  up  carefully, 
and  the  more  sharply  we  distinguish  them  from  one  another, 
the  more  thoroughly  is  the  apperception  perfected.^ 

It  is  because  thoroughgoing  apperception  is  added  to  deep 
aesthetic  feeling,  that  solemn  things  so  iwwerfully  impress 
the  mind.  ' '  And  all  things  of  slow  movement,  if  not  ad- 
veree  to  the  idea  on  other  grounds,  approach  the  solemn" 
(Herbart).     So  much  for  the  object  of  apperception. 

Among  the  ideas  awakened  by  a  perception,  those  which 
for  the  time  being  display  the  greatest  power  are  called 
the  subject  of  apperception.  The  power  of  these  ideas 
depends  first  of  all  upon  their  intensity  and  activity. 
Knowledge  which  has  "flown"  to  us,  which  has  been 
drilled  into  us,  which  did  not  arise  from  our  own  active 
experience,  is  deficient  in  such  force.  Book-knowledge  is 
likely  to  give  exhausted,  feeble  aids  to  apperception.  He 
who  sees  only  with  the  eyes  of  another  and  not  with  his 
own  senses,  is  always  lacking  in  vigorous,  active  thoughts 

'  In  "  The  Soul's  Comfort,"  a  relisioua  book  of  tlie  middle  ages,  which 
contains  numerous  anecdotes  illustrating;  the  Ten  Commandments,  the 
Father-confessor  asks  a  woman  how  many  Pater  Nostcrs  she  says  daily. 
She  replies:  "  When  I  come  to  Mass  and  God  gives  me  grace  so  that  I 
can  say  my  Pater  Noster  well,  then  I  say  half  a  Pater  Noster,  or  a  fourth 
part,  or  a  whole  Pater  Noster;  but  if  I  do  not  succeed  well,  then  I  say 
a  dozen  or  one  hundred  Pater  Nosters."  Then  she  explained  how  this 
occurred.  When  slie  began  the  prayer  earnestly  and  reflected  ui)OU  all 
the  love  and  faitlifulness  which  her  Heavenly  Father  had  hitherto  shown 
her  and  all  men,  then  she  could  not  easily  get  beyond  the  beginning, 
and  would  finish  a  whole  Mass  with  the  words:  "Our  Father."  Just 
so  it  was  with  the  next  words.  If  she  wished  to  reflect  with  true  fervor 
upon  every  part,  during  a  whole  service,  she  could  barely  repeat  the  whole 
once.  Only  when  she  had  no  sincerity  did  she  sometimes  say  fifty  Pater 
Nosters.    But  then  she  did  not  count  her  effort  successful. 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  45 

that  spring  forth  at  the  right  moment  and  make  themselves 
felt  in  the  apperceiving  process.  One  may  have  learned  a 
marvellous  amount,  and  yet  in  regard  to  capacity  for  apper- 
ceiving be  a  very  stupid  fellow.  We  ourselves  must  have 
elaboratedithat  which  is  to  gain  force  and  life  in  us.  For  we 
not  only  learn  more  thoroughly  the  things  we  work  out  for 
ourselves,  but  with  this  self -helpfulness  are  closely  connected 
the  feelings  of  successful  effort.  But  feelings  are  best  capa- 
ble of  rendering  mobile  and  permanent  the  multitude  of  our 
inner  states.  That  with  which  the  memory  of  painful  or 
happy  houi"s  is  associated,  that  which  is  entwined  with  the 
heart  by  a  thousand  threads,  stands,  as  a  rule,  nearest  to 
consciousness,  and  generally  offers  itself  first  to  the  newly- 
entering  perceptions  as  an  aid  to  apperception.^ 

Ideas  of  high  emotional  value,  groups  of  thought  that 
proceeded  from  very  strong,  distinct  perceptions,  and,  in 
consequence  of   frequent   repetition,   have   made   numerous 


1  This  fact  is  very  beautifully  expressed  by  Vogel  in  the  well  known 
poem  "  Das  Erkennen  "  (The  Recognition) :  — 

"  A  wanderer,  with  his  staff  in  hand, 
Comes  home  again  from  ii  foreign  land  ; 
His  hair  is  begrimed,  his  face  is  burned  ; 
Who'll  first  know  the  lad  that's  home  returned?  " 

His  friend,  the  collector,  does  not  recognize  him,  and  even  his  sweet- 
heart opposes  a  cool  and  reserved  attitude  to  the  greeting  of  the  young  fel- 
low, so  much  has  the  sun  scorched  his  face.  But  the  mother  ?  Ah !  at  the 
first  glance  she  recognizes  the  returned  wanderer.  In  her  soul  lives  most 
strongly  and  warmly  the  dear  son's  image,  glorified  by  the  sunshine  of  un- 
selfish, faithful  love.  So  closely  lias  the  youth  grown  with  her  whole  be- 
ing that  she  has  remembered  him  daily  and  hourly,  and  even  in  the 
stillness  of  the  little  churcli  or  tlie  quiet  grave-yard  she  has  sent  long- 
ing thoughts  after  her  absent  son.  So  entirely  does  his  image  fill  her 
soul  that  she,  m  contrast  with  the  collector  and  the  sweetheart,  ha.s 
no  room  for  other  persons  and  interests,  for  distracting  and  diverting 
thoughts.  Such  true  affection  sharpens  the  aging  eye,  so  that  it  turns 
steady  and  clear  upon  the  stranger. 

"  Sorely  as  the  sun  his  face  has  burned. 
The  mother's  eye  knows  her  boy  returned." 


46  APPERCEPTION. 

combinations  among  themselves  and  with  the  self,  manifest 
this  activity  and  susceptibility,  by  virtue  of  which  they  return 
to  consciousness  upon  the  slightest  occasion.  They  form 
such  dominating  habits  of  tliought  as  arise  from  scientific 
study,  professions,  and  daily  environments. 

Tine,  the  strength  and  activity  of  the  apperceiving  ideas 
do  not  of  themselves  guarantee  tlie  correctness  of  the  apper- 
ception. The  child,  for  example,  whose  relatively  modest 
and  defective  store  of  experience  is  ready  at  hand,  not  infre- 
quently apperceives  more  quickly  than  the  adult.  Yet  on 
this  account  it  contributes  more  to  the  external  perception, 
thus  giving  rise  to  incorrect  subjective  apperceptions.  The 
case  is  similar  with  the  adult  who,  during  his  whole  life,  has 
not  been  freed  from  closely  restricted  relations,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  the  limitation  of  his  store  of  ideas,  of  the  nar- 
rowness of  his  mental  horizon,  is  able  only  with  difficulty  to 
bring  his  mind  into  harmony  with  foreign  thoughts,  customs 
and  habits,  being  but  seldom  able  to  speak  of  them  without 
prejudice.  Here  the  strength  of  individual  experience  re- 
peated a  thousand  times,  and  thus  grown  to  a  favorite  habit, 
is  a  hindrance  to  the  objective  apprehension  of  the  new ; 
what  is  lost  in  logical  consistency  is  made  up  in  psychical 
intensity.  And  thus  even  forceful  characters  who  have 
produced  admirable  results  in  some  definite,  practical  sphere, 
and  for  this  reason,  being  sure  of  victory,  come  to  believe 
that  they  can  dispense  with  all  theory,  are  often  found  to 
be  lacking  in  capacity  of  apperception  for  new  facts  of 
experience.  They  either  dismiss  the  facts  summarily  or 
keep  certain  formulas  and  judgments  read}',  with  which  the 
new  experience  must  be  measured,  whether  for  good  or  bad. 
They  are  only  too  much  inclined  to  regard  every  innovation, 
so  far  as  they  grant  it  any  significance  at  all,  as  only  an  old 
thought  in  a  new  garment.     *'  Nothing  new  under  the  sun," 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION,  47 

—  this  is  the  constant  magic  formula  for  all  uncomfortable 
facts  and  theories.  "The  good  is  not  new,  and  the  new  is 
not  good."  Thus  without  thorough  testing,  following  for 
the  most  part  the  first  impression,  such  people  are  accustomed 
to  decide  quickly,  with  over- weening  confidence.  In  this 
case  the  apperception  is  completed  too  easily  and  superfi- 
cially ;  it  leaves  behind  no  strong  feeling  that  influences  the 
rest  of  the  world  of  thought  and  arouses  interest  and  will. 

If,  therefore,  the  apperception  is  to  proceed  vigorously 
and  correctly,  then,  not  merely  strong  and  active,  but  also 
significant,  wide-reaching,  and  plastic  groups  of  ideas  in 
which  there  is  an  indwelling  tendency  for  completion  and 
perfection,  must  confront  the  object  of  apperception.  For 
only  in  such  cases  do  so  many  related  elements  rise  into 
consciousness  that  the  new  is  not  falsified  by  chance  ideas, 
but  apprehended  by  that  thought-complex  to  whose  content 
it  corresponds  most  closely. 

Yet,  if  it  is  to  fulfil  its  end  completely,  the  apperceiving 
thought-complex  must  by  no  means  be  lacking  in  care- 
ful elaboration  and  organization.  Where  the  ideas  do  not 
stand  in  the  right  relation  to  one  another,  or  where  they 
suffer  from  obscurity  and  indefiniteness,  there  is  to  be  seen 
that  superficial  facility  of  apperception  which  throws  to- 
gether the  most  heterogeneous  elements,  —  that  precipitate 
judging  peculiar  to  uncritical  minds.  There  may  be  in 
such  apprehension  a  certain  correctness ;  but  since  the  simi- 
lar and  the  opposed,  the  false  and  the  true,  are  not  shai*ply 
distinguished,  the  apperception  is  either  precipitate  or  en- 
tirely false.  Where,  on  the  contrary,  strong,  disciplined 
thought  weighs  carefully  that  which  is  to  be  brought  iuto 
relation  with  the  new;  where  clear,  studied,  and  well-united 
groups  of  ideas  come  into  contact  with  it,  there  the  apper- 
ception will  often  be  slow,  but  it  will  be  completed  so  much 


48  APPERCEPTION, 

the  more  correctly  and  certainly.  Then,  as  a  rule,  it  is  not 
at  all  necessary  that  the  apperceiving  mass  of  thought  be 
reproduced  in  its  full  extent  and  content,  but  it  is  sufficient 
that  the  conception,  the  law,  the  principle,  stand  in  con- 
sciousness. The  latter  represent  all  the  related  ideas  that 
make  themselves  felt  as  unconscious  co-operating  elements  in 
the  course  of  apperception. 

We  saw  that  to  the  subject  of  apperception  belong  also 
the  obscure  psychical  conditions,  the  feelings  and  obscure 
notions,  that  accompany  the  apperceiving  ideas.  This 
shows  us  what  significance  the  whole  mental  and  emotional 
condition  has  for  the  course  of  mental  assimilation.  Domi- 
nating states  of  mind  that  have  no  internal  relation  to  the 
object  of  apperception,  secret  care  and  anxiety  that  disturb 
the  spirit,  may  also  prevent  the  strongest  aids  to  appercep- 
tion from  rising,  thus  making  their  force  ineffective.  In  the 
life  of  every  person  come  hours  in  which,  to  his  own  surprise, 
he  maintains  an  unimpressionable  and  indifferent  attitude 
towards  the  most  interesting  events  and  facts.  A  cer- 
tain bodily  and  mental  tranquillity  is  then  necessary  to  re- 
establish the  equilibrium  between  the  •  various  psychical 
elements,  if  an  unbiased  apprehension  of  the  new  is  to 
follow.  Yet  more :  our  inner  life  with  all  the  feelings  and 
inclinations,  with  the  secret  impulses  and  interests,  which  at 
the  time  stand  above  or  near  the  threshold  of  consciousness, 
must  receive  a  uniform  impression,  and  this  world  of  thought 
and  feeling  in  which  we  live  nmst  be  related  to  the  content 
of  the  new ;  in  a  word,  the  right  mood  must  dominate. 
Then  consciousness  will  be  occupied  witli  ideas  that  will 
ward  off  disturbing  thoughts  and  efforts,  and,  by  reason  of 
their  uniform  tone  of  feeling,  will  greatly  facilitate  the 
reproduction  of  the  right  aids  to  apperception.  The  sphere 
in  which  the  latter  are  to  be  sought  approaches  consciousness, 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  49 

and  every  element  of  its  content  may  become  a  beginning 
member  of  a  series  of  reproduced  ideas.  Kinally,  when  im- 
portant individual  members  of  these  related  products  of  con- 
sciousness rise  especially  high,  anticipating  the  perception ; 
when  a  certain  tension  of  the  sense  organs  precedes  the 
expected  impression,  and  an  increased  power  of  attention  is 
felt,  then  the  favorable  condition  is  present  in  which  apper- 
ception may  take  place  —  the  condition  of  expectation. 
Many  spiritual  arms  are  stretched  out  to  receive  that  for 
which  we  are  prepared,  so  that  we  assimilate  more  easily 
and  more  accurately  than  when  surprised  by  a  new  experi- 
ence. We  have  now  reached  an  important  factor  that  is 
always  present  in  active  apperception,  viz.,  the  tcill.  That 
a  perception  or  a  memory  picture  may  be  expected,  or  the 
mind  incited  to  a  fundamental  apperception,  it  is  often  ne- 
cessary to  have  a  vigorous  action  of  the  will,  in  addition  to 
appropriate  emotional  states  of  mind.  The  will  holds  the 
perception  firmly  in  consciousness  until  it  is  rightly  recog- 
nized and  understood.  It  controls  the  desires  and  feelings 
that  affect  the  mind,  so  that  the  right  helps  to  apperception 
may  appear.  Without  an  exercise  of  will  the  attention 
would  soon  flag.  The  reason  that  among  men  a  failure  to 
understand  is  so  frequent,  and  that  all  new  and  epoch-mak- 
ing doctrines  find  so  slow  and  so  difficult  a  recognition,  is,  to 
a  considerable  extent,  due  to  the  want  of  good-will  toward 
these  subjects.  This  has  been  experienced  by  all  great  men 
who  have  been  in  advance  of  their  time.  This  was  experi- 
enced even  by  the  Apostles  of  so  victorious  a  cause  as  the 
gospel  of  Christ.  Let  us  think  of  the  foremost  among  them, 
Paul,  the  great  Apostle  to  the  heathen.  Few  teachers  have 
been  so  inspired  and  have  preached  the  new  faith  so  impres- 
sively as  this  chosen  warrior  of  the  Lord.  How  admirably 
he  knows  how  to  arouse  appereeiving  ideas  in  his  hearers ; 


50  APPERCEPTION. 

&6  when,  for  example,  he  reminds  the  Athenians  of  the  un- 
known God,  to»whom  they  have  unwittingly  erected  an  al- 
tar ;  of  the  splendid  temples  in  whose  halls  the  gods  were  to 
abide ;  of  their  poets  who  sang  of  the  divine  origin  of  man. 
If,  notwithstanding,  his  sermon  found  entrance  into  but 
limited  circles,  and  was  not  understood  by  the  great  mass  of 
Jews  and  heathens,  such  unbelief  was  not  founded  merely 
in  the  nature  of  their  mental  and  emotional  life.  The  Athen- 
ian pride  of  culture  would  not  learn  from  the  despised  Jew, 
the  legal  pride  of  the  Israelite  would  not  accept  any 
innovation,  while  in  other  places  (Ephesus,  Antioch, 
etc.)  self-interest  and  envy  closed  the  door  of  the  heart 
to  the  gospel.  Custom  and  inclination,  desire  and  passion, 
and  not  least,  indolence  of  will,  very  often  make  a  man 
incapable  of  recognizing  and  receiving  new  truths.  The  in- 
telligent assimilation  of  strange  truths,  the  transformation 
of  one's  own  conviction,  demands  not  a  slight  degree  of 
mental  exertion  and  force.  In  this  case,  to  apperceive 
means  to  undergo  victoriously  an  internal  struggle.  Such  a 
mental  struggle  cannot  be  easily  understood,  however,  by 
one  whose  heart  is  already  bound  up  in  other  interests  than 
those  of  the  investigation  of  stern  truth,  by  one  who,  on  no 
account,  will  allow  himself  to  be  disturbed  in  the  secure  pos- 
session of  an  acquired  good  or  an  agreeable  habit.  Here 
the  will  does  not  determine  the  opinion,  but  the  wish  is 
father  to  the  thought.  Hence  that  which  is  regardetl  as  lack 
of  intelligence  is  not  infrequently  a  defect  of  the  will.  To 
apperceive  impartially  and  thoroughly,  despite  inclinations 
and  wishes,  at  least  in  the  spheres  of  science  and  ethics,  is 
at  bottom  a  moral  act,  and  the  prerogative  of  a  strong 
character. 

Side  by  side  with  the  psychical  conditions,  as  they  were 
presented  above,  must  not  be  oveiiooked  those  physical  pro- 


THE  THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  51 

cesses  that  are  connected  with  the  former,  and  that  in  the 
process  of  apperception  prove  not  less  effective.  It  is  highly 
probable  that  all  our  mental  activity  is  accompanied  by  cor- 
responding nerve  excitations ;  indeed  it  is  probable  that  a 
great  part  of  our  ideas  would  not  be  present  without  them. 
We  are  thinking  not  merely  of  the  rise  of  sensations,  in 
which  that  fact  has  for  a  long  time  been  generally  recog- 
nized, but  we  are  thinking  also  of  the  union  and  reproduc- 
tion of  ideas.  The  ofteuer,  however,  a  nerve-current  is 
called  into  exercise,  so  much  the  easier  is  the  transmission. 
An  effect  remains  from  every  excitation  of  the  nerve  and  its 
central  station,  the  ganglion  cells,  which  puts  the  current  into 
a  condition  to  follow  a  renewed  excitation  more  easily. 
Such  ' '  functional  tendencies  "  towards  the  renewal  of  an 
excitation  are  of  great  significance  for  the  course  of  apper- 
ception. If  a  similar  idea  enters  consciousness,  it  will,  by 
virtue  of  a  remaining  tendency,  or  disposition,  renew  an 
earlier  similar  nerve-excitation,  and  thereby  facilitate  the 
return  of  the  psychical  product  corresponding  to  it,  —  that 
is  to  say,  the  apperceiving  idea.  The  functional  tendencies 
of  nerves  made  active  according  to  the  laws  of  relationship 
may,  according  to  this,  conduce  essentially  to  the  awaken- 
ing of  such  ideas  as  hasten  forward  as  aids  to  our  apper- 
ception. And  it  is  clear  that  the  apperceiving  activity 
within  definite  spheres  of  thought  must  be  perfected  the  more 
surely  and  speedily,  the  more  the  corresponding  excitations 
are  exercised  in  certain  nei"ve  currents  by  frequent  repetition, 
and  the  more  undisturbed  they  decline.  These  functional 
tendencies  attain  special  importance  in  the  apperception  of 
an  expected  sense  impression.  Then  related  ideas  stand  in 
consciousness,  which  are  accompanied  by  the  same  physio- 
logical occurrences,  though  perhaps  in  a  less  degree,  which 
once   preceded   their  formation   as  physical  condition  and 


52  APPERCEPTION. 

cause.  These  advancing  excitations  of  nenes  and  nerve- 
centers  on  the  ground  of  acquired  functional  tendency,  do 
not  contribute  as  motor  irritants  to  the  intentional  cessation 
of  the  action  of  sense  organs,  but  they  strengthen  the  expected 
sense-excitation  and  help  it  to  apprehend  more  quickly. 
We  become  conscious  of  how  much  our  bodily  organs  are 
concerned  in  the  progress  of  apperception  through  the  sensa- 
tions connected  with  it. 

In  certain  ner\'e  activities  essential  conditions  are  giv(Mi 
for  the  delay  or  prevention  of  an  apperception,  as  well  as 
for  its  successful  and  rapid  completion.  It  is  a  fact  that, 
after  heavy,  tedious  illnesses  which  leave  behind  a  general 
weakness  of  the  body,  and  especially  of  the  nerves,  the 
duration  of  the  apperception  is  particularly  long.  The  same 
is  true  when  one  is  in  a  condition  of  fatigue.  As  is  well 
known,  the  blood  continually  brings  to  the  ners'es  nourish- 
ing matter,  which  there  undergoes  a  chemical  change.  The 
strength  and  quickness  of  this  change  are  in  proportion  to 
the  vigor  with  which  the  nerves  are  set  in  action  through 
bodily  or  mental  effort.  The  continuously  flowing  blood 
takes  up  those  products  of  the  change  which  could  not  be 
used  in  the  future,  and  replaces  them  with  new  material. 
If,  in  consequence  of  long  and  difficult  labor,  the  outlay  is 
greater  than  the  blood  is  able  to  replace,  then  arises  that 
condition  which  is  known  as  exhaustion.  In  this  condition 
we  feel  our  mental  activity  arrested  to  a  significant  degree. 
Notwithstanding  the  great  effort  of  the  will,  and  even  with 
the  presence  of  psychical  conditions  favorable  to  apper- 
ception, the  assimilation  of  new  perceptions,  or  ideas, 
will  be  completed  but  slowly  and  imperfectly.  Indeed,  it 
may  be  entirely  omitted,  if,  in  consequence  of  a  lasting  or 
transient'disturbance  of  a  nerve  current,  the  corresponding 
physiological  action  is  not  accomplished,  as  when  we  say. 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  53 

*'  The  nerves  no  longer  act  together."  We  then  become 
actively  conscious  of  how  much  the  activity  of  the  soul  is 
dependent  upon  the  co-operation  of  the  central  excitations 
and  nerve-actions,  since  to  attempt  to  do  without  those 
would  be  as  vain  as  to  attempt  to  play  upon  an  instrument 
without  strings. 

3.     Significance  of  Apperception  for  the  Mental 
Development  of  Man. 

Our  text-books  on  psychology  usually  treat  the  subject  of 
apperception  in  connection  with  that  of  internal  perception, 
after  sense-perception,  reproduction,  memory,  imagination, 
the  ego,  and  even  judging  and  reasoning  have  already  been 
treated.  This  might  give  rise  to  the  idea  that  mental  as- 
similation takes  place  rather  late  in  the  development  of 
mind,  and  that  it  is  limited  to  a  definite  epoch. 

This  opinion  has  actually  been  voiced  in  a  very  deter- 
mined manner.  It  has  been  denied  that  apperception 
belongs  to  childhood,  or  to  the  school  period  of  life,  the 
claim  being  made  that  it  is  confined  to  the  age  of  reflection. 
But  those  who  say  this,  overlook  the  fact  that  passive 
apperceptions  occur  even  in  earliest  childhood,  and  that  the 
idea  of  apperception  cannot  be  limited  to  the  cases  of 
intentional  assimilation  of  new  impressions.  If  appercep- 
tion means  the  grasping  of  new  ideas  by  the  aid  of  present 
similar  ones,  if  it  is  the  process  of  growth  of  the  soul, 
then  it  belongs  not  only  to  one,  but  to  all  epochs  of  the 
mental  development  of  man ;  it  must  play  a  very  important 
part  in  the  sphere  of  inner  growth,  during  the  whole  of  life. 
Let  us  try  to  comprehend  the  significance  of  apperception 
in  the  mental  development  of  the  individual. 

The  first  great  task  proposed  to  the  child's  mind  is  that 
of   learning   to    find    its  way  in  the  world  of  perceptions ; 


54  APPERCEPTION. 

to  master  the  world  by  learning  to  know  it.  It  does  not 
solve  this  problem  in  a  strictly  systematic  manner,  contem- 
plating, closely  it  may  be,  one  object  after  the  other,  and 
thus  proceeding  gradually  according  to  a  definite  plan  from 
the  parts  to  the  whole.  That  is  by  no  means  possible. 
Perceptions,  as  a  rule,  come  in  masses  and  are  too  transient 
to  give  the  child  a  chance  to  devote  his  particular  attention 
to  each  one  of  them.  Besides,  he  is  not  able  to  apprehend 
them  sharply  and  correctly,  owing  to  the  imperfection  of  his 
senses  and  the  poverty  of  his  knowledge.  And  even  if  he 
were  able  to  do  this,  it  would  be  very  impracticable  to  try 
to  devote  to  all  sensations  the  same  sense-energy  and 
attention.  For,  as  the  child  is  mostly  occupied  with  more 
than  one  object,  his  perceiving  and  knowing  would  for  a 
long  time  lag  far  behind  his  practical  neetls,  and  would 
never  correspond  to  them.  The  child,  on  the  contrary, 
takes  possession  of  the  outer  world  first  as  a  whole,  by 
being  for  the  present  satisfied  with  an  obscure  general 
impression.  From  this  he  gradually  selects  and  grasps  the 
important  elements  one  by  one.  His  choice  is  not  deter- 
mined by  logical  reasons,  but  by  his  practical  needs  as 
determined  by  circumstances.  Those  objects  and  events 
which,  as  conditions  of  life,  lie  particularly  near  to  the  feel- 
ings and  desires  of  the  child  (food  and  drink,  lodging, 
dress,  parents,  etc.)  or  excite  his  interest  in  a  vivid  manner, 
are  preferred  above  all  others.  When  the  remaining  com- 
ponent parts  of  the  total  perception,  at  least  for  the  time 
being,  reach  only  the  general  field  of  consciousness,  the 
preferred  objects  rise  to  the  focus  of  consciousness.*  Thus 
by  degrees  several  clearer  percepts  rise  out  of  the  confused 
manifoldness   of   obscure   general    impressions ;    the    child 

'  See  Wtmdt's  Theory  of  Apperception  in  the  present  volume. 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  55 

gains  a  number  of  fundamental  ideas  that  are  mostly  char- 
acterized by  great  activity  and  powerful  tone  of  feeling. 

For  these  perceptions  are  not  heaped  up  like  dead  trea- 
sures, but  almost  as  soou  as  aquired  they  become  living 
forces  that  assist  in  the  assimilation  of  new  perceptions, 
thus  strengthening  the  power  of  apprehension.  They  are  the 
contents  of  the  soul  that  now  permanently  assert  themselves 
in  the  act  of  perception.  For  wherever  it  is  at  all  possible, 
the  child  refers  the  new  to  the  related  older  ideas.  "NVith 
the  aid  of  familiar  perceptions,  he  appropriates  that  which 
is  foreign  to  him  and  conquers  with  the  arms  of  apper- 
ception the  outer  world  which  assails  his  senses.  Thus, 
for  instance,  Steinthal,^  from  his  own  observation,  relates 
of  a  two-year-old  girl,  that  she  called  the  picture  of  spectral 
forms  of  women  with  long  floating  garments  "  birds,"  corn- 
stalks "trees,"  swimming  swans  "fishes,"  and  mistook  a 
flag  that  floated  from  the  top  of  a  house  for  a  "  white  horse." 
Something  similar  to  this  is  told  by  Lazarus  of  a  child  that 
had  been  brought  up  in  the  South;  snow-flakes,  for  in- 
stance, that  he  saw  for  the  first  time,  he  called  "  butter- 
flies." And  who  does  not  know  from  his  own  experience 
how  the  child  at  first  considers  every  man  his  "pa"  or 
"daddy"  or  "father,"  every  flying  creature  as  "bird"  (or 
whatever  else  the  expression  of  the  little  ones  may  be), 
every  plant  as  "  tree  " ;  how  he  apperceives  the  lightning 
perhaps  as  a  fiery  swallow,  the  clouds  as  mountains,  the 
the  lights  in  the  windows  of  a  distant  house  in  the  darkness 
of  the  night  as  "  peep  eyes."  Such  false  or  limited  apper- 
ception is  peculiar  not  only  to  early  childhood,  but  it  asserts 
itself  also  later  on.  Let  us  listen  to  the  report  of  an  atten- 
tive observer  of  six-year-old  children,  who  visit  the  zoo- 

*  Abriss  der  Sprachwissenscha/t,"  p.  158. 


56  APPERCEPTION. 

logical  garden  for  the  first  time.  There  is  so  much  new 
presented  to  them  that  they  are  unable  to  carry  away  clear 
ideas  of  what  they  have  seen.  They  must  master  the  new 
impression  as  well  as  possible  under  the  circumstances. 
And  thus  we  are  told  that  the  little  ones  regarded  the  buffalo 
and  aurochs  as  cows,  ibexes  and  chamois  simply  as  goats, 
the  rhinoceros  as  an  elephant,  while  they  loudly  and  joyfully 
greeted  the  tiger  with  "kitty,  kitty!  "  The  ostrich  was  to 
them  a  big  goose  or  a  stork  ;  smaller  exotic  birds  they  called 
finclies  (for  these  birds  had  often  been  observed  on  class 
excureions)  ;  beavers,  first  mice,  then  fishes  or  frogs ;  and 
the  seal  was  after  long  deliberation  classified  as  a  fish,  but  one 
"  from  another  river."*  Here  we  have  by  no  means  merely 
witty  comparisons,  as  perhaps  an  adult  would  jestingly  try 
to  make,  no  toying  with  ideas,  but  earnest  work  of  the  child, 
who  in  his  manner  seeks  to  understand  strange  new  impres- 
sions. He  does  not  compare  merely,  but  he  straightway 
identifies  the  new  with  the  familiar.  According  to  a  law  of 
the  mind  that  cannot  be  further  derived,  but  only  settled  as 
a  fact,  he  must  work  thus,  if  by  degrees  he  is  to  change 
from  a  slave  to  a  master  of  his  external  perceptions.  In 
accordance  with  his  mental  nature,  he  cannot  but  practice 
usury  with  the  acquired  capital,  he  must  assimilate  new 
ideas  with  the  present  ones.  The  latter  become  the  organs 
of  the  perceiving  soul  with  which  it  grasps  the  manifold 
world  of  perception,  articulates  it,  aiTauges  it  in  accordance 
with  the  present  store  of  ideas. 

Language  "in  this  connection  renders  impoilant  services 

>  Lehmensick  in  Just's  Praxis  der  Erziehungsschule,  1888,  part  II, 
p.  75. 

*  That  the  learuiug  of  the  language  is  itself  an  apperception-process, 
Lazarus  has  showo  in  hia  L\fe  c/  the  ISoul  (third  edition),  II-,  pp.  168- 
I7a 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  57 

to  the  mind.  It  is  true  that  apperception  is  possible  also 
without  it ;  as,  for  instance,  the  child  in  the  two  first  years 
of  his  life  refers  throughout  the  new  to  the  old,  without 
always  having  a  corresponding  word  at  his  command.  But 
still  apperception  proceeds  more  surely  and  more  easily, 
when  the  fundamental  ideas  are  fixed  by  language.  The 
name  separates  each  one  of  them  from  other  notions  and 
holds  it  fast  in  memory,  so  that  the  ideas  gain  in  clearness 
and  liveliness,  and  can  more  easily  assist  in  the  acts  of 
apperception.  The  word  unites  similar  perceptions,  holding 
them  together  in  groups  and  enabling  them  to  unite  with  the 
fundamental  idea.  Applied  to  new  contents  of  conscious- 
ness, the  word  is  an  expression  of  accomplished  appercep- 
tion. 

The  word  does  indeed  in  certain  cases  rather  hinder  than 
further  a  right  apperception.  If  it  is  a  name,  for  instance, 
that  belongs  to  a  certain  fundamental  idea  exclusively,  if  it 
signifies  an  individual,  a  single  phenomenon  and  only  this 
one,  then  the  word  does  not  form  a  far-reaching  roof  under 
which  other  related  perceptions  also  can  find  a  place,  but  it 
coincides  merely  with  the  apperceiving  idea.  When  other 
perceptions  are  now  joined  with  the  latter,  they  of  course 
having  also  their  own  names,  the  individual  name  is  used  as 
a  generic  name,  so  that  the  new  idea  is  incorrectly  named. 
(It  is  indifferent  whether  the  child  received  the  name  from 
others  or  whether  he  formed  it  for  himself.)  A  few  exam- 
ples may  serve  to  illustrate  this.  "  A  child  that  was  begin- 
ing  to  talk,  saw  and  heard  a  duck  on  the  water,  and  said 
'  quack.'  After  that,  he  called  all  birds  and  insects,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  all  the  fluids,  on  the  other,  '  quack.'  At  last 
he  called  also  coins  '  quack,'  after  having  seen  the  image  of 
an  eagle  on  a  French  sou.  Thus,  through  gradual  generaliz- 
ing (?)  the  child  went  so  far  as  to  designate  a  fly,  a  coin 


58  APPERCEPTION. 

and  even  wine  by  the  same  onomatopoetic  word,  although 
only  the  first  perception  contained  the  name-giving  charac- 
teristic."' Such  an  extraordinarily  superficial  apperception 
can  occur  perhaps  only  in  tlie  first  months  of  life,  j'et  simi- 
lar processes  repeat  themselves  regularly  also  in  later  years. 
"When  in  all  earnest  the  child  at  first  gives  to  foreign  moun- 
tains, rivers  and  creeks  the  names  of  his  native  place ; 
when  Schiller,  for  instance,  as  a  little  boy  declared  all  rivers 
of  his  native  state  to  be  "  Neckars,"  or  another  three-year- 
old  boy  who  had  before  that  seen  from  his  window  daily  the 
Syra  creek,  called  the  river  near  his  home,  upon  seeing  it  for 
the  first  time, ' '  Elstersyra,"  -  here  as  in  many  other  instances 
we  meet  with  restricted  apperception,  i.e.,  an  apprehension 
where  the  most  varied  observations  are  with  the  aid  of  a 
name  traced  back  to  certain  individual  ideas.  The  child  will 
certainly  correct  his  apprehension  later  on ;  he  will  frequently 
have  to  unlearn.  But  this  drawback  is  not  serious  when  we 
consider  the  fact  that  he  is  really  appropriating  the  new  and 
making  it  subject  to  himself,  that  he  is  learning  to  rule 
the  impressions  of  the  outer  world.  Besides,  there  is  not 
much  to  be  done  against  such  a  restricted  apperception,  at 
least  not  in  early  childhood.  It  corresponds  to  the  nature 
of  the  child's  mind,  and  is  mostly  performed  without  the 
knowledge  or  assistance  of  the  teacher.  It  does  not  even 
appear  advisable  to  give  to  the  child  from  the  beginning  the 
con-esponding  word  for  every  new  perception :  he  would  not 
be  able  to  remember  all  the  names  for  the  multitude  of  ex- 
ternal impressions.  But,  where  confusion  is  likely  to  result, 
some  persons  would  meet  the  child's  urgent  inquiries  for  the 
names  of  things  in  another  manner :  in  the  earliest  period  of 
development  they  tell  the  cliild  the  generic  name  of  many  )io- 

*  Prayer,  The  $oul  of  the  child,  I.  E.  S.,  Vol.  IX.,  p.  <J0. 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  59 

mogeneous  objects,  and  not  that  of  the  individual  or  the 
species.  They  speak  to  their  little  ones,  not  of  the  birch,  oak, 
linden,  pine,  fir,  but  of  the  tree.  For  the  swallow,  the  finch,  the 
sparrow,  the  starling,  the  name  bird  or  a  still  more  childlike 
expression  is  for  a  time  sufficient.  In  this  case  the  name  of 
the  apperceiving  idea  presents  a  far-reaching  roof  under 
which  numerous  related  perceptions  may  collect ;  the  child 
transfers  the  generic  name  to  similar  notions  that  really  be- 
long to  it,  so  that  unlearning  will  not  be  necessary  later 
on.  Homogeneous  perceptions  unite  most  easily  to  a 
single  indefinite  idea,  which  manifests  all  that  was  common 
to  the  former,  but  without  the  distinguishing  characteristics, 
and  which  therefore  presents  a  silhouette  rather  than  a 
picture  of  the  objects.  A  general  idea,  or  picture,  arises, 
with  whose  aid  related  things  or  events  are  apperceived. 
As  the  child,  however,  gets  into  the  habit  of  tracing  back  a 
great  number  of  homogeneous  perceptions  to  relatively  few 
generic  names,  he  makes  a  very  important  advance.  "  For, 
first  of  all,  the  infinite  variety  of  outer  and  adjacent  things 
that  come  to  meet  the  attention  of  the  mind  and  threaten 
nearly  to  overwhelm  it,  is  so  greatly  simplified  through  the 
combination  of  the  whole  series  of  individual  ideas  into  rela- 
tively few  general  pictures,  that  even  the  less  vigorous  child- 
mind  can  soon  manage  to  find  the  way  through  it.  Then, 
however,  a  substantial  preparation  is  made  for  conscious 
thinking  proper,  through  this  formation  of  general  ideas, 
and  its  material  is  brought  to  the  mind  not  in  crude,  sensuous 
directness,  but  already  logically  prepared  in  some  degree."^ 
Finally,  the  child  is  enabled  with  the  aid  of  his  general 
pictures  soon  to  follow  the  linguistic  intercourse  of  adults 
with  understanding,  and  also  to  take  part  in  it.^ 

*  Pfisterer's  Paedagogische  Psychologte,  p.  95. 

*  If  country  children  on  entering  school  have   less  power  of  expres- 
sion than  city  children,  the  reason  for  it  is  to  be  found,  not  only  in  the 


60  APPERCEPTION. 

The  fact  that  the  child  with  the  aid  of  fundamental  ideas 
or  general  impressions  intellectually  conquers  a  great  part 
of  his  environment,  has  given  rise  to  the  opinion  that  man 
perceives  first  the  general,  the  genus,  and  then  proceeds 
from  this  to  the  cognizance  of  the  particular,  the  single 
thing.* 

That  is  just  as  erroneous  as  the  current  assumption  that  he 
proceeds  from  the  species,  in  order  to  elevate  himself 
gradually  in  a  strictly  logical  manner  to  the  genus.  It  is  not 
with  the  naming  and  discerning  of  the  species  that  he  begins 
to  ascend  regularly  to  the  genus,  but  with  obscure  and 
general  impressions  that  are  mostly  held  fast  and  connected 
temporarily  by  a  generic  name.  Hut  as  little  as  the  word  is 
identical  in  meaning  with  the  idea  it  signifies,  so  little  does 
the  generic  name  contain  the  cognition  of  the  general,  the 
rational.  It  includes,  on  the  contrary,  for  a  long  time 
many  similar  ideas,  from  which  later  a  conception-content 
is  first  gained  through  discernment  of  the  species.  The 
seeming  conception  of   the  general  first  awakens  only  the 

want  of  exercise  in  speaking,  but  also  in  the  circumstance  that  they  have 
not  learned  as  many  expressions  for  the  general  notions  current  in  the 
family  conversation,  and  therefore  cannot  express  themselves  as  readily 
as  city  children  who  have  grown  up  in  the  midst  of  a  more  lively  inter- 
course. But  the  apperception  of  the  country  child  is  often  the  more 
vigorous  and  original  because  of  this  fact. 

»  Compare  Sigwart's  Logic,  I.,  p.  49:  "  Quit«  contrary  to  the  common 
doctrine  of  the  formation  of  concepts,  the  general  precedes  the  special 
with  individuals,  as  it  does  in  language,  just  as  an  incomplete  idea  pre- 
cedes a  complete  one,  the  latter  presupposing  more  far-reaching  discrimi- 
nation." According  to  this,  S.  looks  upon  the  indefinite  apprehension  of 
the  child  as  a  logical  activity  that  selects  from  many  perceivable  charac- 
teristics the  essential  ones.  But  that  is  not  the  case.  It  is  a  result  of  a 
psychical  impot«ncy,  not  of  a  logical  capacity.  That  man  descends  in 
the  course  of  his  mental  development  from  the  general  to  the  particular, 
can  be  admitted  only  as  far  as  the  name  is  concerned,  not  with  reference 
to  the  contents  of  the  developing  thought. 


THE  THEORY  OF   APPERCEPTION.  61 

generic  name,  which  is  made  use  of  for  psychological 
reasons.  We  have  at  first  not  general,  deeply  penetrating 
thought,  but  rather  a  somewhat  indefinite  perception. 

For  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  facility  of  apperception 
in  earliest  childhood  necessarily  results  in  a  merely  super- 
ficial or  rather  one-sided  apprehension  of  things.  So  long 
as  the  child  must  trace  the  most  varied  perceptions  back  to  a 
relatively  few  fundamental  notions  or  general  impressions, 
80  long  will  he  have  no  regard  for  an  all-sided  observation 
and  keen  discrimination  of  single  objects.  It  is  sufficient 
for  a  time  that  he  grasps  one  or  the  other  characteristic  of 
the  latter  clearly,  thus  holding  fast  the  idea.  Often  even  this 
is  lacking,  and  he  retains  only  an  obscure  sensuous  impres- 
sion, especially  when  the  name  was  offered  too  early.  Such 
wholly  or  partially  empty  word-shells  often  fill  themselves 
later  with  the  right  thought-content;  often,  however,  they 
assert  themselves  unchanged  in  consciousness.  Thus  the 
child  tells  his  playmate,  perhaps  with  triumphant  pride : 
"Our  house  has  got  a  mortgage  on  it  and  yours  hasn't," 
thinking  that  a  mortgage  must  be  something  wonderfully 
fine  and  excellent ;  or  it  happens  to  him  as  to  the  Berlin 
market-woman  who  called  her  colleague  a  "  confounded 
differential  tariff "  with  the  intention  of  saying  something 
very  hurtful.  Makeshift  apperceptions,  i.  e. ,  assimila- 
tions without  sufficient  or  correct  apperception  aids,  arise, 
which  are  always  equivalent  to  misunderstandings.  Then 
it  may  happen,  to  quote  a  few  examples  from  life,  that 
the  child  understands  by  **  dressed  beef,"  beef  in  some 
sort  of  apparel ;  by  "  guardian,"  a  person  who  takes  care  of 
the  garden;  by  "  salon,"  a  liquor  shop;  and  forms  such 
words  as  "exercise  clerk"  (excise),  "upper  glass" 
(opera).  In  short,  as  the  child  is  lacking  in  a  rich,  logically 
formed  sphere  of  thought,  he  fails  to  grasp  the  objects  of 


62  APPERCEPTION. 

the  external  world  in  a  manner  strictly  objective,  but  appre- 
hends them  subjectively ;  he  sees  them  in  the  light  of  his 
limited  experience,  his  feelings  and  inclinations ;  he  asks 
more  for  the  worth  they  have  for  himself  (for  his  ego)  than 
for  their  meaning.  To  this  then  corresponds  also  the  real 
or  imaginary  intercourse  that  he  has  with  them.  As  he  now 
sees  no  difference  between  body  and  soul,  but  looks  upon 
the  feeling  and  desiring,  the  acting  and  moving  body  as 
his  ego,  so  he  conceives  also  his  relation  to  outer  objects 
in  a  very  childlike  manner.  He  apperceives  them  with  the 
aid  of  his  idea  of  himself,  i.  e.,  his  ego-idea.  As  his  body 
evinces  life  in  arbitrary  motion,  he  adjudges  personal  being 
to  all  that  moves  really  or  apparently  of  itself.  For  to  show 
life  and  motion  is  to  him  idieutical.  He  places  external  ob- 
jects on  one  and  the  same  stage  with  himself,  and  ascribes  to 
them  his  mental  states ;  he  looks  upon  them  as  sensitive  and 
volitional  beings.'  Hence  the  lively  interest  of  the  little  ones 
for  animals  and  plants,  the  affectionate  intercourse  with 
them,  the  understanding  they  have  for  their  real  or  imagi- 
nary conditions.  Hence  the  sharp  ear  of  youth  for  the  lan- 
guage of  birds,  which  they,  "  happy  in  their  unconscious 
wisdom,"  apperceive  after  their  own  poetic  fashion. 

When,  however,  the  child  thus  ascribes  his  own  mental 
states  to  outer  things,  when  in  early  years  he  discovers  so 
many  new  and  mysterious  things  in  nature,  everything  may 
appear  to  him  m  the  vagueness  of  the  fairy  tale ;  at  any  rate, 
his  apprehension  will  not  be  sober  and  clear  as  with  adults.' 

'  A  child  not  yet  two  years  old,  said  pityingly  on  seeing  the  dripping 
plants:  "  Tree  cry,  cry  —  oh"! 

*  This  explains  also  many  strange  and  almost  marvellous  incidents  of 
the  days  of  our  childliood.  A  friend  of  mine  toUI  me,  for  instance,  the  fol- 
lowing incident  of  his  boyhood  :  "  Close  to  our  house,  near  the  limits  of 
the  village,  were  the  grassy  plains  of  the  Elster.  There  was  a  bowling- 
alley,  and  on  one  of  its  sides  grew  weeds,  celandines,  nettles,  thistles,  and 


THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  63 

We  comprehend  how  the  child  builds  up  for  himself  such 
a  world  of  fancy  also  in  playing ;  how  the  boy  can  have  in- 
tercourse with  his  wooden  horse  for  hours  as  with  a  trusty 
and  intelligent  playmate ;  how  the  little  girl  can  nurse  her 
dolls  in  full  earnest  with  a  truly  touching  tenderness.  We 
understand  also  the  great  joy,  the  lively  interest  with  which 
they  both  listen  to  the  fairy-tales  of  the  mother.  P'or  those 
are  tales  that  lead  them  into  their  dearest  thought-regions, 
stories  that  they  anticipate  with  their  whole  world  of  per- 
ception and  feeling. 

Thus,  early  childhood  is  the  great  harvest  time  in  which 
the  child  apperceivuigly  takes  possession  of  the  outer  world 
in  its  principal  traits  with  the  aid  of  fundamental  notions 
and  general  impressions ;  but  just  because  he  always  refers 
the  new  to  the  old,  he  grasps  it  very  one-sidedly  and  sub- 
jectively. It  is  the  time  when  he  prefers  to  have  a  fanciful 
intercourse  with  the  outer  world  and  to  meet  a  fanciful 
apprehension  and  representation  of  it  with  a  peculiar  under- 
standing and  a  lively  interest.  Finally,  so  far  as  his  rela- 
tion  to   the    mental,    the    religious,    the    moral   world    is 


dandelions,  in  exuberant  profusion.  This  place,  wlio.se  damp  ground  was 
hidden  from  the  rays  of  the  sun,  had  an  uncommon  charm  for  me,  as  I 
imagined  behind  its  wildly  entangled  world  of  leaves  marvellous  things 
of  all  sorts.  I  always  went  with  a  feeling  of  awe,  and  yet  returned  with 
the  hope  and  premonition  that  I  should  there  discover  strange  things. 
One  morning  the  dew  still  sparkled  on  the  beautifully  formed  leaves  of 
the  lady's  mantle  (alchemilla)  of  which  I  was  very  fond,  and  to  which  my 
lather  to  my  chagrin  had  given  the  very  prosaic  name  "  goose  slipper." 
Everything  had  an  enchanting  interest.  Just  then  a  big  green  frog  with 
eyes  that  glittered  like  gold  ran  toward  that  chaos  of  leaves.  The  soli- 
tude of  the  place,  my  own  lively  feeling,  made  me  see  in  the  frog  a  little 
mannlkin  dressed  in  a  green  glittering  gown.  Often  after  that  I  tried  to 
see  the  same  again  or  at  least  to  spy  his  little  house."  When  the  same 
boy,  at  the  age  of  alx,  came  for  the  first  time  to  the  city,  he  mistook  the 
red  glove  at  the  sign  of  the  glove-maker  for  tiie  bloody  hand  of  a  giant. 
The  red,  glistening  wheels  of  a  locomotive  appeared  to  him  fiery  and 
glowing. 


64  APPERCEPTION. 

concerned,  bis  apperceiving  ideas  prove  themselves  here  also 
to  be  standard  and  determining  factors.  To  them  belong 
in  the  first  place  the  ideas  that  are  associated  with  sensuous 
feelings  and  aspirations.  For  even  if,  in  the  intercourse 
with  nature  and  men,  nearly  all  feelings  and  interests  awake 
in  the  child,  such  as  interest  for  beautiful  forms  and  moral 
judgments,  sympathy  for  the  welfare  and  sorrow  of  others, 
and  joy  in  intellectual  activity,  we  may  still  assert  that 
during  the  time  when  the  child  yet  identifies  his  ego  with 
his  body,  the  sensual  feelings  and  desires  predominate  in 
him.  They  very  often  influence  his  moral  judgment  regard- 
ing his  own  conduct  or  the  actions  of  others,  so  that  he 
looks  upon  that  as  right  which  is  pleasing  to  him,  and  that 
as  bad  which  he  fears.  Is  that  man  or  that  animal  good 
or  bad?  —  This  oft-repeated  question  of  the  child  fre- 
quently betrays  more  sensuous  interest  than  ethical  feel- 
ing. And  thus  for  a  long  time  the  sensuous  would  pre- 
vent the  ethical  from  asserting  itself  rightly,  and  would ^ 
control  the  juvenile  soul  exclusively  and  absolutely,  if  from 
the  beginning,  under  normal  conditions,  another  important 
sphere  of  thought  did  not  meet  it,  and  hinder  and  restrain 
it;  namely,  the  world  of  ideas  that  clings  to  the  child's 
ideal  picture  of  his  parents.  Here  also  the  sensuous  feel- 
ings and  desires  do,  to  be  sure,  often  assert  themselves. 
For,  why  does  the  picture  of  the  parents  stand  so  vividly 
before  the  soul  of  the  child?  First  of  all,  most  likely, 
because  he  sees  himself  bound  to  them  with  his  whole  being, 
because  they  are  the  source  of  his  well-being,  because  he 
receives  reward  and  punishment  from  them.  The  rever- 
ence for  father  and  mother  is  at  the  beginning  very  closely 
united  with  the  sensuous  feelings  of  fear  and  dependence. 
But  these  sensuous  feelings  and  relations  that  give  so  high 
a  motive-worth  to  the  picture  of  the  parents  for  early  child- 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  65 

hood,  are,  at  the  same  time,  just  because  they  are  awakened 
by  ethical  personalities,  always  iudissolubly  united  with 
the  intimations  of  the  high  ethical  worth  of  the  parents,  and 
the  ethical  order  of  the  world  which  they  represent.  That 
father  and  mother  are  more  than  mere  supporters,  powerful 
authorities,  soon  dawns  in  the  consciousness,  even  if  only 
in  an  obscure  feeling.  And  thus  the  dominating  idea  of 
the  parents  includes  both  a  sensuous  and  an  ethical  total  of 
feeling,  and  that  too  in  such  close  connection  that  it  would 
mostly  be  very  ditlicult  to  determine  w'here  the  one  begins 
and  the  other  ends.  This  ideal  picture  is  to  the  child  that 
grows  up  in  happy,  honorable  family  relations,  the  embodied 
moralit}',  the  model  of  all  that  is  good  and  right,  the  living 
conscience.  Wherever  a  moral  judgment  of  the  worth  of 
the  disposition  of  others,  or  a  decision  in  a  matter  of  his  own 
conduct  is  to  be  induced,  the  question  that  lies  nearest  to 
the  child  is :  What  do  father  and  mother  say  about  it  ? 
Who  has  not  observed  one  of  the  little  ones  in  such  a  state 
that  he  is  not  sure  how  he  is  to  regard  his  own  action  or 
that  of  another?  He  looks  inquiringly  from  father  to 
mother,  to  read  in  their  countenances  the  right,  and  when 
they  give  an  unmistakable  and  clear  answer,  then  his 
ethical  judgment  is  decided  at  once.  When  he  has  done 
wrong,  he  avoids  his  parents :  he  shuns  their  look  and 
sight,  he  shrinks  from  the  thought  that  makes  his  conduct 
appear  wrong  and  punishable.  Thus,  where  the  sensuous 
world  of  thought  and  feeling  does  not  assert  itself  exclu- 
sively, the  unspoiled  child  apperceives  sentiments  and 
actions  mostly  through  the  ideal  he  has  of  his  parents, 
which  stands  before  his  soul  as  an  ideal  or  pattern.  It  is 
also  through  his  ideal  of  them  that  he  gradually  gains  a 
notion  of  God  and  of  right  inner  relations  to  him. 

Let  us  accompany  the  child  further,  to  the  next  stage  of 


66  APPERCEPTION. 

development,  M'hich  reaches  about  from  the  seventh  to  the 
tenth  year.  The  child  enters  upon  the  boy  and  girl  age : 
he  goes  to  school.  The  world  of  his  previous  experiences 
may  be  said  to  enter  with  him  into  the  little  school-room 
—  for  in  that  sphere  of  thought  does  early  instruction 
mostly  move — and  is  met  by  a  new,  strange  world,  one 
that  lies  beyond  the  limits  of  the  home.  But  the 
objects  of  perception  do  not  continue  to  assail  his  senses  in 
masses  and  without  plan ;  they  come  before  his  eye  in  a 
regulated  procession,  set  by  the  teacher's  art  into  narrow 
frames  that  separate  them  from  each  other  and  make  their 
careful  contemplation  possible.  Hitherto  the  child  has 
given  himself  up,  in  the  free  play  of  his  fancy,  to  outer 
impressions,  letting  himself  be  guided  by  them  ;  now  he  is  to 
absorb  those  perceptions  in  earnest  labor  and  to  make  them 
serve  his  purposes.  Hitherto  he  was  accustomed  to  jump 
from  one  object  of  interest  to  another  and  to  follow  the 
direction  of  the  strongest  sense  impressions ;  now  he  is  to 
learn  to  fix  his  attention  and  to  direct  it  for  some  time  to 
certain  objects  of  instruction,  and  to  repel  disturbing  exci- 
tations of  the  senses.  He  does  not  always  succeed  in  this 
unaccustomed  "concentration  of  consciousness."  Often  he 
stands  dull  and  indifferent  before  the  objects  that  he  is 
to  view,  and  which  the  teacher  believes  to  have  been  well- 
chosen  and  well-presented  ;  he  looks,  yet  perceives  nothing ; 
he  talks  about  the  things  and  yet' does  not  really  grasp  them ; 
they  remain  indifferent  to  him.  Attention  then  quickly 
flags.  At  another  time,  he  cannot  gaze  long  enough  to 
satisfy  his  desire :  he  is  all  eyes  and  ears,  and  he  departs 
from  the  object  of  his  attention  with  regret.  It  has  be- 
witched him,  because  he  has  been  fond  of  it  from  child- 
hood, or  it  has  received  peculiar  illuniination.  Thus,  it 
is  not  the  excitation  of   the  senses  which   here   holds   the 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  67 

attention,  but  the  great  number  of  apperceiving  ideas  that 
were  awakened  by  the  object  observed.  These  ideas  often 
invest  the  newly  entering  perception  with  so  strong  a  motive- 
worth  that  the  will  springs  forth  and  holds  fast  in  conscious- 
ness what  at  the  beginning  was  noticed  only  involuntarily. 
With  the  aid  of  the  will,  the  mind  of  the  child  grasps  new 
experiences  in  the  light  of  past  ones.^  And,  therefore,  even 
here  we  cannot  yet  speak  of  a  complete,  purely  intellectual, 
apprehension  of  external  objects.  To  be  sure,  it  becomes, 
especially  in  consequence  of  instruction,  gradually  more 
correct,  more  varied  and  clear:  still,  it  is  yet  so  closely 
united  with  subjective  notions  that  it  may  be  considered,  on 
the  whole,  a  fanciful  apprehension  of  nature. 

Not  always  can  the  objects  of  which  instruction  treats  be 
presented  to  the  child  in  natura.  Pictures  then  take  their 
place.  It  is  commonly  supposed  that  they  produce  much 
the  same  impression  as  the  real  things.     But  that  is  the  case 


'An  incident  from  school-room  practice  may  serve  as  an  example. 
The  teacher  speaks  with  the  little  ones  of  the  first  school  year  about 
the  sun.  After  having  attended  to  the  necessary  observations,  he  wants 
to  make  them  understand  that  the  sun  shines,  warms,  is  in  the  sky, 
and  is  created  by  God.  The  teacher  does  his  best  to  make  this  clear 
to  the  children  —  he  finds  it  impossible.  They  repeat  all  that  he  said, 
but  it  seems  as  if  it  were  so  strange  to  them,  that  it  must  be  uttered 
without  their  really  believing  it.  Then  a  child  drops  the  remark:  "  The 
sun  is  God's  lamp."  Immediately  the  conversation  receives  an  entirely 
new  impulse.  Numerous  ideas  awake  and  press  to  the  front,  thus  placing 
the  object  in  the  right  light.  Now  the  children  see  God  light  his 
lamp,  as  it  were,  early  in  the  morning,  so  that  his  children  can  see 
during  the  day ;  they  see  him  blow  it  out  in  the  evening  when  all  go  to 
bed,  or  turn  it  down  when  it  is  dim.  That  the  sun  shines  as  the  light  of 
heaven,  that  he  brightens  all  and  gives  us  light  to  see  our  work,  that 
darkness  covers  the  earth  when  he  ceases  to  beam —  this  and  much  more 
is  now  clear  to  the  child,  and  has  become  his  mental  property.  In  a  very 
childlike  form,  to  be  sure,  but  when  the  little  ones  cannot  grasp  the 
objects  of  the  outer  world  in  other  than  a  fanciful  way,  why  not  let  tUem 
do  so  in  this  manner  ? 


68  APPERCEPTION. 

only  under  certain  conditions,  for  even  the  ability  to  under- 
stand drawings  or  to  inteqjret  pictures  is  an  acquired  power. 
The  eye  sees  in  reality  only  surfaces  and  outlines ;  of  itself 
it  knows  nothing  of  solid  bodies  and  perspective.  That  is 
proved  by  the  statements  of  those  who,  having  been  born 
blind,  have  later  received  their  sight.  They  at  first  regard 
paintings  simply  as  colored  surfaces,  without  the  least 
thought  of  perapective,  or  of  the  solid  bodies  thus  repre- 
sented.* When  we  understand  drawings  and  interpret 
pictures,  we  do  it  largely  with  the  help  of  the  ideas  we 
already  possess :  we  fill  in  the  outlines  until  they  become 
objects ;  we  lend  life  and  feeling  to  the  dead  forms ;  we  put 
our  own  thoughts  and  emotions  into  the  variegated  world  of 
pictures.  And  the  more  or  less  we  are  able,  in  this  way,  to 
put  in,  the  more  or  less  do  we  read  out  in  return.  So  it  is 
also  with  the  child.  Even  though  he  may  early  have  had 
practice  in  the  comprehension  of  the  simplest  sketches,' 
still  he  understands  a  drawing  only  to  the  extent  that  he 
has  already  seen  and  experienced  something  similar. 
Whenever  the  picture  goes  beyond  his  range  of  observation, 
beyond  his  experience,  he  does  not  see  what  he  should, 
even  though  he  have  the  best  of  intentions.  For  all  com- 
prehension of  pictures  is  an  apperceiving,  a  grasping  and 
interpreting  of  them  by  means  of  strong  and  clear  ideas 
which  we  have  already  secured  from  real  objects  and 
events. 

A  majority  of  the  objects  to  be  studied  in  school  cannot 
be  presented   in  natura.,  neither  can  their  pictures  be  ob- 

»Preyer,  Die  Seele  des  Kindea,  pp.  466,  484. 

'  My  oldest  little  girl,  even  at  the  end  of  her  first  year,  designated  the 
leaves  and  tendrils  u]K>n  the  window-curtains  as  tree.  When,  in  her  twenty- 
second  month,  I  laid  before  her  one  after  another  the  photograi)hic  pic- 
tures of  Juno  Ludovisi  and  of  Zeus  from  Otricoli,  she  immediately  called 
Uiem  "  Mama  "  and  "  Man  "  (or  "  I'apa,"  "  pretty  Papa  "). 


THE    THEORY   OF    APPERCEPTION.  69 

tained ;  many  others  also  cannot  be  perceived  through  the 
senses  at  all.  The  child  is  then  compelled  to  look  within 
himself  for  the  means  of  apperception.  "  Instruction  can 
thus  impart  only  words ;  the  ideas  for  which  the  words  stand, 
and  without  which  they  could  mean  nothing,  must  come  from 
within  the  child  himself."  "  Most  of  the  process  of  learning 
consists  simply  in  understanding  words,  i.e..,  the  pupil,  by 
means  of  the  mental  store  which  he  has  already  collected, 
puts  meaning  into  the  word  she  hears."  ^  Hence  every  lecture, 
every  narrative,  every  question  of  the  teacher,  is  a  demand 
upon  the  pupil  to  connect  the  word,  which  in  itself  is  mean- 
ingless and  empty,  with  concrete  notions  or  thoughts  already 
in  his  possession ;  they  each  require  the  reproduction  of  old 
ideas  which  stand  in  close  relation  to  the  subject  of  instruc- 
tion. Thus  pupils  think  and  feel  what  is  peculiar  to  them- 
selves ^  every  time  they  are  taught  anything,  each  in  his 
own  individual  manner  according  to  the  fund  of  knowledge 
at  hand.^  "  But  it  is  these  hidden  thoughts  and  feelings, 
running  quietly  along  beside  those  of  the  teacher,"  that  ex- 
plain the  words  which  are  heard,  and  fill  them  with  a  con- 
crete living  content ;  they  form  the  background  upon  which 
the  new  rises,  clear  and  sharp ;  they  are  the  apperceiving 
force  by  the  aid  of  which  the  new  is  made  intelligible. 

For  instance,  if  a  pupil  is  to  follow  intelligently  an  historical 

^  Herbart's  Pddagogische  Schriften,  published  by  Willmann,  Vol.  II., 
pp.  541,  605. 

'Hildebrand,  Vom  deutschen  Sprachunterricht,  3d  edition,  p.  54. 

8 Compare  also  the  following  from  Emerson:  "What  can  we  see  or 
acquire,  but  what  we  are  ?  You  have  seen  a  skillful  man  reading  Virgil. 
Well,  that  author  is  a  thousand  books  to  a  thousand  persons.  Take  the 
book  into  your  hands,  and  read  your  eyes  out ;  you  will  never  find  what  I 
find.  If  any  ingenious  reader  would  have  a  monopoly  of  the  wisdom  or 
delight  he  gets,  ho  is  as  secure  now  the  book  is  Englished,  as  if  it  were 
imprisoned  in  the  Pelews  tongue." 


70  APPERCEPTION. 

or  geographical  lecture,  the  first  essential  condition  is  that  he 
be  able  to  give  to  what  he  hears  a  definite  concrete  basis,  to 
transport  himself  easily  into  distant  times  and  places.  But 
how  can  that  come  about?  If  we  examine  closely  to  see 
where  our  thoughts  wandered  as  we,  in  our  youth,  for  the 
first  time,  heard  the  story  of  the  beautiful  garden  of  Eden 
and  of  the  first  human  beings ;  as  we  marched  with  the  Israel- 
ites through  the  Red  Sea  and  encamped  upon  Mt.  Sinai ;  as 
with  Moses  we  looked  from  the  heights  of  Mt.  Nebo  into  the 
promised  land,  where  flowed  milk  and  honey ;  we  make  the 
surprising  discovery  that  it  was  at  our  own  home  with  its  val- 
leys and  mountains,  where  our  thoughts  dwelt ;  that  we  trans- 
ported the  woods  and  fields  of  grain,  the  deserts  and  fertile 
plains,  the  houses  and  wells,  the  men  and  animals  of  sacred 
and  profane  history  to  our  own  neighborhood ;  and,  while 
we  were  travelling  in  distant  countries  over  sterile  land  and 
mountainous  regions,  over  seas  and  rivers  whose  names  had 
never  before  sounded  in  our  ears,  we  were  nevertheless  all  the 
time  at  home ;  we  pictured  foreign  places  clearly  by  means 
of  those  with  which  we  were  already  fjimiliar.  One  is  likely 
to  be  reminded,  by  this  fact,  of  the  imaginative  faculty,  and 
to  rejoice  over  its  great  activity  among  children,  who  can 
so  easily  bring  the  most  distant  objects  within  their  horizon. 
But  it  is  iusutlicient  to  refer  a  process  to  a  special  and  won- 
derful faculty,  when  it  can  be  explained  nmch  more  naturally 
by  a  universal  law  of  psychology,  and  shown  to  be  an  entirely 
normal  and  necessary  phenomenon  of  mental  life.  When 
we  transported  ourselves  into  an  unknown  and  distant  region 
of  Bible  History,  or  rather  created  it  in  our  minds,  there 
came  lo  the  help  of  the  new  names  certain  familiar  and  similar 
notions ;  namely,  the  names  and  images  of  objects  at  home. 
The  names  of  sacred  places,  the  ideas  of  persons  and  events 
in  sacred  history,  called  up  related  groups  of  ideas  (/.  e. ,  those 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  71 

produced  at  some  time  by  the  immediate  environment)  and 
united  with  them,  until  the  two  became  thoroughly  fused,  and 
formed  a  single  group.  Thus  the  new  part  that  the  narrative 
contained  was  interpreted  and  digested  by  the  help  of  ideas 
already  in  our  possession ;  and  we  must  therefore  credit 
apperception  with  that  which  is  usually  ascribed  to  the 
activity  of  the  imagination. 

Bogumil  Goltz,  who  is  so  well  acquainted  with  and  ap- 
preciative of  child  life,  describes  such  childish  apperception 
in  a  very  attractive  manner.  When  for  the  first  time,  to 
his  great  joy,  he  came  into  the  possession  of  a  variegated 
woodpecker,  brilliant  in  all  colors,  he  imagined  heaven  to  be 
a  wood  and  meadow  in  which  there  was  nothing  but  tame 
woodpeckers,  which  could  be  taken  up  by  the  angels  in 
their  hands  (Buch  der  Kindheit,  3d  edition,  p.  42.)  ;  like- 
wise, later,  he  was  accustomed,  by  the  aid  of  his  home 
experiences,  to  picture  concretely  each  city  and  country  under 
discussion  in  Geography  and  History.  He  says,  "  I  saw 
especially  Jerusalem  from  the  beginning  always  in  the  same 
light,  the  natural  scenery,  weather,  time  of  day  and  year 
remaining  the  same;  the  streets  were  unpaved,  but  fabu- 
lously wide  and  composed  of  hard,  sandy  soil ;  the  houses  were 
low  and  comparatively  large,  being  separated  from  one  an- 
other by  spacious  yards;'  an  indescribably  dreamy  quiet 
rested  upon  the  whole  ;  there  was  no  work,  no  manufacturing, 
no  police,  no  trading;  all  was  in  a  state  of  pious,  contem- 
plative reflection  in  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath  and 
the  worship  of  Jehovah." 

At  Easter  when  the  snow  was  melting  and  the  streets 
of  Konigsberg  were  flooded,  "when  all  the  fields  far  and 
near  were  covei'ed  by  a  countless  number  of  lakes,  and  all 
the  granaries  and  houses  appeared  iu  the  water  like  a 
northern  Venice,  1  had  a  view  of  the    first  waters  and  the 


72  APPERCEPTION. 

flood,  of  Noah's  ark,  and  all  of  Genesis  beBide^ ;  I  then 
reviewed  in  mind  and  sense  all  the  diluvian  and  ante-diluvian 
stories,  and  the  days  of  creation." 

The  author  of  this  book  cannot  refrain  from  adding  to  the 
interesting  reminiscences  of  this  friend  of  children  a  few  from 
his  own  youth.  lie  was  accustomed,  just  as  Goltz,  to  reach  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  facts  of  sacred  history  by  asso- 
ciating distant  localities  and  events  with  those  at  home. 
"When,  tor  example,  the  story  of  the  creation  was  studied  in 
school,  his  childish  fancy  pictured  chaos  to  be  similar  to 
sach  a  flood  as  was  often  caused  by  the  Saale  river  at  a 
certain  place,  in  the  centre  of  which  was  a  pond  surrounded 
by  gloomy  linden  and  willow  trees.  The  mist  that  arose 
from  the  water  mornings  and  evenings  was  the  Spirit  of 
God  that  hovered  over  the  waters.  On  the  shore  of  the 
Saale  where  there  were  many  reeds,  Moses  was  exposed  in 
his  little  basket,  while  his  sister  in  a  neighboring  field 
watched  the  fate  of  the  little  fellow. 

From  the  same  stream  arose  the  seven  fat  and  lean  kine 
of  Pharoah ;  at  the  point  where  it  was  particularly  deep,  the 
Israelites  marched  through  the  Red  Sea ;  there  the  Egyptian 
army  was  swallowed  up  by  the  returning  floods.  Mt.  Par- 
nitz,  rising  rather  abruptly  on  one  side,  appeared  to  me  as 
Mt.  Sinai  on  which  the  law  was  given  amid  thunder  and 
lightning,  aud  at  its  foot  the  people  of  Israel  were  encamped 
in  the  desert  (though  fertile)  valley  of  the  Saale.  The  same 
meadow  in  which  the  Lord  appeared  to  Moses  in  the  burn- 
ing bush  saw  also  the  shepherds  of  Bethlehem  tending  their 
flocks  on  Christmds  night,  and  heard  the  song  of  the 
heavenly  hosts.  I  remember  still  more  vividly  the  dark, 
old  stable — it  has  long  since  been  removed  —  upon  which 
I  fixed  as  the  birthplace  of  the  Saviour. 

When  the  temple  of  the  Jews  was  mentioned,  I  brought  to 


THE   THEORY  OF  APPERCEPTION.  73 

mind  our  village  chxirch;  there  the  aged  Simeon  sang  his 
song  of  praise,  and  at  the  altar,  where  each  year  the 
examination  of  candidates  for  confirmation  was  held,  the 
twelve-year-old  Jesus  disputed  with  the  learned  scribes. 
The  town-hall  was  first  the  prison,  then  Joseph's  dwelling ; 
the  royal  palace  (a  large  inn) ,  in  which  he  interpreted  the 
dreams  of  Pharoah,  stood  opposite  it  facing  the  public 
square ;  and  the  house  of  Potiphar  was  on  the  same  street. 
Joseph's  brothers  passed  along  this  street  and  stood  trem- 
bling at  the  door  of  the  town-hall  as  they  were  to  answer  for 
the  theft  of  the  cup ;  and  hei'e  also  was  the  spot  on  which 
the  brothers  recognized  each  other  with  much  emotion. 
The  dwelling  of  the  high  priest,  Caiaphas,  was  a  spacious 
building,  the  guardhouse,  whose  large  hall  was  formerly 
occupied  by  sessions  of  the  court ;  Jesus  was  brought  there, 
and  in  the  entry  Peter  denied  his  Lord.  Naturally  enough 
Pilate  lived  just  opposite  to  the  high-priest's  palace.  As  I 
thought  of  Christ's  cross  as  standing  by  a  garden-wall  upon 
the  brow  of  a  hill,  so  I  imagined  His  grave  to  be  in  a  certain 
yard  near  by.  But  the  road  from  Jerusalem  to  Jericho  led 
along  past  the  cross,  for  the  man  who  fell  among  thieves 
went  doivii  towards  Jericho.  A  few  steps  distant,  in  a  wide 
path  with  some  gardens  on  either  side,  lay  the  stone  upon 
which  Jacob  laid  his  weary  head,  as  he  was  fleeing  into 
Mesopotamia.  Tlien  came  the  place  in  which  I  had  located 
the  garden  of  Paradise.  Adam  and  Eve  wandered  about  in 
it ;  in  the  centre  stood  the  tree  of  knowledge,  and  the  guilty 
couple  fled  behind^ yonder  bush  when  God  reminded  them 
of  His  commandment.  From  this  point  one  could  see  the 
Galgenberg,  where  Cain  slew  his  brother;  the  Birkenhain, 
where  Isaac  was  to  have  been  sacrificed ;  and  in  the  distant 
horizon  Mt.  Nebo  appeared,  from  which  Moses  looked  over 
into  the  promised  land. 


74  APPERCEPTION. 

These  recollections  show  that  the  child's  conception 
compresses  within  narrow  bounds  many  facts  that  are 
widely  separated  in  time  and  space  —  a  tnith  which  is 
entirel}^  in  accord  with  the  limited  circle  of  ideas  that  he 
brought  with  him  into  the  school.  To  be  sure,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  an  understanding  of  some  of  the  stories  was 
not  acquired  in  the  best  way,  that  the  Bible  pictures  received 
a  local  coloring  and  many  non-essential  and  incorrect  char- 
acteristics. 

But  all  these  defects  are  counterbalanced  by  the  single 
fact  that  the  new  knowledge  was  apperceived  with  certainty, 
that  the  words  of  the  teacher  did  not  remain  empty,  but 
produced  brightly  colored,  living  pictures  iu  the  child's 
mind.  It  is  related  of  Byron,  that  his  conception  of  the 
classical  regions  of  the  Homeric  poems,  which  he  secured  by 
viewing  them  in  person,  was  far  inferior  in  impressiveness 
and  beauty  to  that  which  he  had  already  formed  of  those 
places  by  the  help  of  his  home  environment.  Thus  we  see 
that,  at  times,  apperception  may  be  so  vivid  that  it  at  least 
equals  perception  in  the  clearness  and  force  of  ideas.  But 
whatever  the  childish  mind  has  once  created  so  uncon- 
sciously —  for  of  course  reference  is  not  here  made  to  any 
conscious  seeking  on  his  part  after  corresponding  pictures 
from  his  environment  —  has  impressed  itself  too  deeply 
upon  him  to  allow  reflection  at  a  later  time  to  alter  and  cor- 
rect everything.  Of  course  by  means  of  illustrations,  de- 
scriptions, and  study,  one's  youthful  apperceptions  may  be 
corrected ;  but  when  I  examine  carefully  to  determine  which 
mental  pictures  rise  into  my  consciousness  involuntarily, 
first,  and  most  readily,  at  the  mention  of  the  Garden  of 
Eden,  Golgotha  and  Jerusalem,  I  find  that  they  are  my 
earliest  notions,  and  that  later  knowledge  has  succeeded  in 
changing  them  but  little. 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  75 

An  historical  narrative  or  geographical  description  requires 
of  the  pupil  not  only  a  vivid  representation  of  distant  places, 
but  also  a  clear  idea  of  strange  customs,  of  strange 
persons  and  their  experiences,  their  thoughts  and  emotions. 
Here  again  the  child  must  look  within  himself  in  order  to  fill 
the  words  that  are  heard  with  a  concrete  meaning.  This 
happens  when  he  looks  back  over  his  own  experience, 
such  as  his  home  in  the  main  has  furnished  him,  over  the 
subjective  and  objective  events  of  his  life,  and  by  their  help 
transports  himself  into  historical  times  and  conditions,  among 
strange  customs  and  usages. 

The  more  scanty  and  inadequate  these  apperceiving  ideas 
are,  the  more  defective  and  naive,  will  be  his  comprehension 
of  the  newly  acquired  information.  INIisconceptions  are 
certain  to  occur,  as  when  one  boy  thought  that  God  made 
Adam  out  of  potato-dumplings,  and  that  the  Angel  of 
Paradise  held  a  large  Schwarte  (i.  e.,  board,  instead  of 
ScJncert,  meaning  .word)  in  his  hand.  Or  the  apperceptions 
are  altogether  too  childish,  as  when  a  pupil  thought  that 
Jacob  might  easily  have  been  nin  over  by  the  cars  while 
sleeping  under  the  open  sky,  and  that  Joseph  became  the 
Egyptian  king's  "apprentice"  when  he  was  elevated  by 
him  to  office. 

It  will  always  be  especially  difficult  to  arouse  apperceiving 
ideas  for  the  thoughts  and  emotions  of  historical  characters. 
In  such  cases  it  is  best  to  direct  the  child's  attention  to  his 
own  inner  experiences,  and  allow  him  to  linger  in  thought 
upon  those  moments  when  he  was  moved  with  anxiety  and 
dread,  or  fear  and  repentance ;  when  the  voice  of  conscience 
lifted  itself  to  punish,  or  the  satisfaction  arising  from  a  kindly 
and  effective  deed  rejoiced  the  heart.  An  occasional  quiet 
return  into  one's  own  inner  world,  such  as  history,  when 
taught  with  tact,  can  cause,  not  only  teaches  us  to  under- 


76  APPERCEPTION. 

stand  better  what  passes  in  the  souls  of  otlicrs,  but  leads 
gradually  also  to  right  self-knowledge,  which  is  the  first 
condition  of  self-control. 

Thus  those  numerous  ideas  and  experiences  which  the 
child  has  secured  mainly  through  apperception  are  them- 
selves in  turn  active  in  instruction  as  apperceiving  agents. 
They  give  the  proper  tone  and  meaning  to  the  words  of  the 
teacher;  they  are  the  material  by  means  of  which  the 
youthful  mind  gradually  builds  for  itself  a  new  historical 
world  :  truly  a  great  work  ! 

But  soon  books  come  to  the  teacher's  aid  ;  the  child  must 
learn  to  comprehend  fully  new  thoughts  from  the  printed 
page  without  assistance  from  others.  That  is  a  far  more 
difficult  task  than  to  convert  oral  language  into  mental 
images.  For -all  reading  involves  a  threefold  apperception; 
first,  a  series  of  letters  or  word-pictures  must  be  perceived, 
or  recognized  as  more  or  less  familiar;  then  the  correspond- 
ing series  of  sounds ;  and  third,  the  group  of  ideas  for 
which  these  symbols  stand.  When  we  perform  these  three 
acts  of  recognition  simultaneously,  and  associate  them  with 
one  another,  we  understand  what  we  read.  The  child,  at 
the  age  under  consideration,  is  not  so  successful  in  such 
efforts  as  the  adult.  As  a  rule  he  is  not  able  to  recognize 
the  three  series  at  one  time,  and  when  he  nevertheless 
attempts  it,  while  he  is  directing  his  attention  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  words,  frequently  the  result  is  "guessing,"  which 
is  a  false  apperception  of  the  series  of  letters  and  sounds. 
He  usually  prefers,  therefore,  to  concentrate  his  mind 
upon  the  sounds  first,  and  reads  the  words  without  fully 
comprehending  their  connection.  The  apperception  of  most 
of  the  content  follows  later;  /.  c,  the  child  must  look  once 
more  at  the  words  and  examine  them  with  special  reference 
to  their  meaning,  if  the  thought  is  to  be  entirely  revealed  to 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  77 

him.  He  cannot,  then,  immediately  understand  a  story 
which  he  himself  reads ;  whereas  the  same  words,  if  related 
by  the  teacher,  are  instantly  grasped.  It  is  the  privilege 
only  of  older  children  to  perceive  readily  and  easily  the 
meaning  of  what  they  read. 

From  what  has  preceded,  we  see  that  the  more  thorough 
the  comprehension  of  the  numerous  new  ideas  is,  i.  e.,  the 
more  correct  and  numerous  the  connections  into  which  the 
related  contents  of  the  mind  have  entered,  the  easier  becomes 
the  logical  arrangement  and  perfecting  of  the  knowledge 
acquired.  The  indistinct  general  notions,  which,  as  we  saw, 
being  favored  by  the  names  of  genera,  are  characteristic  of 
childhood,  receive  now  sharper  outlines  and  a  richer  content. 
Let  us  explain  the  origin  of  these  general  notions  clearly 
by  an  example. 

As  long  as  the  child  in  early  youth  saw  only  red  centi- 
folias  he  imagined  all  roses  to  be  red  and  full.  Then  in  a 
field  somewhei'e  he  found  a  bush  with  similar  flowers,  but 
they  were  neither  red  nor  filled.  That  seemed  strange  to  , 
him,  and  for  a  moment  he  was  in  doubt  whether  he  had 
before  him  an  entirely  new  plant,  or  one  already  familiar. 
For,  the  related  idea  of  the  centifolia,  which  was  repro- 
duced by  the  new  observation,  differed  from  it  in  several 
striking  particulars.  But  however  strange  this  may  have 
seemed  at  first,  there  were  decidedly  more  characteristics  in 
which  the  two  agreed  than  in  which  they  differed.  And 
therefore  the  mind  (in  accordance  with  its  peculiar  nature, 
which  everj-where  struggles  for  unity  and  order  among  its 
ideas)  emphasized,  as  the  essential  part,  that  which  was 
common  to  the  two  perceptions,  and  classed  the  new  under 
the  old  as  being  similar  to  it.  The  child  expressed  this  con- 
clusion in  the  words,  ' '  That  is  a  rose  too,  but  a  white  and 
simple  one."     In  spite   of   several   points  of   contrast,  he 


78  APPERCEPTION. 

united  the  new  perception  with  the  old  idea,  and  applied  the 
name  rose  to  the  former  because  it  had  too  much  in  common 
with  the  latter  to  allow  their  complete  separation.  Had  the 
name  of  the  genus,  rose,  been  given  to  him  simultaneously 
with  the  new  perception,  the  apperception  would  have  taken 
place  much  more  easily  and  quickly.  But  at  all  events  it 
was  not  the  result  of  a  special  act  of  the  will,  of  consciously 
directed  thought ;  the  mind  created  rather  the  general  notion 
while  involuntarily  observing  the  content  of  the  individual 
notions  that  were  fused.  Further,  neither  of  the  two  was 
able  to  assert  a  superiority  over  the  other ;  wherefore  it  re- 
mains doubtful  which  should  be  regarded  as  subject,  which 
as  object  of  the  apperception. 

But  this  process  of  apperception  will  be  altered  now,  since 
in  the  course  of  time  the  child's  experience  and  mental 
capacity  increase ;  foi*  he  becomes  acquainted  with  new 
species  of  the  rose,  for  instance  the  yellow  and  the  moss 
roses,  and  observes  them  more  minutely.  Every  new  sim- 
ilar perception  is  then  welcomed  by  a  related  group  of  ideas 
in  the  general  concept,  which  is  superior  to  the  new  percep- 
tion in  the  extent  and  strength  of  its  connections.  When  a 
perception  joins  such  a  group,  it  surrenders  its  independent 
existence  in  order  to  enrich  the  apperceiving  notions  with 
one  or  more  new  properties.  Each  one  of  these  new  ob- 
servations, therefore,  enriches  and  perfects  the  concept  rose, 
and  when  the  latter  contains  most  of  the  essential  character- 
ictics,  the  child  may  be  said  to  have  the  concept  rose.  It 
contains  many  non-essentials  also,  but,  on  account  of  the 
differences  among  them,  they  cannot  rise  to  the  degree  of 
clearness  attained  by  those  elements  common  to  all  the 
notions  of  the  genus.  While  in  early  youth  this  fusion  of  a 
new  idea  with  a  related  older  one  took  place  wholly  uncon- 
sciously (although  it  was  in  obedience    to  certain  laws  of 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  79 

logic),  it  now  becomes  a  conscious  act.  Some  reflection 
precedes  the  apperception :  the  child  draws  conclusions,  he 
passes  judgments,  he  thinks.  The  final  judgment  is  the 
simplest  expression  of  the  completed  apperception.  When 
he  says,  "That  too  (i.  e.,  the  moss  rose)  is  a  rose,"  it 
means  simply  that  the  subject  (namel}',  the  new  perception 
which  at  first  could  not  be  classed)  has  been  apperceived  by 
the  predicate  (the  notion  rose,  already  at  hand).  We  shall 
later  on  consider  the  fact  that  concepts  arising  in  this  man- 
ner possess,  on  account  of  their  greater  perfection,  far 
greater  apperceiving  power  than  the  indistinct  general  no- 
tions of  childhood. 

While  the  child  is  growing  intellectually,  he  is  making 
progress  ethically  as  well.  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
ruling  sphere  of  ideas  and  emotions  determines  in  the  main 
the  moral  insight  of  the  human  being.  He  usually  judges 
his  own  moral  worth  and  that  of  others  according  to  what 
he  himself  loves,  or  what  he  wishes  and  longs  for  for  him- 
self. There  is,  therefore,  no  doubt  but  that  in  early  youth, 
as  well  as  in  infancy,  the  feelings  and  interests  of  sense 
influence  to  a  considerable  extent  the  moral  consciousness 
of  man.  Indeed  they  can  become  the  one  controlling  group 
of  ideas  among  bad  and  uneducated  children ;  with  these 
anything  is  permissible  that  pleases.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  the  case  of  the  well-trained  child,  they  are  subordinated 
more  and  more  to  the  ideal  example  of  the  parents.  He  no 
longer  follows  blindly  this  authority,  to  which  he  has  always 
been  subject.  But  by  comparing  them  with  other  persons 
and  with  his  own  imperfect  being,  he  comes  gradually  to 
feel  an  unlimited  reverence  for  his  parents,  which  makes 
voluntary  obedience  toward  them  a  duty,  and  causes  their 
example  to  be  regarded  as  a  model.  And  soon  other 
authority  is  associated  with  theirs ;  namely,  that  of  teachers, 


80  APPERCEPTION. 

near  relatives,  leaders  among  school  companions,  and  masters 
with  their  servants.  Especially  in  sacred  history  does  God, 
the  Perfect  and  Just  One,  appear  as  the  highest  authority, 
whose  supreme  will  and  control  impress  themselves  indelibly 
upon  the  pupil's  mind.  These  are  the  examples  which  especially 
determine  his  moral  conceptions,  and  hence  control  his  apper- 
ception on  moral  questions.  They  are  vividl}^  in  mind  when 
he  acts;  they  are  his  conscience.  Not  as  though  he  were 
unable  to  distinguish  for  himself  what  is  good  or  bad.  He 
knows  unworthy  deeds  or  worthy  motives  in  themselves 
very  well,  entirely  apart  from  all  thought  of  what  his  parents, 
or  teacher,  or  God,  would  say  on  the  matter.  But  such  pure, 
independent  moral  feelings  and  judgments  do  not  appear 
at  this  stage  of  development  in  the  abstract,  but  rather  in 
connection  with  certain  model  examples.  Just  as  the 
thought  of  a  child  in  all  spheres  of  knowledge  deals  in  part 
with  very  imperfect  general  pictures,  not  with  general  con- 
cepts, so  in  the  field  of  ethics  his  morality  does  not  show  itself 
effective  in  the  abstract  form  of  the  idea,  —  the  jyrincijde,  — 
but  in  the  concrete  form  of  the  ideal.  When  one  obserN-es 
closely  what  guides  the  moral  judgment  in  early  youth, 
one  finds  that,  in  most  cases,  the  example  of  some  real 
person  closely  related  to  the  child  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously exerts  a  deciding  influence  in  the  apperception,  and 
thus  largely  determines  the  will. 

We  come  now  to  the  third  stage  of  development,  which 
covers  a  riper  age  of  boys  and  girls,  the  period  from  eleven 
to  fourteen  years  of  age.  Here  the  processes  in  apperception 
are  much  the  same  as  those  we  have  already  seen  in  the 
preceding  stage.  For  instruction  still  continues  to  enlarge 
the  child's  experience  by  means  of  words,  pictures  and  the 
presentation  of  new  concrete  objects.  But  the  demands 
now  made  upon  his  ability  are  raised.     The  world  of  forms 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  81 

and  symbols  comes  more  to  the  front  than  heretofore,  and 
these  the  pupil  is  to  fill  with  ideas  and  thoughts  from  his 
mental  store.  If  he  studies  intelligently  he  must  see  the 
figures  in  Drawing  and  Geometry  as  real  bodies,  and  learn 
to  interpret  mere  outlines  differently  according  to  their 
shading  and  color.  The  familiar  formula  of  Geometry, 
"Imagine  a  line  drawn,"  etc.,  involves  a  somewhat  difficult 
process  of  apperception.  Geography  imposes  an  equally 
difficult  task  upon  the  pupil  when  it  requires  him  to  translate 
the  mute  symbols  of  the  map  into  fresh-colored  images  of 
mountain  ranges  and  broad  plains,  of  snow-capped  mountain 
peaks  and  deep  valleys,  of  rivers  and  lakes  and  the  bound- 
less ocean,  of  villages  and  cities,  fortifications  and  all  the 
various  objects  of  human  interest.  The  thought-studies  rely 
more  than  heretofore  on  mere  words  to  produce  new  ideas 
and  knowledge,  and  it  is  the  pupil's  duty  to  bring  to  bear 
the  best  he  can  from  within  himself ;  i.  e. ,  through  his  inner 
perceptions  to  put  meaning  into  the  words  he  hears,  or,  as 
has  been  well  said,  to  follow  the  teacher's  discourse  by  the 
help  of  the  imagination. 

And  likewise,  when  reading,  the  pupil  must  now  learn  to 
apperceive  the  thought  at  the  same  time  with  the  printed 
symbols,  to  read  while  thinking  and  to  understand  while 
reading.  He  shows  himself  better  and  better  prepared  to 
meet  such  a  great  demand  for  apperceiving  ability  ;  for  the 
ideas  which  now  stand  at  his  disposal  for  the  comprehension 
of  the  new  matter  are  much  more  numerous  and  correct  than 
iu  the  former  stages.  Also  many  of  his  concrete  notions  have 
become  condensed  into  clear  concepts  and  united  into  groups 
and  series.  This  more  closely  associated  and  richer  store 
of  knowledge  is  eager  for  employment,  and  shows  itself 
effective  with  every  new  related  perception.  It  not  only 
sharpens  the  senses  so  that  they  observe  what  easily  remains 


82  APPERCEPTION. 

hidden  to  the  untrained  eye,  but  it  teadicn  also  to  compre- 
hend more  corrertltf,  reasonabb/  and  rapidly.  By  the  help 
of  the  apperceiving  concepts  new  facts  find  the  right  ex- 
planation with  greater  certainty,  and  secure  their  proper 
places  in  the  thought-structure.  Hence  it  happens  that  a 
pupil  in  an  advanced  chiss  observes  a  plant,  an  animal,  a 
natural  phenomenon,  with  very  ditTerent  eyes  from  those  of 
a  child  in  a  beginning  class,  —  namely  with  eyes  which  are 
the  result  of  scholastic  knowledge.  lie  is  able  to  apperceive 
not  only  more  forcibly  and  compreliensively,  but  also  more 
correctly.  Whereas  he  was  subjective  and  fanciful  in  his 
interpretation,  he  has  now  become  more  objective  and  reason- 
able. This  change  betrays  itself  in  all  fields  of  knowledge 
by  his  critical  attitude  towards  new  impressions.  "The 
na'ive  manner  in  which,  during  the  firet  half  of  his  sdiool 
life,  he  accepted  old  legends  and  mere  outward  appearances 
as  true,  gives  place  more  and  more  to  a  different  frame  of 
mind  and  behavior.  The  riper  scholar  does  not  believe 
everything  so  unhesitatingly,  but  begins  to  ask  for  proofs ; 
and  where  freedom  of  speech  is  allowed,  he  does  not  grant 
immediately  the  reasons  and  proofs  given,  but,  instead, 
weighs  them  in  discussions  that  are  often  spirited."  ' 

It  is  true  that  critical,  thorough  and  objective  knowledge 
is  present  in  full  measure  only  when  one  thinks  in  real 
concepts.  Still  the  foundation  for  such  thinking  is  being 
already  laid  at  this  age.  In  the  previous  periods  of  de- 
velopment the  mind  reveals  its  effort  to  establish  tinity  and 
order  among  its  products  by  forming  its  ideas  into  group 
series ;  now,  since  the  quantity  of  knowledge  threatens  to 
become  unmanageable,  it  is  active  in  uniting  these  groups 
into  concepts  and  general  rules,  into  laws  and  principles. 
The  boy  feels  the  need  of  giving  greater  clearness  and  unity 

>  Pfisterer,  p.  241. 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  83 

to  what  he  knows,  and  of  advancing  from  uncertain  general 
pictures  to  clarified  concepts.  And  so  he  exercises  his 
thought  in  the  criticism  of  those  general  pictures  which 
his  growing  insight  has  shown  to  be  inadequate.  Such 
childish  definitions  as,  "  One  who  lies  tells  an  untruth,"  or 
"  An  echo  is  that  which  returns  again  when  it  is  thrown 
against  the  wall,"  no  longer  satisfy  the  youth.  He  strives 
now  for  a  stronger  grasp  of  ideas  in  order  to  meet  the  ob- 
jections of  his  school  companions.  Under  the  teacher's  lead- 
ership he  endeavors  clearly  to  separate  from  one  another, 
fields  of  thought  that  are  related,  and  therefore  such  as 
could  be  easily  confused ;  also  to  become  acquainted  with 
and  to  comprehend  all  the  ideas  under  one  and  the  same  con- 
cept, so  that  no  essential  characteristic  of  the  latter  may 
escape  him.  He  compares  and  distinguishes  the  material 
collected,  associates  elements  that  have  heretofore  stood 
isolated  in  his  mind,  or  breaks  up  groups  of  ideas  that  are 
incompatible  with  one  another;  he  unites  the  similar  and 
separates  the  dissimilar,  and  all  the  time  travels  about 
through  various  sets  of  notions  with  a  speed  and  ease  which 
find  their  only  explanation  in  the  activity  of  apperception. 
Similar  or  related  members  of  reproduced  series  set  in  mo- 
tion the  thought-groups  to  which  they  belong  and  help  pre- 
serve their  union,  thus  rendering  a  thoughtful,  reflective 
study  of  the  same  an  easy  matter.  The  apperceiving  atten- 
tion scarcely  allows  any  notion  that  is  within  the  horizon  of 
consciousness  or  beyond  it  to  escape,  provided  it  falls  under 
the  general  concept,  or  even  appears  to.  It  recognizes  the 
essential  in  everything,  and  instinctively  anticipates  that 
which  subsequent  reflection  establishes  as  correct.  This 
latter  has  simply  to  choose  out  the  important  characteristics 
already  partly  known,  separate  them  from  the  non-essentials 
and  unite  them  into  a  pure  concept,  or  definition. 


84  APPERCEPTION. 

Logical  concepts  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  i.  e.,  such 
as  contain  no  non-essential,  accidental  property  whatever, 
are,  to  be  sure,  like  the  ideals  that  human  effort  never 
succeeds  in  fully  realizing.  Even  adults  can  attain  them 
only  approximately  in  their  thinking.  ^ 

Naturally  enougli  then,  children  will  seldom  reach  them. 
They  think  chiefly  in  psychological  concepts.  But  these  can 
receive  such  a  clarification  that  they  perform  almost  the 
same  service  for  knowledge  as  the  logical  concepts.  And 
it  is  just  such  clarified  general  ideas,  suJlicient  for  logical 
thinking,  that  the  boy  is  acquiring  and  can  acquire,  through 
apperception,  in  all  fields  of  knowledge.  They,  together 
with   the   rules    and   laws  to  which,  at  a  maturer  age,  he 

'This  is  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  concept.  It  is  not,  as 
has  been  stated  in  our  former  editious,  a  new  and  separate  creation  pro- 
duced by  tlie  soul,  originating  from  the  fusion  of  the  common  and  essen- 
tial characteristics  of  similar  notions.  "We  understand,  on  the  contrary, 
under  concept  the  entirety  of  the  similar  essential  characteristics  which 
thought,  passing  through  the  notions  rapidly,  chooses  from  among  thorn 
and  holds  side  by  side  in  consciousness.  It  is  not  a  new  mental  product 
existing  apart  from  and  outside  of  the  concrete  notions;  but  it  is 
thought  out  each  time,  inasmuch  as  a  person  from  among  tlie  numerous 
ideas  of  the  same  kind  (or  also  from  only  one  idea)  lifts  exclusively  the 
essential  characteristics  into  the  centre  of  cunsciouiiness  and  endeavors  to 
isolate  them  from  the  others,  which  recede  or  withdraw  (an  attempt  that 
is  always,  of  course,  only  partially  successful).  It  is  like  a  melody,  which 
can  be  easily  distinguished  in  a  piece  of  music  of  several  parts  on  account 
of  special  emphasis  or  peculiar  registering,  while,  however,  it  never 
ceases  to  form  a  constituent  part  of  the  separate  accords.  It  happens  to 
us  regularly,  when  we  attempt  really  to  think  a  concept  and  nut  simply 
repeat  the  words  of  the  definition,  that  we  involuntarily  glide  down 
among  its  individual  notions,  that  we  hasten  through  those  quickly  and 
emphasize  what  is  common  and  essential,  rejecting  the  non-es.suntial. 
The  general  is  nut  really  separated  from  the  particular,  but  only  distin- 
guished from  it;  for  deep  down  in  consciousness  it  is  always  united  with 
what  is  concrete.  And  for  just  that  reason,  because  the  concept  is  not  a 
finished  product,  but  the  result  each  time  of  a  very  energetic  cencentra- 
tion  of  consciousness,  it  issodiflicult  to  think  itstrictly  in  the  logical  form. 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  86 

gladly  rises  out  of  the  multiplicity  of  phenomena,  constitute 
the  apperceiving  agents  through  which,  in  the  future,  he 
comprehends  his  new  experiences  more  correctly  and  rapidly 
than  heretofore.  The  most  important  effect  of  instruction 
is  that  it  makes  the  pupil  more  and  more  capable  of  apper- 
ception, i.  e.,  independent  thinking,  and  therefore  less  subject 
to  the  control  of  outward  impressions.  "With  every  new  effec- 
tive act  of  apperception  that  instruction  superintends,  he 
becomes  better  able  to  protect  himself  from  the  forces  of  the 
mechanism  of  ideas,  from  the  power  of  mere  fancies,  and  to 
follow  a  definite  purpose  in  collecting  and  concentrating  his 
ideas.  Thus  while  the  quantity  of  his  thought  has  grown 
larger,  the  energy  of  his  tliinking  has  also  increased ;  he 
has  acquired  greater  ability  to  hold  many  thoughts  together 
at  one  time,  to  examine  critically  large  groups  of  ideas,  and 
has  thus  gained  the  most  correct  concept  possible. 

In  the  sphere  of  moral  thoughts  and  deeds  the  feelings  of 
sense  do  not  predominate  to  such  an  extent  as  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  development.  They  are  counterbalanced  by 
higher,  spiritual  interests  that  have  awakened  with  the  de- 
velopment of  a  valuable  thought-content. 

As  noticed  above,  successful  apperception  is  the  source 
of  interest.  In  proportion  as  the  field  within  which  active 
apperception  is  employed  is  rich,  interest  will  be  many- 
sided  and  the  will  manifold  and  strong.  The  child's  mind 
is  now  no  longer  entirely  absorbed  in  bodily  satisfactions, 
but  it  begins  to  concern  itself  with  higher  things.  The  enjoy- 
ment of  well-mastered  knowledge,  of  aesthetic  forms  and  of 
independent  thought,  enlarges  the  child's  idea  of  happiness. 
But  however  much  these  intellectual  interests  may  pave  the 
way  for  a  moral  disposition  and  lend  it  support,  ihoy  are 
still  not  necessarily  bound  up  with  it.  They  may  just  as 
readily    serve    a    naked    egoism,   which   cultivates   virtue 


86  APPERCEPTION. 

merely  to  gain  advancement,  asking  first,  what  profit  or 
hinderance  will  it  be  tome?  Where  this  disposition  dom- 
inates thought  and  effort,  there  can  be  no  objective  and 
purely  ethical  judgment  of  one's  own  or  of  others'  purposes ; 
but  in  such  cases  apperception  is  mingled  with  selfish,  pleas- 
ure-seeking prejudices.  Who  would  deny  that  the  boy  is 
often  inclined  to  such  a  view  of  life? 

But  a  painstaking  education  tries  to  prevent  such  a 
tendency  from  becoming  a  habitual  drift  of  one's  nature. 
We  have  seen  before  how  the  living  example  of  parents  and 
teachers  may  become  such  a  power  over  the  child,  under 
normal  conditions,  that  he  will  find  it  difficult  to  resist  its 
influence.  Those  ideal  characters  also,  drawn  from  sacred 
and  from  profane  history,  with  which  instruction  makes  him 
acquainted,  may  now  exercise  upon  him  more  and  more  of 
their  formative  power.  And  just  this  fancied  intercourse 
with  historical  persons  is  able,  in  a  high  degree,  to  generate 
pure,  moral  thinking.  So  long  as  a  child  exercises  his 
moral  judgment  upon  himself  and  his  surroundings,  the  de- 
cision is  seldom  free  from  selfish  interest  and  is  therefore 
seldom  objective.  How  easily  and  even  unconsciously  he 
allows  himself  to  be  led  by  secret  wishes  or  by  a  regard  for 
other  persons.  Very  different  is  it  when,  in  fancied  inter- 
course with  ideal  persons  of  antiquity,  the  child  is  impelled 
to  ethical  perception  and  judgment.  Those  historical 
characters  are  persons  to  whom  he  can  do  neither  a  favor 
nor  an  injury,  and  they  in  turn  have  no  power  either  to 
benefit  or  harm  him.  Here  the  moral  judgment  can  ripen  in 
perfect  freedom,  uninfluenced  by  other  interests  or  by 
reference  to  the  child's  own  actions.  Here  the  boy  first 
shows  his  inclination  and  capacity  to  estimate  moral  disposi- 
tions objectively  and  trains  himself  to  a  pure  ethical  com- 
prehension.    In  the  historical  world  that  now  finds  entrance 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  87 

to  his  head  and  heart,  he  discovers  a  second  power  of 
soul  that  gives  direction  to  his  ethical  perception.  But  the 
ethical  types  which  real  and  fancied  intercourse  with  ideal 
persons  present  to  him,  are  the  foundation  upon  which 
thought  gradually  builds  up  general  requirements  and  com- 
mands, as  they  have  found  classical  expression,  for  example, 
in  the  decalogue.  With  the  aid  of  such  general  and  uni- 
versal precepts,  which  the  boy  has  acquired  and  stored 
away,  he  now  apperceives  his  own  action  and  that  of  others. 
They  are  the  rules  to  which  he  subjects  conduct.  But  those 
rules  have  not  yet  acquired  for  him  the  weight  of  principles. 
For,  however  completely  they  may  have  found  acceptance 
with  him,  they  yet  remain  to  him,  primarily,  only  the  ex- 
pression of  the  divine  will,  — not  self-given  rules,  but  com- 
mands. Behind  all  the  ethical  rules  that  he  has  recognized 
as  valid  stands  God  as  a  power  commanding  reverence,  who 
maintains  his  precepts  intact  and  for  whose  sake  the  child 
incorporates  them  into  his  own  will.  "  To  have  God  before 
one's  eyes  "  —  with  these  words  of  the  sacred  text  one  might 
summarize  and  illustrate  the  character  of  ethical  appercep- 
tion that  is  suited  to  a  well-bred  boy  in  our  present  stage  of 
culture. 

At  first  the  child's  own  body  was  the  starting  point  and 
centre  of  all  his  feeling  and  desires,  but  the  youth  learns 
gradually  to  look  upon  his  body  as  a  part  of  the  external 
world,  and  with  every  fresh  inner  experience  his  self -con- 
sciousness retreats  more  and  more  into  the  introspective  life. 
In  his  previously  acquired  ideas  and  feelings  he  now  also  seeks 
his  ego  or  self.  This  entire  self-consciousness  as  the  essential 
basis  of  his  nature  he  sets  over  against  external  impressions 
and  disturbances. 

This  transformation  of  the  notion  of  the  ego  is  carried  out 
most  fully  in  the  next  period  of  development,  young  man- 


88  APPERCEPTION. 

hood,  which  we  must  briefly  consider.  It  is  the  period  of 
the  domination  of  the  sensibilities,  in  which  mental  states 
arising  from  the  feelings  chiefly  guide  the  person.  The  in- 
tellectual feelings  can  develop  in  a  much  richer,  purer  form, 
becoming  stronger,  and  more  permanent,  because  the  con- 
ditions in  favor  of  them  are  present  in  a  far  different  degree 
than  in  previous  stages  of  growth.  Consider,  for  example, 
the  development  of  aesthetic  feeling.  The  admiration  of 
beautiful  forms  appears  quite  early.  The  child,  we  saw,  is 
delighted  with  the  harmony  of  rhyme  and  with  the  smooth 
movement  of  measures.  He  is  able  to  appreciate  the  charm 
of  symmetrical  figures  and  objects,  and  to  prefer  a  beautiful 
face  to  an  ugly  one.  In  addition  to  this  come  the  well- 
devised  plans  of  instruction  for  discovering  and  appre- 
ciating the  beautiful  in  the  simplest  sensations  of  space 
and  tone,  in  geometrical  and  plant  ornamentation,  not  less 
than  in  poem  and  song.  But  they  are  only  isolated  element- 
ary aesthetic  feelings  that  thus  arise,  not  strong  unified  sum- 
totals  that  take  root  in  important  well-connected  masses 
of  thought,  aud  become  stimulated  in  a  greater  degree  by  the 
entire  view  of  a  work  of  art.  That  which  gives  interest  and 
pleasure  to  the  boy  in  viewing  a  painting  or  an  architectural 
work  is  less  the  harmony  of  the  constituent  form-elements, 
less  the  thought  realized,  than  single  unessential  or  accidental 
parts  which  lie  outside  of  the  aesthetic  judgment.  The  right 
understanding  of  a  work  of  art,  and  the  deep  and  pure  feeling 
for  its  beauties,  first  disclose  themselves  to  the  youth  or  man. 
Where  the  variety  of  forms  confuses  the  boy's  mind,  the 
trained  eye  is  able  to  detect  the  law  by  which  the  whole  is 
determined ;  it  reveals  fundamental  forms  that  reappear  in 
the  most  varied  setting,  and  shows  harmonious  construction 
of  the  whole.  So  the  master-piece  of  art  enters  conscious- 
ness in  the  form  of  a  clear  and  well-articulated  total  effect, 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  89 

which,  by  virtue  of  its  form,  awakens  a  strong  and  elevating 
feeling.  But  for  this  mental  picture  we  are  indebted  only  in 
a  small  degree  to  the  ear  and  eye,  which  convey  to  us  the 
sense-impression.  Its  existence  is  due  rather  to  the  power- 
ful influence  of  all  the  memory-pictures  that  we  have  before 
acquired  from  similar  forms,  and  of  the  aesthetic  judgments 
and  feelings  that  sprang  out  of  a  close  observation.  The 
eye,  which  in  observing  a  picture  or  a  Gothic  dome  quickly 
rectifies  itself  and  separates  the  important  from  the  acci- 
dental, is  guided  by  cei'tain  rules  which  it  has  previously 
appropriated  and  is  supported  by  an  acquired  efficiency  in 
supplementing  certain  serial  forms  from  memory.  Since  we 
recognize  familiar  or  similar  things  in  a  work  of  art,  the  eye 
need  not  lose  itself  in  the  parts,  but  may  confine  itself  to  the 
chief  characteristics.  "We  thus  apperceive  the  beautiful  by 
the  aid  of  previously  acquired  aesthetic  perceptions,  and  each 
person's  aesthetic  sensibility  is  dependent  upon  his  memory 
content.  ^ 

This  is  tme  in  a  double  sense  of  those  works  of  art 
which  please  not  only  because  of  the  pure  form,  but  for  the 
sake  of  what  they  signify  or  suggest.  When  we  attribute 
a  thought-content  to  a  painting  or  statue,  or  when  we  find 
pleasure  in  the  actions  or  sensibilities  to  which  they  give 
ideal  expression,  we  comprehend  them  in  accordance  with 
our  own  store  of  ideas  and  feelings,  and  the  aesthetic  impulse 
is  dependent  upon  the  degree  of  thoroughness  and  ease 
with  which  the  apperception  of  the  beautiful  is  accomplished. 
But  this  kind  of  apperception  presupposes  such  a  wealth  of 
knowledge  alid  inner  experience  as  one  does  not  usually 
acquire   before   young   manhood.     We   have   in    mind   not 

The  knowledge  of  tliis  dependence  of  our  sense  of  form  upon  revived 
memory  pictures  has  led  even  to  the  formation  of  anew  law  controlling 
the  whole  SBsthetics  of  form. 


90  APPERCEPTION. 

simply  such  master-pieces  as  Raphael's  Disputation  and  the 
School  of  Athens,  or  Kaulbach's  Destruction  of  Jerusalem, 
or  the  pediment  group  of  the  Parthenon,  whose  sesthetic 
appreciation  is  conditioned  upon  numerous  religious,  histori- 
cal and  mythological  facts,  but  chiefly  upon  all  those  works 
of  art  whose  beauty  can  onlj'  be  revealed  to  a  soul  which 
has  known  and  experienced  all  those  feelings,  passions  and 
conflicts  which  And  representiition  in  these  works.  ^ 

Sympathetic  feeling  of  joy  or  sorrow  is,  like  aesthetic  ap- 
preciation, dependent  upon  the  content  of  our  memory,  upon 
what  we  have  pondered  and  experienced  in  our  own  hearts. 

But  we  can  share  the  feelings  of  another  person.  Since 
they  cannot  be  directly  perceived  by  us,  they  must  manifest 
themselves  by  peculiar  changes  in  the  various  physical 
organs,  through  the  agency  of  words,  manners,  gestures  and 
other  external  signs.  The  instant  we  perceive  these,  there 
arises  above  the  threshold  of  thought,  in  accordance  with  the 
law  of  indirect  reproduction,  the  notion  of  identical  or  similar 
expressions  of  feeling  as  we  have  observed  them  previously 
in  ourselves;  and  frequently  they  appear  with  a  strength 
and  life  that  cause  us  to  imitate  involuntarily  the  move- 
ments of  another.  According  as  this  group  of  ideas  acquires 
total  or  partial  reproductiou,  it  enters  into  a  relation  of 
interchange  with  the  signs  of  feeling  that  we  have  observed 
in  others,  and  as  soon  as  the  similar  elements  in  the  two 
groups  predominate,  they  fuse  together  completely.  Now 
for  the  first  time  the  mind,  by  the  aid  of  the  old  group,  is  able 


>The  youQg  man  now  interprets  the' voices  of  nature  in  a  different 
strain  from  that  of  his  cliildhood  and  gives  a  different  meaning  to  the 
simple  childliood's  song  of  the  swallow,  and  with  ]>oetic  sympathy 
follows  the  poet  when  he  sins-s :  — 

"  When  I  said  farewell,  when  I  aaid  farewell, 
The  world  was  full  and  fair  ; 
When  I  came  a(^in,  when  I  came  agalu, 
It  had  grown  so  poor  and  bare." 


THE   THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  91 

to  interpret  the  new  perception.  The  old  ideas  supplement 
the  latter,  since  by  the  analogy  of  experience  we  can  con- 
jecture what  is  taking  place  in  the  mind  of  another,  when  the 
latter,  for  instance,  blushing,  drops  the  eyes  or  stammers 
confused  words ;  we  can  tell  what  thoughts  are  storming 
upon  him  in  the  moment  when  sighs  are  forced  from  him  and 
tears  stream  from  his  eyes.  Now  we  understand  the  words, 
manners,  and  gestures  of  another.  There  is  but  one  step 
more  to  sympathy. 

The  apperceiving  group  of  ideas  was  previously  the  seat 
of  a  feeling  by  virtue  of  the  constraining  or  stimulating 
conditions  existing  within  it  or  in  consequence  of  its  value 
for  the  ego.  While  this  group  of  ideas  is  being  reproduced 
and  strengthened  by  fusion  with  other  new  and  similar 
perceptions,  the  aforesaid  constraining  and  stimulating  re- 
lations are  produced  anew,  and  the  relations  to  the  self  are 
recognized  again,  so  that  a  similar  feeling  arises  above  the 
threshold  of  consciousness.  But  it  has  a  like  significance 
with  the  feeling  of  another  person,  since  they  are  the  same, 
or  at  least  similar  notions  out  of  which  both  spring.  At 
the  moment  when  we  understand  our  neighbor,  when  an 
appreciation  of  his  mental  state  is  complete,  we  feel  his  joy 
or  grief ;  we  have  sympathy  with  him  as  if  we  were  touched 
with  the  same  cause  of  feeling. 

But  the  way  to  symjftithy,  as  pointed  out  in  the  foregoing 
discussion,  is  through  apperception.  Without  it  there  is  no 
appreciation  of  others'  states  of  feeling.  Where  this  is  lack- 
ing, the  joy  or  sorrow  of  our  neighbor  knocks  in  vain  at  the 
door  of  our  inner  life ;  there  remains  no  sympathy  with  weal 
or  woe.  And  now  we  understand  why  the  child,  which  is 
usually  so  inclined  to  share  the  pain  of  another,  limits  its 
sympathy  mostly  to  the  narrow  circle  of  its  own  nearest 
acquaintance ;  also  how  the  boy  can  pitilessly  and  thought- 


92  APPERCEPTION. 

lessly  injure  another's  success,  or  coolly  ignore  his  need.  We 
find  it  explicable  that  even  well-meaning  children  are  often 
guilty  of  an  apparent  cruelty  which  is  certainly  foreign  to 
their  nature,  that  they  can  play  thoughtlessly  beside  the  coflin 
of  a  loved  one  without  feeling  the  loss  or  understanding  the 
tears  and  grief  of  their  friends.  It  would  be  an  error  to 
infer  a  wicked  and  hardened  disposition  or  a  rude  and 
depraved  nature,  where  sympathy  with  othei-s'  weal  or  woe 
is  lacking.  In  very  many  such  cases  there  is  only  a  lack  of 
apperception.  One  cannot  put  himself  in  the  place  of  his 
neighbor,  since  the  latter  moves  in  an  entirely  different 
circle  of  thought ;  one  cannot  sympathize  with  him  because 
one  has  not  experienced  what  troubles  or  exalts  him  :  his 
feelings  awaken  nothing  kindred  in  the  soul  of  the  observer. 
But  whenever  the  sight  of  a  suffering  or  rejoicing  neighbor 
transports  one  vividly  into  the  time  of  his  own  success  or 
misfortune,  where  one  hopes  or  fears  for  himself  what 
happens  to  another,  there  a  strong  and  living  sympathy  will 
not  easily  fail ;  there  it  constrains  even  hard  hearts.  In  a 
beautiful  and  fitting  manner  the  immortal  Homer,  in  a 
scene  of  the  Iliad,  has  vividly  represented  this  psychical 
process.  Hector,  the  splendid  hero,  has  just  fallen  before 
the  walls  of  Troy.  No  favor  is  shown  him  by  his  rival,  the 
fearfully  angered  Achilles.  ''Be  silent  and  conjure  me  not 
on  bended  knees,  nor  in  behalf  of  thy  parents,  for  no  one 
shall  drive  the  dogs  from  thy  head."  —  Thus  had  he 
darkly  answered  the  petitioner  and,  without  reganl  for  the 
distress  of  the  despairing  parents,  he  dragged  the  body 
through  the  dust,  visiting  ujwn  his  enemy  a  treatment  un- 
worthy even  of  an  iron  heart.  Daily  he  repeats  the  shame- 
less deed,  pondering  how  he  may  most  completely  avenge  his 
friend  Patroklus.  Then  on  the  twelfth  night  there  appears 
before  him  the  gray-haired  father  of  Hector.     While  pray- 


THE   THEORY  ,0F   APPERCEPTION.  93 

ing  for  the  body  of  his  slain  son,  he  reminds  Achilles  of  the 
aging  father  whom  he  has  left  behind  in  his  distant  home, 
how  the  latter  is  even  now,  perhaps,  hard-pressed  by  sur- 
rounding peoples,  and,  deprived  of  help  and  protection, 
longing  for  the  joy  of  his  age,  his  only  son,  as  he  waits 
for  his  retuni.  "  Like  grief  has  fallen  upon  me,"  continues 
Priam,  "and  worse.  Not  only  have  I  lost  a  son,  who 
protected  the  city  and  all  of  us,  and  the  fifty  sous  who  were 
born  to  me,  but  even  now  I  press  to  my  lips  the  baud  that 
has  slain  my  children."  Silently  Achilles  receives  the 
words  of  the  king.  But  as  the  latter  speaks  to  him  of  the 
father  at  home,  a  thousand  thoughts  rush  through  his  mind 
and  awaken  feelings  of  longing  and  sorrow.  For  he  con- 
siders how,  according  to  the  decree  of  the  gods,  he  shall 
never  ^ee  his  home,  how  he  is  early  to  descend  to  Hades, 
and  will  never  provide  for  his  aged  father.  And  as  grief 
now  enters  his  own  soul,  suddenly  his  understanding  opens 
to  the  grief  of  the  suppliant  old  man.  The  same  Achilles 
who  rejoiced  so  jubilantly  at  the  fall  of  his  enemy,  who 
heartlessly  abused  and  dishonored  the  dead,  knows  now 
how  deeply  the  unhappy  father  suffers,  who  lies  before  him 
in  the  dust.  He  feels  in  his  own  distress  the  grief  of  an- 
other. The  ice  which  enveloped  the  cold  and  even  cruel 
heart  of  the  young  man,  is  now  melted  away ;  he  weeps 
with  the  king,  he  springs  down  from  the  seat  and,  lifting  the 
old  man  by  the  hand,  speaks'  to  him  these  words  of  sym- 
pathy: "Unfortunate  man,  of  a  truth  thou  hast  endured 
much  grief  of  heart." 

Thus  pain  and  grief  make  the  heart  receptive  •  for  all  ten- 
der impulses  and  feelings.  This  is  the  blessing  of  sorrow  — 
that  the  /which  in  success  and  pleasure  is  easily  isolated 
and  subject  to  egoism,  is  expanded  to  the  unselfish  and 
sympathetic  tee,  that  it  deepens  the  heart  and  plants  in  it  a 


94  APPERCEPTION. 

living  sympathy.  Perpetual  sunshine  and  an  unbroken  suc- 
cession of  fortunate  days  would  little  enrich  our  soul-life ; 
for  as  Riickers  says:  "The  stream  flows  turbid  that  has 
not  passed  through  a  lake ;  the  heart  is  still  impure  that  has 
never  known  son'ow." 

The  more  a  human  being  has  tasted  grief  in  the  school  of 
heart-trouble,  and  the  more  he  has  deeply  experienced  the 
changes  of  fortune,  the  more  easily  and  fully  can  he  under- 
stand another's  state  of  feeling,  the  quicker  can  he  rejoice 
with  those  who  do  rejoice  and  weep  with  those  who  mourn. 
For  this  reason  the  well  trained  young  man  will  ever  dis- 
tinguish himself  above  the  boy  by  the  strength  and  variety 
of  his  sympathetic  feelings. 

But  this  enriching  and  deepening  of  soul  experiences  (sen- 
sibilities) is  in  the  main  identical  with  the  promotion  of  moral 
disposition,  of  will  action.  For  it  is  in  the  feelings  that  our 
interests,  inclinations,  desires  and  undertakings  find  root. 
The  more  our  nobler  intellectual  feelings  grow  and  prevail, 
the  less  can  impure,  low  thoughts  and  inclinations  manifest 
themselves ;  the  greater  the  strength  with  which  moral  feel- 
ing speaks  to  us,  the  oftener  does  the  will  follow  it.  lie- 
sides  this,  with  feeling  the  inner  perception  grows  in  vivid- 
ness and  power.  The  periods  when  those  states  of  mind 
prevail  whicii  are  dominated  by  feeling,  are  also  the  periods 
of  quiet  introspection  and  sober  self -observation.  Just  as 
the  young  man  in  the  field*  of  scientific  knowledge  has 
learned  to  gather  up  and  bind  together  his  thoughts,  so  now 
he  is  better  able  to  hold  fast,  to  contemplate  and  to  i)ass 
judgment  upon  the  pictures  presented  by  his  own  will  and 
conduct.  And  now  when  he  applies  to  these  the  standards 
which  he  has  acquired  in  his  intercourse  with  real  autl  fan- 
cied persons,  when  he  api>erceive8  them  by  means  of  the 
ethical  laws,  as  the  purpose  of  his  teachera  and  the  will  of 


THE  THEORY   OF   APPERCEPTION.  95 

God  have  represented  them,  a  living  moral  sensibility  is  cer- 
tain to  follow.  Inner  satisfaction  will  succeed  when  conduct 
corresponds  to  the  type  and  awakens  a  desire  always  thus  to 
act  in  similar  cases.  In  the  form  of  remorse,  or  a  torturing 
feeling  of  pain,  on  the  other  hand,  there  will  be  the  attend- 
ant conviction  that  his  acts  of  will  cannot  stand  in  the 
presence  of  his  moral  patterns,  and  the  urgent  requirement 
springs  up  to  be  more  careful  in  the  future  and  *to  avoid  the 
repetition  of  such  humiliating  moments.  To  be  sure,  ego- 
tistical ideas  and  motives,  the  consideration  of  one's  own 
sensuous  comfort,  the  lower  feelings  and  inclinations  will 
manifest  themselves  all  too  soon,  in  order  to  make  excuse 
for  the  mutually  criminating  ideas,  to  apperceive  the  present 
case  of  conduct  in  accordance  with  selfish  pi'inciples  and  in- 
terests, and  thus  to  give  it  another  and  more  favorable  turn. 
"  Necessity  knows  no  law,"  "Each  one  is  his  own  nearest 
neighbor,"  "  One  must  howl  with  the  wolves,"  "  When  one 
is  in  Rome  one  must  do  as  the  Romans  do "  —  these  are 
some  of  those  maxims  of  worldly  wisdom,  which  seek  to  gain 
acceptance  and  indeed  in  many  cases  determine  the  valua- 
tion of  a  moral  object. 

And  yet  the  more  vividly  and  feelingly  the  pure  model  of 
his  earthly  and  heavenly  authorities  stands  before  the  soul, 
together  with  the  remembrance  of  all  those  cases  in  which 
he  has  followed  it  with  self-satisfaction,  and  the  more  his 
moral  judgment  and  feeling  have  been  developed  in  freedom, 
purity  and  strength  in  accordance  with  the  ideal  characters 
of  history,  so  much  more  will  such  experience  stand  forth 
as  psychical  forces,  as  a  power  which  works  manfully  against 
egotistic  tendencies.  They  will  not  always  preponderate  in 
the  moment  of  decision,  but  they  will  at  least  secure  an  au- 
dience aftei^wards  as  the  voice  of  conscience.  And  thus  out 
of  such  experiences,  bound  up  with  elevating  or  humiliating 


96  APPERCEPTION. 

feelings;  out  of  right  principles,  which  spring  from  rcmorao 
or  from  moral  self-satisfaction,  along  the  pathway  of  apper- 
ception, gradually  a  rule,  or  universal  ethical  judgment  arises, 
which  stretches  over  a  whole  multitude  of  the  same  or  sim- 
ilar exercises  of  will.  But  it  will  be  set  up  with  the  firm 
determination  that  it  shall  prevail  as  a  law  for  our  conduct 
in  all  the  future.  A  new  temper  of  will  begins  therefore  to 
spring  up,  whose  object  and  content  is  that  nile,  or  rather 
the  corresponding  command,  which  the  young  man  once 
learned  to  know  and  estimate  as  God's  or  man's  will.  But 
now  it  presents  itself  to  him,  not  as  the  expression  of  an- 
other's, but  as  the  content  of  his  own  will;  not  as  a  com- 
mand, but  as  his  own  free  determination ;  not  as  a  precept 
that  one  can  approve  and  then  fail  to  act  in  accordance 
with,  but  as  a  fundamental  law  that  is  obligatory  for  his 
own  action.  In  this  way  the  young  man  gradually  trans- 
forms these  external  laws  into  his  own  maxims ;  the  knowl- 
edge of  an  authoritative  will  becomes  his  own  moral  insight. 
These  maxims  and  principles,  whicli  we  have  seen  spring- 
ing up  when  occasioned  and  aided  by  apperceiving  activity, 
are  in  their  turn  the  fii-st  among  moral  regulations  adapted 
to  apperceive  vigorously  and  easily  kindred  dispositions  and 
actions.  For  they  acquire  a  high  motive  value  from  the 
feelings  out  of  which  they  spring  and  from  the  will  which 
supports  them.  They  are  the  standards  by  which  the  adult 
measures  his  own  and  others'  actions.  Through  them  we 
acquire  the  faculty  of  quickly  grasping  new  impressions  in 
the  moral  world  and  of  responding  to  them  with  suitable  de- 
cisions of  the  will.  With  their  help  we  ob8er^•e  and  regu- 
late our  impulses  and  desires,  and  those  wishes  and  inclin- 
ations of  will  that  spring  from  the  psychical  mechanism. 
If  one  of  them  does  not  harmonize  with  the  general  maxim 
and  cannot  attain  to  an  equal  motive  power  with  it,  it  is 


THE   THEORY  OF   APPERCEPTIOX.  97 

rejected  as  unacceptable.  And  now  one  gives  up  a  wisJi  or 
an  intention  because  he  has  reconsidered  the  matter;  one 
denies  himself  an  enjoyment  so  as  to  avoid  unreasonable 
action,  imposes  upon  himself  an  effort  so  as  to  escape  an 
inner  disapproval.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  individual  desire 
is  in  harmony  with  the  principle  in  mind,  it  will  be  accept- 
ably apperceived  with  the  aid  of  the  latter ;  it  also  attains  a 
power  and  vigor  it  would  not  have  secured  alone,  while  on  the 
other  hand  the  practical  principle  is  strengthened  and  estab- 
lished by  the  recently  apperceived  act  of  will.  If  the  will  has 
reached  its  object,  the  maxim  is  a  second  time  brought  for- 
ward with  the  question  whether  the  actualized  desire  cor- 
responds to  its  content.  The  result  of  the  accomplished 
apperception  finds  consciously  a  very  strong  expression  in 
those  agreeable  or  disagreeable  feelings  which  we  learned 
above  to  recognize  as  inner  satisfaction  or  remorse. 

Apperception  is  accordingly  the  first  condition  for  self- 
criticism  and  self-mastery.  In  that  moral  principles  are 
employed  in  apperception,  they  become  the  defenders  of  the 
sensibilities  of  the  soul,  which  endeavor  to  protect  it  against 
hostile  assaults  such  as  are  not  infrequently  attempted  by 
the  passions  and  secret  impulses,  or  by  violent  and  sudden 
overthrows.  If  these  maxims  are  gathered  into  a  system 
that  expands  over  the  whole  activity  of  the  will,  if  again 
they  are  subordinated  and  held  together  by  certain  universal 
superior  principles,  as  the  single  notion  is  held  by  the  gen- 
eral concept,  then  the  inner  life  of  the  person  acquires  that 
seal  of  unity  which  is  denominated  character.  Then  a 
circle  of  moral  ideas  acquires  mastery  in  such  a  way  as  to 
make  itself  felt  in  apperception,  not  only  now  and  then,  as 
at  church  and  on  solemn  occasions,  but  always  and  every- 
where, and  as  a  secret  power  able  to  direct  our  action. 

This  group  of  ideas,  standing  at  all  times  close  to  con- 


98  APPERCEPTION. 

sciousness,  attended  by  strong  feelings  and  acts  of  will, 
takes  still  deeper  root  and  works  with  still  greater  certainty 
the  more  it  is  supported  and  permeated  by  a  religious 
temper.  He  who  seeks  the  origin  of  moral  ideas  in  that 
highest  and  most  venerated  Being  who  first  willed  them, 
will  not  hearken  to  them  without  looking  up  reverently  to 
God,  the  only  perfect  ideal  of  a  morally  free  person,  from 
whom  power  and  courage  descend  to  him  in  the  battle 
against  evil.  For  him  the  ethical  ideals  found  in  God  and 
in  his  Son,  sent  for  our  purification,  acquire  personal  life,  so 
that  they  determine  his  will-action  more  strongly  and  deeply 
with  all  the  power  of  concrete  reality.  In  him  the  enthu- 
siasm for  moral  ideas  is  changed  into  an  inner  love  for  the 
highest  ideal,  and  obedience  to  self-chosen  maxims  is 
changed  more  and  more  into  a  free  and  willing  obedience 
to  the  highest  lawgiver.  Of  him  who  apperceives  his  will- 
actions  and  conduct  in  the  spirit  of  such  prevailing  thought- 
centers  and  dispositions,  the  Scripture  says  :  "  He  has  God 
before  his  eyes  and  in  his  heart."  He  approximates  moral 
freedom,  that  ideal  which  the  youth  seldom  indeed,  and  the 
man  only  in  alimited  degree,  can  attain. 

Let  us  look  back  again  at  the  results  of  our  investigation. 
We  observed  first  what  essential  services  apperception  per- 
forms for  the  human  mind  in  the  acquisition  of  new  ideas, 
and  for  what  an  extraordinary  easement  and  unburdening  the 
acquiring  soul  is  indebted  to  it.  Should  apperception  once 
fail,  or  were  it  not  implied  in  the  very  nature  of  our  minds, 
we  should  in  the  reception  of  sense-impressions  daily  ex- 
pend as  much  power  as  the  child  in  its  earliest  years,  since 
the  per])etually  changing  objects  of  the  external  world  would 
nearly  always  appear  strange  and  new.  We  should  gain  tiie 
mastery  of  external  things  more  slowly  and  painfully,  and 
arrive  much  later  at  a  certain  conclusion  of  our  external  ex- 


THE  THEORY    OF  APPERCEPTION.  99 

perience  than  we  now  do,  and  thereby  remain  perceptibly  be- 
hind in  our  mental  development.  Like  children  with  their  A 
B  C,  we  should  be  forced  to  take  careful  note  of  each  word, 
and  not  as  now  allow  ourselves  actually  to  perceive  only  a  few 
words  in  each  sentence.  In  a  word,  without  apperception, 
our  minds,  with  strikingly  greater  and  more  exhaustive 
labor,  would  attain  relatively  smaller  results.  Indeed,  we  are 
seldom  conscious  of  the  extent  to  which  our  perception  is 
supported  by  apperception  ;  of  how  it  releases  the  senses  from 
a  large  part  of  their  labor,  so  that  in  reality  we  listen  usually 
with  half  an  ear  or  with  a  divided  attention ;  nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  do  we  ordinarily  reflect  that  apperception  lends  the 
sense  organs  a  still  greater  degree  of  energy,  so  that  they 
perceive  with  greater  sharpness  and  penetration  than  were 
otherwise  possible.  We  do  not  consider  that  apperception 
spares  us  the  trouble  of  examining  ever  anew  and  in  small 
detail  all  the  objects  and  phenomena  that  present  themselves 
to  us,  so  as  to  get  their  meaning,  or  that  it  thus  prevents 
our  mental  power  from  scattering  and  from  being  worn  out 
with  wearisome,  fruitless  detail  labors.  The  secret  of  its 
extraordinary  success  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  refers  the  new 
to  the  old,  the  strange  to  the  familiar,  the  unknown  to  the 
known,  that  which  is  not  comprehended  to  what  as  already 
understood  constitutes  a  part  of  our  mental  furniture ;  that 
it  transforms  the  difficult  and  unaccustomed  into  the  accus- 
tomed, and  causes  us  to  grasp  everything  new  by  means  of 
old-time,  well-kuown  ideas.  Since,  then,  it  accomplishes 
great  and  unusual  results  by  small  means,  in  so  far  as  it 
reserves  for  the  soul  the  greatest  amount  of  power  for 
other  purposes,  it  agrees  with  the  general  principle  of  the 
least  expenditure  of  force,  or  with  that  of  the  best  adapta- 
bility of  means  to  ends. 

We  have  every  reason,  in  this  process,  to  recognize  and 


100  APPERCEPTION. 

ailmire  the  wisdom  of  the  divine  Creator,  who  has  estab- 
lished such  suitable  provisions  for  giving  freedom  and  fur- 
therance to  our  mental  life. 

As  in  the  reception  of  new  impressions,  so  also  in  working 
over  and  developing  the  previously  acquired  content  of  the 
mind,  the  helpful  work  of  apperception  shows  itself.  By 
connecting  isolated  things  with  mental  groups  already 
formed,  and  by  assigning  to  the  new  its  proper  place  among 
them,  apperception  not  only  increases  the  clearness  and  defi- 
niteness  of  ideas,  but  knits  them  more  firmly  to  our  con- 
sciousness. Api'erceiving  ideas  are  the  best  aids  to  mem- 
ory. Again,  so  often  as  it  subordinates  new  impressions  to 
older  ones,  it  labors  at  the  association  and  articulation  of  the 
manifold  materials  of  perception  and  thought.  By  condens- 
ing the  content  of  observation  and  thinking  into  concepts 
and  rules,  or  general  experiences  and  principles,  or  ideals 
and  general  notions,  apperception  produces  connection 
and  order  in  our  knowledge  and  volition.  With  its  assist- 
ance there  spring  up  those  universal  thought-complexes 
which,  distributed  to  the  various  fields  to  which  they  belong, 
appear  as  logical,  linguistic,  aesthetic,  moral  and  religious 
norms,  or  principles.  If  these  acquire  a  high  degree  of 
value  for  our  feelings ;  if  we  find  ourselves  heartily  attached 
to  them,  so  that  we  prefer  them  to  all  those  things  which 
are  contradictory ;  if  we  bind  them  to  our  own  self,  they 
will  thus  become  powerful  mental  groups,  which  spring  up 
independent  of  the  psychical  mechanism  as  often  as  kindred 
ideas  appear  in  the  mind.  In  the  presence  of  these  they 
now  make  manifest  their  apperceiving  power.  We  measure 
and  estimate  them  now  according  to  universal  laws.  They 
are,  so  to  speak,  the  eyes  aud  hand  of  the  will,  with  which, 
regulating  and  supplementing,  rejecting  and  correcting,  it 
lays  a  grasp  upon  the  content  as  well  as  upon  the  succession 


THE   THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION.  101 

of  ideas.  They  hinder  the  purely  mechanical  flow  of  thought 
and  desire,  and  our  involuntary  absorption  in  external  im- 
pressions and  in  the  varied  play  of  fancy.  "We  learn  how 
to  control  religious  impulses  by  laws,  to  rule  thoughts  by 
thoughts.  In  the  place  of  the  mechanical,  appears  the  reg- 
ulated coarse  of  thinking ;  in  the  place  of  the  psychical  rule 
of  caprice,  the  monarchical  control  of  higher  laws  and  prin- 
ciples, and  the  spontaneity  of  the  ego  as  the  kernel  of  the  per- 
sonality. By  the  aid  of  apperception,  therefore,  we  are  lifted 
gradually  from  psychical  bondage  to  mental  and  moral  free- 
dom. And  now  when  ideal  norms  are  apperceivingly  active 
in  the  field  of  knowledge  and  thought,  of  feeling  and  will, 
when  they  give  laws  to  the  psychical  mechanism,  true  cul- 
ture is  attained.^ 

*  "  Only  the  skill  to  rise  quickly  in  every  emergency  to  universal 
truths,  makes  the  great  mind,  tlie  true  hero  in  virtue,  the  discoverer  in 
science  and  art." —  Lessing,  Brief e. 

"We  must  regretfully  deny  ourselves  in  this  place  the  discussion  of 
the  important  role  that  apperception  has  played  in  the  development  of 
whole  peoples. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SANTA  BARBARA  OOI  T  Br;i3  imDADV 


PART  II. 
THE    THEORY   OF  APPERCEPTION 

IN  ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY. 


As  a  member  of  a  nation,  the  pupil  finds  himself  from  the 
beginning  bound  to  a  certain  stage  of  civilization,  which  his 
ancestors  have  transmitted  as  the  result  of  thousands  of 
years  of  growth,  which  they  have  made  through  hard  and 
painful  labor.  To  get  possession  of  this  inheritance  must 
be  his  first  and  foremost  duty.  For  only  thus  can  he  him- 
self exercise  his  own  powers  in  the  midst  of  a  great  society, 
according  to  moral  principles ;  only  thus  can  he  contribute 
his  share  to  preserve,  increase,  and  transmit  the  inheritance 
of  the  fathers  to  the  coming  generations  for  still  greater 
perfection.  To  this  end  education  first  of  all  should  aid 
him.  It  must  assume  the  responsibility  of  leading  the  child 
to  appropriate  the  most  important  mental  treasures  which 
have  been  brought  to  light  by  the  work  of  culture,  so  that, 
starting  from  this  basis,  he  may  advance  still  further.  It 
should  awaken  in  him  a  right  estimation  of  these  results  of 
civilization  acquired  by  hard  conflicts,  and  a  right  appreci- 
ation for  the  duties  of  his  time,  that  he  may  share  in  the 
life  and  struggle  thereof  with  true  insight,  warmth,  and 
power.  In  a  relatively  short  time  it  must  lift  the  youth  as 
far  as  possible  to  the  height  of  intellectual  and  moral  and 
religious  culture  to  which  mankind,  and  especially  his  own 

1C8 


104  APPERCEPTION. 

people,  have  attained.     How  shall  education  accomplish  this 
high  purpose? 

Judging  by  the  popular  view,  we  might  think  that  the 
way  to  this  result  was  clearly  and  simply  pointed  out :  — 
let  the  pupil  be  taught  the  results  of  the  intellectual  labor 
of  mankind,  and  he  will  quickly  surmount  the  heights  of 
culture.  In  the  opinion  of  many  people,  language  has 
"the  power  of  transmitting  to  the  hearer,  with  the  full 
force  of  sense-impressions,  the  notions  of  the  speaker  and 
of  calling  forth  in  the  hearer  the  feelings  of  the  speaker 
with  undiminished  strength."  It  is  all  too  easy  for  the  in- 
cipient educator  to  draw  the  consequences  from  this  doubt- 
ful theory,  and  to  have  faith  in  the  magical  power  of  his 
own  words  to  generate  and  to  call  forth  in  the  mind  of  the 
child  the  very  same  ideas  and  impressions  that  he  himself 
connects  with  them.  If  the  facts  were  really  so;  if,  without 
further  care  or  effort,  at  the  sound  of  a  word  the  child 
invariably  received  the  corresponding  idea  of  a  thing,  then 
nothing  would  be  easier  than  to  teach  and  train.  It  would 
be  sufficient  for  a  teacher  merely  to  ponder  a  subject  of  in- 
struction thoroughly  and  to  give  expression  to  his  thoughts 
in  a  clear  i)re8entation,  so  as  to  help  the  pupil  at  once  and 
without  effort  to  a  knowledge  both  clear  and  deep.  Then 
forsooth  the  results  of  science,  the  materials  of  culture, 
might  be  simply  transmitted,  as  a  jug  is  filled.  Then  one 
might  speak,  not  only  of  a  certain  class  of  recitations  (as 
has  really  happened)  in  which  the  pupil  "has  nothing  to 
do,"  but  the  same  thing  nuist  be  said  of  all  of  them.  In 
this  case  nothing  would  depend  upon  the  understanding  or 
study  of  the  pupil,  but  evei^thing  upon  that  of  the  teacher. 
But  happily  this  is  not  so.  We  saw  before  how  the  child 
constructs  no  idea,  whether  it  be  given  him  through  objects, 
pictures,  words,  or  letters,  without   bringing  into  exercise 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  105 

the  previously  acquired  contents  of  his  mind.  We  dis- 
covered that  the  little  ones,  in  all  that  they  acquired  through 
instruction,  were  thinking  and  feeling  something  peculiar  to 
themselves,  that  their  original  thoughts  and  feelings  were 
secretly  running  side  by  side  with  the  words  of  the  teacher. 
The  tension  and  the  involuntary  absorption,  with  which  they 
follow  good  instruction,  testify  to  this  secret  activity;  so 
also  do  the  bright  glowing  eye,  and  the  lively  sunshine  which 
gleams  from  their  faces  whenever  the  word  of  the  teacher  has 
struck  the  right  tone  or  has  touched  the  deepest  chords  of 
their  feeling.  It  is  further  proved  by  the  lively  questions  of 
the  pupils,  by  their  joyful  assent,  which  perhaps  breaks  forth 
in  a  hearty  :  "  Yes,  that's  so  !  "  Whoever  has  observ-ed  in 
such  moments  a  joyfully  active  group  of  children,  knows  how 
far  removed  their  energetic  learning  is  from  a  simple,  pas- 
sive reception,  and  that  not  the  teacher,  but  they  themselves 
have  the  most  to  perform.  He  is  convinced  that  knowledge 
cannot, be  transmitted,  that  the  pupil  must  work  it  out  inde- 
pendently for  himself.  That  is  what  the  poet  means  when 
he  says  :  "  What  you  have  inherited  from  your  fathers,  you 
must  eai'n  again  in  order  to  possess  it." 

As  has  been  already  established,  all  mental  treasures  that 
education  and  instruction  should  transmit  to  the  pupil,  can 
be  appropriated  only  with  the  help  of  a  previous  group  of 
ideas,  and  then  only  to  the  extent  that  the  greatest  possible 
number  of  kindred  ideas  is  brought  to  bear  upon  new  facts 
to  set  them  in  their  proper  light,  and  to  bring  them  into  the 
best  possible  adjustment.  "  No  one  hears  anything  except 
what  he  knows,  no  one  perceives  anything  except  what  he 
has  experienced."  This  saying  is  true  here  also.  What  is 
entirely  new  and  can  find  no  point  of  connection  is  either 
not  understood  or  only  superficially  apprehended.  On  the 
other  hand  the  best  instruction  is  given  when  the  words  of 


106  APPERCEPTION. 

the  teacher  stir  the  inmost  thoughts  of  the  child,  so  that  he 
is  not  passive,  but  wholly  active.  And  so  it  remains  time, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  that  the  most  eminent  characteristic 
of  learning  is  not  to  be  denominated  passivity,  but  activity, 
that  all  learning  is  apperceiving. 

Accordingly,  it  cannot  be  the  duty  of  the  teacher  simply 
to  transmit  to  the  pupil  the  material  of  knowledge,  or  to 
communicate  to  him  ideas,  feelings  and  sentiments,  but  to 
awaken,  stimulate  and  give  life  to  mental  activities.  He  has 
to  reach  down  with  regulative  hand  into  those  quiet,  private 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  child  in  which  lie  his  ego  and 
his  whole  future,  that  they  may  rise  above  the  threshold  of 
consciousness  and  communicate  understanding,  clearness, 
warmth,  and  life  to  instruction.  In  a  word  he  has  to  make 
provision  that  in  every  case  the  process  of  apperception  is 
accomplished  with  as  much  thoroughness  as  certainty  and 
judgment.  Then  not  only  will  the  matter  taught  be  me- 
chanically acquired,  but  it  will  be  transformed  at  once  into 
mental  power;  it  will  contribute  steadily,  by  awakening 
thought  and  interest,  to  lift  and  ennoble  the  mental  life. 

The  higher  we  set  our  requirements  for  the  teacher,  the 
nearer  lies  the  objection  that  we  require  what  is  unnecessai*y 
and  impossible,  and  that  the  process  of  assimilation  can  be 
worked  out  in  the  child  independently,  without  interference 
by  the  teacher.  We  can  grant  this  objection  for  those 
cases  in  which  the  pupil  in  an  exceptional  manner  ap- 
proaches instruction  in  a  favorable  mental  temper.  We 
admit  also  that  very  strong  natures,  which  are  distinguished 
by  unusual  inner  activity,  are  accustomed  to  supply  without 
the  aid  of  others  those  apperceiving  ideas  which  make  pos- 
sible the  comprehension  of  a  new  object  of  study,  since  it  is 
a  fact  that  a  genius  even  with  bad  instruction,  by  his  own 
power,  finds  the  right  road  to  development.     But  no  one  for 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  107 

this  reason  would  make  the  exception  the  rule  ;  no  one  would 
attribute  to  "all  children  without  exception  what  is  the  priv- 
ilege of  only  a  few  gifted  minds. 

If  such  an  over-trustful  teacher,  who  believes  that  apper- 
ception, as  the  rule,  will  take  care  of  itself,  could  look  into 
the  minds  of  his  pupils  while  he  is  speaking  to  them,  he 
would  be  astonished  often  at  what  he  would  find  there : 
either  no  thoughts  at  all  or  entirely  foreign  ones,  that  go 
promenading  during  instruction,  and  wander  about  in  for- 
bidden ways ;  while  in  favorable  cases,  when  the  boy  is 
taken  up  with  the  matter,  the  teacher  would  often  find 
a  grasp  of  the  subject  that  differs  as  widely  as  the  poles 
from  his  own.  This  is  a  state  of  mind  in  which  apper- 
ception takes  place  superficially,  or  falsely,  or  not  at  all, 
for  the  pupil  hears  only  words,  nothing  but  words,  and 
learns  not  from  within  outward,  but  is  taught  something 
superficially.  No  wonder  if  the  boy  is  dull  or  uninterested 
in  the  school  room,^  when,  as  Festalozzi  says,  "he  plays 
with  words  from  his  pocket,"  and  when  that  which  he  has 
learned  mechanically  is  soon  forgotten  or  when  the  hollow, 
unsubstantial  mental  structure  collapses  after  the  school 
life  is  over.* 

This  result  must  follow  when  we  do  not  open  up  the  inner- 
most springs  of   a   child's    feeling,  or  when  we  neglect  to 

*  The  usual  instruction,  so  little  regardful  of  ideas  already  in  the 
pupil's  mind,  since  it  keeps  in  mind  only  what  is  to  be  learned,  begins  to 
bestir  itself  about  the  necessary  attention,  when  it  is  already  lost,  and 
progress  has  been  thereby  hindered. 

'  Herbart  refers  to  the  peculiar  fact  that  many  pupils  show  much  power 
of  memory,  fancy,  and  understanding  in  their  own  sphere  while  little  of 
these  is  attributed  to  them  by  their  teachers.  They  even  dominate  as 
the  intelligent  ones  in  their  own  circle ;  they  possess  at  least  the  respect  of 
their  playmates,  whereas  in  the  hours  of  study  they  are  incapable.  Such 
experiences  betray  the  difficulty  of  making  instruction  take  hold  effect- 
ually of  individual  development. 


108  APPERCEPTION. 

awaken  the  apperceiving  ideas  for  the  new.  Only  consider 
what  is  demanded  of  a  boy  when  he  is  held  hour  after  hour 
to  his  task.  He  must  forget  a  large  part  of  the  thoughts  and 
feelings  which  he  brought  into  the  school  with  him  from  with- 
out, he  must  suppress  the  most  choice  and  agreeable,  the 
strongest  and  liveliest  ideas  and  impulses,  so  as  to  follow  the 
wholly  new  and  strange  notions  of  the  teacher,  or  such  as 
are  little  familiar  to  him.  Even  when  he  is  interested 
in  it,  he  dare  not  travel  his  own  chosen  road,  following 
up  the  ideas  called  forth  by  instruction ;  but  he  is  bound 
within  his  class  limit  to  a  definite  fixed  progress  of  thought, 
a  certain  average  time  of  thought-movement,  requiring  an 
attention,  labor,  and  effort  of  mind  often  felt  as  a  burden, 
even  by  an  adult.  And  now  let  one  put  himself  in  the  8tat« 
of  mind  of  a  six-year  old  little  one,  whose  world,  up  to  the 
present,  has  been  the  play-room,  the  street,  the  lawn,  the 
garden,  the  field,  who  has  tumbled  about  in  the  fresh  fields 
of  nature  without  care  or  aim ;  how  must  he  feel  when  he 
suddenly  finds  himself  placed  between  the  four  walls  of  a 
school-room?  Behind  him  are  all  the  joys  of  the  play- 
ground, the  golden  sunshine  of  nature ;  before  him,  the 
earnest  man  with  the  serious  countenance.  And  now  he  is 
to  learn  tiresome  letters  and  write  figures  that  have  no  inter- 
est for  him  —  no  wonder  if,  in  grief,  he  breaks  out  into  tears, 
the  school-room  seeming  a  prison  to  him.  If  the  teacher  does 
not  lay  hold  of  the  inner  thought-treasures  of  the  child,  lead- 
ing him  back  in  thought  to  the  paradise  of  his  youth,  to  the 
field  of  his  inner  and  outer  experience;  if  the  teacher  is 
indifferent  whether  the  child  gets  anything  out  of  his  words 
or  not,  then  he  plays  on  an  instrument  without  strings. 
The  apperception  of  the  child  must  not  and  cannot  be  left 
to  blind,  uncertain  chance,  and  it  must  be  regarded  as  the 
highest  art  of  the  teacher  and  educator,  rightly  to  induce 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  109 

the  process  of  mental  assimilation  in  the  pupil,  and  to  con- 
duct it  to  a  sure  conclusion. 

From  what  has  been  said  above  concerning  the  conditions 
under  which  mental  appropriation  takes  place,  it  follows  that 
herein  the  instructor  must  direct  his  attention  both  to  the 
subject  and  to  the  object  of  apperception,  both  to  the  apper- 
ceiving  ideas  and  to  those  to  be  assimilated. 

1.    Pedagogical  Requirements  ik  respect  to  the  Ob- 
jects OF  Apperception. 

(Choice  and  arrangement  of  the  material  of  instruction.) 
The  object  of  apperception  consists  usually  of  those  new 
and  unfamiliar  thoughts  which  the  pupil  has  to  master,  the 
subject-matter  of  instruction  which  he  has  to  apperceive. 
Of  course  this  must  answer  certain  conditions,  if  a  thorough 
assimilation  is  to  follow.  It  is  manifestly  insufficient  that  a 
subject-matter  be  selected  in  conformity  with  special  scientific 
or  ethical  standpoints,  and  then  left  to  the  skill  of  the 
teacher  as  to  how  it  is  to  be  mastered.  Anything,  to  be 
sure,  can  be  assimilated  by  the  hungry  mind  of  the  child, 
and,  in  the  end,  he  would  learn  even  Chinese  if  he  had  to. 
It  is  not  only  a  matter  of  concern  that  something  be  apper- 
ceived,  but  that  it  shall  take  place  with  the  greatest  possi- 
ble mental  culture,  with  certainty,  and  without  unnecessary 
expenditure  of  power.  It  should  be  so  learned  that  the. 
culture-content  of  the  matter  may  bring  about  the  best  pos- 
sible effect.  To  this,  a  well  determined  selection  and  arrange- 
ment of  the  subject-matter  can  essentially  contribute,  so  far 
as  regard  is  had  for  the  constant,  and  in  the  course  of  de- 
velopment, also  for  the  changing,  peculiarities  of  child-nature, 
for  the  phases  of  thought  and  effort  which  dominate  at  dif- 
ferent times  in  the  pupil.  The  teacher  therefore  has  to 
see  to  it  that  he  does  not  treat  of  things  for  which  there  are 


110  APPERCEPTION. 

not  at  hand  sufficient  points  of  contact  in  the  youthful  soul, 
for  otherwise  there  would  arise  the  greatest  difficulties  for 
instruction.  Out  of  the  whole  field  of  learning,  so  far  as 
it  is  admissible  in  accordance  with  the  moral-religious  aim 
of  education,  only  those  materials  of  culture  and  knowledge 
are  to  be  selected  which  are  adapted  to  the  child's  temporary 
stage  of  apperception.* 

The  question,  what  these  materials  are,  Ziller  has  attempt- 
ed to  answer  by  a  precept  as  brief  as  it  is  comprehensive, 
drawn  from  psychology  and  histor}' :  "The  mental  develop- 
ment of  the  child  corresponds  in  general  to  the  chief  phases 
in  the  development  of  his  i>eople  or  of  mankind.  The  mind- 
development  of  the  child  therefore  cannot  be  better  furthered 
than  when  he    receives   his   mental   nourishment   from   the 


'Instruction  therefore  follows  a  line  of  the  divine  pedagogy.  For  even 
the  exalted  Educator  of  the  whole  human  family  is  wont  to  reveal  bis 
heavenly  truths  to  men  only  so  far  as  they  possess  sufficient  apperceiving 
ideas  for  them.  When  the  time  was  ripe,  when  both  Jews  and  Pagans 
had  prepared  the  way  for  an  understanding  of  the  new  evangel,  when 
the  longing  for  the  Savior  had  been  powerfully  wakened,  then  God  sent 
his  Son.  Then  only  could  his  life  and  teaching  unfold  a  deeply  pene- 
trating and  world-historical  influence.  And  does  not  the  same  divine 
wisdom  appear  in  the  words  of  the  Lord,  directed  to  his  disciples, 
"  I  have  still  many  things  to  say  to  you,  but  ye  cannot  bear  them  now. 
When,  however,  the  spirit  of  truth  is  come,  he  will  lead  you  into  all 
truth."  So  long  as  his  disciples  were  still  entangled  in  the  views  of  the 
people  concerning  the  promised  national  Messiah,  the  King  of  the  Jews, 
the  divine  Master  could  not  entrust  to  them  the  whole  secret  of  his 
sending.  Only  when  they  had  experienced  so  many  tilings  in  the  days  of 
Easter,  which  they  had  neither  hoped  nor  feared,  after  they  had  seen  the 
Lord  suffer,  die,  rise  again  and  ascend  to  heaven,  did  they  fully  under- 
stand his  person,  his  mission,  his  destiny.  Now  tliey  saw  liim  in  the  light 
of  the  Old  Testament  prophecies,  apperceived  fully  what  was  at  first  dark, 
as  is  so  beautifully  expressed  in  the  speech  of  Peter  on  the  day  of  Pente- 
cost. 

Compare  also  Goethe's  words:  "Man  understands  nothing  but  what  is 
appropriate  to  him.  Hence  the  duty  of  saying  to  others  only  the  things 
that  they  can  receive." — Wilhelm  Meittera  Wanderjahre,  Chapter  III. 


ITS   APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  Ill 

general  development  of  culture  as  it  is  laid  down  in  literature 
and  history.  Every  pupil  should  accordingly  pass  succes- 
sively through  each  of  the  chief  epochs  of  the  general  mental 
development  of  mankind  suitable  to  his  stage  of  advance- 
ment." The  material  of  instruction,  therefore,  "  should  be 
drawn  from  the  thought-material  of  that  stage  of  historical 
development  in  culture  which  runs  parallel  with  the  present 
mental  state  of  the  pupil."  Now,  of  these  chief  stages  or 
epochs  of  general  culture,  classical  presentations  give  us 
sufficient  and  reliable  knowledge.  AVhile  we  permit  the  child 
to  live  through  in  succession  these  narratives,  belonging  to 
sacred  and  secular  history,  we  shall  supply  him  in  each  period 
of  education  with  that  material  which  is  best  suited  to  him ; 
that  is,  for  which  there  lie  ready  the  greatest  number  of  ap- 
perceiving  aids.  In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  Ziller  has  pro- 
posed a  mass  of  sacred  and  secular  historical  material  of 
ethical  value  which  follows  general  as  well  as  national  growth 
in  culture.  He  claims  that  this  material  best  corresponds  to 
the  stages  of  apperception,  and  to  the  individual  develop- 
ment of  the  child,  and  that  it  essentially  furthers  an^  hastens 
both. 

A  more  pedagogically  correct  selection  of  the  subject- 
matter  than  this  seems  in  fact  impossible,  so  far  as  the 
hypothesis  from  which  Ziller  proceeds  is  shown  to  be  an 
incontrovertible  fact.  Can  we  assert  this  concerning  it? 
Does  there  really  exist  such  a  far-reaching  similarity  be- 
tween the  development  of  mankind  or  of  the  people  and 
the  individual  development  of  the  pupil,  that  upon  it  the 
theory  of  the  choice  of  pedagogical  material  can  be  based  ?  ^ 


>To  Richard  Staude  is  due  the  honor  of  having  first  subjected  this 
question  to  thorough  critical  consideration.  See  Rein's  Pad  Studien,  1880, 
No.  2;  1881,  No.  2;  1888,  No.  3.  See  also  Sallwiirk's  treatise:  Gesin- 
nungsunterricht  und  Kulturgeschichte,  1887. 


112  APPERCEPTION. 

That  the  individual  in  his  intellectual  development  repeats 
the  evolution  of  all  mankind  has  been  from  earliest  times  a 
favorite  thought  of  minds  prone  to  philosophy.  When 
Vaihinger,  in  his  treatise  '•'■  Naturforschung  und  die  Schule  " 
(Scientific  Investigation  and  the  School,  1889), brings  for- 
ward as  proof  of  this  a  crowd  of  witnesses,  one  receives  the 
impression  that  a  certain  principle,  recognized  by  all,  must 
indeed  underlie  such  a  number  of  harmonizing  testimonies 
from  our  most  prominent  poets  and  thinkers.  It  is  an  ad- 
ditional proof  that  in  the  realm  of  science,  the  law  of  the 
congruence  of  octogenetic  and  phylogenetic  series,  according 
to  which  every  more  highly  organized  being  has  to  pass 
through  the  stages  of  development  of  its  species,  has  long 
since  enjoyed  universal  recognition.  Does  it  not  lie  close  at 
hand  to  presume  the  activity  of  a  similar  law  in  the  intel- 
lectual realm  also?  To  be  sure  the  attempt  to  transfer  the 
biogenetic  law  without  modification  to  the  realm  of  intel- 
lectual life  "because  there  exists  no  diflference  in  principle 
between  somatic  and  psychical  development "  ^  must  be  re- 
jected for  evident  reasons.  But  when  it  is  shown  by  close 
psychological  investigation  that  the  development  of  the  in- 
dividual is  bound,  not  only  to  the  same  culture-content  which 
mankind  has  produced,  but  also  that  the  individual,  like  the 
latter,  raises  himself  ^  to  ever  higher  culture-epochs  (or  stages ) 
only  by  means  of  the  apperception  of  that  culture-matter,  is 
not  a  formal  as  well  as  material  analogy  between  race  and 
individual  development  sufficiently  proven?  —  An  analogy, 
a  similarity  there  surely  is ;  is  there  not  possibly  also  a 
parallelism  between  the  two  reaching  still  farther?  That, 
however,  may  be  a  matter  of  some  doubt.  For  even  if 
the  individual  apperceives  and  appropriates  the  knowledge 

>  Vaihinger,  pp.  14-15. 

*  See  Capesius  in  Jahrb.  d.  Verein*.  f.  wittenchaft.  PSdag.  XVI.,  149. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  113 

and  experience  given  in  tlie  progress  of  human  development 
just  as  the  race  itself  did,  it  by  no  means  follows  from  that, 
that  this  must  happen  in  exactly  the  progression  in  which  the 
culture-matter  was  gradually  evolved.  The  case  is  rather 
conceivable  that  the  individual  mind,  avoiding  the  circuitous 
and  misleading  paths  of  race  development,  apperceives  the 
experience  of  the  race  according  to  other,  and  to  him  better 
suited,  points  of  view.* 

There  is  the  possibility  that  for  him  another  equally  valid, 
and  yet  far  simpler  and  shorter  path  of  development  to 
the  desired  goal  may  be  found,  and  that  race  development 
and  individual  development  differ  from  one  another  because 
of  various  conditions.  Certain  facts  in  experience  make 
this  indeed  very  probable.  The  bearers  of  human  develop- 
ment are  always  adults,  who  unite,  in  their  consciousness, 
the  culture-content  of  their  age ;  the  bearer  of  individual 
development  is,  in  the  first  epochs,  a  child.  Even  though  the 
latter  may  have  many  incomplete  moral  and  religious  intu- 
itions, many  feelings  and  thoughts  in  common  with  the 
people  of  an  earlier  epoch  —  he  is,  after  all,  always  a  child, 
whose  thoughts,  feelings  and  aspirations  are  surely  separated 
by  a  deep  chasm  from  the  prevailing  habits  of  thought  of  an 
adult.  It  follows  from  the  corporeal  organism  of  the  latter 
that  always  and  everywhere  he  will  have  other  needs,  other 

'  Thus  there  was,  long  ago  in  history,  a  perfected  science  of  logic  before 
the  simplest  events  in  nature  could  be  successfully  explained.  But  in  our 
schools  the  discoveries  of  Galileo  will  be  taught  before  the  creations  of 
Aristotle.  "  The  study  of  electricity  is  almost  entirely  a  creation  of 
more  modern  times ;  the  identity  of  lightning  and  the  electric  spark  was 
first  known  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century.  The  first  electro-mag- 
netic phenomena  were  discovered  in  the  twenties  of  this  century,  and  yet 
we  will  teach  our  scholars  both  the  identity  of  lightning  and  the  electric 
spark,  and  the  universal  phenomena  of  electro-magnetism,  earlier  than 
the  laws  of  centrifugal  motion,  for  instance,  which  Huygens  had  estab- 
lished even  in  1663. "—  Capesius,  P.  162-163;  cf.  168-169. 


114  APPERCEPTION. 

inclinjitious  and  habits,  than  the  undeveloped  cliild.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  child  of  our  day  brings  with  it 
into  the  world  inherited  tendencies,  as  a  result  of  which,  cer- 
tain intellectual  activities  become  earlier  apparent  in  it  than 
is  the  case  with  adults  of  the  first  culture  epochs,  and  give  to 
its  intellectual  life  special  distinguishing  features.  In  short, 
it  might  be  a  very  diflicult  matter  to  find  an  exact  corres- 
pondence between  the  epochs  of  universal  human  development 
and  those  of  the  child.  One  will  always  find  that  the  child 
in  some  directions,  —  for  example,  as  regards  certain  thought 
operations  —  is  far  beyond  the  corresponding  culture  epoch 
of  the  people,  but  in  another  direction,  is  far  behind 
(consider  the  practical  experience  proceeding  from  occupa- 
tion), so  that  a  uniform,  corresponding  progress  m  the 
individual  and  the  whole  race  does  not  take  place.' 

In  general,  a  far-reaching  correspondence  between  the 
race  and  individual  development  is,  after  all,  only  conceivable 
by  presupposing  that  the  single  mind,  in  regard  to  the  chief 
points,  and  under  the  same  outward  and  inner  conditions,  is 
gradually  unfolded,  just  as  mankind  was,  in  its  separate 
epochs  of  culture.  The  boy  who,  for  example,  has  entered 
his  patriarchal  or  nomadic  period  under  the  same  influences 
of  society  and  nature,  would  have  to  grow  up  in  the  same 
moral  and  religious  habits  of  thought,  and  devote  himself  to 
the  same  pursuits  as,  perchance,  the  members  of  patriarchal 
families,  if  he  were  to  live  entirely  and  completely  through 
the  corresponding  culture  epoch.  And  thus  in  each  follow- 
ing epoch,  other  conditions  of  life  and  development  would 
have  to  be  offered  to  the  child,  if  it  were  really  compelled  to 
pass  through  in  detail,  and  to  experience  in  its  own  life,  the 
progressive  culture  of  the  whole  race.  That  is  impossible. 
The  child  of  our  day  is,  once  for  all,  bound  to  a  definite 

>C1.  Strumpell,  Psycholog.  Padagogik,  p.  189. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  115 

• 

sphere  of  life,  from  which  it  cannot  be  separated.  It  grows 
up  in  the  midst  of  abundant  culture,  which  very  nearly  repre- 
sents the  gain  in  culture  of  all  previous  centuries.  It  is  sur- 
rounded by  far  more  complicated  conditions  of  life  than  were 
presented  by  the  primeval  age,  by  men  who,  as  regards  their 
degrees  of  culture,  exhibit  the  greatest  differences  in  such  a 
way  that  almost  every  epoch  in  civilization  is  represented  by 
them  in  certain  respects.  The  extraordinarily  manifold  and 
quickly  changing  influences  to  which  the  child  is  in  this  way 
exposed,  by  no  means  exert  their  force  in  a  regular  manner, 
as,  for  instance,  according  to  the  historical  point  of  view. 
They  are  more  likely  to  confront  the  child  in  motley  order 
according  to  the  needs  of  daily  life.  His  mind  lays  hold 
now  of  this,  now  of  that,  and  now  again  of  very  different 
parts  simultaneously,  and,  at  least  in  the  realm  of  outer 
experience,  does  not  advance  in  the  logical  order  of  a  sys- 
tem of  study,  or  according  to  regular  epochs.*  In  the  city, 
for  instance,  he  usually  learns  our  modern  methods  of 
business  intercourse,  or  our  highly  developed  industry,  earlier 
than  the  simpler  forms  of  human  labor.  He  becomes  ac- 
quainted with  the  Christian  belief  and  Christian  manner  of 
thought  even  before  the  typical  forms  of  previous  religious 
epochs  of  development  can  be  presented  to  him.*  But  if, 
according  to  that,  the  intellectual  and  bodily  life  of  the  in- 
dividual is  unfolded  under  numerous  other  conditions  than 
those  of  earlier  human  races,  there  must  also  exist  a  de- 
cided difference  between  race  and  individual  development.' 

»Strumpell,  p.  161. 

*  Here  we  do  not  think  merely  of  "  tales  from  the  life  of  Christ,  brought 
from  the  home  to  the  school,"  as  ThrHndorf,  nor  of  "externals  of  Chris- 
tianity," asVaihinger  gracefully  puts  it.  But  we  mean  that  the  whole 
serious  manner  of  life  in  a  Christian  family  imparts  to  the  child  strong, 
warm  and  pure  moral-religious  ideas  which  exclude  experience  of  certain- 
sense  perceptions,  standing  lower  down  in  the  scale. 

^The   attempt  to  withdraw  the  cliild  artificially  from  given  culture 


116  APPERCEPTION. 

The  psycho-genetic  law  of  parallelism  between  the  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  and  the  species,  suffers  accordingly  a 
similar  limitation  to  that  of  the  biogenetic  law  in  the 
scientific  world.  It  is  well-known  that  the  latter  holds  good 
only  for  the  embryo  in  its  prenatal  state. 

Free  embryos  or  larvae,  on  the  contrary,  must  adapt 
themselves  iudependeutly  to  the  conditions  of  exterior  life, 
and  can  therefore  not  repeat  faithfully  the  historic  develop- 
ment of  their  species.  The  individual  mind  of  our  day  is 
similarly  conditioned.  It  is  not  an  embryo,  protected  from 
exterior  influences,  which  repeat  without  disturbance  the 
race  development,  but  from  the  beginning  it  is  exposed  to 
the  effects  of  an  essentiallj'  different  environment,  in  accord- 
ance with  which  it  has  to  conform  itself.  Consequently, 
with  the  child,  it  cannot  be  merely  a  question  of  a  develop- 
ment in  harmony  with  the  progress  of  historical  culture,  but 
it  is  also  with  equal  right,  a  question  of  adaptibility  to 
changed  circumstances,  and  no  educational  art  will  bring  the 
child  to  the  point  where  its  culture  will  run  fully  parallel  to 
the  race  development.  In  general,  we  indeed  recognize  a  cer- 
tain similarity  between  single  and  collective  development; 
but  as  soon  as  we  enter  into  details,  our  analogy  is,  in  many 
cases,  no  longer  tenable.^  If  that  is  the  case,  then,  peda- 
gogical proofs  can  be  drawn  from  that  analogy  only  in  lim- 


induences  in  order  to  keep  it  in  a  certain  definite  culture-epoch  is,  of  it- 
self, prohibited  as  a  vain  endeavor.  Neither  Rousseau's  tiight  from 
the  world  nor  Jean  Paul's  "  subterranean  education"  can  pass  for  accept- 
able attempts  at  settling  pedagogical  questions. 

'  Capesius,  p.  182. 

"  The  path  in  which  we  load  youth  is  not  so  firmly  established  in  the 
highways  along  which  the  human  race  has  passed,  that  we,  the  educators, 
may  not  have  essentially  aided  in  determining  it  by  our  aims  and  judg- 
ments ;  education  may  be  a  compendious  repetition  of  the  world's  history ; 
but  we  make  the  compendium  in  the  spirit  of  definite  ideals,  which  fill 
u»."—WUlmann,  Didactik  I.,  74, 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  117 

ited  measure.  It  will  give  us  many  an  excellent  hint  for  me- 
thodical work  in  more  than  one  province  of  knowledge.  But 
it  is  not  such  a  far-reaching  or  deeply-rooted  principle,  that 
the  study  of  the  choice  and  arrangement  of  culture-matter 
could  be  based  upon  it  without  further  thought. 

Herein  we  may  perhaps  have  found  an  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion from  which  our  investigation  started,  and  a  negative 
one  at  that.  But  Ziller  asserts,  not  merely  an  agreement  of 
race  and  individual  development  in  general,  but  he  insists 
that  the  child  shall  pass  through  the  various  stages  of  each 
epoch  of  culture  development.  Now,  in  opposition  to  this, 
it  might  undoubtedly  be  asserted  that  what  was  firmly  es- 
tablished in  respect  to  the  development  of  the  individual 
taken  as  a  whole,  might  also  be  applicable  to  a  part  of  this 
development  —  to  that  of  the  child.  Nevertheless  there 
might  still  exist  even  here  especial  circumstances  which  would 
admit  of  another  interpretation.  Let  us,  accordingly,  see 
what  facts  Ziller  brings  into  the  field  to  support  his  assump- 
tion. He  asserts  that  the  pupil,  as  regards  his  connection 
with  a  greater  community,  passes  through  the  following 
epochs  of  moral  development  by  the  aid  of  instruction,  and 
must  necessarily  pass  through  them  in  conformity  with  his 
nature  :  — 

1.  He  subjects  himself,  first  of  all,  to  authority  in  pure 
childish  confidence. 

2.  His  own  thoughts  must  then  move  freely  in  that  sphere 
which  is  ruled  over  by  this  authority. 

3.  He  must  subordinate  himself  to  this  authority  volun- 
tarily. 

4.  He  must  recognise  and  love  the  highest  authority. 

5.  He  must  learn  to  work  in  its  service  toward  the  goal 
of  a  moral  and  religious  culture  of  his  own  inner  being,  as 
well  as, 

6.  For  that  of  the  larger  community  to  which  he  will  be- 
long. 


118  APPERCEPTION. 

Certain  culture  epochs  of  the  general  social  development 
seem  to  correspond  to  this  development  of  the  individual  in 
his  relation  to  a  larger  race  life,  as  is  shown  with  especial 
distinctness  in  the  epochs  of  sacred  history.* 

It  is,  first  of  all,  noticeable  in  the  preceding  statement, 
that  there  is  an  effort  to  set  forth  a  correspondence  between 
general  and  individual  development,  in  the  province  of  social 
ethics  alone.  For  the  remaining  province  of  intellectual 
life  a  similar  proof  has  not  been  offered  (expect  a  few  weak 
attempts).  And  yet,  without  such  a  one,  the  whole  culture- 
epoch  theory  hovers  in  mid-air,  for  the  idea  of  culture 
embraces  more  than  the  moral  relation  of  the  individual  to 
society. 

And  then  it  is  subject  to  a  very  considerable  doubt  as  to 
whether  it  may  be  possible  to  establish  firmly,  within  the 
moral  and  religious  development  of  the  child,  a  large  num- 
ber of  epochs,  sharply  distinguished  from  one  another.  A 
careful,  unbiased  observation  shows  us,  rather,  how  unsteady 
and  indefinite  the  youthful  mind-life  is  exactly  in  this  re- 
spect, how  it  lacks  evenness  of  character,  and  a  steadfast  will- 
power. The  beginnings  of  all  possible  ethical  lines  of  con- 
duct are  present  even  early  in  life,  and  those  things  that  Ziller 
passes  in  review,  one  after  the  other,  are  generally  limited 
to  no  definite  epoch  at  all,  but  are  developed  simultaneously. 
Thus,  the  child  that  subjects  itself,  without  reflection,  to 
human  authorities,  will  surely,  very  soon,  receive  a  presenti- 
ment of  the  fact  that  its  will  is  bound  to  the  highest  author- 
ity, and  if  it  obeys  —  whether  voluntarily  or  involuntarily  — 
is  it  not  already  w^orking  here  on  the  moral  formation  of  its 
inner  life  in  the  sen'ice  of  this  authority?  Furthermore,  who 

•  See  the  further  exposition  in  Jahrh.  d.  V.f.  w.,  P.  XIII.  (1881),  p.  118. 
It  is  expressly  stated  here  that  the  culture  epochs  appear  to  correspond  to 
the  normal  development  of  the  child's  mind. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  119 

could  define,  even  approximately,  the  moment  when  the 
pupil  passes  from  the  first  to  the  second  epoch  of  develop- 
ment, since  thus  his  own  thoughts  move  voluntarily  in  the 
sphere  of  that  which  is  governed  by  tjiis  authority?  "Who 
would  be  able  to  assert  at  what  moment  he  subordinated 
himself  to  the  highest  authority  by  his  voluntary  act?  Do 
not  the  most  varied  ethical  lines  of  conduct  often  alternate 
in  him,  just  according  to  his  momentary  condition  of  mind, 
according  to  the  exterior  circumstances,  which  render  the 
moral  action  easier  or  harder  for  him  ?  Do  not,  even  with 
the  well-instructed  and  well-bred  child,  eudaemonistic  and 
strictly  ethical  sentiments  dwell  for  a  long  time  peaceably 
by  one  another?  This  inability  of  the  childish  will,  this 
lack  of  uniform  endeavor,  does  not  permit  us  to  recognize  a 
whole  line  of  milestones  and  turning-points  in  the  path  of 
the  pupil's  ethical  development,  from  his  sixth  to  his  four- 
teenth year.  "We  shall  indeed  be  able  to  define,  in  general, 
the  direction  of  the  ethical  progress,  and  perhaps  in  this  re- 
spect (as  in  the  sketch  given  on  pages  66  and  following)  prove 
an  essential  difference  between  the  early  and  the  late  boyish 
period.  But  the  effort  to  fix  upon  six,  or  indeed  eight  ethi- 
cal epochs  of  development  for  the  eight  school  years  of  the 
public  school  pupil  appears  to  us  to  be  a  fruitless  en- 
deavor.^ 

I  In  an  article  in  the  Sachs.  Schulzeitung,  well  worth  reading  ( 1887, 
p.  128,  etc.),  Hartmann  has  attempted  to  prove  at  least  four  epochs  of  de- 
velopment in  the  pupil,  for  the  period  from  the  sixtli  to  the  fourteenth 
year.  But,  however  valuable  his  exposition  may  be  in  detail,  it  still  ap- 
pears to  stand  too  much  in  the  jurisdiction  of  Ziller's  congruence  hypothe- 
sis, for  it  to  be  everywhere  true  to  the  facts.  We  are,  at  least,  not  able 
to  admit  that  precisely  the  ninth  and  tenth  years  of  life  is  the  epoch  of 
the  subordination  of  the  individual  will  to  an  authorized  general  will,  and 
that  the  pupil,  in  the  thirteenth  or  fourteenth  year,  already  allows  him- 
self to  be  directed  in  his  action  by  fundamental  moral  ideas.  Vogt  distin- 
guishes only  three  ethical  epochs  of  development  in  the  individual, 


120  APPERCEPTION. 

But  even  if  it  be  granted  that,  in  the  future,  penetrating  psy- 
chological research  may  succeed  in  accomplishing  the  improb- 
able, it  is  still  a  very  great  question  whether  it  would  define 
those  epochs  exactly  as  Ziller  does.  For  it  is,  indeed,  a  matter 
of  no  doubt  at  all,  that  his  social  and  ethical  culture-epochs 
reach,  in  part,  far  beyond  the  age  of  childhood,  beyond  the 
school  period  of  the  public  school  pupil.  How  many  men 
there  are  who  do  not  learn,  in  all  their  lives,  to  submit 
themselves  voluntarily  to  authority  !  And  does  not  daily 
experience  prove  that  love  for  the  highest  authority  is, 
as  a  rule,  not  the  prevailing  sentiment  of  boyhood ;  that 
the  instructor  gladly  contents  himself,  for  the  present, 
with  a  less  voluntary  obedience  on  the  part  of  the  pupil  who 
leaves  the  public  school,  if  only  the  idea  of  God  has  become 
a  power  in  his  mind?  That  moral  freedom,  then,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  man  consciously  and  systematically  works 
for  the  completion  of  his  own  ethical  culture,  as  well  as  for 
the  realization  of  an  ideal  human  society,  we  shall  never 
hope  to  find  in  the  boy,  but,  on  the  contrary,  at  best  only  in 
the  maturing  youth  and  in  the  man. 

Let  us  not  be  checked  by  the  fact  that  the  pupil  can  and 
must  grow  into  higher  epochs  of  moral  development,  by  the 
aid  of  ideals.  Certainly  he  can  and  should.  But  by  that 
we  still  do  not  say  that  the  thoughts  and  sentiments  with 
which  he  thus  becomes  acquainted  immediately  predominate 
in  him,  and  must  do  so  as  a  result  of  instruction ;  that  now 
the  pupil  must  have  necessarily  attained  to  the  same  ethical 

which  be  characterizes  thus :  subjection  to  a  foreign  authority,  voluntary 
action  under  the  authority  of  the  law,  and  the  independent  authority  or 
government  of  ideas  (Explanations  to  Jahrhuch  d.  V.f.  w.,  P.  XVI.,  p.  40). 
His  assertion  that  the  third  epoch  "comes  to  view"  already  in  the  four- 
teenth year  becomes  comprehensible  only  if  we,  with  him,  give  to  the 
concept,  epoch  of  development,  a  meaning  totally  different  from  the  or- 
dinary use  of  the  word. 


ITS   APPLICATION    TO   PEDAGOGY.  121 

epoch  of  development  by  passing,  in  fancy,  through  the  high- 
est epoch  of  human  culture.  The  degree  of  ethical  reality  in 
the  subject-matter  for  instruction  is  dependent  on  certain  psy- 
chical conditions  which  no  education  and  no  instruction  can 
permanently  create.  If,  for  example,  the  conditions  for  the 
sovereignty  of  ethical  ideas,  or  for  the  moral  freedom,  accord- 
ing to  our  exposition  given  on  page  76,  etc.,  are  first  dis- 
covered in  the  period  of  youth  or  manhood,  then  the  most  valu- 
able subject-matter  before  this  time  produces  only  germs  and 
tendencies  towards  that  moral  constitution  of  will,  but  will 
never  be  able  to  transfer  the  highest  epoch  of  ethical  develop- 
ment into  the  period  of  boyhood,  and  thus  essentially  hasten 
the  culture  of  the  pupil.  It  is  not  true  that  the  public  school 
pupil  passes  through  the  same  order  of  development  as  the 
pupil  in  the  upper  schools,  only  in  a  more  condensed  form  — 
that  is,  more  quickly  and  probably  earlier. .  He  does  not 
pass  through  them  any  sooner,  or  in  any  shorter  time,  but  in 
an  abridged  form,  incompletely,  in  only  a  part  of  the  stages. 
That  will  not  keep  us  from  introducing  him  also  to  the  culture- 
matter  of  the  latest  epochs  of  development,  in  order  that 
they  may  contribute  to  the  ennoblement  of  his  spiritual  life 
according  to  the  measure  of  apperceiving  ideas  at  his  disposal. 
But  herewith,  we  say  to  ourselves,  that  we  may  only  expect 
from  the  future,  a  more  thorough  comprehension,  a  deeper 
ethical  effect  of  the  culture-matter  when  he  is  met  by  the 
numerous  inner  experiences  of  the  adult.  "What  we  mature 
in  the  pupil  is,  under  favorable  circumstances,  a  new  ap- 
perception, or  knowledge  epoch,  not  an  epoch  of  develop- 
ment. 

But  could  not  those  tendencies  of  the  will,  those  traces 
which  a  newly  gained  insight  leaves  behind  in  the  moral 
culture  of  the  pupil,  as  soon  as  it  is  supported  by  strong 
feelings,  be  already  regarded  as  tokens  of  a  new  epoch  of 


122  APPERCEPTION. 

development?*  But  that  would  contradict  all  use  of  lan- 
guage. For  when  we  speak  of  the  epochs  of  development 
we  think,  first  of  all,  of  certain  dominant  groups  of  ideas, 
which  imprint  their  character  upon  the  thought,  volition  and 
action  of  any  given  period ;  that  is,  of  the  sum  total  of  new, 
valuable  culture  elements  which  were  unfolded  and  developed 
in  it.  But  it  is  assumed  that  the  corresponding  epochs  of 
development  in  the  individual  show  a  similar  stamp  of  intel- 
lectual life  and  aspiration,  and  at  the  same  time  present  the 
best  and  most  numerous  apperception  aids  to  the  compre- 
hension of  the  universal  epochs  of  development  under  ques- 
tion. Indeed  it  can  be  positively  asserted  that  the  stage  for 
the  most  favorable  apperception  of  the  culture -con  tent  of  an 
epoch  of  universal  development,  is  likewise  that  of  the  cor- 
responding epoch  in  the  individual.  Accordingly  an  ethical 
epoch  of  development  will  be  determined  by  the  kind  of 
moral  volition  which  predominates  in  it,  or  begins  to  pre- 
dominate.* Hence,  the  highest  epoch  of  development  has 
been  attained  by  him  whose  moral  effort  is  practically  free, 
or  tries  to  free  itself  more  and  more,  from  the  eudaemonistic 
reasons  for  action ;  not,  however,  by  the  boy  in  whom  ten- 
dencies to  such  freedom  are  present  for  the  first  time.  For 
it  is  unquestionably  true  that  more  favorable  conditions  for 
the  apperception  of  the  highest  epoch  of  development  are 
present  with  the  former  than   in   the   case   of  the   latter; 

'  See  Vogt  in  the  explanations  for  the  21st  Journal  of  the  Society  for 
Scientific  Pedagogy,  p.  30.    (Jahrbuch  d.  V.f.  w.,  P.  XXI.) 

'  One  need  not  on  this  account,  as  Vogt,  Ibid,  p.  35. ,  presents  to  us, 
"  represent  the  epoch  by  the  image  of  a  fixed  point  or  a  fixed  surface,  " 
but  one  may  admit  that  the  development  of  the  individual  is,  in  every 
epoch,  completed  quite  gradually  and  includes  a  number  of  years.  In- 
deed, as  Willmann  rightly  observes,  the  growth  of  human  power, 
considered  as  a  whole,  is  more  like  a  gradually  ascending  path  than 
a  flight  of  stairs. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO  PEDAGOGY.  123 

indeed,  one  may  say,  the  most  favorable  of  all.  To  this  is 
added  another  consideration.  We  saw  that,  with  the  child, 
indications  of  the  most  varied  attitudes  toward  ethical  con- 
duct are  shown  relatively  early.  He  need  not  wait  until  the 
highest  stages  of  religious  instruction  have  been  reached 
to  get  a  vague  idea  of  the  categorical  imperatives  but 
this  conception  can  be  awakened  much  earlier  by  the 
unselfish,  self-sacrificing  action  of  the  parents ;  by  the  ex- 
amples of  noble  characters,  which  impress  themselves 
indelibly  on  his  mind,  and  thus  leave  traces  behind  in  his 
moral  disposition.  How  could  we,  under  such  conditions, 
distinguish  one  epoch  of  development  from  another,  were 
the  different  stages  not  characterized  by  predominating, 
rather  than  isolated  states  of  will  ?  The  fact  therefore 
remains,  that  knowledge  epochs  are  not  also  always  epochs 
of  development  in  the  historical  sense,  and  that  the  boy  does 
not  attain  to  the"  highest  form  of  the  latter  before  his  four- 
teenth year. 

But  if  it  be  firmly  established  that,  for  most  pupils,  the  last 
epochs  of  individual  development  lie  far  beyond  the  school 
period,  and  if  the  cultui'e- matter  for  each  individual  epoch  of 
development  is  to  be  taken  from  the  corresponding  culture- 
epoch  of  the  people,  —  then  certain  subject-matter,  and  indeed 
the  most  valuable  and  indispensable,  may  not  come  up  at  all  in 
the  public  school.^  That  might  be  justifiable  perhaps  in  the 
province  of  theory,  but  never  in  the  practical  pi'ovince  of  moral 

'  The  Categorical  Imperative  as  developed  by  Kant  may  be  stated  as 
follows :  "  So  act  that,  through  your  own  will,  the  rules  of  your  conduct 
might  become  universal  laws."  In  other  words,  if  you  want  a  test  for 
your  conduct,  universalize  it,  imagine  that  everybody  acts  in  the  same  way, 
then  see  if  you  could  approve  the  result. — Ed. 

'  Ziller  says:  "  The  subject-matter  for  moral  culture  is  expressly  based 
upon  the  correspondence  between  the  two  lines  of  development." — Ally. 
Pddagogik,  2nd  edition,  p.  217. 


124  APPERCEPTION. 

and  religious  culture.  For  even  if  the  pupil  of  the  public 
school  can  not  be  conducted  to  the  heights  of  art  and  science, 
still  nothing  must  be  lacking  that  is  essential  to  his  recognition 
of  what  is  necessary  for  the  happiness  of  the  soul.  He 
must  also  be  led  toward  the  ideal  of  a  pure  moral  character. 
But  here  arises  the  necessity  of  his  entering  into  maturer 
thoughts  and  purer  sentiments,  into  such  healing  truths,  as 
only  the  last  and  highest  culture-epochs  of  his  people  have  to 
offer  him. 

We  have  seen  that  between  the  development  of  the  in- 
dividual and  that  of  his  people,  or  humanity,  there  exists 
only  a  relative,  not  a  complete  correspondence.  Education 
will  accordingly  have  to  take  into  consideration  the  great 
differences  existing  between  the  two  lines  of  development, 
and  especially  will  it  have  to  establish  firmly  the  succession 
of  culture-matter,  but  not  exclusively  and  without  further 
ceremony,  according  to  the  couree  of  historical  culture. 

It  is  further  proven  that  the  moral  development  of  the 
pupil,  even  with  the  best  of  instruction,  does  not  close  with 
his  fourteenth  year.  Consequently  the  childish  develop- 
ment —  at  least  in  the  province  of  ethics  —  passes  through 
only  a  part  of  the  culture  epochs,  and  for  this  reason,  there- 
fore, the  selection  of  material  for  study  cannot  be  based  on 
the  asserted  correspondence  of  race  and  individual  develop- 
ment, for  otherwise  the  most  valuable  culture-matter  would 
have  to  be  withheld  from  the  public  school  pupil. 

Against  these  conclusions  it  has  been  urged,  in  a 
sorrowful  tone,  the  consideration  that  "  it  is  always 
the  public  school  alone  that  is  kept  in  view ' ' ;  that 
naturally  the  public  school  in  its  limited  scope  can  "ex- 
hibit but  very  imperfectly ' '  the  path  of  culture  and  that  it 
must  consequently  treat  the  development  epochs  in  part 
too  early.     But  from  that  the  unreliability  of  the  culture- 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  125 

epoch  theory  would  not  follow.  On  the  contrary,  the  theory 
would  have  strict  validity  for  higher  schools  where  there  is 
more  time  at  disposal.^ 

In  reply  to  this,  we  have  the  following  to  offer.  —  If  Ziller 
in  the  exposition  of  his  theory  of  culture  epochs  keeps  solely 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  public  school,  it  becomes  the 
duty  of  the  critical  examiner  to  follow  him  in  this  province 
of  experience,  and  there,  first  of  all,  to  investigate  the  validity 
of  his  principle.  Indeed,  it  is  here  alone  that  his  opinion 
could  be  ascertained  with  some  certainty,  and  the  practica- 
bility of  his  theory  be  tested  on  a  given  pedagogical  subject- 
matter.  We  hold  with  Ziller,  that  the  highest  principles  of 
instruction  must  always  be  considered  as  universally  valid, 
equally  applicable  to  all  schools  and  ages.  If,  then,  it  can 
be  rightfully  said  concerning  so  important  a  principle  as 
that  of  the  selection  and  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter 
of  education  in  general,  that  it  is  really  only  applicable  for 
higher  schools,  the  principle  must  appear  inadmissible  from 
the  very  beginning.  A  principle  that  is  perfectly  valid  only 
for  the  upper  schools  and  allows  the  work  of  the  public 
school  to  appear  in  so  unfavorable  a  light,  cannot  be  recog- 
nized as  the  highest,  universally  valid,  educational  law.'^ 

But  suppose  its  asserted  validity  were  denied,  even  for 
higher  schools?  According  to  Ziller,  the  subject-matter  of 
education  is  always  "to  be  borrowed  from  that  culture 
development  which  is  parallel  to  the  pupil's  present  condition 
of  mind."  *    Ziller  demands,  that,  wherever  possible,  every 

1  Thrandorf  in  Jahrbuch  des  V.f.  w.  Pad.,  XII.,  709. 

*If,  according  to  him,  subject-matter  is  treated  "too  early"  in  the 
public  schools,  it  is,  of  course,  not  in  its  right  place,  and  a  sound  peda- 
gogical principle  should  not  admit  at  all  such  preniature  work.  But  if 
that  matter  can  in  reality  be  treated,  then  it  has  evidently  nothing  to  do 
with  the  theory  of  culture  epochs. 

s  Ziller,  Allg-  Pddagogik,  2nd  edition,  p.  260. 


126  APPERCEPTION. 

culture-epoch  shall  be  presented  to  the  pupil  at  the  moment 
when  his  whole  attitude  of  mind,  natural  as  well  as  acquired 
through  instruction,  guarantees  an  apperception  of  the  new  as 
nearly  perfect  as  possible."  ^ 

A  given  topic,  therefore,  should  not  be  presented  until 
the  moment  when  the  pupil  has  reached  the  corresponding 
epoch  of  development;  for  not  until  then  will  he,  as  we  saw 
above,  apperceive  most  perfectly  new  thoughts  and  aspira- 
tions. Not  until  this  time  is  his  stage  of  mental  develop- 
ment abreast  of  the  corresponding  culture-epoch. —  But  the 
highest  stage  of  development,  that  of  moral- religious  freedom, 
comes  with  most  people  in  the  more  mature  period  of  youth 
or  manhood ;  a  fact  which,  for  evident  psychological  rea- 
sons, will  not  greatly  alter  the  best  curriculum  of  studies. 
For  as  long  as  the  pupil  still  stands  in  complete  outward 
dependence  upon  others,  his  actions  will  be  naturally  caused 
by  eudffimonistic  (even  if  not  ignoble)  motives ;  as  long  as 
no  responsible  occupation  places  him  in  the  midst  of  the 
battle  of  life,  he  lacks  in  great  measure  those  inner  experi- 
ences, doubts  and  needs  such  as  are  presupposed  by  the 
last  period  of  religious  development;  in  other  words,  he 
lacks  the  best  apperceptive  aids  to  a  final  adoption  of  the 
highest  religious  truths." 

As  a  consequence,  according  to  the  strict  requirements 
of  the  principle,  the  presentation  of  the  culture-epochs 
would  have  to  be  extended  past  the  period  of  youth,  and  un- 
til then  certain  culture-matter  would  have  to  be  kept  from  him. 

'  Thrandorf,  Jahrbuch  des  V.f.  w.  Pad.,  XII.,  109. 

*  "According  totlie  inner  psychological  nature  of  everything  ethical  in 
character,  knowledge  and  actions  mutually  condition  each  other;  moral 
maturity  and  elevaCion  of  spirit  are  never  attainable  without  active, 
personal  experience  of  life.  Not  only  for,  but  also  through  conduct, 
is  moral  sense  developed." — Lazarus,  Dai  Leben  der  Heele,"  3d  vol.,  p.  103. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  127 

Futhermore,  according  to  Thrandorf's  method,^  matter  of 
the  highest  ethical  epoch,  the  life  of  Jesus  and  the  history 
of  the  Apostles,  would  have  to  be  treated  at  the  middle 
period  of  the  upper  school,  and  thus  at  a  time  when  "  these 
phases  of  religious  truth  do  not  receive  the  full  and  conclusive 
estimation  due  them,"  but  could  be  apperceived  only  in 
the  spirit  of  the  second  stage  of  mental  development.^ 

Here,  too,  then,  even  if  not  in  the  same  degree  as  in  the 
public  school,  there  is  either  a  premature  presentation  of 
culture-matter,  or  the  necessity  of  withholding  it  from  the 
pupil  until  past  the  school  period.  This  shows  us  quite 
plainly  that  a  strict  carrying  out  of  the  culture-epochs  is 
not  possible  in  any  of  the  existing  schools,  because  the 
pupil  does  not  pass  through  so  many  epochs  of  development 
that  the  matter  of  the  separate  culture  stages  could  ever 
be  added  to  a  related,  that  is,  the  corresponding  individual 
epoch.  And  only  in  so  far  as  one  gives  up  this  require- 
ment—  which  is,  to  be  sure,  the  essence  of  Ziller's  theory 
—  will  that  theory  ever  be  recognized  as  applicable.  The 
thought  of  arranging  the  subject-matter  of  instruction  in 
genetic  order  must  be  regarded,  not  as  a  sole  and  universally 
valid  principle,  but  oue  to  be  taken  into  account  along 
with  others. 

If,  according  to  this,  we  cannot  deduce  directly  the 
child' s  stages  of  apperception  from  a  universal  pyschological 
and  historical  proposition,  nothing  remains  but  to  settle 
the  question,  propounded  above,  by  a  minute  investigation 
of    the    conditions     under    which     the    subject-matter    of 

^Jahrhuch  d.  V.f.w.  P.,  XX.,  106. 

*  To  be  sure,  Tliriindorf  thinks  that  that  would  exactly  correspoud  to 
tlie  different  interpretations  which  Christianity  has  found  in  the  course 
of  time.  But  the  pupil  is  not  here  for  the  purpose  of  living  over  again 
the  retrogression  of  the  human  race  from  biblical  to  medisaval  Christianity. 


128  APPERCEPTION. 

education  will  be  apperceived  in  the  best  manner. 
First  of  all,  it  is  indeed  clear  that  the  matter  to  be  taught 
must  on  the  whole  lie  close  to  the  child's  experience. 
Since  the  latter  has  its  root  in  the  home  soil,  the  material  of 
the  studies  must  be  taken  from  the  national  treasures  of 
knowledge,  or  at  least  stand  in  close  relation  to  national  in- 
terests, sentiments  and  ideas.  It  must,  to  be  sure,  be  sub- 
ject-matter that  apparently  transfers  the  child  into  unknown 
regions,  but  yet  in  reality  leads  it  back  to  the  realm  of  its 
most  familiar  ideas,  its  daily  needs  and  experiences.  Such 
a  choice  of  subject-matter  presupposes  a  thorough  analysis 
of  the  sphere  of  national  thought,  an  exact  knowledge  of 
the  lasting  and  permanently  valuable  possessions  of  the 
national  culture. 

But  from  the  nature  of  the  latter,  all  cannot  be  presented 
to  the  child  at  every  period  and  in  like  manner.  We  have 
already  seen  how  the  pupil's  gradual  development  puts  limits 
to  the  application  of  a  pedagogical  principle  that  cannot  be 
passed  over  with  impunity.  As  the  compass  of  its  outward 
experiences  arrives  at  a  certain  completion  only  after  the 
work  of  years,  so  also  does  the  breadth  of  its  consciousness, 
the  power  to  grasp  and  retain  ideas  as  a  whole,  increase 
but  gradually.  The  epoch  of  development  in  which  the 
cliild  is  able  to  think  only  in  pictures  is  followed  by  an- 
other in  which  it  really  gives  him  pleasure  to  lift  himself  in 
the  abstract  above  the  confusing  variety  of  individual  ob- 
jects up  to  the  universal  law,  that  is,  to  rule  and  concept. 

From  the  fanciful  he  advances  to  the  real,  from  an  imag- 
inative to  a  sensible  and  intelligent  conception  of  the  world. 
Many  things  that  at  first  seemed  to  him  historical  facts, 
later  on  become  poetical  images.  Certain  experiences  and 
conditions  of  mind  —  consider,  for  example,  the  complex 
of  {esthetic  feelings  that  arises  from  contemplation  of  works 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO  PEDAGOGY.  129 

of  art,  the  thoughts  and  feelings  pertaining  to  the  sexes,  the 
interest  in  difficult  political  questions  of  the  day,  do  not 
present  themselves  until  the  close  pf  the  youthful  stage 
of  development.  Thus  the  pupil's  power  of  appercep- 
tion is  a  constantly  changing  one,  according  to  scope  and 
nature  of  the  experience  obtained  outside  the  school,  and  the 
stage  of  intellectual  activity  to  which  he  has  attained.  But 
instruction  must  pay  attention  to  this  law  of  child  devel- 
opment when  choosing  its  subject-matter,  in  order  that  it 
may  correspond  to  the  changing  power  of  conception,  to  the 
experience  and  interest  of  the  pupil.  Matter  must  not  be 
offered,  the  comprehension  of  which  demands  certain  necessaiy 
outer  or  inner  experiences  which  are  at  the  time  still  wanting 
and  must  be  wanting,  or  the  form  of  which  presupposes  a 
higher  and  more  mature  intellect  than  the  pupil  possesses.  It 
must,  however,  first  of  all  and  principally,  treat  of  that  which 
lies  nearest  to  the  experience  of  the  child.  It  must  correspond 
to  the  epoch  of  mind  arrived  at,  in  order  by  means  of  this 
subject-matter,  gradually  to  lift  the  child  above  that  epoch. 

However  important  in  general  the  foregoing  didactic  regu- 
lations for  the  choice  of  matter  for  instruction  are,  they 
evidently  do  not  attain  to  the  solution  of  the  question  as  to 
what  portion  of  instruction  is  to  be  allotted  to  the  separate 
school  years,  and  as  to  how  this  should  be  divided  and  ar- 
ranged for  the  whole  period  of  school  life.  If  we  take  into 
consideration  merely  the  fact  of  the  development  of  the 
child's  mind,  we  gain  for  the  period  from  the  sixth  to  the 
fourteenth  year,  not  the  desired  eight  epochs  of  apperception, 
but  at  the  most  only  two.  This  fact  suggests,  however,  that 
these  various  epochs  do  not  depend  exclusively  upon  the  un- 
changeable factors  given  in  the  child's  development,  but  fully 
as  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  offered  by  in- 
struction.    They  are  not  something  exclusively  innate,  but 


130  APPEKCEPTION. 

can  be,  in  a  measure  at  least,  artificially  produced.  Or  still 
better,  within  tlie  stages  of  the  child's  mind  that  are  determined 
by  fixed  laws,  instruction  is  able  to  create  epochs  of  apper- 
ception, in  accordance  with  the  given  psychical  conditions, 
just  as  surely  as  the  ability  to  apperceive  depends  essentially 
upon  the  range  of  thought  already  acquired.  The  power  of 
apperception,  however,  is  produced  through  instruction  by 
means  of  such  an  arrangement  of  the  teaching  matter  as  will 
make  the  sequel  intelligible  from  what  precedes,  "  so  that 
every  previous  subject  best  prepares  the  mind  of  the  pupil 
for  that  which  succeeds  more  or  less  closely."  ^  That  is 
brought  about  most  naturally  and  perfectly  by  following  the 
historical  principle,  by  grouping  the  material  with  reference 
to  the  historical  development  which  a  definite  phase  of 
national  thought  has  taken.  "  Especially  does  what  goes 
before  in  a  given  subject  contain  the  key  to  what  follows, 
and  following  up  the  development  of  a  subject  leads  most 
simply  to  an  understanding  of  it."^  While  the  child  follows 
the  progress  of  national  culture  or  the  facts  of  sacred  his- 
tory from  epoch  to  epoch,  it  receives  indeed  in  each  of  these 
stages  numerous  ideas  that  prepare  it  for  what  is  new  in  the 
next  epoch. 

Everything  that  is  learned  in  one  epoch  serves  at  once  as 
a  powerful  aid  to  the  understanding  of  what  follows  in  the 
next  higher ;  that  which  has  become,  explains  that  which  is 
becoming.  A  happier  arrangement  of  material  for  the  pur- 
pose of  the  most  thorough  and  many-sided  apperception, 
can  scarcely  be  imagined.     With  its  aid,  it  would  seem  that 

'  Herbart,  Psychology  as  a  Science,  II.,  236 ;  Stoy,  Encyclopadie,  p.  67, 
81.  What  is  true  in  the  oft  quoted  and  oft  misunderstood  phrase,  "  Let 
all  instruction  advance  without  break,"  receives  in  the  above  require- 
ment its  due- 

»  Willman,  Didaktik  als  Dildungslehre,  Vol.  II.,  214.  Cf.  also  Karmin 
in  Rein's  Pad.  Studien,  1888,  p.  201. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  131 

subject-matter  can  be  assigned  to  each  school  year,  for 
which  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  apperception  are, 
relatively  speaking,  at  hand,  and  through  which  certain 
epochs  of  apperception  can  be  created  within  the  limits  of 
the  capacities  of  child  mind.^  In  the  choice  of  matter 
according  to  historical  points  of  view  we  discover  all  that  is 
justifiable  in  Ziller's  theory  of  culture-epochs.^ 

Finally,  the  apperceptive  power  of  the  pupil  can  be 
increased  by  the  sequence  of  topics  in  the  various  studies ; 
so  it  can  be  also  by  the  right  choice   and  arrangement  of 

*  These,  nevertheless,  do  not  always  coincide  with  the  actual  periods  of 
development  in  the  mind  of  the  child.  The  latter,  rather,  comprehend 
several  of  the  former  in  themselves;  the  pupil,  too,  will  not  "pass 
through  and  experience  "  the  culture-epochs,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
word,  but  only  busy  himself  with  them,  in  order,  as  vividly  as  possible, 
with  the  aid  of  fancy,  to  picture  them  to  himself  as  historical  facts,  to 
understand  them  thoroughly,  and  to  unite  them  with  the  feelings  of 
hearty  sympathy.  If  such  a  thorough  and  sympathetic  grasp  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  studies  can  be  called  "  experiencing  "  it  we  have  no  ob- 
jections to  make. 

=  That  wliich  is  untenable  in  it  will  be  hidden  from  many  by  the  ambi- 
guity of  certain  universal  concepts.  For  example,  the  defence  is  made 
that  Ziller  only  asserts  a  correspont^ence  between  individual  and  race 
development  —  "on  tlie  whole"  —  but  there  are  deduced  from  this  ex- 
ceedingly indefinite  expression  very  comprehensive,  definite,  and  there- 
fore far-reaching  conclusions.  First  of  all,  the  parallelism  (or  more 
recently,  the  analogy)  between  the  development  of  the  race  and  that  of 
the  individual  is  touched  upon,  in  order,  without  further  ceremony,  to 
substitute  pupil  for  individual  where  pedagogical  conditions  are  to  be 
drawn.  The  concept  "  epoch  of  development "  is  used  just  so  long  as  one 
moves  in  the  universal,  abstract  requirements  of  tlie  theory.  But  as  soon 
as  one  descends  to  the  concrete  facts  of  the  school  practice,  that  concept 
receives  in  a  twinkling  quite  a  different  meaning,  that  of  the  apperception 
epoch.  And  now  one  can  indeed  willingly  grant  to  the  defender  of  the 
theory  that  in  general  the  culture-matter  is  best  apperceived  if  it  is  pre- 
sented in  historical  sequence.  But  if  that  is  to  be  the  essence  and  real 
meaning  of  the  theory  of  culture  epochs,  wherefore  the  lofty  words  about 
the  two  developments  that  run  fully  parallel  with  one  another,  which  in 
their  chief  stages  must  correspond  perfectly?  Cf.  Jahrbuch  d.  V.f.w 
P.,  XXI.,  165 ;    Ziller,  Allg.  Pdday.,  p.  216. 


132  APPERCEPTION. 

that  which  is  carried  on  side  by  side ;  in  other  words,  by 
the  proper  coordination  of  studies.  It  becomes  clear  that  a 
simultaneous  treatment  of  the  same  topic  in  different  subjects 
according  to  several  points  of  view,  or  the  introduction  of 
closely  related  objects  and  facts,  must  essentially  assist  mental 
assimilation.  Then  the  ideas  and  interests  gained  from 
the  one  province  of  knowledge  affect  the  related  provinces  as 
apperceiving  powers  which  fix  the  new  in  consciousness  as 
something  relatively  familiar.  They  assist  understanding, 
because  they  constitute  in  some  cases  the  conditions  of  apper- 
ception, and  in  others  a  sufficient  explanation  of  enigmatical 
phenomena,  thus  helping  to  complete  the  apprehension  and 
insuring  a  more  fundamental  grasp  of  the  subject.  But  they 
do  this  so  much  the  more  reliably,  in  that  they  appear,  not 
years  after  when  obstructed  by  other  and  totally  different 
ideas  and  interests,  but  at  once  and  with  undiminished 
force.  Thus  arises  that  harmonious  state  of  thought 
and  feeling  which,  like  the  right  mood,  is  especially 
favorable  to  the  assimilation  of  knowledge.  Accordingly 
there  is  to  be  recommended  such  a  choice  and  arrangement 
of  studies  that  at  each  stage  the  largest  possible  amount  of 
related  matter  may  be  treated  at  one  time,  and  thus  be 
brought  into  a  unity  in  consciousness. 

Let  us  now  sum  up  briefly  the  requirements  that  have 
revealed  themselves  in  reference  to  the  object  of  appercep- 
tion. In  general  this  direction  holds  good :  Offer  to  the 
child  always  that  knowledge  for  whose  thorough  assimilation 
the  most  favorable  conditions  are  present  or  easy  to  create. 

How  can  this  be  done  ? 

1.  Such  materials  of  knowledge  must  be  chosen  as  lie 
close  to  child  experience  in  general,  and  likewise  to  the 
consciousness  of  the  people,  t.  e.,  the  subject-matter  of 
national  culture. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  133 

2.  They  must,  as  regards  content  and  form,  take  into 
consideration  certain  peculiarities  of  the  child's  intellectual 
development. 

3.  They  are  to  be  arranged  in  such  a  manner  that  every 
topic  shall  create  for  the  following  ones  numerous  strong 
aids  to  apperception;  i.  e.,  according  to  historical  sequence 
(Law  of  Propjedeutics). 

4.  The  various  parallel  subjects  of  the  curriculum  are 
to  be  arranged  in  such  a  manner  that  in  each  grade  as 
many  as  possible  allied  topics  may  be  associated,  so  that 
what  is  related  in  fact,  may  be  related  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  child  (Law  of  Coordination,  or  Concentration  of 
Studies). 

In  so  far  as  the  simultaneous  realization  of  the  foregoing 
requirements  does  not  meet  insurmountable  difficulties  they 
may  be  regarded  as  valid.  And  indeed  in  most  cases  they 
will  support  and  confirm  one  another.  Yet  the  possibility  is 
by  no  means  excluded  that  one  or  the  other  requirements 
will  clash  with  the  rest.  Certain  material  may  be  chosen  in 
accordance  with  the  historical  principle,  which  in  content 
and  form  expects  too  much  from  the  child  at  a  certain  epoch 
of  his  development.  Or  the  unequal  rate  of  historical  pro- 
gress in  the  different  branches  does  not  admit  of  a  useful 
concentration  in  the  instruction.  And  the  case  is  also  con- 
ceivable that,  in  the  realization  of  the  third  and  fourth  re- 
quirements, the  intrinsic  value  of  the  subject-matter  for 
instruction  might  not  receive  its  full  due.  In  all  these 
cases  it  is  advisable  to  limit  one  requirement  by  another,  as 
far  as  is  necessary,  and  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  chief  prin- 
ciple while  considering  special  applications.  This  refers  to 
the  last  two  directions ;  while  the  first  two,  which  have 
reference  to  given,  unchangeable  facts,  can  not  be  sub- 
jected tp  any  limitation.     It  does  not  lie  within  the  province 


134  APPERCEPTION. 

of  this  discussion  to  sketch  a  complete  curriculum  of  studies 
in  accordance  with  the  foregoing  principles,  even  for  one 
grade  of  school.  Only  a  few  practical  conclusions  may  be 
permitted  to  us  in  connection  with  these  general  require- 
ments. 

If  we  ask  what  historical  subject-matter  for  moral  culture 
must  at  all  events  have  a  place  in  the  scheme  of  instruction, 
not  merely  for  moral  and  religious,  but  also  for  psychological 
reasons,  we  find  that  custom  ascribes  the  first  place  to  stories 
from  the  Sacred  Writ.  And  properly,  too.  For  its  figures 
stand  close  to  the  consciousness  of  the  people  as  very  few 
others  do ;  its  thoughts  are  bound  up  with  our  most  sacred 
feelings  and  convictions.  As  long  as  our  people  see  the 
source  of  their  belief  in  the  Holy  Scriptures ;  as  long  as 
they,  like  their  fathers,  are  edified  by  the  examples  of  its 
holy  men,  just  so  long  will  biblical  views  and  sentiments, 
biblical  thoughts  and  precepts  —  even  in  the  language  pe- 
culiar to  them  —  constitute  the  essence  of  our  national 
thought.  However  remote  they  seem  to  be  from  our 
country,  the  Scriptures  are  still  the  basis  of  the  national 
culture  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word.  That  they  must 
stand  in  the  foreground  of  public  school  instruction,  is 
the  universal  agreement  of  the  German  people.  Only  in 
this  do  opinions  differ, — the  order  in  which  they  shall  be 
presented,  whether  in  concentric  circles  or  in  a  straight  line; 
whether  sacred  history  is  to  be  brought  forward  only  once 
according  to  the  chief  points  in  its  epochs,  or  whether  each 
story  is  to  be  offered  repeatedly. 

The  law  of  propaedeutics  undoubtedly  demands  progress 
according  to  historical  points  of  view,  a  gradual  travei'sing 
of  the  matter  in  accordance  with  the  historical  course  of 
biblical  development.  This  manner  of  procedure  offers 
the  opportunity  of  always  bringing  before  the  child   great 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  135 

connected  epochs  of  history.^  Then  the  pupil  will  not  be 
constantly  thrown  from  one  sphere  of  thought  to  another  by 
means  of  numerous  isolated  stories,  but  the  inner  connection 
that  exists  between  the  personages  and  events  of  the  same 
sacred  epoch,  the  similarity  of  exterior  circumstances  ac- 
companying them,  of  geographical  surroundings,  of  customs 
and  usages,  of  the  conditions  of  life  and  the  like,  make  it 
possible  for  the  child  soon  to  feel  at  home  in  this  world, 
otherwise  strange  to  him.  There  are  indeed  the  same  re- 
ligious sentiments  and  intuitions,  the  same  social  affairs 
and  customs,  the  same  planes  and  conditions  of  culture 
which  are  constantly  recurring  in  the  various  stories.  And 
how  often  and  naturally  is  opportunity  given  for  compari- 
sons, for  looking  backward  and  forward,  for  the  perfecting 
and  repetition  of  what  is  already  learned  !  The  instruction 
advances  constantly  and  yet  gives  nothing  completely  new. 
In  a  word,  closely  related  historical  matter  creates  in  the 
numerous  related  ideas  that  it  awakens  the  most  favorable 
conditions  for  their  successful  apperception.  In  addition  to 
this,  religious  instruction  that  progresses  according  to  epochs 
of  history  gives  the  pupil  sufHcient  time  thoroughly  to  ab- 
sorb and  appropriate  the  subject-matter.  It  is  not  of  im- 
portance to  the  child  to  "go  through"  the  subject  in  two  or 
three  years  at  any  cost ;  that  the  knowledge  shall  surely  be- 
come the  intellectual  property  of  the  pupil  during  his  school 
life  is  the  important  thing.  By  going  forward  so  slowly,  a 
thorough  mastery  of  the  individual  stories  is  rendered  pos- 
sible.    The  child  gains  time,  not  merely  to  grasp  firmly  the 

*  Our  school  programs,  often  suffering  from  the  diffusion  of  instruction, 
appear  to  be  in  especial  need  of  such  important,  unitary  classic  matter. 
Indeed  Geibel,  to  whom  we  owe  so  many  encouraging  words  about  moral 
education  and  instruction,  sees  in  the  motley  array  of  these  programs, 
and  the  hasty  treatment  of  lioterogeneous  matter,  a  backward  and  harmful 
tendency  of  our  modern  culture. 


136  APPERCEPTION. 

sacred  events  jier  .sp,  but  to  make  for  liimself  a  clear  picture 
of  their  historical  background,  and  to  see  the  conditions  of 
human  action.  AVe  can  seek  to  follow  the  motives  and  in- 
tentions of  the  acting  personages,  to  recognize  their  feelings 
and  thoughts,  and  thus  gain  deeper  understanding  of  histori- 
cal events.  By  entering  thus  into  strange  manners  of 
thought  and  aspirations,  the  child  now  cultivates  an  inter- 
course with  historical  personages  from  which  a  strong  sym- 
pathetic fellow-feeling,  a  lively  interest,  readily  arises.  It 
is  our  conviction,  resting  upon  years  of  experience,  that  such 
a  d^ep,  cheerful  grasp  of  sacred  history  is  not  possible  in 
the  restless  haste  with  which  instruction  usually  advances 
and  is  compelled  to  advance  according  to  "  concentric 
circles."  And  even  this  fact,  confirmed  by  many  conscien- 
tious teachers,  that  the  essential  content  of  sacred  history 
can  never  be  assimilated  by  the  tender  youth  in  two  or  three 
years,  and  much  less  infused  into  heart  and  disposition, 
argues  an  extension  and  lengthening  of  the  course  in  biblical 
history,  and  a  laying  aside  or  modification  of  the  concentric 
circles. 

To  be  sure,  in  defense  of  the  repeated  appearance  of  the 
same  historical  matter,  one  may  argue  that  the  lesson  will 
tend  to  become  more  firmly  impressed  on  tlie  mind,  and 
that  the  right  understanding  will  perhaps  reveal  the  second 
time  what  remained  obscure  to  the  child  at  first.  But 
we  fear  that  thou^  in  this  manner  it  is  perhaps  more 
firmly  impressed  (and  mechanically  at  that),  it  is  not  apper- 
ceived  any  better.  For  it  is  a  psychological  fact  that  a 
mere  supei-ficial  grasp  of  the  new  usually  kills  the  interest 
in  it.  What  one  has  learned  once,  but  not  rightly,  has 
too  little  attraction  and  too  many  known  elements  to  be 
able  to  hold  the*  attention  long.  The  right  apperception  is 
lacking,  or  a  very  superficial  apperception  is  accomplished, 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  137 

not  because  the  subject-matter  offers  too  much  that  is  new, 
but  because  it  offers  too  little.  Jean  Paul  remarks  in  one 
place,  when  looking  back  at  the  restless  traffic  of  the  great 
city :  ' '  We  become  indifferent  to  men  only  when  we  see 
them  often  and  not  rightly,  when  we  associate  with  many 
without  becoming  rightly  acquainted  with  one."  Might  not 
that  hold  good  also  with  historical  characters,  who  hasteu, 
according  to  the  "  concentric  circles,"  in  motley  array  every 
year  or  two  across  the  threshhold  of  the  childish  con- 
sciousness? Does  not  many  a  pupil  become  frightfully 
indifferent  to  the  ideal  figures  of  biblical  history  and  to 
those  of  his  country  because  he  had  intercourse  with  too 
many,  one  after  the  other,  without  "  being  rightly  acquainted 
with  any  one  "  ? 

Rather  assimilate  one  subject  once,  but  thoroughly,  than 
busy  ourselves  with  it  repeatedly,  but  without  deeper  in- 
terest !  That  which  is  to  become  a  power  in  the  pupil,  and 
to  be  closely  welded  to  his  most  cherished  thoughts  and 
feelings,  must  not  pass  hurriedly  and  uncounectedly  before 
his  soul  like  the  images  of  a  kaleidoscope ;  it  must  occupy 
him  long  and  uninterruptedly. 

The  more  thoroughly  and  successfully  the  pupil  enters  into 
the  religious  epochs  of  development,  the  more  does  a  further 
reason  for  the  superiority  of  the  instruction  that  advances 
in  a  straight  line  assert  its  value ;  —  every thiug  that  pre- 
cedes prepares  the  mind  of  the  pupil  for  what  follows.  In- 
deed often  the  religious  views  of  earlier  epochs  of  sacred 
history  furnish  the  key  to  an  understanding  of  the  later 
epochs  of  xeligious  life,  such  as  the  great  deeds  of  the  divine 
Teacher.  The  Old  Testament  has  especial  value  as  a  neces- 
sary epoch,  preparatory  for  Christianity  as  a  discipline  es- 
sential to  a  reception  of  Christ.  "The  pictures  of  the  Old 
Testament   become   prototypes   to   those  of  the  New.     In 


138  APPERCEPTION. 

Israel's  priesthood,  in  its  kingdom  and  its  age  of  prophets, 
is  concentrated  the  Old  Testament  prototype  of  Christianity.* 
Through  these  types  the  Old  Testament  becomes  likewise  an 
elementary  school  for  the  comprehension  of  Christ  and  his 
works.  How  could  the  holy  work  of  reconciliation  be  pre- 
sented more  clearly  or  in  a  more  plastic  manner  than  by  the 
whole  sacrificial  service  of  the  priesthootl ;  how  could  the 
all-embracing  position  of  Christ  as  Lord  be  expressed  to  his 
disciples  and  to  the  world  more  comprehensibly  than  by  the 
image  of  the  King  in  the  realm  of  God  ?  Therefore  the  New 
Testament  speaks  almost  entirely  in  Old  Testament  figures, 
even  when  it  speaks  of  New  Testament  matters.  — The  New 
Testament  cannot  speak  othenvise  than  in  Old  Testa- 
ment language;  for  the  Old  Testament  is  the  lexicon  of 
the  New :  from  it  are  borrowed  the  words,  figures,  ideas,  — 
the  whole  language,  but  everything  in  spirit  and  in  truth 
filled  with  that  life,  the  shadow  and  prototype  of  which  is  in 
the  Old  Testament."  If  that  is  the  case,  then  the  pupil  who 
by  a  longer  study  of  the  Old  Testament  stories  has  been 
made  intimately  acquainted  with  their  contents  and  spirit 
will  evidently  enter  most  deeply  into  the  instructive  matter 
of  the  New  Testament ;  at  any  rate,  more  easily  and  surely 
than  the  child  that  has  been  led  in  quick  course  through  the 
most  varied  eiK)chs  of  sacred  history,  and  in  whose  mind  the 
most  diverse  religious  conceptions  have  been  already 
mingled. 

If,  from  the  reasons  just  presented,  the  arrangement  of 
biblical  histoiy  according  to  historical  principles,  appears  the 
right  one,  it  still  behooves  us  before  we  finally  decide,  to 
test  some  considerations  in  opposition  to  our  assumption, 

*  See  the  beautiful  and  convincing  proof  of  this  in  Max  Frommel's 
Charakterbildern  zur  Charakterbildung,  from  which  we  have  cited  the 
above  passage  (p.  38,  etc.)- 


ITS    APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  139 

which  are  deduced  from  other  and  not  less  correct  principles. 
It  is  said  that  our  arrangement  of  matter  does  not  take  the 
child's  power  of  comprehension  sufficiently  into  consideration, 
that  it  offers  certain  stories  at  a  period  when  the  proper 
capability  for  apperceiving  them  is  not  yet  present.  Now, 
it  may  indeed  happen  that  at  the  time  the  child  may  lack 
either  the  necessary  inner  experience  or  the  required  maturity 
and  keenness  of  judgment  for  the  deeper  comprehension  of 
certain  historical  facts  and  sacred  truths.  But  instruction 
according  to  "concentric  circles"  does  not  remove  this  diflS- 
culty. 

For  we  have  here  to  do  with  conditions  of  apperception 
which  do  not  make  their  appearance  suddenly,  in  a  day,  or 
even  in  a  year  or  two,  but  which  are  to  be  looked  for  only 
after  a  much  longer  time  in  the  next  stage  of  development. 
Accordingly  that  for  which  the  child  is  not  yet  mature 
enough  will  have  to  be  treated,  not  in  ' '  the  next  course  or 
concentric  circle,"  but  much  later,  perhaps  at  the  end  of 
his  school  days. 

It  is  therefore  advisable,  at  all  events  in  the  last  year  of 
school,  to  follow  the  instruction  in  biblical  history,  for  the 
purpose  of  connection,  with  a  repetition  of  the  Gospel,  to- 
gether with  supplementary  biblical  and  poetical  selections 
to  fill  out  the  previous  omissions.  But  much  of  what  is 
thought  too  difficult  for  certain  grades  is,  however,  to  be 
included  in  those  matters,  tlie  ability  for  the  apperception 
of  which  can  be  formed  in  the  recitation,  if  the  teacher  will 
avail  himself  of  the  advantage  presented  by  an  arrangement 
of  the  selections  according  to  the  law  of  propaedeutics. 
The  instruction  approaches  this  in  so  far  as  it  follows  the 
course  of  the  unfolding  of  the  Gospel,  proceeding  essentially 
from  simple,  easily  understood  conditions  and  religious 
truths  to  more  complicated  and   difficult  ones.     This  is  in 


140  APPERCEPTION. 

imitation  of  the  Divine  Teacher  who  likewise  has  raised 
mankind  only  gradually  from  incomplete  notions  to  riper 
knowledge.  By  this  is  not,  however,  to  be  understood  that 
we  detain  the  pupil  purposely  in  erroneous,  specifically 
Jewish  ways  of  thinking ;  much  rather  should  such  religious 
prejudices,  when  encountered  by  the  child  in  the  Bible,  find 
their  correction  through  reference  to  the  Christian  con- 
science of  our  own  time.  By  such  a  couree  we  are  enabled 
to  present  to  the  children  the  divine  tiniths  in  such  a  sequence 
as  corresponds  approximately  to  their  successive  stages  of 
spiritual  maturity.  We  can  announce  the  great  divine 
secrets,  as  they  reveal  themselves  in  the  work  of  redemption 
tlu-ough  Christ,  to  the  pupil  at  a  time  when  a  suflScient 
measure  of  inner  experience  has  prepared  in  him  the  right 
receptivity  for  them.^  Is  not  that  taking  sufficient  account 
of  the  development  of  the  child  ?  Enough,  —  we  are  not 
afraid  that  our  course  of  instruction  will  reserN'e  for  a  time 
too  much  of  the  actual  facts  of  the  Gospel.  We  admit  readily 
that  the  first  stories  of  the  Old  Testament  are  not  appro- 
priate to  begin  with.  We  have  Bible  stories,  the  facts  of 
which  lie  much  nearer  to  the  religious  conscience  of  the 
people  and  the  experience  of  the  child ;  e.  g.^  those  stories 
of  the  New  Testament  whose  content  the  child  has  learned 
to  know  and  love,  or  at  least  for  which  a  lively  interest  has 

>  Nothing  is  indeed  so  apt  to  close  the  child's  heart  against  divine 
things  as  a  too  early  introduction  to  their  knowledge.  But  what  deep 
secrets  of  the  Christian  faith  are  only  too  often  discussed  with  young 
children  who  lack  entirely  the  experiences  necessary  to  understand  them ! 
What  can  result  but  verbalism,  which  fastens  itself  like  mildew  on  the 
youthful  spirit?  The  understanding  can  of  course  at  length  reach  the 
verbal  meaning  of  most  of  the  teachings  of  the  faith.  But  for  real  ap- 
preciation, for  actual  conviction,  there  is  need  of  the  help  of  a  soul  in 
whose  own  experiences  the  word  of  Scripture  finds  a  clear  echo.  And  for 
such  spiritual  comprehension  of  the  sublimest  secrets  of  our  faith  we 
should  indeed  grant  our  little  ones  tlie  right  time. 


ITS   APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  141 

been  roused  in  him  through  the  chief  events  of  the  church 
year,  and  more  particularly  the  festivals.  For  the  solemn 
celebration  by  the  church  of  those  important  days,  the 
popular  customs  at  the  various  festivals,  all  the  small  and 
great  joys  that  they  are  wont  to  bring  to  the  simple-minded 
youth,  are  so  closely  bound  up  in  the  heart  that  in  and  with 
these  joyous  memories  the  child  brings  with  him  into  the 
school  strong  and  lively  apperception  helps  for  more  than 
one  group  of  Bible  stories.  Now  just  as  the  Christian  .father 
does  not  neglect  at  Christmas  time,  under  the  bright  rays 
of  the  Christmas  tree,  to  open  the  eyes  and  hearts  of  his 
children  to  the  meaning  of  the  day  through  the  simple 
narration  of  the  Gospel  of  Glad  Tidings,  so  the  teacher, 
rightly  and  with  success,  will  also  announce  even  to  the  little 
ones  of  the  first  grade  the  joyful  message  of  the  Christ-child. 
He  will,  in  connection  with  the  child's  own  daily  life  and 
experience,  and  with  the  usages  and  customs  of  the  neighbor- 
hood, make  the  journey  with  him  in  the  course  of  the  school 
year,  up  to  the  main  events  of  the  church  year,  and  in  this 
way  give  the  chief  days  the  right  religious  meaning ;  he  will 
associate  the  sacred  stories  with  the  strongest  and  most  joy- 
ous memories  of  the  little  ones.  He  will  further  lead  the 
interest  of  the  children  from  those  stories  as  the  starting 
point  to  the  life  and  work  of  the  Saviour ;  he  will  relate  to 
them  how  the  dear  Lord  went  about  doing  good  everywhere, 
healing  the  sick  and  blessing  the  children,  and  in  this  way 
he  will  teach  them  to  love  Him  as  the  best  friend  of  man. 
Thus  at  the  very  opening  of  the  sacred  history  appears  a 
group  of  stories  which,  being  connected  by  the  unity  of  their 
content  and  carried  through  the  church  life  of  the  present, 
are  best  calculated  to  meet  the  interest  of  the  little  folks. 
It  is  not  only  psychologically  possible,  but  we  are  morally 
bound,  to  begin  the  religious  instruction  with  the  little  ones, 


142  APPERCEPTION. 

and  that,  too,  in  the  course  of  the  first  school  year.  What- 
ever is,  in  future,  to  be  a  power  in  the  child,  must  from  a 
very  early  age  grow  up  with  his  thinking  and  feeling. 

Accordingly,  when  we  at  first  anticipate  the  connected 
history  of  the  Gospel  with  stories  from  the  New  Testament, 
and  then  in  the  next  grade  follow  the  church  festivals  and 
treat  such  stories  further,  although  also  partly  for  edification ; 
when  we  still  further  decide  from  pedagogical  motives  on 
another  closing  recapitulation  of  sacred  history  in  connection 
with  Bible  reading,  all  this  shows  that  the  historical  principle 
cannot  prevail  without  modification,  but  must  suffer  a  re- 
striction from  another  equally  important  principle.  To  be 
sure,  the  objection  that  once  going  over  the  chief  points 
in  the  history  is  no  warrant  for  the  permanent  retention  of 
the  matter,  is  not  able  to  shake  that  principle.  For  it  is 
quite  in  accord  with  the  latter  to  pass  over  and  live  through 
the  Bible  stories  again  and  again  —  to  be  sure  not  in  the 
form  of  mechanical,  arbitrary  repetition,  which  is  sure  to  be 
followed  by  weariness,  but  rather  in  the  way  of  thoughtful 
and  thorough  comprehension  of  the  meaning.  In  so  far  as 
on  principle  we  ask  ourselves,  when  we  take  up  any  new 
topic,  what  known  ideas  from  earlier  stories  can  be  used 
for  the  purpose  of  comparing  and  filling  out,  confirming 
and  illustrating  the  important  facts  and  truths  contained  in 
the  story ;  in  so  far  as  in  this  way  we  put  the  newly  learned 
everywhere  in  relation  to  the  earlier  acquired  religious 
thoughts  of  the  child,  we  impress  upon  him  the  facts  of  the 
Gospel  history,  if  not  in  a  better  way  than  that  of  instruction 
in  concentric  circles^  at  least  in  a  manner  leading  to  results 
quite  as  lasting.  Such  explanatory  repetitions  have,  besides, 
the  advantage  of  not  appearing  to  the  child  as  such,  and 
therefore  keep  off  the  oppressive  feeling  of  mental  stagna- 
tion.    They  furnish  opportunity,  further,  of  setting  such  parts 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  143 

of  the  history  as  could  not  at  first  be  fully  gi-asped  by  the 
children  in  the  light  of  other  facts  at  a  later  time,  and  thus 
securing  for  them  a  complete  understanding.  In  this  way 
the  culture  quality  of  the  harder  parts  of  the  Gospel  certainly 
secures  due  treatment,  and  it  is  not  to  be  feared  that,  as 
Dorpf eld  ^  says,  ' '  the  ideas  of  the  great  personalities  of 
the  Old  Testament  especially  will  remain  entirely  too 
childish.' ' 

Finally,  we  have  still  to  consider  how  the  religious  in- 
struction (of  the  public  schools)  can  best  satisfy  the 
demands  of  the  fourth  of  the  above  named  principles,  the  law 
of  Concentration,  in  relation  to  choice  and  arrangement  of 
the  subject-matter.  It  of  course  goes  without  saying  that  in 
its  own  field  this  instniction  must  not  separate  and  tear  apart 
what  naturally  belongs  together.  It  must  not  let  Bible  read- 
ing, Bible  quotation,  Bible  story,  catechism,  and  religious 
hymn  go  their  own  separate  ways.  That  would  amount  to 
deliberately  dissipating  the  child's  thoughts  and  purposely 
making  the  learning  more  difficult.  Religious  instruction  is, 
on  the  contrary,  a  connected  whole,  and  its  basis  in  all  the 
grades  is  biblical  history. '^  From  the  facts  of  the  Gospel, 
the  child  gains  under  the  direction  of  the  teacher  these  moral 

'Rector  F. \V. Dorpfeld  of  Ronsdorf  near  Elberfeld-Barmen  in  Rhenish 
Prussia. 

*  Ilompler  expresses  himself  in  the  same  sense  in  his  Manual  for 
Teachers  in  the  proper  Treatment  of  Biblical  History.  He  regards  it  as 
quite  iiroper  even  in  middle  and  upper  grades  to  base  all  the  religious  in- 
struction on  that  in  biblical  history  (p.  12).  For  the  instruction  in  bib- 
lical history  furnishes  in  connection  with  certain  didactic  portions  all 
that  the  children  of  the  imblic  schools  need  in  the  way  of  religious  and 
moral  culture  (p.  23).  Especially  noticeable  is  the  proposition  to  sub- 
stitute the  name  "Religion"  in  the  Roster  for  all  classes,  since  it  would 
consequently  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  religious  instructor,  whether 
in  his  recitation  to-day  or  to-morrow  he  makes  use  of  a  story  or  a  proposi- 
tion or  the  contents  of  a  whole  book  in  the  Bible,  etc.,  provided  only  he 
cover  the  prescribed  ground  (p.  12). 


144  APPERCEPTION. 

aud  religious  truths  as  tlicy  are  hiitl  down  in  church  creed 
and  Bible  proverb ;  and  the  exalted,  pious  frame  of  mind 
gained  by  earnest  absoi-ption  in  biblical  history  finds  its 
pei'manent  expression  in  the  religious  hymn.  Proverb, 
catechism,  prayer  and  hymn  are  the  blossom  and  fnxit  of 
one  tree  —  the  story  of  the  Gospel.  And,  as  little  as  blossom 
and  fruit  can  be  thought  of  witliout  the  stem  or  trunk  that 
bears  them,  so  little  can  those  forms  of  religious  instruction, 
in  the  public  schools  at  least,  be  separated  from  the  his- 
torical ground  on  which  they  grew  up.  To  put  these  into 
the  closest  connection  with  one  another  and  with  biblical 
history  means  to  prepare  for  them  the  best  helps  to  apper- 
ception. On  this  account  the  course  in  biblical  history 
should  control  the  choice  of  the  other  religious  matter  con- 
nected with  it.  In  particular,  no  teacher,  if  he  prefers  the 
historical  to  tlie  systematical  method  of  instruction  in  the 
catechism,  ought  to  be  prevented  from  following  his  convic- 
tion, provided  only  that  the  scholars  are  brought  to  an 
understanding  aud  into  sure  possession  of  the  prescribed 
amount.* 

In  the  above  we  have  given  the  instraction  in  biblical  his- 
tory a  relatively  detailed  exposition,  in  ortler  to  show  as 
plainly  as  possible  by  one  example  how  we  mean  to  realize 
the  four  fundamental  principles  relating  to  choice  of  matter 
aud  its  arrangement,  and  how  each  is  modified  through  the 
others.  Now,  then,  we  can  be  brief  in  speaking  of  the  other 
subjects  of  tlie  couree. 

Of  the  secular  subjects,  the  German  popular  fairy  tales 
have  rightly  found  an  abiding  place  in  school  instruction. 
They  have  great  national  educational  value,  since  they  reflect 


>  Whether  the  religious  instruction  is  t«  be  brouplit  into  relation  with 
the  other  subjects  of  instruction  and  in  bow  far  this  should  take  place 
cannot  be  discussed  here. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  145 

the  thoughts  and  feelings,  the  naive  view  of  creation  charac- 
teristic of  the  youthful  period  of  our  people,  and  since  they 
disclose  the  noblest  traits  iu  the  souls  of  the  people  —  fidelity 
and  moral  purity.  Above  all  they  are  in  sympathy  with  the 
child's  way  of  looking  at  things,  —  his  yearnings  and  feel- 
ings. The  persons  in  the  fairy  tales  belong  to  the  simple 
conditions  of  the  village  or  small  town,  and  where  kings  and 
princes  enter  into  the  stoi-y,  the  court  life  is  represented  in  a 
very  childlike  manner.  In  general  these  people  think  and 
feel* altogether  like  children.  This  shows  itself  no  less  in 
their  simple  humor  than  in  the  judgment  of  others*  motives 
and  intentions.  Just  as  the  child  knows  only  good  and  bad 
people  in  his  intercourse,  according  to  the  sympathy  or  antip- 
athy which  they  inspire  in  him,  so  also  in  the  fairy  tales  the 
persons  are  either  good  or  bad.  In  them  the  impatient  feel- 
ing of  justice  so  characteristic  of  young  people  is  always 
satisfied.  We  see  even  here  on  earth  in  these  tales  the  good 
rewaixled  and  the  bad  punished.  Tlie  fairy  tale  lingers  with 
especial  fondness  in  the  animal  kingdom,  in  this  respect  cor- 
responding exactly  to  the  childish  inclination  that  loves  best 
to  regard  animals  as  playfellows.  And  just  as  the  little 
folks  lend  them  human  thoughts  and  motives,  so  also  the 
fairy  tale  makes  the  grim  bear,  the  voracious  wolf,  and  the 
cunning  fox  appear  in  the  story  as  equally  privileged  com- 
panions of  man.  Neither  the  child  nor  the  fairy  tale  have 
any  definite  consciousness  of  time ;  therefore  it  says  so 
often:  —  "A  long  time  ago  there  lived  — ,"  "Once  upon 
a  time — ."  And  space,  too,  presents  no  bounds  to  their 
imagination,  for  there  is  no  definite  place,  no  definite  scene  of 
action  named ;  but  house  and  yard,  garden  and  field  and 
woods,  where  the  child  is  at  home,  are  the  external  world  of 
the  fairy  tale.  What  lies  beyond  the  dark  woods  belongs, 
alike  for  child  and  fairy  tale,  to  the  realm  of  the  mysterious 


146  APPERCEPTION. 

and  wonderful.  And  it  is  precisely  the  wonderful  and  the 
magical  that  both  love.  The  critical  understanding  does  not 
yet  make  itself  dominant  and  seek  after  the  causes  of  things 
and  events,  distinguishing  between  the  possible  and  the  im- 
possible, but  the  imagination  has  full  sway.  The  imaginative 
view  of  the  world  is  common  to  both.  Accordingly  the  fairy 
tale  must  be  considered  congenial  matter  for  early  youth  and 
must  be  assured  of  a  preferred  place  at  the  beginning  of 
school  instruction.* 

The  fairy  tale  is  followed  by  the  heroic  saga.  This  ac- 
quaints us  with  that  stirring  period,  when  German  power  and 
spirit  for  the  first  time  step  forward  in  the  dawn  of  history 
and  maintain  themselves  victorious  and  glorious  in  the  struggle 
with  the  mighty  powers  of  nature  and  with  foreign  peoples. 
Their  gigantic  figures  still  live  on  in  the  mouth  and  heart  of 
our  people,  expressing  their  own  strong  points  and  weak- 
nesses with  especial  vividness.  Since  the  saga  treads  earthly 
ways  more  than  the  fairy  tale  and  turns  with  preference  to 
human  figures  and  deeds,  as  it  connects  its  tales  with  definite 
persons  and  places,  and  not  seldom  mingles  with  these  some 
real  historical  facts,  so  it  forms  the  natural  transition  from 
the  fairy  tale  to  history ;  it  carries  over  the  imaginative  view 
of  the  world  characteristic  of  the  child  into  the  rational. 

>  It  is  here  presupposed  that  a  pedagogically  wise  choice  has  been 
made  from  the  multitude  of  available  tales.  —  It  is  not  seldom  that  one 
hears  the  opinion  expressed  tliat  those  meritorious  collectors  and  re- 
hearsers of  the  German  popular  fairy  tales,  the  Brothers  Grimm,  were 
quite  far  from  ever  intending  to  present  in  their  book  for  young  people  a 
new  material  for  culture  and  instruction.  This  is  contradicted  most 
directly  by  an  expression  of  Jacob  Grimm's.  On  New  Year's  day,  1813,  he 
sent  his  friend  Wigand  his  little  book  with  the  words:  "Your  children 
will  learn  a  great  deal  out  of  the  book,  I  hope.  It  is  our  df  finite  purpose 
that  the  book  shall  be  regarded  as  an  educational  one.  Only  you  must 
wait  till  they  can  understand,  and  then  you  must  not  gire  too  tnuch  at 
once,  but  little  by  little,  always  a  crumb  of  this  tweet  food."  —  Deutsche 
Rundschau,  1885,  pp.  55,  ft. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  147 

And  still  another,  an  ethical  quality,  makes  it  appear  a  spe- 
cially appropriate  matter  of  instruction  for  the  growing  boy. 
Experience  teaches  that  not  all  moral  ideas  unfold  at  the 
same  time  and  in  equal  measure  in  the  human  mind ;  that 
rather  at  certain  periods  one  or  another  exercises  a  kind  of 
predominance  over  the  rest.  "We  have  already  seen  how, 
for  example,  in  every  one  the  idea  of  inner  freedom  (L  e.,  the 
ideal  of  a  will  that  guides  itself  not  according  to  subjective 
reasons,  sensual  feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain,  but  without  ex- 
ception, strictly  according  to  the  best  objective  insight) 
reaches  realization  only  relatively  late.  Even  the  hearty 
affection  and  devotion  to  a  person,  such  as  we  often  notice 
touchingly  exemplified  in  children,  is  still  in  the  most  cases 
very  far  from  pure,  disinterested  benevolence.  One  idea, 
however,  rules  without  exception  in  the  boyhood  of  eveiy 
one,  and  that  is  the  idea  of  perfection,  or,  better,  there  is 
one  yearning  in  the  mind  of  the  boy  —  that  of  the  exercise 
of  power,  the  joy  in  the  strong  will,  and  the  adventurous 
deed.  Visit  the  play-grounds  of  our  boys.  Nothing  but  ex- 
ceptional strength,  bodily  vigor,  and  an  energetic  will  are 
of  any  account  here.  Whoever  in  the  military  games  and 
wrestling  matches  is  always  victorious,  by  reason  of  bodily 
strength  and  intellectual  superiority,  is  obeyed  by  the  whole 
crowd ;  the  weakling,  however,  or  lax  character,  let  him  show 
ever  so  much  good-naturedness  and  agreeableness,  does  not 
gain  recognition.  Pestalozzi,  provided  with  all  the  best 
qualities  of  the  heart,  but  dreamy  and  awkward,  was  teased 
by  his  playfellows  as  *' Harry  Wonderful  of  Foolsdom"; 
while  the  determined  and  skillful  grandson  of  Astyages  on 
the  other  hand  was  chosen  by  the  Medean  boys  as  their  king. 
AVith  what  joy  do  the  young  listen  to  the  tales  of  the  glorious 
old  heroes  of  the  early  days !  They  are  certainly  not  in- 
different to  the  gentleness  of  tenfper  and  purity  of  mind  that 


148  APPERCEPTION. 

is  SO  praised  in  them  ;  but  what  e:(cites  them  the  most,  what 
pleases  them  beyond  all,  is  still  the  tremendous  power  and 
the  defiant  courage.  Moreover,  the  child  does  not  have  at 
this  time  an  equal  receptivity  for  all  ideas ;  he  must  first  live 
through  his  period  of  force  and  have  his  hero,  with  whom  he 
fights  and  suffers,  on  whose  will  his  own  grows  strong  and 
matures.  Let  us  then  not  begrudge  him  such  an  ideal,  but 
let  us  give  the  saga  the  place  that  it  deserves.  The  epic 
should  form  the  beginning  of  the  instruction  in  history.  For 
this  is  just  what  rouses  a  multitude  of  apperceptive  aids  in 
the  boy  when  it  sings  of  the  deeds  and  victories  of  human 
power ;  when  it  tells  how  a  strong  will  overcomes  even  giants 
and  goes  forth  undaunted  out  of  years  of  disgraceful  impris- 
onment. The  boy  needs  a  hero  that  he  understands,  for 
whom  he  has  a  warm  interest,  and  whom  he  can  emulate — 
then  give  him  at  the  right  time  his  Siegfried  and  his  Dietrich, 
that  their  example  may  light  him  onward.* 

But  what  is  true  of  the  German  saga  may  surely,  one 
would  think,  be  maintained  also  in  regard  to  the  Hellenic 
sagas,  the  history  of  Achilles  and  Ulysses.  Indeed  they 
reflect  the  same  period  of  civilization  and  correspond  to  the 
mental  constitution  of  youth  as  few  epics  do,  so  that  they 
have  not  seldom  been  preferred  in  school  to  our  own  heroic 
sagas.  But  the  latter  are  certainly  nearer  to  the  individu- 
ality of  a  German  boy  than  those  of  the  Greeks  are.  For 
they  are  the  heroes  of  his  people,  speaking  his  language, 
living  in  his  country  —  are  the  bold  heroes  into  whose  world 
of  thought  and  deed  he  has  already  been  introduced  by  the 
stories  of  the  neighborhood,  the  castle-niins  gray  with  age, 
the  knights'  armor  and  weapons,  popular  belief  and  legend. 
All  these  of  themselves  attract  the  individuality  of  a  German 


'  Zillig  in  Jahrbuch  de$  Vereiru/Sr  XDia$en$chaftlicke  Podagogik,  XVI., 
p.  39. 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  149 

boy.*  But  how  different  is  it  in  the  case  of  the  Homeric 
sagas !  Strange  names  and  figures,  strange  customs  and 
habits,  an  entirely  different  landscape  with  its  peculiar 
flora,  all  these  prevent  a  full  appreciation  of  the  elements  of 
those  sagas  which  otherwise  are  so  beautifully  adapted  to 
mental  constitution  of  the  young,  because  they  render  the 
apperception  of  the  new,  difficult  to  the  boy  who  has  to  be 
made  to  feel  at  home  in  the  prehistoric  period  of  Greece.  It 
follows  from  this,  that  the  German  boy  is  to  be  introduced 
first  of  all  to  the  national  epics,  and  that  through  these  the 
foreign  sagas  are  then  to  be  appropriated.  When  the  ele- 
mentary instruction  in  histoi-y  of  the  public  schools  has  made 
them  familiar  with  the  Nibelungen  Tales,  our  boys  in  the 
higher  classes,  stimulated  perhaps  by  the  instruction  in 
German,  may  choose  for  themselves  the  sagas  of  Ulysses 
and  Achilles  as  reading.^ 

Finally,  so  far  as  concerns  the  material  of  profane  history 
in  the  public  school,  it  can  scarcely  admit  of  doubt  after 
the  preceding  exposition  that  it  must  be  gathered  not  from 
universal  history,  but  first  of  all  from  the  history  of  the 
German  people.  Foreign  civilixed  nations  are  to  receive 
attention  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  exercised  an  essential 
influence  that  the  child  can  be  made  to  understand  on  the 
development  of  our  civilized  life  or  of  the  history  of  the 
Gospel.     But  those  historical  facts  are  always  to  be  made 

1  Compare  the  author's  treatise  on  "  The  German  Saga  in  Historical  In- 
struction in  the  People's  Schools." — Kehr's  Padagogische  Blatter,  1876, 
pp.  202,  ff. 

'Against  the  treatment  of  Robinson  Crusoe  in  the  first  course  (per- 
haps in  second  grade)  we  may  mention  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a  material  for 
national  culture,  that  it  is  too  far  removed  from  the  outward  and  inward 
experience  of  the  child  in  this  grade,  and  therefore  presumes  decidedly 
too  much  on  his  activity  of  imagination  and  his  moral  conscience.  "We 
agree,  therefore,  entirely  with  the  doubts  expressed  by  Hartmann  in  this 
regard.  —  Sachsische  Schulzeitung ,  1887,  p.  175. 


150  APPERCEPTION. 

prominent  that  testify  to  the  gradual  progi'ess  in  intellectual 
and  material  life,  those  facts  that  stand  in  causal  connection 
with  the  civil,  religious,  social  and  economical  institutions 
and  conditions  of  our  time.  In  this  way  the  history  of  the 
several  states  becomes  the  history  of  civilization ;  the  past 
empties  into  the  present  with  as  full  a  stream  as  possible ; 
the  material  of  culture  ever  remains  near  to  the  national 
sphere  of  thought  and  so  also  near  to  the  experience  and  in- 
terest of  the  child. 

The  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  course  will 
here  in  the  fnain  follow  the  historical  principle  likewise, 
although  in  details  the  other  pedagogical  principles  may  make 
modifications  necessary.  In  this  connection  we  can  refer  the 
reader  to  our  remarks  on  instruction  in  biblical  history. 

In  other  fields  of  instruction,  as  in  history  it  appears  that 
the  pupil's  power  of  apperception  is  not  dependent  solely  on 
the  unchanging  factors  connected  with  his  mental  develop- 
ment, but  that  it  can  be  essentially  increased  through  appro- 
priate choice  and  distribution  of  the  subject-matter  of 
instruction.  How  much  easier  and  better  would  be  the 
apperception,  with  how  much  greater  success  would  be  the 
learning,  if  the  geographical  matter  were  put  in  closer  con- 
nection with  the  history ;  if  natural  philosophy  illustrated 
the  progress  in  human  work,  if  drawing  followed  the  develop- 
ment of  the  fine  arts,  if  arithmetic  drew  its  matter  principally 
from  subjects  dealing  with  material  things, —  to  demonstrate 
all  this  would  be  as  interesting  as  it  would  be  important. 
In  these  matters  we  have  made  only  isolated  beginnings, 
although  they  are  full  of  promise.  Much  individual  work 
is  still  to  be  done,  and  much  credit  is  still  to  be  gained. 
But  we  do  not  deceive  ourselves,  when  we  seek  progress  in 
methods  preferably  in  that  direction  designated  by  the  laws 
of  propiedeutics  and  of  concentration.     To  select  the  material 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  151 

for  instruction,  and  then  to  bring  these  laws  as  far  as  pos- 
sible into  consonance  with  one  another  and  with  other 
principles,  should  be,  in  eveiy  subject,  the  most  important 
problem  of  the  student  of  methodology. 

After  the  teacher  has  satisfied  the  demands  to  be  made 
regarding  the  object  of  apperception,  he  has  further  to  take 
care  that  all  the  helps  to  apperception  that  already  exist  in 
the  mind  of  the  scholar  or  that  may  easily  be  made  effective, 
shall  be  turned  to  account.  He  must  therefore  turn  his 
attention  to  the  subject  that  apperceives ;  viz.,  the  child. 

2.  Pedagogical   Demands   with   Reference  to  the 
Apperceiving   Subject. 

(^Investigation^  enlargement  and  utilization  of  the  child's  store 
of  experience. ) 

In  general,  with  reference  to  the  apperceiving  subject,  the 
teacher  must  see  to  it  that  the  pupil  holds  in  readiness 
numerous  similar,  strong  and  well  arranged  ideas  for  the 
new  material  that  the  instruction  is  to  bring  to  the  understand- 
ing. 

This  presupposes,  however,  not  only  familiarity  with 
child-nature  in  general,  and  its  stages  of  development,  but 
also  in  particular  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  peculiar  store 
of  ideas  possessed  by  the  pupils  of  a  particular  school,  and 
a  deep  insight  into  head  and  heart  of  one's  own  scholars. 
Both  do  not  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  born  educator ;  they  must 
be  laboriously  acquired  through  long  years  of  conscientious 
obsei'V'ation.  For  this  purpose  it  is  not  enough  to  know  the 
pupil  merely  in  the  few  school  hours  in  which  only  a  portion 
of  his  ego  manifests  itself,  and  that  not  always  the  most  im- 
portant part,  nor  is  it  enough  to  undertake  to  judge  him  by 
his  reports.     It  is  necessary  to  hunt  for  his  individual  traits 


152  APPERCEPTION. 

on  the  play-ground,  on  walks  and  at  celebrations,  where  he 
appears  much  more  free  and  unconstrained  among  his  play- 
fellows. It  is  necessary  to  cultivate  active  intercourse  with 
the  parents,  and  in  general  with  the  circle  of  people  to  whom 
the  scholar  belongs ;  not  less  necessarj'  is  it  through  pure, 
unselfish  benevolence  to  keep  the  heart  of  the  child  open  to 
us,  if  a  deeper  view  into  his  soul  is  to  be  our  portion.  Ex- 
tremely difficult  it  will  of  course  always  remain  to  see  into 
and  imderetand  the  child  at  the  commencement  of  instmc- 
tion,  when  as  a  stranger  he  comes  to  school  for  the  first 
time.  What  does  the  teacher  know  of  the  great  work  of 
mental  creation  that  has  been  going  on  in  each  and  eveiy 
child,  and  of  all  that  he  has  lived  through  and  experienced  in 
six  long  years?  It  can  not  cause  us  wonder  then,  that  there 
are  still  in  the  pedagogical  world  opjwsing  views  in  vogue  in 
regard  to  the  number  of  apperceiving  ideas,  feelings  and 
desires  that  the  child  gains  before  instruction  begins.  Some 
believe  that  in  the  case  of  the  elementary  pupil  we  must  not 
presuppose  anything,  nor  reckon  on  any,  or  at  least  many 
helps  to  aijprehension  derived  from  his  experience.  They 
think  that  instruction,  at  least  at  the  very  first,  must 
commence  quite  at  the  beginning  and  create  something 
entirely  new ;  it  must  ever  remain  in  irreconcilable  contradic- 
tion to  the  life  and  doings  of  the  child  outside  of  the  school. 
Opposed  to  this  pessimistic  view  stands  on  the  other  extreme 
one  that  is  quite  too  optimistic.  Such  views  are  held  by  all 
those  who  point  to  the  acquired  and  innate  abilities  of  the 
children  and  believe  we  cannot  presuppose  too  much  in 
them  and  who  therefore,  without  asking  about  the  store  of 
apperceiving  ideas  existing  in  the  child,  with  enviable  care- 
lessness and  security  strike  out  boldly  to  teach.  If  the 
teacher  is  ever  called  upon  to  choose  his  position  in  a  con- 
flict of  opinions,  and  through  original  investigation  to  form 


ITS  APPLICATION    TO   PEDAGOGY.  153 

his  own  conviction,  such  is  the  case  here.  It  appears  to  us 
that  the  investigation  (difficult  as  it  may  be)  of  the  mental 
products  gained  by  the  pupil  before  the  school  age,  is  espe- 
cially necessary  and  requisite  for  all  instniction  that  does 
not  wish  to  build  on  a  sandy  foundation.  Important  reasons 
support  this  view.  — 

Jean  Paul  says  of  the  child,  that  it  learns  more  in  the 
first  three  years  of  its  life  than  an  adult  in  his  three  years 
at  the  university ;  that  a  circumnavigator  of  the  globe  is 
indebted  for  more  notions  to  his  nurse  than  to  all  the  peoples 
of  the  world  with  whom  he  has  come  in  contact.  It  is,  in 
fact,  astounding  what  a  relatively  immense  crowd  of  ideas 
a  human  being  gains  in  the  first  years.  He  gets  acquainted 
with  the  thousand  things  of  home,  street,  garden,  field, 
wood,  the  wonders  of  the  heavens,  the  manifold  events  of 
nature,  the  land  and  people  of  the  neighborhood,  and 
learns  to  call  most  of  them  by  name ;  he  learns  to  use  a  great 
part  of  the  vocabulary  of  his  mother  tongue,  and  its  rriost 
important  forms  of  word  and  sentence ;  he  learns  to  think  in 
the  vernacular. 

These  numerous  ideas  belong  at  the  same  time  to  the  most 
important  that  a  human  being  ever  acquires.  They  are  the  first 
and  chief  harvest  of  intellectual  activity ;  tlie  main  trunk  of 
the  material  of  thought  with  which  the  whole  after-life  of  the 
soul  is  connected.  As  they  are  the  result  of  the  intercourse 
of  the  human  being  with  surrounding  nature  and  the  people 
of  the  neighborhood,  so  they  serve  in  turn  to  facilitate  and 
advance  this  intercourse  ;  they  are  certain  of  an  uncommonly 
frequent  reproduction  by  reason  of  their  simplicity  and 
distinctness.  They  form,  as  it  were,  the  capital  in  iron,  the 
most  indispensable  miniunxm  of  stock  in  thought,  without 
which  a  human  being  could  not  get  along  in  the  most  limited 
surroundings,  in  the  most  restricted  circle  of  experience,  let 


154  APPERCEPTION. 

alone  take  part  in  the  material  and  intellectual  interests  of 
his  people.  They  are  further  the  presupposition  of  all 
higher  intellectual  life,  the  bottom  and  foundation  on  which 
all  true  culture  rests.  And  just  because  they  have  proceeded 
from  sense  perceptions,  and  mostly  represent  something 
tangible,  mirroring  tilings  of  the  outer  world,  are  they  es- 
pecially adapted  to  be  "  representative  pictures  of  the  distant 
and  the  past."  They  bring  into  vivid  consciousness  and 
distinctness  of  perception  that  which  lies  beyond  our  horizon 
in  space  and  time.  Just  so  the  pupil,  if  he  succeeds  in 
becoming  absorbed  in  the  past  and  in  distinctly  picturing  to 
himself  historical  persons  and  conditions,  or  in  travelling  in 
fancy  in  foreign  lands,  still  after  all  is  really  wandering  on 
his  native  soil  and  working  with  ideas  and  perceptions  that 
he  has  gained  about  home.  This  has  already  been  shown 
above.  We  have  here  merely  to  add  that  not  only  in 
geography  and  history,  but  in  general  in  all  instruction 
which  requires  illustration  of  what  is  distant  and  past  by 
means  of  description  and  picturing,  recourse  must  ever  be 
had  to  ideas  acquired  by  the  boy  outside  of  school.  Out  of 
these  arise  further,  little  by  little,  numerous  psychical  con- 
cepts ;  or  at  least  such  as  have  their  root  in  these  and  re- 
ceive from  them  their  living  content.  For  instance,  it  is  a 
long  time  before  the  pupil  can  think  of  spring  without  at  the 
same  time  involuntarily  thinking  of  the  green  fields,  the 
variegated  meadows  and  blooming  trees  of  his  native  place. 
If  he  has  mentally  to  measure  off  an  hour's  journey  Or  a  mile, 
he  will  surely  recur  to  two  familiar  points  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  home,  perhaps  two  villages  or  two  hills.  In  this 
way  the  child  keeps  the  acquired  concepts  alive ;  for  as  the 
tree  must  wither  whose  cells  are  not  refilled  Avilh  fresh  sap 
every  spring,  so  would  also  our  abstract  concepts  die  away 
and  turn  to  empty  shells,  if  we  did  not  ever  anew  fill  them 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  155 

with  material  derived  from  living  sense  perceptions.  In 
this  way  the  perceptions  acquired  by  the  child  in  his  youth 
help  to  master  and  secure  the  abstract  ideas.  This  is  shown 
by  still  another  consideration.  As  is  well  known,  all  abstract 
ideas  are  denoted  by  words  that  originally  applied  only  to 
concrete  things,  to  activities  and  relations  of  the  outer  world. 
Of  course  this  transference  did  not  take  place  entirely 
arbitrarily,  but  words  were  mostly  chosen  that  referred  to  a 
similarity  or  to  certain  relations  between  the  concrete  and 
the  abstract  idea.  One  that  has  the  concrete  idea  in  ques- 
tion vividly  present,  will  necessarily  unlock  the  abstract 
ideas  more  easily  and  fully.  Accordingly,  we  may  further 
assume  that  also  in  the  case  of  the  child,  who  brings  with 
him  so  many  concrete  mental  pictures  to  school,  "the  ab- 
stract ideas  must  gain  much  in  meaning  through  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  relation  of  the  words  in  which  they  are  expressed 
to  the  picture-words  from  which  they  are  derived."^  So, 
for  instance,  the  idea  of  the  process  of  plant  growth  observ^ed 
innumerable  times  in  nature  in  the  most  varied  stages,  could 
not  exist  in  the  soul  without  at  the  same  time  throwing  a 
bright  light  on  the  conception  of  spiritual  and  moral  growth. 
Or,  what  lively  echo  may  those  lines  from  the  Edda  arouse 
in  the  boy,  who  has  become  familiar  with  wood  and  field, 
with  path  and  bridge,  on  his  numerous  forays  into  the  sur- 
rounding country  :  — 

"  If  you've  won  a  friend  that  you  can  trust, 
Then  visit  him  not  seldom, 
For  bushes  green  and  grass  grows  high 
On  the  road  that  no  one  treads." 

Experience  confirms  this  view.  We  see  how  a  striking 
figure,  a  fitting  comparison,  often  transmits  understanding 
of  a  point  to  the  mind  like  lightning,  and  lends  to  concepts 

1  Lazarus,  Das  Leben  der  Seek  (third  edition),  II.,  pp.  195-196. 


156  APPERCEPTION. 

a  distinctness  that  could  not  be  reached  without  the  help  of 
concrete  ideas.  But  if,  as  Lazarus  says,  clearness  in  think- 
ing, all  the  way  up  into  the  highest  regions  of  concepts,  is 
dependent  on  the  distinctness  of  the  underlying  sense- 
perceptions,  then  it  becomes  clear  from  this  fact  also,  how 
incomparably  impoi-tant  the  concrete  ideas  acquired  in  early 
youth  are  for  the  intellectual  life  of  man.  They  are  to  be 
set  down  at  once  as  his  strongest  and  his  most  lasting  ideas. 
The  child  received  them  in  a  relatively  restricted  sphere  of 
experience ;  again  and  again  the  same  things  presented 
themselves  to  his  perception,  and  ever  deeper  did  the  same 
ideas  imprint  themselves  upon  his  mind.  With  every  repeti- 
tion they  increased  in  vividness  and  strength,  and  so  he 
became  little  by  little  entirely  familiar  with  the  objects  of 
his  home  and  his  neighborhood  as  with  dear  old  friends. 
For,  "that  which  gains  a  predominating  influence  on  the 
way  of  thinking  in  the  child,  is  not  likely  to  be  solitary, 
infrequent  phenomena  and  actions,  but  the  general  character 
and  continuity  of  similar  observ'atious  which  he  has  the 
opportunity  of  making  on  persons  and  things.' '  ^  The  adult 
has  the  greatest  inclination  and  love  for  those  fields  of  ex- 
perience and  spheres  of  activity  in  which  he  works  with  the 
greatest  ease  and  success,  in  which  he  feels  himself  fully  at 
home.  Just  so  for  the  child ;  ideas  of  objects  around  home 
have  a  special  charm,  because  they  are  associated  with 
numerous  feelings  of  pleasure  and  of  successful  activity. 
Whatever  is  known  and  familiar  "accommodates  itself 
easily  to  the  flow  of  ideas  and  their  connections,"  and  gives 
the  mental  activity  that  certainty  and  regularity  on  which 
calmness  and  joyousness  of  spirit  essentially  depend.  There- 
fore  also,  because  the  child  is    "  at  home "    among   them, 

'  Waitz,  AUgemeine  Padagoyik,  third  edition,  edited   by  WiUnuton, 
page  201. 


ITS  APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  157 

does  he  feel  so  well  in  the  midst  of  the  things  about  home. 
He  recognizes  in  them  his  whole  world  of  feeling;  for  it 
was  already  indicated  above  that  the  first  six  years  of  life 
furnish  the  foundation  for  the  feelings  also.  The  intimate 
intercourse  of  the  child  with  father,  mother,  brothers  and 
sisters  easily  gives  rise  to  the  feeling  of  love  and  to  benevo- 
lence in  its  preliminary  form  directed  toward,  particular 
persons  only.  The  social  intercourse  with  playmates  and 
others  of  the  same  age  gives  rise  to  sympathy  in  sorrow  and 
in  joy,  the  feeling  of  justice  and  of  fairness.  The  helpless- 
ness and  need  that  make  the  child  run  continually  to  his 
parents,  produce  the  feeling  of  dependence,  of  respect  and 
reverence  for  authority.  How  the  power  of  family  life,  the 
settled  order  and  quiet  habit  of  home  is  calculated  to  implant 
little  by  little  the  moral  ideas  and  religious  feelings  in  the 
heart  of  the  child,  has  been  sliown  in  an  especially  warm  and 
convincing  manner  by  Pestalozzi  in  his  book,  "How  Ger- 
trude teaches  her  children."  According  to  him  the  home  is 
the  soil  in  which  alone  virtue  and  religious  feeling  can  thrive 
and  develop.  The  relation  of  mother  and  child  is  the  main 
source  of  moral  and  religious  ideas.  In  this  connection, 
however,  the  influence  of  surrounding  nature  cannot  be  left 
unnoticed,  as  is  testified  by  the  confessions  of  no  less  gifted 
persons.  Let  the  reader  recall  that  beautiful  expression  of 
our  countryman,  B.  Golz,  on  the  awakening  of  child-religion 
through  the  feelings  connected  with  spring:  "When  the 
mild  days  of  winter  had  gi-adually  melted  the  snow,  when 
the  sparrow  and  the  goldfinch  chirruped  on  all  the  hedges 
and  roofs  in  the  joyousness  of  spring,  then  a  mild  breeze 
blew  around  me,  and  the  sun  looked  out  of  the  purest 
ethereal  blue,  as  full  of  promise  into  every  window  and  into 
every  human  eye,  as  if  it  wanted  to  say  to  the  soul :  "  Now 
you  have  conquered,  and  I  am  your  old  sun  again,  and  you 


158  APPERCEPTION. 

are  my  dear  soul  as  ever'  ;  then  such  a  mild  winter's  day 
became  to  me  a  reminder  of  the  old  and  the  new  covenant, 
and  a  child-religion  budded  into  my  childish  heart  with  the 
anticipated  feelings  of  spring,  and  opened  all  the  leaves  of 
the  written  Bible  before  my  mind's  eye,  so  that  I  afterwaixls 
had  to  recognize  in  the  Christian  doctrine  and  in  my  con- 
lirmation  nothing  but  known  teachings  and  sensations."  ^ 

These  feelings  then  grew  up  before  any  instruction,  and 
so  they  remain  also  the  inseparable  companion  of  the  range 
of  thoughts  connected  with  home.  Their  contents  are  in- 
dissolubly  connected.  The  things  that  «uiTounded  a  child 
or  with  which  he  was  engaged,  in  the  moment  when  joy  or 
sorrow  stirred  his  heart,  became  afterwards  the  witnesses  to 
his  deepest  emotions.  This  explains  in  no  small  measure 
the  peculiar  charm  of  home,  pictures  and  ideas,  the  strength 
and  persistency  with  which  they  make  themselves  felt,  often 
unconsciously,  through  the  whole  of  life ;  and  also  the  fresh- 
ness and  vivacity  which  adapt  tliem  in  preference  to  all  otlier 
ideas  to  the  apprehension  of  the  new  and  the  strange.  For 
it  has  been  already  explicitly  shown  above  that  the  numer- 
ous, concrete,  fresh  and  strong  ideas  gained  in  earliest  j'outh 
are  the  best  helps  to  apperception  for  all  subsequent  learning. 

While  above,  however,  we  noted  the  richness  and  im- 
portance of  the  sphere  of  ideas  and  feelings  which  our  little 
ones  bring  with  them  to  school,  we  were  still  thoroughly  con- 
scious of  their  limits.  It  could  not,  therefore,  be  our  object 
to  substantiate  the  opinion  of  those  who  believe  they  can 
presuppose  everything  possible.  Quite  in  a  genenil  way  it 
was  our  wish  to  give  a  description  of  the  mental  stock  that 
the  child  brings  with  him  to  school,  a  picture  that  needs 
modification  and  completion  as  often  as  juvenile  individu- 
alities occur.     For  all  pupils  do  not  bring   with   them   an 

1  Btich  der  Kindheit,  page  103. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  159 

equal  amount  of  mental  treasure,  nor  do  all  bring  the  same. 
On  the  contrary,  there  often  appears  in  the  extent  and  con- 
tent of  children's  ideas  somewhat  glaring  differences.  The 
pupil  who  has  passed  the  morning  of  his  youth  in  the  circle 
of  a  happy,  honorable,  and  pious  family,  who  has  had  the 
sacred  love  of  a  true  mother  and  the  moral  earnestness  of  a 
strict  father  to  watch  over  him,  will  come  to  school  with 
quite  other  moral  and  religious  feelings  and  views  than  the 
poor  child  of  the  proletariat,  who  perhaps  does  not  even 
know  his  father,  or  who  has  been  daily  witness  to  the  most 
disgusting  and  ugly  family  scenes,  who  has  spent  the  most 
part  of  his  childhood  on  the  street  and  has  never  known  the 
blessing  of  quiet,  happy  domestic  life.  "Children  who 
grow  up  among  crippled  factory  hands,  among  consumptive 
weavers  and  in  woodless  places,  —  children  who  from  birth 
have  never  seen  sea  or  mountain,  are  all  their  lives  lacking 
in  the  tones,  accords  and  stories  that  make  up  the  poetry  of 
the  world."  ^  For,  besides  the  family  life,  there  is  also  the 
character  of  the  surrounding  nature  that  conditions  many  a 
peculiarity  of  the  child's  thought  and  feeling.  It  is  not  a 
matter  of  indifference  whether  we  passed  our  youth  in  a 
quiet,  retired  forest- village,  or  in  a  dark,  damp  dwelling  in 
the  turmoil  of  the  metropolis.  It  is  not  the  same  whether 
we  played  before  the  door  of  a  lonely  hut  on  the  heath,  or 
whether  mighty  mountain  giants  looked  in  at  us  through  the 
window  early  and  late.  The  son  of  the  mountains,  who  has 
never  gotten  out  of  the  exclusiveness  of  his  landscape,  will 
find  difliculty  in  forming  an  idea  of  a  broad  plain.  He  will 
ever  be  thinking  of  his  valley  widened  out  somewhat,  even 
wlien  he  himself  later  uses  the  word.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  boys  from  the  Liineburg  Heath  will  remain  ^  long  time 
with  a  very  cloudy  idea  of  the  Alps,  just  as  our  children 

>  Golz,  Buch  der  Kindheit,  p.  378. 


160  APPERCEPTION. 

from  the  Vogtland  bring  to  school  no  notion  of  the  ocean,  or 
a  very  imperfect  one.  Different  in  many  respects  are  the 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  child  from  the  metropolis  and 
the  child  from  the  village  or  country  town.  Very  different 
are  the  notions  that  they  bring  with  them  to  the  recitation. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  metropolis  offers  many  ideas  to 
the  pupil,  that  never  fall  to  the  lot  of  the  peasant  or  small 
townsman  in  his  whole  life.  They  offer  a  many-sided 
stimulus.  But  the  material  of  ideas  and  concepts  is  too 
immense  *  for  the  child  to  master  it ;  it  is  too  manifold  and 
different  in  kind,  so  that  the  mental  pictiures  too  often  inter- 
fere with  one  another.  The  objects  of  perception  follow  one 
another  in  such  rapid  change  that  the  youthful  mind  has  not 
enough  time  in  many  cases  to  comprehend  them  clearly  and 
distinctly.  The  greatest  disadvantage  is,  finally,  that  the 
child  in  the  metropolis  gains  too  few  perceptions  of  the 
woods  and  fields,  of  the  mountains,  valleys  and  waters,  and 
of  the  most  important  and  simplest  employments  of  man,  — 
I.  e.,  such  out-door  notions  as  we  became  acquainted  with 
above,  as  forming  the  foundation  of  our  intellectual  life.  So 
it  was  found,  for  instance,  in  thirty-three  people's  schools  in 
the  Vogtland,  in  the  examination  of  the  newly  entered  six- 
years-old  children  in  June  of  the  year  1878,'  that  of  500  city 


'  See  Bartholemai  (Jahrbuch  de»  Vereint  fur  voittentchaftliche  Pada- 
goyik,  V.,  pp.  290  if.).  Compare  also  S'lchniche  Schulzeitunrj,  1880,  No. 
35:  "Ou  the  intluence  of  the  metropolis  on  the  sphere  of  ideas  of  the 
child." 

'  Tlie  examination  took  place  at  the  instance  of  the  author,  between 
Easter  and  Whitsuntide,  1878,  in  the  Burgher  Schools  in  Plaucn,  and 
in  twenty-one  village  schools  of  the  Vogtland.  The  number  of  children 
questioned  wa.s  over  800.  Similar  statistics  were  taken  in  1880-1884,  by 
Director  Dr.  Ilartmann  in  Annaberg.  From  the  interesting  statements 
published  we  take  the  fact  that  the  girls  showed  themselves  on  the  aver- 
age richer  in  ideas  than  the  boys,  but  that  all  the  Annaberg  children  were 
in  command  of  relatively,  few  useful  ideas  on  their  entrance  into  school. 


ITS  APPLICATION  TO  PEDAGOGY.  161 

children  questioned,  82  per  cent  had  no  idea  of  "  Sunrise  " 
and  77  per  cent  none  of  "  Sunset"  ;  37  per  cent  had  never 
seen  a  grainfield,  49  per  cent  had  never  seen  a  pond, 
80  per  cent  a  lai-k,  and  82  per  cent  an  oak ;  37  per  cent  had 
never  been  in  the  woods,  29  per  cent  never  on  a  river  bank, 
62  per  cent  never  on  a  mountain,  50  per  cent  never  in 
church,  57  per  cent  never  in  a  village,  and  81  per  cent  had 
not  yet  been  in  the  castle  of  Plauen ;  72  per  cent  could  not 
tell'  how  bread  is  made  out  of  grain,  and  49  per  cent  knew 
nothing  yet  of  God.  Similar  conditions  were  shown  in  a 
factory  village  in  the  neighborhood  of  Reichenbach.  In  that 
place  of  1 7  children  only  two  knew  any  river,  and  what  these 
called  a  river  was  a  shallow  ditch ;  only  two  knew  anything 
of  God,  and  one  of  these  thought  of  the  clouds  instead. 
Relatively  much  more  favorable  results  were  obtained  in  the 
examination  in  the  other  village  schools..  Of  the  300  ele- 
mentary scholars  in  these  only  8  per  cent  had  never  seen  a 
grainfield,  14  per  cent  had  never  seen  a  pond,  30  per  cent  a 
lark,  and  43  per  cent  an  oak ;  only  14  per  cent  had  never 
been  in  the  woods,  18  percent  on  the  bank  of  a  creek  or 
river,  26  per  cent  on  a  mountain,  51  per  cent  in  a  church 
(many  children  do  not  have  a  church  in  the  place  where  they 
live)  ;  only  37  per  cent  could  not  tell  how  bread  comes  from 
grain,  and  34  per  cent  knew  nothing  of  God.  We  see  from 
this  that  the  child's  store  of  knowledge,  though  relatively 
rich  in  external  percepts,  is  subject  to  a  certain  one-sidedness 
that  makes  itself   sensible  as  a  want  because  the  child's 

It  is  noticeable  that  tiie  boys  showed  themselves  superior  to  the  girls  in 
nearly  all  objects  taken  from  the  animal  and  mineral  kingdoms  as  well  as 
ideas  relating  to  human  life.  On  the  other  hand,  the  girls  were  more  at 
home  in  fields  requiring  observation  which  were  designated  by  the  head- 
ings "Natural  Events,"  "  Division  of  Time,"  "Landscape,"  "Religious 
Ideas."  —  Hartmann,  Die  Analyse  des  Kindlichen  Gedankenkreises,  etc, 
1885,  page  88-94. 


162  APPERCEPTION. 

knowledge  frequently  covers  only  a  few  fields.  Indeed  we 
are  not  afraid  of  falling  into  contradiction  with  our  previous 
exposition,  if  we  further  maintain  that  even  those  important, 
strong  and  lasting  notions  that  the  child  collects  in  his  youth, 
still  need  in  great  part  supplementing  and  clearing  up.  We 
called  them  strong  and  lasting  ideas  on  account  of  the  lively 
feelings  associated  with  them  and  the  numerous  repetitions 
that  they  experienced.  That  does  not  in  any  way  mean  that 
the  child  every  time  comprehends  the  things  he  meets  in  all 
their  essential  characteristics.  We  have  already  seen  how  in 
early  youth  on  account  of  the  abundance  of  impressions 
pouring  in  on  his  senses,  the  child  cannot  help  apperceiving 
in  a  one-sided  way.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  he 
not  unfrequently  gets  no  more  than  quite  superficial  or 
even  entirely  incorrect  notions,  and  that  with  reference  to 
objects  that  he  hap  daily  opportunity  of  observing. 

Two  things  follow  from  the  above  consideration :  It  is  cer- 
tain that  the  child  bmigs  to  school  with  him  in  the  numerous^ 
important  and  strong  ideas^  feelings  and  inclinations  acquired 
in  youth,  at  the  same  time  the  best  and  most  vivid  helps  to  ap- 
perception in  the  recitation.  But  the  content  and  extent  of 
these  are  nowhere  entirely  the  same,  and  in  many  pupils  often 
differ  strikingly  from  one  another. 

For  these  reasons  we  demanded  above  that  the  teacher 
should  not  begin  the  instruction  of  his  six-year-old  little  ones 
at  once,  as  if  they  were  in  command  of  all  the  helps  to  ap- 
perception in  equal  measure,  and  that  he  should  not  pre- 
suppose everything  in  them.^      We  demanded  thai  he  explore 

* "  That  painful  habit  of  assuming  unknown  things  to  be  found  in 
children,  bars  all  regular  instruction,  all  orderly  education,  aud  implants 
a  habit  of  thoughtless  acceptance  and  thoughtless  repetition  of  words  of 
the  meaning  of  which  one  does  not  think.  This  habit  is  a  cancer  disease 
in  our  schools."  —  Jer.  Gottbelf,  Leiden  und  Freuden  eines  Schulmeisters, 
I.,  pages  158-159. 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  163 

the  existing  store  of  thoughts  in  the  children  in  order  that  he 
may  learn  to  know  the  ground  on  which  he  is  further  to  build, 
and  the  most  important  omissions  in  sense-perceptions  that 
require  filling  out. 

For  this  purpose  statistical  information  is  necessary,  simi- 
lar to  that  mentioned  above,  or  like  those  investigations  first 
started,  we  believe,  by  the  pedagogical  association  in  Berlin 
in  the  year  1869.^ 

Of  course,  many  diflSculties  stand  in  the  way  of  taking 
such  statistics  of  our  six-year-old  little  ones  at  their  entrance 
into  school.  If,  for  instance,  the  examination  questions 
be  directed  to  the  class,  then  there  is  danger  that  many 
scholars  will  acknowledge  views  that  they  in  reality  do  not 
entertain ;  many  answer  in  the  aflSrmative  only  because  the 
others  do,  below  whom  they  desire  not  to  stand.  If,  there- 
fore, the  answers  of  the  children  are  to  serve  as  a  foundation 
for  statistical  inferences  of  any  kind  at  all,  it  is  indispensable 
to  examine  the  pupils  in  small  groups  (of  two  to  five  chil- 
dren). This  can  easily  be  arranged  for  at  the  intermissions 
or  at  the  close  of  the  recitations. 

But  even  then  when  the  children  are  questioned  singly  or 
in  smaller  groups,  they  very  often  make  use  of  words  with 
which  they  associate  either  no  idea  at  all  or  a  wrong  one. 
It  is  advisable,  therefore,  besides  the  main  question,  to  put 
still  other  side  questions  to  the  scholars  in  order  to  convince 
one's  self  by  unconstrained  conversation  with  them,  that  they 
have  not  merely  repeated  what  others  answered,  or  that  they 
are  not  deceiving  themselves.  It  is  hard  to  induce  some 
children,  especially  those  in  the  country,  to  express  them- 

>  The  association  sent  out  question  blanks  to  all  the  school  principals 
of  the  capital,  with  the  request  that  by  means  of  definite  questions  and 
answers,  they  should  determine  the  range  of  ideas  of  the  Berlin  children 
on  entering  the  lowest  class,  in  so  far  as  it  related  to  the  neighborhood. 


164  APPERCEPTION. 

selves  about  what  they  have  seen  and  heard.  Their  tongue 
can  be  loosened  only  by  the  kind  manner  of  the  teacher; 
for  this  purpose  he  will  very  often  have  to  converse  with 
them  in  their  own  peculiar  way  of  talking  in  order  to  free 
them  from  their  bashfulness. 

We  are  not  afraid  that  (as  Nieden  claims  in  Jahrbnch 
des  V.  f.  10.  Pddagogik,  XIV.,  p.  87)  such  investigations 
will  determine  the  existence  of  only  rudimentary  and  iso- 
lated ideas.  For  such  questions  will  always  be  chosen,  an 
affirmative  answer  to  which  will  presuppose  a  definite  group 
or  chain  of  sense-perceptions.  If,  for  instance,  the  child 
demonstrates  beyond  doubt  that  he  has  already  been  in  the 
woods,  on  a  mountain,  or  in  a  church ;  that  he  has  seen  a 
fish  swim  in  the  river  or  in  the  pond,  then  we  are  well  justi- 
fied in  inferring  the  existence  not  only  of  isolated  rudi- 
mentary ideas,  but  of  entire  groups  of  ideas.  Or,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  a  child  in  Plauen  has  not  yet  been  in  our 
castle  or  on  the  bank  of  the  Elster,  then  it  is  certain  that 
he  lacks  many  (if  not  all)  of  the  separate  ideas  belonging 
to  the  whole  idea  of  "castle"  or  "  river."  If,  finally,  the 
objection  be  made  that  the  six-year-old  child  has  perceived 
and  experienced  much  more  than  he  can  designate  in  words ; 
that,  accordingly,  our  statistical  data  will  never  sufficiently 
cover  the  child's  field  of  ideas,  we  answer  that  all  percepts 
that  are  not  fixed  by  words  have  as  good  as  no  value  for 
the  recitation ;  they  are  too  indistinct  and  fleeting  to  be 
used  there  with  success. 

But  where,  in  spite  of  all,  such  statistical  investigations 
must  be  omitted,  it  ought  to  be  ascertained,  by  long  con- 
tinued, careful  obsers'ations,  what  instruction  can  presup- 
pose in  the  child,  and  what  necessary  notions  the  newly 
entered  pupils,  as  a  rule,  are  lacking  in.  That  can  be  ac- 
complished without  a  great  expenditure  of   time ;    there  is 


ITS    APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  165 

only  need  of  the  regular  noting  of  such  experiences  as  con- 
stantly press  themselves  one  by  one  upon  the  teacher  in 
every  recitation.  For  instance,  each  primary  teacher  should, 
upon  the  presentation  of  new  matter,  —  i.  e.,  at  the  stage  of 
analysis,  or  preparation,  —  take  thorough  survey  of  what 
contributions  the  experiences  of  the  children  can  make  to 
the  new  topic.  If  the  results  of  these  inquiries  are  carefully 
recorded,  there  will  gradually  arise  "an  analysis  of  the 
contents  of  children's  minds,"  which  will  satisfy  all  reason- 
able demands.  For  only  when  this  has  been  done  will  the 
teacher  be  fully  conscious  of  a  further  duty,  that  of  calling 
up  defective  ideas,  and  of  strengthening,  supplementing 
and  enriching  them,  together  with  others  that  may  be  present, 
thus  enlarging,  arranging,  and  deepening  the  pupil's  store  of 
experiences. 

In  and  about  the  home  the  child  has  acquired  all  the  ideas 
he  brings  to  school ;  here  dwell  the  objects  of  his  perceptions, 
here  are  found  the  beginnings  of  his  notions  and  feelings. 
It  is  therefore  self-evident  that  the  instruction  which  is  to 
elaborate  and  supplement  this  material,  should  start  with 
the  same  sphere  of  experiences,  or,  in  other  words,  deal 
with  the  surroundings  of  the  child.  Because  we  know  that 
the  child  on  entering  school  has  fully  mastered  only  a  limited 
part  of  his  surroundings,  and  that  many  of  his  home  obser- 
vations need  clearing  up  and  sifting,  we  lead  him  back  into 
the  old  familiar  world,  in  which  he  has  heretofore  lived,  and 
which  is  dear  to  him.  We  teach  him  to  know  it  better  and 
to  make  him  more  familiar  with  it  —  we  develop  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  home  environment  (Heimatkunde). 

If  we  take  this  word  contrary  to  common  usage,  in  its 
broadest  meaning,  we  of  course  do  not  deal  here  merely 
with  a  preparatory  course  for  geography,  for  the  home  com- 
prises more  than  the  piece  of  earth  where  we  were  born 


166  ArPERCEPTION. 

and  brought  up ;  it  includes  also  the  products  of  the  soil, 
the  plant  and  animal  life,  the  inhabitants  with  their  .occupa- 
tions and  customs ;  so  through  careful  observations  of  home 
objects  and  incidents,  our  instruction  is  to  secure  vivid 
sense-perceptions  for  more  than  one  realm  of  knowledge. 

Geography,  history  and  natural  science  owe  to  it  the  most 
important  elementary  ideas;  and  similarly  geometry,  arith- 
metic, instruction  in  the  mother-tongue  and  in  drawing,  relate 
to  numerous  inner  and  outer  experiences  of  the  child  as  they 
come  to  him  in  his  intercourse  with  things  and  people  at 
home.  It  does  not  aim  to  familiarize  the  child  with  all  the 
knowledge  that  a  thorough  and  detailed  description  of  the 
home  might  afford,  for  how  could  he  assimilate  all  this 
material  so  vast,  so  difficult  of  apprehension? 

Not  the  entire  home  even  to  its  smallest,  most  insigni- 
ficant nooks  would  it  present  to  the  pupil,  but  only  so  many 
objects  of  the  same  as  he  may  need  in  order  to  understand 
the  instruction.  It  will  consequently  bring  into  the  field  of 
his  observation  the  most  important  and  most  necessary 
objects  of  the  environment.  It  will  content  itself  with  the 
production  of  observations  most  needed  for  the  lesson  :  with 
typical  perceptions  which  he  uses  most  frequently  as  aids  to 
apperception,  and  the  objects  of  which  are  capable  of 
awakening  a  strong,  direct  interest  in  the  child.  Accord- 
ingly Pestalozzi's  ' '  hole  in  the  wall-paper  "  is  just  as  much 
to  be  excluded  from  this  home-knowledge  as  those  empty, 
extremely  prosaic  things  chosen  from  considerations  of  thor- 
oughness for  purposes  of  object  teaching,  such  as  boot- 
jacks, horse-shoes,  slippers,  night-tapers,  coal-shovels,  pitch- 
forks, and  all  similar  objects  smuggled  in  through  the 
"normal  words"  of  the  reading  and  writing  method,  and  in 
themselves  unlikely  to  elicit  the  interest  of  the  pupil. 

We  remind  the  reader  of   the  following  favorite  objects 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  167 

mentioned  in  most  of  our  primers :  ax,  hook,  wheel,  paper- 
bag,  saw,  club,  cane,  etc. 

This  home-obsei'vation  lesson,  futhermore,  should  deal 
only  with  such  things  as  belong  to  the  personal  expe- 
riences of  the  child,  which  he  can  really  observe  with  his 
own  eyes  and  ears ;  whatever  things  lie  beyond  the  horizon 
of  home  —  if  ever  so  interesting  —  as  for  instance  strange 
animals  and  plants,  as  long  as  they  cannot  be  observed  at 
home  or  explained  through  visible  home-objects,  are  abso- 
lutely to  be  excluded.  Likewise  we  should  guard  against  a 
general  discussion  about  the  seasons,  the  garden,  the  mea- 
dows, water,  etc.  Prefatory  reflections  such  as  the  follow- 
ing are  often  assigned  to  observation  lessons  :  "  descrip- 
tion of  spring,  summer,  autumn  and  winter  in  general," 
"  general  review  of  the  garden  and  garden  work,"  "  descrip- 
tion of  the  meadows  and  fields  in  general,"  ' '  the  forest  in  gen- 
eral."—  Such  general  observations  as  do  not  emanate  from 
a  fullness  of  concrete  single  perceptions,  stand  on  the  same 
footing  with  those  abstract  and  fruitless  exercises  in  think- 
ing and  speaking  with  which  formerly  our  youth  were 
tormented.  Consequently  instead  of  taking  a  course  that 
has  to  do  neither  with  home  nor  with  observation  lessons 
and  would  improve  the  pupil  in  nothing,  we  should  rather 
always  start  from  a  definite  forest,  mountain,  pond,  or  river 
of  the  neighborhood,  and  always  return  to  it,  if  thereby  we  can 
lift  obscure  and  unsettled  ideas  into  clearness.  For  not  the 
general,  but  only  the  particular,  the  special,  the, individual, 
can  be  au  object  of  this  home-observation  lesson. 

From  the  school-room  and  the  school-house,  to  which  our 
little  ones  first  pay  attention,  we  lead  them  into  the  school 
garden,  with  whose  kitchen  plants,  flowering  shrubs  and  fruit 
trees  they  become  familiar,  whose  inhabitants  (bugs,  bees, 
ants,  snails,  birds) ,  they  can  watch  in  their  life  and  work. 


168  APPERCEPTION. 

In  field  and  meadow  there  is  offered  no  less  rich  and  inter- 
esting material  for  observation  :  the  manifold  labors  of  the 
farmer  and  the  herder,  and  the  most  important  products  of  the 
field  in  the  different  stages  of  their  development.  Over  hill, 
mountain  and  valley  we  ramble  through  the  woods,  with 
whose  trees,  fruits  and  animals,  together  with  their  manage- 
ment, we  become  familiar  under  the  friendly  guidance  of 
the  forester.  We  go  down  to  the  nearest  creek,  river  or 
pond  in  order  to  observe  the  aquatic  animals  as  well  as  the 
fisher  and  trapper,  who  catch  them ;  we  follow  the  course 
of  the  water  down  to  the  mill,  which  we  inspect  minutely, 
and  which  furnishes  an  occasion  to  discuss  the  question  how 
bread  is  prepared.  We  observe  the  native  sky  with  its 
clouds  and  stars,  we  learn  to  take  our  bearings  according  to 
the  points  of  the  compass  and  to  notice  the  changes  of  the 
day  and  the  season ;  we  obsers'e  the  phenomena  of  the 
thunderstorm,  count  the  colors  of  the  rainbow,  gaze  with 
interest  upon  the  flocks  of  birds  of  passage  which  pass 
through  the  sky  in  the  spring  and  autumn.  And  as  in 
the  village  we  have  become  acquainted  with  the  most 
important  occupations  of  the  farmer  and  the  forester, 
the  simplest  human  dwellings,  the  farmyard  with  its  domestic 
animals,  so  in  the  city  we  visit,  as  convenient  opportunity 
offers,  the  workshops  of  the  mechanic,  who  will  disclose  to 
us  the  construction  of  the  most  necessary  utensils  and  tools, 
the  building  lot  of  the  mason  and  carpenter,  the  factories 
of  the  most  important  industries.  We  follow  the  principal 
streets,  upon  which  moves  the  home  trafllc,  and  even  where 
we  find  a  remarkable  building,  perhaps  an  old  castle,  a 
palace,  a  church,  a  city  hall,  we  tarry  with  special  interest. 
This  home  instruction  demands  therefore  a  wandering  through 
the  home  neighborhood  in  all  directions ;  it  requires  of  the 
child  a  continued  observation  of  what  is  and  what  transpires 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  169 

in  its  surroundings.  This  kind  of  instruction  would  com- 
pletely miss  its  purpose  if,  instead  of  the  objects  them- 
selves, it  were  perhaps  to  present  merely  pictures,  such  as  are 
so  popular  in  the  pictorial  lessons  of  our  schools ;  or  if  it 
were  to  start  from  the  lifeless  card  and  try  to  show  the  chQd 
what  it  can  learn  only  in  and  out  of  the  home  itself ;  or  if 
it  were  to  attempt  to  overcome  the  deficiencies  of  the  child's 
perception  through  scattered  descriptions  borrowed  from  a 
text-book  and  through  the  mere  word  of  the  teacher. 

It  is .  certainly  self-deception  to  ascribe  to  language  the 
power  ' '  to  transfer  the  observations  of  the  speaker  to  the 
listener  (to  wit,  the  child)  with  the  full  force  of  the  sense 
impression  and  to  awaken  in  the  listener  the  feelings  of  the 
speaker  with  like  vividness."  The  liveliest  representation 
by  the  teacher  is  never  able  to  replace  or  render  unnecessary 
the  child's  personal  observations ;  he  himself  must  see 
and  hear,  must  observe  with  his  senses  the  things  .the 
perception  of  which  he  is  to  share.  And  since  in  gen- 
eral things  do  not  come  to  men,  or  to  children  either  (be- 
cause this  in  many  cases  is  impossible  or  impracticable), 
therefore  the  school  has  to  take  the  children  to  the  things. 

This  is  done  if  from  the  start  there  is  a  school-garden  at 
the  disposal  of  the  pupils  (at  least  those  of  the  city),  con- 
taining the  most  important  plants  cultivated  at  home,  and 
the  children  are  required  to  work  in  the  garden  during  certain 
hours,  and  to  attend  to  the  beds  assigned  them  and  to  watch 
the  gradual  development  of  the  plants ;  or  if  regular  excur- 
sions are  arranged  about  the  home  or  to  the  neighboring  vil- 
lage or  city.  Each  of  these  school  excursions  should  have 
a  definite  aim  and  object,  a  specific  purpose ;  the  excursions 
should  occur,  not  occasionally,  "  for  a  change  and  recreation 
on  some  of  the  free  afternoons  in  summer,"  —  with  such 
palliative   remedy,  such   homoeopathic    pills,  some   seek  to 


170  APPERCEPTION. 

satisfy  the  pedagogic  conscience  and  to  meet  one  of 
the  most  important  didactic  principles,  —  but  as  often  as 
it  becomes  necessary  to  furnish  thorough  observations  re- 
lating to  some  definite  subject  of  instruction.  "We  are 
aware  that  on  account  of  the  difficulties  connected  there- 
with, particularly  in  over-crowded  schools,  these  excursions 
solely  for  purposes  of  instruction  do  not  find  general  favor, 
and  that  men  have  sought  to  ridicule  them  as  time-wasting 
"bumming,"  as  an  "expensive  and  diverting  innovation," 
a  "pedantic  and  sensational  expedient."  ^ 

'  It  depends  entirely  upon  how  these  excursions  are  arranged.  We  have 
already  shown  ahove,  that  the  object  is  not  to  divert  the  children,  but 
rather  to  instruct  them ;  to  each  of  them  is  assigned  a  definite  plan,  a  defi- 
nite task.  We  insist  upon  it,  that  this  task  shall  be  really  accomplished 
by  the  pupils,  that  they  do  not  observe  superficially  and  inaccurately,  bat 
give  an  explicit  account  of  their  perceptions  at  the  place  of  observation. 
There  need  be  no  talk  therefore  about  "  useless  bumming,"  and  just  as 
littllB  about  pedantry  and  ennui.  On  the  contrary  we  know  of  no  other 
lessons  in  which  the  pupils  listen  with  greater  pleasure  and  interest  to 
the  words  of  the  teacher,  or  are  more  eagerly  given  to  observation.  These 
excursions  place  them  once  more  into  their  wonted  sphere,  and  there 
the  teacher  appears  no  longer  as  the  strict  master,  but  ratlier  as  a  father 
who  associates  with  them  familiarly.  In  this  way  the  children  and  the 
teacher  learn  to  know  and  to  love  one  another  better. 

This  is  an  educational  agency,  which,  at  a  time  when  there  is  so  much 
tendency  to  regard  intellectual  culture  as  the  chief  object  of  the  school, 
deserves  to  be  emphasized  all  the  more  strongly.  And  what  about  the 
criticism  that  our  excursions  take  too  much  time?  As  if  the  method 
which  carries  on  home-knowledge  within  the  four  school  walls,  with 
mere  empty  words,  did  not  waste  still  more  time !  This  in  truth  wastes 
the  entire  time,  for  it  builds  on  sand  and  does  not  yield  clear-headed 
intellects,  but  shallow,  pretentious  braggarts.  The  hours  devoted  to 
our  excursions  are  not  at  all  lost,  but  inasmuch  as  upon  the  clearness  of 
>our  perceptions  depends  clearness  of  thought  even  in  most  remote  regions 
of  abstract  ideas,  they  will  bear  fruit  a  hundred  fold.  Moreover  we  are 
not  of  the  opiuion  that  these  excursions  are  to  be  shifted  to  the  leisure 
hours.  It  is  but  fair  that  the  teacher  be  not  oppressed  with  a  now  bur- 
den by  this  work,  inasmuch  as  ho  finds  in  them  additional  labor  rather 
than  recreation.  A  definite  time  should  therefore  be  allotted  to  them  in 
the  study  plan,  perhaps  the  last  afternoon  lesson,  under  some  circum- 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO    PEDAGOGY.  171 

But  the  necessity  of  these  excursions  for  all  teaching 
that  attempts  to  base  the  perceptions  of  the  pupils  on  home 
impressions  is  not  removed  by  the  use  of  opprobrious 
terms.  Besides,  Bartholomiii  has  shown  in  an  excellent 
treatise  that  school  excursions  in  the  manner  just  indicated 
are  really  possible  and  practicable  even  in  large  cities.^ 

stances  even  a  whole  afternoon,  and  they  should  be  put  on  an  equality 
with  the  ordinary  work  of  teaching,  even  if  it  were  only  in  order  to  meet 
any  unjustifiable  objections  of  the  parents.  As  for  the  pretended  expen- 
siveness  of  our  excursions,  we  freely  admit  to  have  had  something  in  our 
mind  quite  different  from  most  of  our  modern  school  rambling.  "We  do 
not  at  all  approve  the  fashionable  mania,  which  unfortunately  has  to  an 
extent  also  seized  the  minds  of  our  children,  which  for  a  genuine  excur- 
sion would  require  at  least  the  crossing  of  the  state  line  and  a  long  ride  in 
the  cars.  We  hold  the  conviction,  that  generally  there  is  too  mmch 
riding  and  too  little  walking,  that  therefore  a  superficial  knowledge  and  a 
certain  depreciation  of  the  home  is  likely  to  result.  "  Distance  lends 
enchantment,"  etc. 

Against  such  disloyalty  towards  the  home  the  school  must  do  its  share 
of  work,  and  for  this  reason  we  have  not  in  mind  expensive  railroad  trips 
and  grand  journeys,  but  simple  foot-ramblings  within  the  limits  of  home, 
which,  in  case  the  mother  provides  the  little  ones  with  some  luncheon  at 
home,  can  easily  be  arranged  at  an  expense  of  a  few  pennies.  In  most 
cases  the  trips  will,  of  course,  not  cause  the  least  outlay. 

'About  excursions  with  reference  to  large  cities  (Jahrbuch  d.  V.f.  w. 
P.,  pp.  209-49).  Our  excursions  will  of  course  meet  with  great  difiicul- 
ties  in  large  cities,  in  over-crowded  schools,  and  also  for  the  want  of 
good  sense  on  the  part  of  some  i)arents.  There  it  is  best  to  divide  the 
school  into  sections  for  this  purpose,  not  to  mind  the  talk  of  the  idle 
crowd,  and  finally  to  overcome  through  the  devoted  and  faithful  discharge 
of  our  duties,  the  prejudices  of  parents  who  do  not  understand  the 
importance  and  necessity  of  our  efforts.  At  least  one  capable  teacher.  Dr. 
Bartholomiii,  succeeded  in  this  way  even  in  a  city  like  Berlin  in  caiTying 
out  these  school-excursions  regularly.  He,  too,  found  idle  starers,  who 
cracked  jokes  at  his  expense,  and  he  heard  it  now  and  then  said  by  the 
Berlin  philistines,  "  that  tlie  children's  clothes  and  shoes  were  being 
ruined  uselessly  "  ;  but  he  maintained  his  purpose.  Now,  what  was  car- 
ried out  there  under  proportionately  much  less  favorable  conditions,  can, 
I  think,  also  be  carried  out  at  every  other  place.  Let  us,  therefore, 
give  a  trial  to  these  instructive  walks,  calculated  to  strengthen  the  body 
of  the  child  and  to  make  his  home  dear  to  him ;  do  not  let  us  begrudge 


172  APPERCEPTION. 

If,  finally,  in  the  upper  grades  a  little  journey  were  added 
annually  that  would  extend  the  sphere  of  vision  of  the  pupils 
beyond  the  nearest  surroundings,  sufBcient  opportunity 
would  be  offered  to  further  the  concrete  ideas  in  which  our 
pupils  are  so  deficient.* 

For  it  is  precisely  to  such  indispensable  external  observa- 
tions, which  pupils  commonly  lack  upon  entering  school 
(every  part  of  the  country,  every  place  has  some  very 
striking  and  interesting  peculiarities),  that  home  knowledge 
has  to  direct  its  special  attention.  Thus,  if  our  children 
have  not  yet  seen  the  sun  rise  and  know  practically  nothing 
of  the  moon  and  the  stars,  we  let  them  in  morning  prome- 
nades and  evening  walks  observe  the  native  sky  long  enough 
to  gain  the  desired  information.  If,  as  in  the  case  of  a 
village  situated  on  a  wide  plateau,  they  have  found  no 
opportunity  to  form  ideas  about  mountain,  creek  and  river, 

our  little  ones  these  pleasant  excursions,  which  fill  their  minds  with  new 
ideas,  and  open  heart  and  soul  to  tlie  fatherly  friend,  who  honestly  shares 
with  them  trouhle  and  hardships! 

>How  in  relation  to  this  the  home  may  prepare  for  and  assist  the 
school  is  shown  hy  Sigismund's  suggestive  paper,  The  Family  as  a  School 
o/i\'atwre,  only  we  should  guard  against  one  error  that  may  frequently 
be  noticed  in  families  and  kindergartens.  Many  parents  and  educators 
go  too  far  in  the  effort,  praiseworthy  in  itself,  of  giving  the  child  as  many 
ideas  as  possible,  preparing  him  for  the  exercise  of  his  powers  of  appre- 
ciation in  the  work  of  the  coming  scliool.  Tiiey  overwhelm  and  divert 
him  with  a  multitude  of  pictures,  the  subjects  of  which  eitlier  go  far 
beyond  his  understanding  and  experience  or  which  can  be  observed  in 
nature  with  much  greater  profit.  By  this  his  apperceptive  attention  is 
considerably  lessened,  because  the  i)erception  produced  by  the  picture 
leaves  much  fainter  ideas  tlian  tlio  observation  of  the  things  themselves. 
Instead  of  such  shadow-like  observations  gained  through  pictures,  that 
forestall  tite  actual,  sensuous  experience  of  the  child,  and  produce  a 
hollow  make-believe  intelligence  without  interest  and  intent,  it  is 
preferable  to  have  none.  Then  at  least  nothing  is  spoiled.  "  For  what 
I  have  not  yet  learned  to  know  at  all,  I  learn  easier  than  what  I  have 
previoxisly  begun  to  learn  in  the  wrong  way."— Roch,  GymnusialpddO' 
gogik,  p.  129. 


ITS   APPLICATION    TO   PEDAGOGY.  173 

we  direct  our  first  travels  towards  these  objects.  If  city 
children  bring  with  them  very  insufficient  ideas  of  large 
standing  waters,  then  the  school-trip  aims  to  reach  a 
neighboring  lake  or  large  pond  ;  if  factory  children,  in  most 
cases  unnecessarily  deficient  in  observations  of  field  and 
forest,  come  to  school,  then  the  latter  should  first  (and  oftener 
than  the  city)  be  considered  as  an  objective  point  of  the  ex- 
cursions. —  But  not  merely  the  lacking  observations,  but 
also  the  numerous  observations  which  the  child  brings  to 
school,  have  to  be  considered  in  the  lessons  on  home  knowl- 
edge. For  many  of  their  observ^ations  are  positively  wrong, 
many  of  them  so  superficial  and  imperfect  that  they  urgently 
need  to  be  repeated,  strengthened,  corrected  and  supple- 
mented. It  is  needful  to  fix  the  attention  of  the  child,  so 
likely  to  touch  only  the  surface  of  things,  upon  definite  ob- 
jects of  perception,  to  lead  him  from  his  crude  ideas  of  things 
as  wholes  to  ideas  of  the  parts  of  these  things,  to  make  these 
clear  in  themselves,  and  in  an  orderly  synthesis  enable  him 
again  to  reach  a  distinct  whole ;  that  is,  to  form  genuine,  clear 
sense-perceptions.  It  is  needful,  in  drawing  and  coloring, 
in  simple  pictorial  representations  of  the  observed  thing 
and  in  its  correct  naming,  to  enhance  the  clearness  of 
the  involved  ideas.  It  is  needful  to  put  into  the  varied 
multiplicity  of  the  acquired  obsers'ations  a  certam  order, 
which  of  course  in  no  way  approaches  a  scientific  arrange- 
ment. The  reply  to  the  important  question  in  what  succes- 
sion to  deal  with  the  objects  of  observation,  will  essentially 
depend  on  the  place  of  home-knowledge  in  the  school,  as  an 
independent  subject  of  instruction  or  as  an  adjunct  of  some 
other  subject.  Against  the  independent  lessons  as  demanded 
by  KarlRichter,  Juetting  and  others,  and  commonly  followed 
in  the  school  practice  of  to-day,  there  are  weighty  objec- 
tions.    All  its  ingenious  grouping  of  ideas  is  inadequate  to 


174  APPERCEPTION. 

hide  the  arbitrariness  with  which  it  proceeds  in  their  selec- 
tion. Convincing  reasons  for  the  proposed  succession  of 
objects  are  mostly  wanting  —  a  sign  that  here  the  theory 
does  not  rest  on  a  sure  scientific  basis.  The  lack  of  an 
orderly  selection  of  home-material  in  accordance  with  uui- 
versally  admitted  principles  weighs,  indeed,  heavily  upoq 
the  teacher.  Consequently  the  children,  too,  usually  do 
not  know  why  just  this  or  that  object  is  taken  up  in  the 
lessons ;  the  thread  is  missing  that  should  unite  all  the 
various  home  observations,  thus  insuring  cohesion,  per 
manence  and  interest.  Indeed,  the  teacher  is  easily  misled, 
through  the  feeling  of  this  want,  to  anticipate  their  logical 
connection  and  arrangement  into  abstract  notions  and  systems 
and  to  strive  for  a  completeness  in  single  groups  of  observa- 
tion, for  which  the  child  at  the  time  feels  neither  the  need 
nor  the  interest.  We  transgress  also  against  the  law  of  ap- 
perception, in  offering  subject-matter  to  the  child  with 
which  he  is  in  part  so  fully  conversant  that  he  finds  it 
difficult  to  interest  himself  in  it  independently.  To  offer 
for  obsers'ation  and  in  the  same  form  during  many- succes- 
sive lessons  things  with  which  the  child  is  perfectly  familiar 
produces  languor.  The  things  of  the  nearest  surroundings 
awaken  the  childish  interest  only  if  they  are  used  in  rela- 
tion to  other  subject-matter,  and  thus  viewed  in  the  light  of 
another  sphere  of  thought.  Finally  this  independent  object- 
teaching  heaps  up,  in  the  first  two  or  three  school  years  that 
are  usually  assigned  to  it,  a  number  of  ideas  without  being 
able  to  insure  their  immediate  or  speedy  use.  It  keeps  a 
cargo  of  observations  valuable  enough  in  themselves  in  store ; 
these  undoubtedly  obstruct  one  another  and  must  steadily  lose 
in  mobility  for  purposes  of  apperception,  i.  e.,  the  power  of 
energetically  uniting  themselves  with  other  ideas.  The  health 
of  the  intellectual  life  suffers  if  we  give  several  years  to  the 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  175 

task  of  gathering  ideas  tending  to  apperception  and  post- 
pone to  later  years  the  exercise  of  their  apperceptive  ten- 
dencies. This  is  contrary  to  the  child's  wonted  practice 
of  restlessly  working  with  his  limited  intellectual  capital. 
The  saying  "  In  rest,  I  rust"  applies  also  to  ideas  stored 
exclusively  for  future  use.  Besides  it  is  well  to  consider 
that  great  apperceptive  mobility  exists  only  in  ideas  that 
are  linked  with  our  personal  interests  by  vivid  feelings  and 
inclinations. 

It  does  not  suffice  that  w^e  have  seen  an  object  and  viewed 
it  closely  ;  we  should  also  in  our  experience  and  in  intimate 
intercourse  thoroughly  assimilate  whatever  is  to  unfold  with- 
in us  into  strong  activity. 

The  dear  places  of  home  where  we  liked  best  to  play,  the 
animals  and  the  people  with  which  we  held  special  inter- 
course, the  roads  upon  which  we  could  accompany  our 
father  through  the  woods  or  fields,  the  grass-plot  or  the 
woodland  meadow  where  we  celebrated  our  splendid  juve- 
nile festivals,  —  these  always  present  themselves  first  as  the 
strongest  and  ever  present  aids  to  apperception.  If,  now, 
the  practice  of  independent  object-teaching  attempts  in  the 
first  two  or  three  school  years  to  accumulate  beforehand  and 
to  lift  into  clearness  nearly  all  those  important  ideas  which 
in  a  succeeding  stage  of  instruction  are  to  serve  as  aids  to  ap- 
perception, may  we  then  presume  that  the  six  to  eight-year- 
old  child  has  learned  by  continued  intercourse  to  know 
familiarly  and  to  love  all  the  various  objects  to  be  discussed 
subsequently  ?  Is  it  really  conceivable  that  the  eight-year- 
old  child  should  have  closed  the  round  of  his  home  experi- 
ences and  now  have  to  meet  nothing  essentially  new?  This 
is  denied  by  the  fact  that  the  boy,  from  the  time  when 
he  can  risk  and  plan  independent  excursions,  starts  out  all 
the  more  upon  new  discoveries ;   that  his  home,  the  farther 


176  APPERCEPTION. 

he  explores  it,  presents  to  him  ever  more  new  and  attrac- 
tive experiences.  Moreover,  it  is  impossible,  in  the  first  three 
school  years,  to  exhaust  the  sphere  of  home  observations, 
and  much  of  it  at  so  early  a  period  lies  beyond  the  child's  un- 
derstanding, as,  for  instance,  the  significance  of  modern  means 
of  communication,  of  industry,  and  of  certain  institutions 
of  state  and  church.  Here  then  we  have  to  await  the  favor- 
able opportunity  when,  as  instruction  progresses,  the  under- 
standing for  such  things  can  be  rendered  easy.  If  accord- 
ingly the  child  becomes  interested  in  home  objects  and  is 
attracted  by  them  only  very  gradually,  and  no  farther  than  he 
enters  into  relations  of  personal  interest  with  them  ;  if  for  the 
formation  of  these  intimate  relations  a  few  years  do  not 
suffice,  but  the  whole  period  of  youth  is  required,  do  not  then 
many  of  the  ideas,  awakened  by  the  independent  observation 
lessons  during  the  first  school-years,  seem  like  empty  nuts 
devoid  of  life  and  germinating  force?  Do  they  not  confine 
the  child,  lesson  upon  lesson,  to  natural  objects  that  can 
mean  nothing  at  all  to  his  mind,  because  he  has  had  no 
experience  with  them?  Do  not  children  in  this  way  collect 
stores  that  are  wanting  beforehand  in  apperceptional  mobility  ? 
All  these  evils  can  be  avoided,  if,  in  accord  with  Ziller's 
plan,  the  establishment  and  extension  of  the  sphere  of  home 
experience  is  not  assigned  to  a  special  subject,  but  to  all 
subjects  of  instruction,  especially  to  history,  literature  and 
science.  By  these  subjects  it  must  be  determined,  from  time 
to  time,  what  things  are  to  be  closely  examined.  Not  system- 
atically and  in  the  tame  way  common  to  travelers'  guide  books 
is  the  home  to  be  gone  through  with  and  described,  but  ever  as 
the  needs  of  instruction  may  demand  it  we  turn  to  the  home 
environmeut.  Where,  for  instance,  it  is  desirable  to  bring 
historic  distances  within  the  grasp  of  the  child's  mind,  or  to 
present  to  his  view  strange  customs  and  institutions,  then 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  177 

we  see  to  it  that  the  pupil  may  find  the  needed  representative 
images  and  perceptions  through  careful  observation  in  and 
about  the  home. 

For  fairy  tales  and  legends,  for  sacred  and  profane  his- 
toiy,  for  geography  and  natural  science,  for  arithmetic  and 
form  study,  we  seek  as  occasion  requires  typical  objects  and 
conditions  for  purposes  of  instruction.  In  this  way  the  study 
of  the  home  surroundings  will  from  the  beginning  and  in 
every  grade  receive  in  regard  to  its  subject-matter  definite 
direction  from  the  material  and  formal  subjects  of  the  curric- 
ulum. 

This  limitation  of  the  material  of  home-knowledge  re- 
leases the  ' '  thoughtful  teacher  from  the  sense  of  oppression 
that  always  attends  the  feeling  of  entire  indefiniteness  as 
regards  teaching  matter"  ;^  for  he  knows  why  he  handles  just 
this  or  that  subject,  and  from  which  point  of  view  it  is 
to  be  regarded  for  the  purpose  in  hand.  While,  further, 
the  analytic  material  of  home-knowledge  enters  into  closest 
communication  with  the  subject-matter  of  the  synthetically 
progressing  branches  of  instruction,  especially  with  the  living 
scenes  of  history,"  the  objects  about  home  receive  a  pecu- 
liar illustration,  a  particular  interest.  In  the  light  of  his- 
tory, of  geographical  description,  or  of  the  contemplation  of 
strange,  interesting  scenes,  products  and  occurrences,  home 
appears  to  the  child  dearer  and  more  significant  as  it  becomes 
to  him  more  intelligible  and  familiar.  Finally,  the  fact 
that  the  material  of  home-knowledge  is  not  crowded  together 
into  two  years,  but  distributed  over  many  years  among  the 
various  subjects  of  instruction,  affords  still  further  important 
advantages.  The  teacher  is  not  so  apt  to  fall  into  the  fatal 
error  of  assuming  that  by  two  or  three  years  of  instruction 
in  home-knowledge  he  has  in  every  direction  supplied  the 

» Rein,  Pickel  and  Scbeller,  Erstes  Schuljahr,  3.  Aufl.  S.  100. 


178  APPERCEPTION. 

needed  aids  to  apperception  and  that  he  may  now  be  released 
from  the  obligation  of  attending  to  close  and  accurate  direct 
observations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pupil  is  not  misled, 
as  a  result,  to  hurry  through  the  home  surroundings  within 
the  narrow  school  room,  but  frequent  excursions  and  his  own 
observations  help  him  in  the  course  of  his  entire  youth  to 
obtain  a  picture  of  home,  which  a  forced  instruction  in  two 
short  school  years  would  have  endeavored  in  vain  to  produce. 
Since  this  instruction  does  not  seek  to  reap  the  entire  harvest 
at  once,  but  gives  the  pupil  time  to  enter  gradually  into  close 
relationship  with  the  objects  of  his  neighborhood,  it  aflfords 
him  from  year  to  year  more  enlarged  views,  invested  with  a 
lively  interest  and  capable  of  speedy  assimilation  with  re- 
lated ideas.  Furthermore,  if  home  experiences  are  not 
stored  for  years  in  advance,  but  always  only  at  the  time  and 
in  the  place  where  needed  in  the  course  of  instruction,  and 
where  they  at  once  can  have  the  strongest  eflfect,  then  there 
is  insured  to  them  the  power  of  apperception,  the  right  con- 
nection with  other  spheres  of  thought.  In  short  the  analyt- 
ical observation  lessons  connected  with  the  various  subjects 
of  instruction  of  succeeding  school  years  is  best  able 
to  lead  to  the  various  provinces  of  knowledge  those  fresh 
springs  of  apperceiving  ideas  as  they  arise  from  the  home 
experience  of  every  one. 

However,  we  do  not  conceal  from  ourselves  the  many 
difliculties  that  at  present  beset  its  establishment  in  our 
schools.  We  shall  not  place  additional  stress  here  on  the 
difficulties,  presented  in  the  first  edition  of  this  work, 
whether  and  how  it  is  possible  to  obtain  the  lacking  aids 
to  apperception  in  school  excursions  at  the  very  time  when 
they  are  needed  for  purposes  of  instruction,  in  factory 
towns  where  the  teacher  cannot  dispose  of  the  leisure  time 
of  his  pupils  as  he  chooses,  in  a  mountainous  district  in  the 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  179 

winter  time,  where  roads  and  paths  are  snowed  under  and 
many  objects  of  observation  are  inaccessible,  or  in  cases 
where  unforeseen  natural  occurrences  like  continual  rains 
have  set  in.  For  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  in  the 
warmer  season,  when  a  favorable  opportunity  presents  itself, 
many  an  observation  should  be  taken  in  advance  and  in  its 
full  details,  although  it  may  not  find  application  in  the 
studies  for  several  weeks  or  months ;  but  such  exceptions 
do  not  change  the  rule. 

Of  more  weight,  however,  is  the  other  fact,  that  this  in- 
cidental home-knowledge  is  not  reconcilable  with  every 
form  of  the  course  of  studies.  Its  successful  conduct  pre- 
supposes at  least  for  each  school  year  a  unified  historical 
body  of  knowledge  into  which  the  home-knowledge  can 
readily  enter;  also  a  patient  tarrying  with  it,  not  a  hasty 
running  through  with  fragmentary  patches  of  material. 
Dry  guide-like  reviews  of  universal  history  or  detached 
Bible-stories,  selected  with  a  view  to  presenting  subjects  in 
concentric  circles,  do  not  answer  the  pui-pose.  So  long  as 
preference  is  given  to  these,  so  long  as  a  unified  course  of 
study  derived  strictly  from  the  object  of  education  does 
not  make  itself  more  strongly  felt,  and  widely  differing 
opinions  concerning  the  content  and  sequence  of  the  matter 
selected  prevail  even  among  the  friends  of  this  method, 
Ziller's  proposition  cannot  gain  general  adoption.  But  that 
it  implies  an  important  step  in  advance,  that  the  future 
belongs  to  it,  is  our  conviction  derived  from  a  varied  practical 
experience. 

In  this  we  are  finally  confirmed  also  by  historical  consid- 
erations. It  is  well  known  that  the  time  lies  not  so  very 
far  back  when  the  public  school  engaged  in  special  ab- 
stract exercises  in  thinking  and  speaking,  thus  wearying 
the  children  and  giving  joy  to  none.     This  was  based  on 


180  APPERCEPTION. 

the  wholly  correct  view,  that  knowledge  without  under- 
standing can  be  of  no  use,  that  the  pupil  has  intellectually 
appropriated  only  that  of  which  he  can  freely  dispose 
in  speech  and  writing.  To  think  and  to  speak  are  conditions 
and  fruits  of  an  educational  intellectual  culture.  The  error 
lay  in  the  assumption  that  these  exercises  had  to  be  confined 
to  special  lessons.  Thus  that  was  isolated  which  should 
be  the  object  of  every  lesson,  of  each  branch  of  study  in  its 
special  province.  The  subject  of  home-knowledge  is  ap- 
parently in  a  similar  condition.  It  is  generally  recognized 
that  our  thinking  even  in  the  highest  abstract  regions  de- 
pends on  sense-perception,  and  that  without  this  firm  founda- 
tion the  results  of  instruction  are  quite  doubtful  and  tran- 
sient. And  yet  from  this  it  does  not  follow  that  one  should 
teach  by  itself,  in  a  special  course,  what  can  not  be  left  to  a 
particular  subject  in  later  instruction.  That  would  be  like 
arguing  as  follows :  Since  thinking  and  speaking  are  among  the 
most  important  activities  of  the  pupil,  therefore  there  should  be 
special  lessons  in  thinking  and  speaking.  Possibly,  it  will 
here  too,  soon  be  generally  admitted,  that  separate  obser- 
vation exercises  unconnected  with  the  principal  school  studies 
of  the  public  school  are  just  as  superfluous  as  those  thinking 
and  speaking  exercises.  Perhaps  it  will  then  be  conceded 
that  to  start  from  the  home  observations  is  not  the  task  of 
one  but  of  most  branches,  and  that  here  a  principle  is  in- 
volved, which  must  be  heeded  not  only  in  one  or  two,  but  in 
every  school  year. 

Consequently,  then,  home-knowledge  is  not  a  study  corres- 
ponding to  a  definite  department  of  instruction.  But  inas- 
much as  it  treats  of  material  home-observation,  it  senses  as 
an  analytic  step  in  nearly  all  branches  of  study,  and  consti- 
tutes through  all  the  school  years  an  essential  component 
of  them.    How  much  in  particular  the  realistic  branches  need 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  181 

these  continual  references  to  home  experience,  how  only 
through  fresh  ideas  derived  from  home-impressions,  the  diffi- 
cult provinces  of  history  and  geography,  for  instance,  can 
be  mastered,  cannot  be  emphasized  too  often  or  too  urgently. 
We  have  already  seen,  what  peculiar  demands  these  branches 
make  upon  the  intellectual  activity  of  the  pupil.  In  geog- 
raphy he  is  mentally  to  hasten  through  thousands  of  miles 
with  lightning  speed,  and  at  the  enumeration  of  great  num- 
bers of  square  and  linear  miles  is  to  form  a  fair  idea  of  the 
world  and  to  associate  sense  impression  with  his  words. 
Under  the  guidance  of  the  teacher  he  is  to  travel  in  strange 
countries  and  to  present  to  himself  a  vivid  living  picture  of 
strange  cities  and  men,  he  is  to  raise  in  his  imagination  the 
snowcapped  mountains  of  the  Old  and  of  the  New  World,  and 
to  let  his  vision  sweep  over  boundless  expanses  of  giant 
streams  and  oceans.  He  is  to  feel  the  oppressive  solitude 
of  the  desert  and  of  the  primeval  forest  as  if  he  were  a 
traveller;  and  stretches  of  country  which  it  took  years  to 
explore,  he  is  to  sur\-ey  and  describe  in  a  twinkling  as 
he  would  an  open  book  or  a  level  field.  But  this  is  only 
possible  if  the  pupil  can  draw  upon  the  store  of  his  own 
experience ;  he  can  comprehend  the  words  of  the  teacher 
only  in  so  far  as  he  succeeds  in  forming  similar  familiar 
ideas.  These  constitiite  the  elementary  materials  out  of 
which  the  extensive  edifice  of  geographical  knowledge  can 
alone  be  composed,  the  foundations  and  main  supports  upon 
which  this  mass  of  related  ideas  can  rest  securely.  Where 
those  aids  to  apperception  are  wanting,  and  the  new  finds 
no  echo  in  the  mind  of  the  scholar,  he  is  unable  to  follow 
the  clearest  and  most  vivid  discourse,  since  he  only  hears 
words,  nothing  but  words.  A  child  that  has  not  yet  ob- 
tained an  idea  of  a  kilometer,  a  mile,  a  hectare,  of  a 
plateau  or  a  valley,  that  has  not  at  some  time  marked  out 


182  APPERCEPTION. 

and  sketched  a  plan  of  his  home  neighborhood,  where  he 
can  readily  find  his  way,  that  is  wanting  in  the  simplest 
of  rudimentary  ideas  for  geographical  study,  cannot  have 
much  of  an  idea  of  a  square  mile,  of  a  plateau  of  ter- 
raced lands,  nor  show  a  real  understanding  of  maps,  and 
even  the  most  perfect  geographical  study  imparts  to  him 
nothing  but  indefinite,  shadow-like  ideas,  and  numerous  unin- 
telligible names.  The  same  applies  to  history.  If  it  at- 
tempts to  bring  before  the  pupil  the  civilization  of  the  most 
important  nations,  if  it  tells  him  of  the  most  varied  gov- 
ernments and  religious  systems,  or  travels  with  him  to  the 
historic  monuments  of  his  native  country  and  describes  to 
him  the  splendor  of  the  chivalry  of  the  middle  ages,  the 
important  inventions,  the  great  wars  of  modem  times,  it 
can  hope  to  create  a  deep  enduring  impression  on  the  pupil's 
mind  only  in  so  far  as  its  words  result  in  the  vivid  repro- 
duction of  older  similar  ideas.  We  demand  the  impossible 
when  we  expect  from  a  pupil  who  has  grown  up  in  a  se- 
cluded place  remote  from  public  life  and  who,  therefore, 
knows  little  of  the  most  important  state  regulations,  of  the 
most  prominent  church  and  state  authorities,  of  laws  and 
taxes,  of  stations  and  ranks,  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
power  of  government  in  the  modem  state  is  divided,  that 
he  should  transfer  himself  into  the  political  life  of  the 
Spartans  and  Athenians  and  to  understand  the  legislation 
of  a  Lycurgus  and  a  Solon. 

We  preach  to  deaf  ears  when  we  speak  of  Olympic  games 
or  mediaeval  tournaments  before  the  pupils  have  had  an  op- 
portunity at  public  festivals  at  home,  to  obtain  aids  to  apper- 
ception (however  immature)  for  the  new  historic  material. 
Indeed,  even  historic  material  that  relates  to  times  and  events 
comparatively  close  at  hand,  as  for  instance,  the  story  of  the 
origin  of  the  German  cities,  and  German  citizenship,  of  the 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  183 

heroic  deeds  of  our  knights,  presupposes  greater  preparation 
in  personal  observations  than  is  usually  demanded :  for 
what  would  be  the  most  brillant  and  popular  discourse  to  a 
pupil  who  does  not  know  from  his  own  obsei-vation  the  vari- 
ous vocations  of  the  people,  who  has  never  stood  before  the 
decaying  outer  wall  of  an  old  town,  and  who  has  never  visited 
and  closely  inspected  the  ivy-clad  ruins  and  quaint  castles  of 
his  home?  We  are  too  apt  to  underrate  the  demands  upon 
the  mental  capacity  of  the  pupil  made  by  the  historical  and 
geographical  studies ;  we  presuppose  in  him  a  great  store  of 
experiences,  an  abundance  of  sense  perceptions  and  ethical 
observations,  of  fundamental  ideas  of  time  and  space,  which 
he  has  either  not  at  all  or  else  not  with  the  desirable  clear- 
ness. No  wonder  that  it  is  just  here  that  the  results  .of  the 
studies  are  not  in  any  way  commensurate  with  the  trouble  and 
time  spent  upon  them,  and  that  after  leaving  school  the  in- 
fluence of  the  school  is  dissipated  nowhere  more  speedily  than 
in  these  two  provinces  of  knowledge.  Geographical  and  his- 
torical instruction  that  does  not  seek  its  best  help  in  the  home 
observation  of  the  child  plays  on  a  piano  without  strings. 
For  only  in  and  about  home  can  be  obtained  most  easily  and 
surely  those  perceptions,  external  observations  and  element- 
ary notions,  the  reproduction  of  which  gives  to  the  words 
of  the  teacher  a  living  content  and  to  the  mere  symbol  the 
corresponding  thing,  and  which  alone  secures  apperception 
in  any  study. 

Now  as  it  is  impossible  to  establish  all  these  aids  to  ap- 
perception in  the  object-teaching  of  the  first  school  years, 
much  less  effectively  to  store  them  for  future  use,  we  recom- 
mend the  extension  of  instruction  in  home-knowledge  to  all 
the  school  years.  In  accordance  with  the  opportunities  in 
the  synthetic  progress  of  the  school  studies,  the  teacher 
should  see  to  it  that  the  pupil  may  obtain  upon  the  founda- 


184  APPEKCEPTION. 

tion  of  numerous  observations  at  home,  those  indispensable 
geographical  ideas  of  creek,  river,  tributary,  source  and 
mouth,  island,  peninsula  and  isthmus,  plateau  and  valley, 
watershed,  mountain  crest  and  pass,  etc.  He  should  exercise 
him  diligently  in  measuring  and  calculating  stretches  of  road 
and  areas.  Thus  he  will  form  in  his  local  home-experience 
clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  geographical  measurements. 
These  measurements  should  be  closely  related  to  the  daily 
observations  of  the  child ;  the  extent  of  an  acre,  a  mile  or  a 
square  mile,  he  should  at  all  times  be  able  to  relate  to  a 
neighboring  piece  of  ground  or  meadow,  a  certain  section 
of  the  road,  the  division  lines  of  his  home  district.  lie  is 
also  to  become  acquainted  with  the  different  soils  of  the 
home  district,  also  with  its  swampy,  sandy  and  barren  tracts, 
BO  that  he  may  have  at  hand  definite  appropriate  images  for 
the  marshes,  deserts  and  plains  of  geography  lessons. 
He  should  group  and  compare  what  he  has  by  degrees 
obsen'ed  concerning  the  changes  of  temperature,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  sun  during  the  different  seasons,  the  gains  and 
losses  of  day  and  night,  the  apparent  changes  of  the  moon, 
and  should  sketch  a  map  of  the  celestial  bodies  with  which 
he  has  become  familiar.  Finally  this  study  will  train  the 
pupil,  and  this  is  not  the  least  of  its  task,  to  draw  an  outline 
map  not  only  of  his  residence  town,  but  also  of  the  entire 
home  district,  as  far  as  it  is  familiar  to  him,  and  so  to  live 
into  an  understanding  of  the  map. 

In  a  similar  manner  historical  instruction  should  seek  to 
gain  the  most  necessary  observations  aud  concepts.  The 
public  buildings  or  native  town  or  neighboring  city,  the 
official  proclamations  of  the  authorities,  the  public  elections, 
all  offer  occasion  to  instruct  the  child  about  the  most  import- 
ant local  aud  state  authorities,  about  the  functions  and 
duties  of  the  court  and  civil  officei-s,  about  the  leaders  of 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  185 

the  churches  and  schools.  In  the  forest  and  on  the  prairie 
can  easily  be  gained  a  picture  of  the  primeval  conditions  of 
the  native  soil  —  at  a  time  when  no  man's  foot  crossed  the 
woods ;  while  on  the  other  hand  perhaps  legends  and 
chronicles  of  the  foundation  of  the  native  place  afford  an 
insight  into  the  conditions  under  which  as  a  rule  the  settle- 
ments of  our  ancestors  came  about,  and  to  show  in  what 
manner  out  of  the  obscurity  of  the  forest  there  rose  by 
degrees,  single  farms  or  entire  villages.  The  giant  graves 
and  heathen  places  of  sacrifice,  to  which  the  children  flock 
with  their  teacher,  the  numerous  legends  of  river-nymphs 
andwat^r-sprites,  of  otter-kings,  dwarfs  and  other  mountaiu- 
Bpu'its,  the  superstitious  native  customs  (Walpurgis-fire, 
Christmas  and  New- Year  superstitions)  of  which  our  children 
can  give  many  vivid  accounts,  are  suflScient  to  transfer  them 
into  the  old  heathen  time,  when  our  ancestors  served  "Wodan 
or  Swantevit,  with  the  same  reality  with  which  a  lone 
forest  chapel,  or  an  old  decaying  church  ruin  brings  before 
the  mind  the  centuries  of  a  Bonifacins,  or  an  Adalbert  of 
Prague.  The  old  castles  and  palaces  of  home  which  we 
visit  frequently  and  inspect  closely,  give  the  pupil  a  clear 
idea  of  the  dwellings  and  also  in  part  of  the  occupations  of 
the  mediaeval  nobility,  while  the  extensive  lands  of  the  neigh- 
boring manor-house,  beside  which  even  now  the  scattered 
properties  of  the  other  villagers  almost  disappear,  afford  in- 
ferences as  to  the  social  and  economical  conditions  of  the 
peasants  under  the  feudal  system,  and  the  relation  between 
the  lord  of  the  castle  and  his  serfs.  Impressive  and  eloquent 
stories  are  told  by  the  old  walls  of  the  native  city  with  its 
loop-holes,  battlements  and  gates,  an  old  tower,  a  decaying 
monastery  of  past  times ;  in  vivid  directness  they  lead  the 
child  back  to  the  times  of  his  mediaeval  ancestors.  Thus  he 
gains  in  such  observations  at  home  a  foundation  for  the  de- 


186  APPERCEPTION. 

scriptions  of  German  city  life,  upon  which  he  finds  a  ready 
and  secure  foot-hold  for  apperception.  Finally  we  render 
the  pupil  familiar  with  the  orijiin  and  significance  of  certain 
popular  festivals  of  home,  search  after  the  traces  of  great 
wars,  which,  unfortunately,  may  be  found  in  almost  every 
district  of  our  fatherland,  old  Swedish  trenches,  a  desert 
from  the  time  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  or  Seven  Years'  "War, 
a  French  cross  on  the  public  road,  a  monument  in  the  centre 
of  a  field  or  in  the  church,  a  memorial  tablet  or  a  "  peace- 
oak  ' '  of  more  modern  origin :  thus  there  will  not  be 
wanting  material  for  analytic  study  relating  even  to  most 
recent  history. 

Of  course  the  sources  are  not  alike  copious  in  all  parts  of 
the  country,  and  local  conditions  limit  the  teacher  in  many 
ways,  especially  in  country  schools.  But  certainly  no  lo- 
cality is  so  poor  in  historic  evidences,  no  home  so  entirely 
new  that  it  does  not  offer  something  for  the  contemplation 
and  inspection  of  the  child,  from  which  the  study  of  history 
may  start. 

But  while  we  thus  extend  the  historical  and  geographical 
sphere  of  experiences  of  the  children,  inducing  them  to  ac- 
count for  a  number  of  facts,  occurrences  and  objects  of 
home,  while  we  lead  them  again  and  again  to  the  field 
of  the  dearest  experiences  of  their  youth,  so  that  they 
may  obtain  clear  apperceiving  ideas  for  their  studies,  we 
still  insist  that  the  observations  of  home-knowledge  should 
not  be  left  off  at  all,  that  they  should  continue  to  the 
last  school  year  of  the  pupil.  In  the  home  the  child's 
powers  are  deeply  rooted,  here  arise  the  springs  of  our 
clearest  perceptions  .and  deepest  feelings.  Therefore,  we 
should  not  merely  through  two  or  three  short  school  years 
foster  and  preserve  these  springs  in  the  cliild,  but  as  long 
as  he  sits  at  our  feet  may  the  sun  at  home  shine  into  the  nar- 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO  PEDAGOGY.  187 

row  schoolroom  and  make  learning  a  joy  and  one  of   the 
most  cheering  reminiscences  of  youth. 

Like  the  home  ideas,  so  too  can  all  other  experiences  of  the 
pupil,  all  that  in  other  ways  has  grown  strong  and  vigorous 
within  him,  serve  as  apperception  aids  in  the  studies.  Here 
belong  particularly  the  ideas  and  thoughts  stimulated  by 
instruction  in  previous  grades,  in  so  far  as  the  material  was 
chosen  according  to  right  rules  and  transformed  into  mental 
power.  To  know  and  to  investigate  these  just  as  accurately 
as  the  spheres  of  the  pupil's  home  experience  is  an  indis- 
pensable duty  of  the  teacher.  When  all  instruction  from  the 
beginning  is  exclusively  in  his  hands  he  familiarizes  himself 
in  the  school  work  itself  with  the  child's  whole  store  of  knowl- 
edge. Difficulties  arise,  however,  in  institutions ;  the  work 
of  instruction  is  apportioned  among  a  number  of  teachers. 
Here  it  is  desirable  —  also  for  other  pedagogic  reasons  — 
not  to  change  teachers  every  year  with  the  advancing  grades, 
but  to  entrust  the  children  to  the  same  teacher  as  long  as 
feasible,  and  to  limit  the  system  of  department  teaching  as 
much  as  possible  in  favor  of  grade  teaching.  But  where 
•this  is  not  possible,  the  tea.cher  should  at  least  be  put  in  a 
position  through  a  course  of  study  carefully  laid  out  in  every 
particular,  through  a  conscientiously  kept  record  of  the 
results  obtained  during  the  course,  and  also  through  a 
lively  pedagogic  intercourse  among  the  various  co-laborers, 
to  form  a  clear  idea  of  the  store  of  his  pupils'  ideas 
assimilated  in  the  previous  instruction.  He  must  diligently 
inquire  after  what  they  have  already  learned  in  a  certain 
direction,  and  how  they  have  learned  it,  so  that  he  may  not 
suppose  the  unknown  to  be  familiar  or  serve  up  the  familiar 
as  something  quite  new.  Do  not  chide  us  for  demanding  too 
much  in  this  respect  from  the  teacher.  If  in  ordinary  life  a 
housekeeper  should  never  examine  the  condition  of  his  house- 


188  APPERCEPTION. 

hold  goods,  luit  lay  in  new  stores  Avithout  regard  to  those  on 
hand,  his  management  could  not  be  of  long  continuance. 
For  like  reasons  the  law  menaces  with  severe  penalty  the 
merchant  who  does  not  make  an  inventorj'  of  his  stock. 
Should  that  which  is  thus  inadmissible  in  the  material  world 
be  permitted  in  the  spiritual?  Certainly  still  less.  And  so 
the  common  demand  is  made  of  the  teacher  not  to  let  any- 
thing essential  be  lost  of  the  stores  already  gathered  in 
study  by  the  pupil,  but  to  make  good  use  of  it  as  a  wel- 
come aid  to  apperception,  and  to  connect  with  it,  as  well 
as  with  the  home  sphere  of  experiences,  all  that  is  new. 

"When  our  Saviour  desired  duly  to  impress  his  listenere 
with  a  religious  truth  he  fiequently  chose  a  parable,  an 
example,  a  stoiy,  in  which  quite  common,  well-known  facts 
served  to  explain  a  new  religious  thought.  The  divine 
thoughts  are  presented  by  the  Lord  in  a  dress  that  corres- 
ponds with  the  country,  tlie  customs  and  usages,  the  dailj^ 
labors  and  vocations  of  his  people  ;  he  descends  into  the 
realm  of  thought  and  feelings  of  his  countrymen  in  order  to 
transform  them  from  within,  and  to  prepare  their  minds 
for  the  reception  of  his  words.  Tlie  land,  the  seed,  the. 
sower,  the  harvest,  lilies  and  weeds,  thorns  and  thistles, 
the  shepherd  and  the  flock,  the  vineyard  and  the  vine,  the 
fisher  and  the  net,  the  merchant,  he  who  seeks  costly  pearls, 
the  publican  —  all  these  men  and  things  of  common  life,  old 
and  familiar,  become  the  vessel  in  which  Jesus  offers  the 
new,  his  gospel  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  The  simplest, 
best  known  incidents  and  conditions  of  life  he  takes  up, 
for  the  purpose  of  teaching  by  them  the  spiritual  truths  of 
the  heavenly  kingdom,  as  if  to  entwine  them  in  one  another. 
Wholly  after  the  manner  his  own  sayings  :  —  "  Every  scribe 
which  is  instructed  unto  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  is  like  unto 
a  man  that  is  an  householder,  which  bringeth  forth  out  of  his 


ITS    APPLICATION   TO    PEDAGOGY.  189 

treasure  things  new  and  old"  (Matt.  13:  52).  "  Ye  have 
heard  that  it  was  said  by  them  of  old  time ;  but  I  say  unto 
you,"  —  so  he  leads  from  the  ethical  views  of  his  time  over  to 
purer,  higher  principles.  "  The  heavenly  kingdom  is  like," 
—  thus  the  words  fall,  time  and  again,  from  his  lips. 

•He  holds  before  the  people  a  mirror  of  life  where  each 
can  see  and  learn  to  judge  for  himself.  Like  an  artist,  he 
presents  forms  before  the  mental  eye,  all  of  which  have  a 
deep  significance  and  are  symbols  of  a  great  truth.  Here 
he  depicts  God  as  a  father  who  gives  a  commission  to  his 
son,  or  hastens  with  open  arms  to  the  one  lost  and  found 
again,  while  he  reproves  the  envy  of  the  self-righteous 
brother ;  or  he  is  a  father  who  gives  good  gifts  to  his  chil- 
dren ;  who  feeds  the  birds  of  heaven,  and  sympathizes  with 
his  rational  creatures.  Here,  God  is  a  King  who  is  about 
to  reckon  with  his  servants ;  thei'e,  a  rich  lord  who  prepares 
a  supper;  now,  a  householder,  who  confers  with  the  gar- 
dener concerning  an  unfruitful  tree  ;  then,  a  proprietor,  who 
employs  people  for  his  vineyard ;  or,  a  vintner,  who  fosters 
and  prunes  his  vines.  At  one  time  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven 
is  a  pearl,  a  treasure  in  the  field ;  then  a  marriage  feast,  a 
fish-net,  a  wheat-field.  Pardoning  love,  strict  justice,  the 
friendly  invitation  to  all,  the  righteousness  and  long  suffer- 
ing of  God,  the  high  worth  of  the  imperishable  treasure,  the 
necessity  of  bringing  to  God  a  pure  heart,  the  mingling  of 
the  noble  and  ignoble  in  this  world,  and  the  last  irrevocable 
separation  —  these  are  all  impressed  in  the  deepest  and 
most  lasting  manner.  This  is  instruction  by  observation. 
We  arc  told  that  Socrates  taught  in  like  manner.  Into  the 
midst  of  the  turmoil  of  the  market  and  the  streets,  into  the 
workshops  of  the  artisans  he  went,  teaching  and  questioning 
his  pupils  who  thirsted  for  knowledge  (for  which  reason 
his   contemporaries   reproached  him  with   speaking   always 


190  APPERCEPTION. 

ouly  of  smiths,  cobblers  and  tanners).  To  the  simplest  and 
most  concrete  things,  to  the  most  personal  events  experi- 
enced by  his  young  friend,  he  joined  the  weightiest  philo- 
sophical inquiries.  This  is  a  hint  as  to  the  way  in  which  we 
can  make  use  of  the  above  stated  principles.  We  can 
secure  to  the  child  a  rich  supply  of  living  apperception 
helps  if  we  not  only  refer  to  the  home  all  that  is  strange 
and  remote,  but  especially  make  the  unknown  plain  through 
the  known,  and  join  all  instruction  in  the  strictest  manner 
to  the  personal  experiences  of  the  pupil. 

This  holds  good  for  all  branches  of  instruction,  and  for 
even  the  driest  subject.  'How  far,  for  example,  Goethe's 
ballad  of  the  Erlking,  that  story  from  the  pagan  antiquity 
of  our  people,  seems  to  lie  from  the  comprehension  of  the 
child ;  and  yet,  apperceiving  ideas  for  this  poem  can  be 
easily  awakened.  We  have  only  to  converse  with  the  child 
about  the  popular  beliefs  in  river  and  water  spirits  to  make 
him  tell  of  the  old  stories,  so  current  with  children,  of  the 
water-maiden  who  bleaches  her  washing  on  the  banks  of  tlie 
stream,  where  the  merman  is  who  demands  his  yearly  offer- 
ing ;  or  of  the  Loreley,  ensnaring  the  boatman  l)y  her  song ; 
to  remind  him,  further,  of  certain  illusions  of  the  senses, 
which  he  himself  has  experienced,  when,  in  the  darkness  of 
night,  he  mistook  strips  of  clouds  for  ghosts,  and  forest 
trees  for  dreadful  monsters.  All  then  becomes  clear. 
However  unknown  and  strange  the  new  idiom,  say  the 
Latin,  appears  to  the  boy,  many  starting-points  even  for 
this  difficult  demand  can  be  found  in  his  personal  experience. 
He  already  possesses  the  Latin  for  numerous  known  names 
and  terms  without  previously  having  been  aware  of  it :  for 
example,  Augustus,  Sylvester,  Felix,  Clara,  Alma,  album, 
sexta,  quinta,  September,  plus,  minus,  doctor,  professor, 
director,    etc.,    which    series    may   be    greatly    extended. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  191 

These  foreign  names  being  carried  over  into  the  mother- 
tongue,  this  analytical  Latin  leads  in  the  best  way  into  the 
vocabulary  and  etymology  of  the  foreign  language.  If  then, 
later,  he  refers  other  English  words,  as  altar,  culture,  fever, 
regal,  rival,  to  their  original  Latin  form,  he  thus  conquers, 
as  it  were,  a  new  world  from  his  home  foundation,  and  the 
entrance  into  this  new  world  must  become  much  easier. 
"We  shall  not,  however,  as  Ziller  wished  to  do,  work  out  this 
analytical  language  material  independently  in  advance. 
Would  not  that  be  to  fall  into  the  mistake  of  the  current 
home-science  teaching,  which  in  advance  stores  up  for 
instruction  the  analytical  material  of  experience,  and  thus 
"  serves  the  spice  by  itself  instead  of  with  the  food"  ?  It 
seems  much  better  to  approach  first  the  known  forms  of  a 
foreign  language,  as  starting  and  connecting  points  for 
similar  forms.  Geographical  and  historical  instruction,  as 
already  mentioned,  will,  for  explanation  and  interpretation, 
likewise  make  use  of  those  ideas  and  concepts  which  were 
acquired  in  the  home.  By  this  means  the  child  ascends  in 
imagination  to  the  highest  Alpine  summit,  as  he  multiplies 
the  size  of  his  home  mountains,  placing  one  on  top  of  the 
other.  The  ponds  known  to  him  he  extends  to  great  lakes 
and  seas,  and,  with  the  concepts  of  his  native  winter  land- 
scape, he  journeys  into  the  icy  region  of  the  North  Pole. 
With  the  church  tower  of  his  own  place  he  measures  the 
pyramids  of  distant  Egypt  and  the  lofty  cathedrals  of 
Christendom.  About  three  times  as  high  as  the  tower  of 
our  principal  church  are  the  great  Pyramids;  somewhat 
higher  still  is  the  Strasburg  Cathedral,  St.  Peter's  Church  at 
Rome,  and  the  cathedral  of  Cologne.  Or,  suppose  the 
children  are  to  learn  in  history  of  the  battle  in  the  narrow 
pass  of  Thermopylae.  Then  let  us  lead  our  little  ones  in 
mind  to  a  certain  place  in  the  Elster  Valley,  well  known  to 


192  APPERCEPTION. 

them  from  their  school  excursions,  where  the  way  is  suddenly 
closed  up,  being  contracted  on  one  side  by  high,  steep  walls 
of  rock,  on  the  other  by  the  water,  which  seems  to  spread 
out  before  us  to  the  horizon.  And  now  we  say  to  them : 
Thus  must  you  form  an  idea  of  the  pass  of  the  warm  springs ; 
there  behind  a  wall  stood  the  hero  band  of  Spartans,  here 
in  the  wide  plain  lay  the  barbarian  army,  and  from  the 
mountain  the  traitor  descended  with  the  enemy  into  the 
valley.  And  as  we  depict  the  battle  of  annihilation,  and 
those  roaring  sounds  echoed  by  the  walls  of  rock ;  as  we 
relate  the  immortal  deeds  of  the  Lacedaemonians  perhaps 
our  pupils  may  be  pleased  meanwhile  to  linger  here  with 
their  thoughts  and  to  transfer  to  this  place  the  din  of 
battle ;  we  will  not  disturb  them  in  this  if  they  only  follow 
our  words  understandingly.  Or  when  the  child  in  sacred 
history,  stimulated  through  the  practical  hint  of  the  teacher 
with  reference  to  his  own  home  circle  of  observation,  paints 
the  biblical  paradise  in  thought  with  the  fresh  colors  of  his 
own  garden  or  of  one  otherwise  well  known  to  him ;  when 
he  transfers  the  Jordan  with  its  holy  place  into  his  known 
river  valley ;  when  he  conveys  the  Bethlehem  shepherds  on 
Christmas  night  to  the  domestic  plains,  and,  involuntarily, 
during  the  narration  of  the  teacher,  glances  up  to  the  neigh- 
boring hill  as  the  mountain  of  the  giving  of  the  law,  —  we 
shall  find  nothing  objectionable  in  such  naive,  subjective 
comprehension,  but  will  rather  rejoice  in  it.  For  the  child 
brings  then  to  the  new  ideas  offered  by  instruction  such 
strong,  living,  helping  notions  as  cannot  be  awakened  more 
strongly  and  permanently  even  by  the  most  perfect  repre- 
sentation of  the  biblical  places ;  he  apperceives  in  reality 
what  to  another  remains  perhaps  only  empty  words  or 
shadowy  ideas.  But  the  other  experiences  of  the  child  also 
present  numerous   apperception   helps.     Suppose,  for  ex- 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  193 

ample,  the  distance  of  the  sun  from  the  earth  is  to  be  made 
plain  to  him.  The  teacher  in  the  spirit  of  our  method  asks, 
"  If  now,  up  there  in  the  sun  one  should  shoot  a  cannon 
ball  straight  at  you,  what  would  you  do?  "  "  Jump  aside," 
will  be  the  answer.  "  But  that  is  entirely  unnecessary :  you 
can  lie  peacefully  asleep  in  your  room,  and  get  up  again, 
you  can  be  confirmed,  learn  a  business,  and  become  as  old 
as  I  am  —  then  here  comes  the  cannon  ball.  Now  spring 
aside !  Behold,  so  great  is  the  distance  from  the  sun  to 
us."  How  easy  for  the  exotics  among  our  flowers  and  trees 
to  transport  us  into  remote  lands,  which  are  their  home ! 
A  tree-shaped  aloe  trained  in  the  windows  of  many  a  farmer's 
room,  or  a  pelargonium,  serves  beautifully  as  a  starting 
point  for  soaring  over  the  Mediterranean  Sea  into  the  sand 
wastes  of  Africa  and  the  desert  plateaus  of  the  cape.  The 
principal  divisions  of  the  earth  have  among  us  agents  and 
consuls  in  every  village  common  and  in  every  garden. 
South  America  sent  fuchsias,  maize,  and,  above  all,  pota- 
toes ;  Mexico,  the  dahlia  and  various  cacti.  And  if  the 
child  comes  to  know,  further,  that  in  Persia  the  walnut,  the 
peach,  the  horse-chestnut  is  at  home ;  that  the  cherry  and 
the  hyacinth  grow  wild  in  Asia  Minor ;  the  white  lily  in  the 
Promised  Land ;  that  the  grape-vine  comes  from  the  Cau- 
casus ;  the  cucumber  and  kidney-bean  from  the  hot  East 
Indies ;  then  these  foreign  lands  remain  to  him  no  longer 
mere  empty  names  or  geographical  terms,  but  he  wins  from 
them  living,  fresh-colored  pictures. 

When  we  at  last  pass  over  to  the  province  of  ethical  and 
religious  ideas,  the  assertion  is  not  surprising  that  right  here 
the  demand  upon  the  educator  is  especially  difficult.  Join 
all  instruction  as  much  as  possible  to  the  experience  of  the 
pupil.  What  the  child  brings  to  school  with  him  of  real 
knowledge  of   nature  and  of   linguistic   readiness,    can   be 


194  APPERCEPTION. 

gradually  discovered  ;  but  how  will  the  teacher  obtain  definite 
knowledge  of  the  experiences  relating  to  manners  and  cus- 
toms, the  moral  and  religious  feelings  of  the  pupil?  The 
heart  of  the  child  is  in  this  respect  almost  inscrutable.  And 
yet,  as  in  every  other  province,  so  also  in  this,  an  under- 
standing canuot  be  attained  without  help  of  apperceiving 
ideas.  Many  a  biography  of  noted  men  attests  that  the 
words  of  the  teacher,  in  the  hour  for  religious  instruction, 
often  went  over  the  heads  of  the  children,  since  they  found 
in  themselves  no  echo  to  the  learned,  abstract  form ;  but 
that  the  inattentive  class  at  once  gave  attention  and  were  all 
eyes  and  ears  if  an  anecdote,  a  story,  an  example  from 
every-day  life  and  childish  experience,  interrupted  like  an 
oasis  the  desert  of  abstract  instruction.  The  domestic  ex- 
periences of  the  child,  his  intercourse  with  parents,  brothers 
and  sisters,  and  playmates,  his  spiritual  relation  to  God, — 
these  are  the  ideas  from  which  the  teacher  must  principally 
derive  the  starting  points,  or  aids  to  apperception.  There 
occurs,  for  example,  in  a  Bible  story  the  word  "  gentle,"  and 
he  finds  that  all  do  not  yet  connect  with  this  word  a  clear 
idea.  Shall  he  now  give  a  comprehensive  definition  ?  No ; 
only  from  his  own  experience  will  it  become  clear  to  the 
pupil  what  '' gentle"  is,  as  must  all  else  which  is  to  be  in 
reality  his  own  spiritual  possession.  The  teacher  reminds 
the  pupil  of  a  night  when  he  suffered  with  a  bad  toothache 
and  his  mother  took  him  at  last  on  her  lap,  and,  rocking 
and  caressing  him,  comforted  him  thus:  '*  Now  it  will  be 
better.  In  the  morning  it  will  be  all  over."  This  is  a 
moment  when  the  child  forgets  the  school,  but  he  never  for- 
gets the  moment.  Or,  if  the  teacher  endeavors  to  awaken 
the  idea  of  sympathy,  he  will  accomplish  this  in  the  surest 
manner  when  he  reminds  the  pupils  of  experiences  of  their 
own  and  brings  before  their  minds  vividly  those  occasions 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  195 

in  which  they  rejoiced  with  the  happy  and  wept  with  the 
weeping.  The  more  richly  the  domestic  instruction  is  imbued 
with  such  ethical  experiences ;  the  more  carefully  the  rise  of 
religious  feelings  and  the  observation  of  manners  is  promoted ; 
the  more  deeply  the  event  has  stirred  the  soul,  the  better  is 
the  understanding  that  the  child  brings  to  the  so-called 
moral  instruction.  —  Indeed  not  all  children  enjoy  so  excel- 
lent an  education,  and  only  too  often  the  experiences  are 
lacking  on  which  this  instruction  must  base  its  developing 
activity.  What  must  be  done  then?  In  this  case  it  would 
be  the  worst  and  most  preposterous  thing  for  the  teacher  to 
attempt  to  supply  the  lacking  ideas  and  feelings  through 
edifying  lectures,  well  meant  admonitions  and  urgent  advice. 
For  virtue  and  religion  must  first  be  lived  before  they  can 
be  taught  and  learned.  Moral,  religious,  and  aesthetic  ideas 
cannot  be  communicated  through  language  and  made  iotelli- 
gible,  unless  their  personal  content,  the  moral  and  aesthetic 
feelings,  arise  in  the  child  himself.  As  little  as  one  can 
make  clear  to  a  blind  person  by  means  of  words,  what  a 
perception  of  a  thing  by  light  and  color  really  implies,  just 
so  little  can  one  show  or  explain  to  one  who  is  absolutely 
without  the  toner  stirring  of  the  moral  feelings  what  such  a 
feeling  is.  The  power  of  instruction  to  awaken  moral  and 
religious  feelings,  through  the  calling  forth  of  ideal  forms, 
to  develop  aud  strengthen  the  ethical  judgment,  rests 
chiefly  on  this  fact.  But  even  here,  instruction  cannot  do 
everything.  Who,  for  example,  has  never  had  the  feeling 
of  repentance,  which  the  cleverest  kind  of  instruction 
scarcely  produces,  and  a  desire  to  recover  what  has  been 
lost?  Who  has  not  in  the  midst  of  a  devout  congregation 
felt  the  nearness  of  the  omnipotent  God,  or  been  driven  by 
some  severe  experience  to  the  avowal,  '^  Here  God's  linger 
is   visible  !  "  —  when   religious   instruction    would    scarcely 


196  APPERCEPTION. 

have  been  able  to  provide  the  lacking  feelings  in  proper 
strength  and  depth  ?  The  moral  feelings  then  must  chiefly 
be  lived,  that  is,  must  be  evolved  out  of  the  practical  rela- 
tions of  the  child  to  life,  before  instruction  can  be  referred 
to  them,  or  the  child  '*  learn  virtue."  Where  these  are 
wanting,  not  instruction,  but  the  surroundings  must  first 
operate  on  the  mind  of  the  pupil.  The  example  of  the 
teacher  and  of  fellow-pupils,  the  intercourse  with  them 
during  instruction  and  after  it,  the  entire  school-life,  should 
show  him  in  living  reality  those  religious  feelings  and  moral 
ideas  which  were  to  him  hitherto  unknown ;  the  intercourse 
with  fellow-pupils  in  study  and  play,  the  praise  and  punish- 
ment of  the  teacher,  the  daily  school  work  and  certain  cere- 
monious arrangements  and  holidays  place  him  in  positions 
which  easily  become  sources  of  moral  convictions  and  religious 
feelings.  Finally,  however,  the  rigid  order  of  the  school 
and  home,  with  their  duties  and  unalterable  customs  and 
usages,  foster  and  develop  those  moral  and  religious  germs 
in  the  ways  of  conformity  to  custom.  This  is  what  Pesta- 
lozzi  meant  when  he  declared,  '^  Virtue  and  faith  must  first  be, 
and  long  continue  to  be  a  thing  of  the  heart  before  they 
can  become  a  thing  of  the  reason."  The  animated  feeling 
of  every  virtue  must  constantly  precede  the  speaking  of  this 
virtue.  This  is  the  only  way  in  which  the  experiences 
necessary  to  the  province  of  ethical  and  religious  interest 
can  be  obtained  by  the  child  and  apperceiving  ideas  be 
provided. 

We  think,  finally,  of  still  another  province  of  public 
school  instruction  in  which  it  is  especially  difficult  always  to 
provide  the  requisite  aids  to  apperception ;  namely,  the 
particular  branches  of  form  instruction.  Experience  teaches 
that  the  pupil  brings  originally  to  the  material  of  instruction 
in  those  branches  only  an  indirect  interest;  and  forms  in- 


ITS    APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  197 

terest  him  only  on  account  of  the  things  to  which  they  belong ; 
his  lines  of  thought  in  mathematics  and  language  have  grown 
together  in  the  strictest  manner  with  the  real  objects  from 
which  they  arise.  For  the  former  owes  very  much  to  the 
latter ;  intercourse  with  things  not  only  secures  to  the  ideas 
lasting  clearness  and  distinctness,  since  it  repeats  them 
many  times,  but  it  leads  also  in  the  easiest  manner  to  their 
understanding.  It  teaches,  in  the  simplest  way,  their  appli- 
cation. Every  one  possesses  the  greatest  readiness  of  speech 
in  that  subject  with  whose  contents  he  is  most  familiar. 
For  the  things  which  I  know  from  the  foundation  up,  over 
which  I  have  sufficiently  grouped  my  thoughts,  the  necessary 
forms  of  speech  also  stand  at  my  disposal.  Therefore  tlie 
old  rule  :  Hold  fast  the  thing,  the  words  will  follow  of  them- 
selves. Why  can  excellent  and  favorable  books  much  more 
surely  initiate  into  the  secrets  of  a  good  style  than  a  hun- 
dred well  established  paragraphs  from  a  book  on  style? 
Because  the  content  and  form  of  speech  stand  in  the  closest 
relation  to  each  other,  and  the  former  cannot  be  given  with- 
out the  latter.  In  the  same  manner  the  subject  of  space  is 
related  to  that  of  number.  Here,  also,  is  the  strength  and 
activity  of  the  form  ideas  of  the  child,  the  ease  with  which 
they  enter  combinations  essentially  dependent  upon  the  con- 
crete observations  which  the  child  owes  to  the  intercourse  with 
things.  If,  then,  it  holds  good  that  the  child,  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  things,  possesses  valuable  apperception  ideas  for 
the  material  of  form-instruction,  the  road  is  set  forth  in  which 
he  can  in  the  best  manner  acquire  his  established  ideas 
through  the  concrete :  instruction  in  foi'm,  at  least  in  the 
public  school,  should  not  stand  isolated,  but  should  be  joined 
to  instruction  in  things.  In  accordance  with  this  principle, 
we  do  not  proceed,  in  the  instruction  in  the  mother-tongue, 
from  language  exercises  which  would  be  read  sliglitly,  and 


198  APPERCEPTION. 

therefore  remain  misunderstood,  or  from  heterogeneous  ex- 
ercises, standing  in  no  real  councction  with  the  examples  and 
sentences,  which  can  awaken  no  interest,  but  from  a  material 
that  has  already  value  and  importance  for  the  pupil,  from  a 
content  that  has  been  brought  already  to  his  understanding. 
This  is  the  ground  and  foundation  by  which  the  boy,  through 
comparison  and  the  placing  together  of  related  forms,  gradu- 
ally and  by  his  own  activity  derives  from  many  individual 
language  forms  the  grammatical  principles  by  which,  in  the 
course  of  time,  he  works  out  for  himself  his  grammar. 
While  we  give  him  further  occasion  to  set  forth  regularly, 
in  a  simple  and  clear  manner,  oral  and  written,  something 
that  he  has  learned  in  the  line  of  other  instruction,  we  form 
his  style  in  a  far  surer  manner  than  when  we,  as  too  often 
happens,  cause  him,  through  selected  exercises  standing  in 
no  relation  to  the  rest  of  instruction,  to  write  about  things 
for  which  he  has  no  heart  or  no  thought. 

We  proceed  in  arithmetic  constantly,  not  only  from  denom- 
inate numbers,  that  is,  from  number  ideas  which  are  joined 
with  ideas  of  things,  because  they  are  more  intelligible  and 
tangible  than  pure  numbers,  but  even  in  this  branch  of  instruc- 
tion we  remain  in  the  closest  relation  with  things  as  they  are 
presented  by  the  rest  of  instruction  and  by  life.  Meanwhile 
we  work  out  these  concrete  "notions  carefully  with  regard  to 
the  required  number  ideas,  drill  the  pupil  in  readiness  of 
calculation,  and  bring  him  back  constantly  upon  them,  pro- 
vided any  obscurity  and  uncertainty  shows  itaelf.  Finally, 
in  regard  to  form  teacliing,  concrete  things  here  also  form 
the  starting-point  of  instruction.  The  child  learns  to  recog- 
nize the  simplest  typical  forms  of  bodies  in  the  prominent  ob- 
jects  of  his  environment ;  for  example,  in  monuments,  build- 
ings, columns,  etc.  Before  there  is  language  of  figures  in 
the  abstract,  these  forms  must  be  comprehended  from  things. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  199 

Not  before  numerous  triangles  have  been  pointed  out, 
measured,  valued,  and  compared,  should  any  general  propo- 
sition of  the  triangle  be  given.  Instruction  must  refer 
regularly  to  things,  if  the  acquired  geometrical  principles  are 
to  find  their  application  in  practical  life.  For  example,  the 
pupil  is  drilled  often  iu  measuring  and  estimating  the  surface 
contents  of  court  and  garden  in  the  calculation  of  the  solid 
contents  of  the  objects  of  his  surroundings.  In  this  manner 
a  stream  of  apperceiving  ideas  will  be  conducted  over  from 
the  province  of  things  to  that  of  form,  and  will  constantly 
fill  the  abstract  ideas  of  form  with  living  content,  making 
them  grow  together  in  the  most  intimate  way  with  other 
lines  of  thought,  protecting  them  from  a  shadowy  past  life 
and  from  an  early  oblivion  after  the  school  life  is  over. 

We  are  at  the  end  of  our  answer  to  the  question,  what  can  the 
teacher  do  for  the  subject  of  apperception?  How  can  he  pro- 
vide for  his  instruction  sufficient  apperceiving  ideas  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  pupil  ?  We  found  that  it  was  his  duty  to  gain 
a  definite  view  into  the  pupil's  range  of  thought,  especially 
in  the  extremely  important  experience  that  they  have 
acquired  previous  to  all  instruction,  to  brighten  and  deepen 
this  and  to  enlarge  it  through  suitable  home  instruction. 
"We  emphasized  further  that  he  must,  in  the  most  careful 
manner,  join  all  his  instruction  to  the  acquired  experience  of 
the  pupils  iu  many  ways,  especially  through  advancing  in- 
struction. 

It  remains  yet  to  direct  our  attention  to  the  connection  of 
the  subject  and  the  object  of  apperception.  Indeed,  as  this 
lies  in  the  nature  of  the  subject  under  consideration,  we 
have  already  touched  this  province  many  times  in  the  course 
of  the  inquiry ;  bift  we  could  only  in  a  very  general  manner 
mention  the  ways  and  means  which  bring  about  the  con- 
nection.    Now,  however,  it  is  our  purpose  to  indicate  the 


200  APPERCEPTION. 

special,  systematic  arrangements  through  which,  in  every 
particular  case,  a  sure  and  intimate  blending  of  the  two 
factors  is  brought  about,  and  to  establish  through  the  par- 
ticular divisions  into  which  the  subject-matter  of  a  branch 
must  be  analyzed,  the  steps  of  instruction  that  are  neces- 
sary, provided  a  thorough  and  complete  union  of  these  factors 
is  to  come  to  pass. 

3.  'The  Proper  Union  of  the  Factors  of  Apperception 
IN  Learning. 
( TJie  Process  of  Teaching.) 
It  has  been  already  emphasized  that  the  process  of  apper- 
ception does  not  by  any  means  properly  develop  itself  in  the 
child;  experience  teaches  rather  that  even  under  the  most 
favorable  circumstances  when  the  child  is  offered  the  material 
of  instruction  for  which  it  already  possesses  numerous  ap- 
perceiving  ideas,  the  connection  of  the  old  with  the  new  not 
infrequently  fails  to  be  made.  This  is  the  case,  if  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  pupil  during  instruction  is  either  filled  with 
foreign  thoughts  and  feelings  which  do  not  permit  the  apper- 
ception helps  to  arise ;  or  if  the  latter  lack  the  requisite 
strength  and  clearness,  the  necessary  order  and  completeness, 
and  therefore  power,  to  grasp  apperceivingly  the  ideas 
called  forth  by  instruction.  Hence  it  does  not  suffice  that 
the  leanier  possesses  apperception  aids  for  the  new;  they 
must  also  be  at  his  disposal  with  the  greatest  clearness  at 
the  right  time  and  place.  They  must,  likewise,  in  the 
moment  of  learning,  stand  at  the  threshold  of  consciousness 
to  present  to  the  new  elements  all  that  are  related,  and  so  to 
grasp  the  new  knowledge  as  to  prepare  for  it  the  right  mood 
and  the  correct  understanding.  "We  conclude,  however,  that 
the  presentation  of  the  new  should  not  be  the  first  thing  in 
instruction,  that  as  a  rule  a  stage  of  preparation  must  precede. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  201 

Fine  tact  forbids  one  to  present,  pell-mell,  weighty  and  unex- 
pected communications.  The  orator  regards  it  as  necessary, 
even  with  an  adult  audience,  to  preface  his  lecture  with  an 
introduction  recalling  known  facts.  Further,  before  reading  a 
new  book  or  scientific  article,  one  calls  forth  his  own  experi- 
ences and  thoughts  concerning  the  matter,  asking  himself  what 
the  author  indeed  has  to  say,  as  the  best  means  for  an  indepen- 
dent, intelligent  connection  of  the  new  ideas.  Every  one 
knows  that  a  merely  mechanical  memoriter  connection  of 
what  is  read  can  best  be  prevented  by  providing  such  a  col- 
lection of  his  own  ideas,  even  if  they  should  be  partly  or 
entirely  erroneous.  Moreover,  to  important  expected  events 
that  affect  our  individuality  in  an  especial  manner,  the  cir- 
cumspect man  opposes  conceptions  refei'ring  to  the  nature 
and  consequences  of  such  events  so  that  they  do  not  surprise 
him  to  his  hurt.  What  is  thus  to  the  adult  a  condition  for 
the  independent  reception  of  new  knowledge  and  important 
experiences,  is  to  the  pupil  a  necessity.  In  a  still  higher 
degree  than  the  man,  the  child  requires  time  to  collect  and 
expand  his  apperceiving  ideas.  "Preparation  is  every- 
thing," holds  good  nowhere  more  than  with  him.  In  this 
preparation,  however,  the  problem  has  to  do  with  searching 
out,  in  the  pupil's  own  range  of  experience,  the  old  and 
known  which  is  included  in  the  new  material  of  instruction 
and  so  working  it  over  that  it  can  enter  into  an  inner  con- 
nection with  what  is  similar  in  the  subject.  It  will  be  neces- 
nary  to  obviate  in  advance  certain  checkings  of  a  quick  flow 
of  thought,  to  utilize  all  the  ideas  of  the  pupil  which  stand 
in  relation  to  the  new,  and  to  explain  and  throw  light  upon 
them  in  order  to  bring  about  their  reproduction  and  to  raise 
them  to  a  higher  degree  of  clearness.  For  this  purpose  we 
must  not  content  ourselves,  indeed,  with  recalling  particular 
facts  that  the  child  knows,  with  pointing   towards    this  or 


202  APPERCEPTION. 

that  which  the  instruction  has  already  treated,  without  going 
deeper  into  the  store  of  the  learner's  ideas.  Just  as  little 
must  we  seek  this  preparation  in  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
preceding  lessons,  however  necessary  for  our  purpose  such 
a  repetition  prove  itself  to  be.  We  must  rather  de- 
vote to  the  apperceiving  ideas  a  thorough  consideration, 
a  thorough  examination  which  spares  neither  trouble  nor 
time.  We  will  not  only  allow  the  pupil  to  reproduce 
even  the  familiar  domestic  events  of  his  life,  whicli  the 
school  often  thinks  it  must  above  all  ignore,  but  we  must 
more  regularly  cause  him  to  express  himself  in  a  free,  unre- 
strained manner  about  the  subjects  of  his  experience,  not 
avoiding  even  the  most  peculiar  related  events,  in  order  that 
a  complete  absorption  in  familiar  ideas,  those  strongest  aids 
to  apperception,  shall  precede  the  presentation  of  the  related 
new  ideas.  The  pupil  must  first  become  at  home  again  in 
definite  old  groups  of  thought ;  he  must  pass  through  these 
old  groups  with  a  certain  warmth  and  ease,  before  we  offer 
him  the  new ;  he  must  feel  firm  ground  under  his  feet  for 
the  new  mental  operations  that  instruction  exacts  from 
him.  If  the  preparatory  convereation  makes  it  apparent 
that  the  existing  apperceiving  ideas  are  too  weak  and  un- 
satisfactory, it  becomes  necessary  for  the  preparation  to 
provide  what  is  lacking.  Often  enough,  therefore,  we 
must  first  of  all  search  out  and  traverse  the  old  ways  in 
which  the  ideas  arose,  in  order  that  the  experiences  and  ob- 
servations may  be  repeated,  and  the  ideas  improved  or 
strengthened.  New  ways  also  must  often  be  open  to  ex- 
perience and  observation.  School  excursions,  therefore,  at 
this  stage  are  suitable  to  those  efforts,  by  which  false,  weak 
or  incomplete  aids  to  apperception  receive  their  correction, 
clearness  and  completeness.  From  indefinite  speaking,  from 
a  vague  roaming  around  in  the  field  of  the  child's  experi- 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  203 

ences,  we  are  prevented  and  protected  in  advance  by  the 
definite  aim  which,  during  the  preparation,  both  teacher  and 
pupil  always  have  in  view.  For  from  the  beginning  the 
pupil  also  must  know  the  problem  which  the  recitation  hour 
has  next  to  solve ;  he  must  know  why  we  call  back  this  or 
that  known  fact  into  his  consciousness.  Only  when  he 
knows  the  purpose  of  the  exercise,  do  apperceiving  ideas 
flow  in  rich  fulness,  and  especially  do  those  deepest  ideas 
arise  which  the  teacher  would  otherwise  never  understand 
how  to  value  or  to  call  forth ;  only  then  do  the  facts  brought 
by  the  discussion  receive  for  the  pupil  that  inner  dependence 
and  elasticity  which  is  indispensable  to  the  reception  of  the 
new ;  only  then  can  that  expectation  be  excited  in  him 
which  hastens  on  in  advance  into  the  province  of  the  new 
material  of  instruction  and  prepares  for  it  a  quick  and  certain 
adoption ;  only  then  can  he  attempt,  in  the  stage  of  prepara- 
tion, by  his  own  reflection,  to  seize  in  whole  or  part  the  object 
of  instruction.  The  apperceiving  ideas  acquired  in  this  and 
similar  ways  will  frequently  be  collected  and  arranged.  If 
we  should  pass  over  the  material  but  once,  and  in  the  order 
in  which  it  would  occur  by  chance,  many  contradictions 
would  remain  unreconciled,  and  many  principal  thoughts  not 
seldom  be  lost  in  a  mass  of  incidentals.  A  brief  summing 
up,  suitable  to  the  content  of  the  ideas,  and  a  separation  of  the 
essential  from  the  unessential,  is  therefore  absolutely  neces- 
sary ;  and  not  less  so,  a  sufficient  repetition  and  impressing 
of  that  which,  as  yet,  shows  itself  uncertain  and  wavering. 
When  this  is  neglected,  we  stop  half  way,  and  apperception, 
in  spite  of  the  preparation,  cannot  be  accomplished  with  the 
requisite  ease. 

The  demand  is  also  natural  and  justifiable  that  the  ground 
for  the  new  lesson  be  prepared  in  advance;  yet  opposed  to 
this   general   truth    there   are    manifold   considerations  and 


204  APPERCEPTION. 

objections.  In  the  first  place,  a  teacher  may  think  he  can 
cause  the  new  to  be  assimilatetl  even  without  a  special  pre- 
paratory step,  and  so  in  the  presentation  of  the  new  matter 
reproduce  the  experiences  of  the  pupil  piecemeal,  and  intro- 
duce, or  possibly  seek  to  create,  the  requisite  apperception 
aids  by  a  subsequent  explanation  of  what  is  offered.  It  may 
be  also  that  the  treatment  of  the  series  of  ideas  called  up 
for  apperception  will  proceed  too  rapidly  and  too  super- 
ficially, without  attaining  the  intended  effect,  or,  if  continued, 
will  delay  or  check  the  pupil's  movement  of  thought  already 
directed  toward  the  comprehension  of  the  new,  a  state  of 
things  which  little  favors  apperception.  An  historical  lec- 
ture, which  ventured  to  take  nothing  for  granted  and 
laboriously  made  all  the  explanations  necessary  for  complete 
understanding,  would  be  most  unprofitable,  and  would  leave 
behind  about  the  same  painful  and  tedious  impression  on 
the  pupil  that  a  poem  furnished  with  innumerable  marginal 
notes,  or  a  text  grown  over  with  learned  remarks,  makes  on 
adult  readers.  For  as  often  as  the  lecturer  interrupts  the 
course  of  the  narrative,  to  procure  the  necessary  apper- 
ception aids,  so  often  also  will  the  strained  expectation  of 
the  listener  be  diverted,  and  the  main  subject  pressing 
rapidly  forward  will  arrest  the  spiritual  assimilation,  and  u 
lasting  impression  of  violent  delay  in  his  current  of  ideas 
will  overcome  the  pupil.  It  would  be  well,  then,  if  the 
apperceiving  ideas  were  provided  by  means  of  a  thorough 
preparation  that  would  complete  and  deepen  the  understand- 
ing of  what  is  presented.  Moreover,  if  the  child  has  a 
previous  comprehension,  incomplete  though  it  may  be,  he 
will  have  a  basis  in  apperceiving  ideas  such  that  a  gradual 
assimilation  of  the  subject  can  take  place.  Where,  on  the 
other  hand,  such  apperception  aids  are  wanting,  the  new 
quickly  sinks   below  the   threshold   of  consciousness  or  is 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  205 

wrongly  perceived.  And  then  it  is  only  with  great  difficulty 
that  an  explanation  can  restore  the  ideas  for  assimilation,  or 
entirely  annul  the  disadvantages  acci'uing  from  a  false, 
incomplete  comprehension ;  it  will  always  remain  a  difficult 
and  thankless  task  to  make  good  again  that  which  an 
insufficient  apperception  has  spoiled,  and  to  eradicate  mis- 
takes already  fixed.  Some  have  disputed  the  possibility  of 
being  able  to  place  a  limit  in  advance  to  each  lesson,  fearing 
that  the  logical  carrying  out  of  our  demand  will  lead  to 
artificial  divisions,  wholly  indifferent  to  the  child.  Besides, 
they  say,  the  general  truth,  the  final  theme,  which  seeks,  for 
example,  to  develop  a  catechism  or  book  of  proverbs,  could 
not  possibly  be  annouuced  to  the  child  in  advance.  Cer- 
tainly, the  proper  determination  of  the  aim  is  not  easily 
made  in  all  subjects,  as,  for  example,  in  natural  science  and 
in  form  instruction,  where  interesting  practical  questions  in 
the  life  of  nature  and  men,  form  the  natural  starting  and 
terminal  points  of  instruction.  And  it  may  be  admitted  that 
many  of  the  tests  hitherto  published  referring  to  the  aim,  for 
example,  in  biblical  stories  have  not  been  correct.  This 
merely  signifies,  however,  that  in  the  selection  of  the  aim  of 
the  lesson,  special  care  must  be  taken  to  avoid  certain  mis- 
takes and  misapprehensions.  With  this  precaution,  the 
announcement  of  a  purpose  in  the  whole  plan  has  constantly 
proved  itself  not  only  possible,  but  also  useful  and  neces- 
sary. We  have  always  found  that  for  every  lesson-whole, 
a  question  or  exercise  or  fact  of  experience  could  be  produced, 
which  announces  the  new  in  such  a  way  that  it  no  longer 
touches  the  pupil's  ear  as  completely  strange,  but  calls  suffi- 
cient apperception  helps  into  consciousness.  But  this  an- 
nouncement must  never  be  permitted  to  take  the  form  of  a 
general  idea  or  a  general  opinion ;  for  it  is  clear  that  the 
abstract  cannot  be  given,  that  it  is  rather  to  be  gradually 


206  APPERCEPTION. 

developed  from  a  group  of  similar  ideas.  Were  we  to  give  the 
pupil  a  principle  in  advance,  as  the  recognized  end  to  be 
attained,  then  almost  all  connecting  ])oints  for  this,  and  con- 
sequently for  every  basis  of  apperceiving  activity,  would  be 
lacking.  Therefore  it  has  always  been  regarded  as  obvious, 
that  only  a  concrete  object  is  to  be  presented  to  the  pupil,  an 
object  lying  near  to  his  previous  experience  and  exciting  lively 
expectation,  an  object  or  aim  existing,  actually  in  the 
absorption  of  new  and  interesting  ideas.  But  where  can 
such  interesting  ideas  be  found?  Must  not  much  be  ac- 
quired for  which  in  itself  the  child,  at  the  time,  feels  no 
interest?  Certainly,  but  if  the  child  is  indifferent  concern- 
ing certain  subjects  of  instruction,  because  he  thinks  he 
knows  these  well  enough  already,  or  because  he  unden'alucs 
their  importance  in  human  knowledge  and  business,  an 
interest  can  be  awakened,  and  he  can,  through  the  method 
of  Socrates,  by  suitable  questions  be  made  aware  that  he 
really  knows  very  little  of  the  things  referred  to,  that  the 
cause  of  certain  phenomena  remains  concealed  ;  also  that  he 
has,  without  reason,  held  certain  things  as  self-evident  and 
uninteresting.  For  the  child,  facts  must  be  converted  into 
problems.  That  which  in  and  of  itself  excites  no  interest 
must  be  used  as  a  means  of  serving  an  interesting  puriK)se. 
If  the  child,  for  example,  is  not  especially  interested  in  tlic 
consideration  of  dry  forms  of  speech,  who  can  blame  him? 
And  yet  interest  in  such  forms  can  immediately  be  acquired 
if  we  put  them  into  connection  with  practical  needs.  This 
is  shown  in  reading,  and  in  the  oral  and  written  expression 
of  thought.  The  child  will  use  grammatical  forms  with 
eagerness,  not  for  their  own  sake,  bnt  for  the  sake  of  being 
able  to  read  well  and  with  understanding,  and  for  the  sake 
of  being  able  to  express  his  ideas  properly  and  exactly. 
By  such  methods,  in  subjects  apparently  the  driest,  an  inter- 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  207 

est  can  be  secured  that  will  lend  to  the  apperceiving  ideas 
the  proper  strength  and  vividness.  Some  have  pointed  out 
that  in  the  work  of  preparation  there  is  a  temptation  to  dwell 
too  long  upon  various  incidental  things,  and  that  the  teacher 
of  little  skill  enters  into  these  at  length,  coming  tardily  to 
the  real  matter  in  hand.  The  inference  has  been  drawn 
from  this  that  with  beginners  and  unskilled  teachers  it  is 
better  to  omit  the  preparation  altogether.  In  fact,  a  prepar- 
ation which  is  merely  mechanical  or  which  introduces  too 
many  details,  conceals  those  defects  and  with  them  the 
danger  of  putting  fatal  weariness  in  place  of  childlike  inter- 
est. It  escapes  this  danger,  however,  when  the  aim  is  so 
clearly,  personally  and  concretely  seized  that  a  rambling 
into  the  indefinite  is  impossible;  when  we  call  up  to  the 
mind  of  the  pupil  only  so  much  of  the  known  as  the  under- 
standing of  the  new  absolutely  demands ;  when  we  do  not 
rely  on  the  accidental,  but  above  all  seek  to  place  the  pupil 
in  the  right  situation  and  disposition.  Limitation  here  also 
marks  the  master.  But  is  the  beginner,  because  he  is  not 
yet  a  master,  never  to  try  his  skill  in  self-limitation,  even  if 
exposed  here  and  there  to  the  danger  of  making  mistakes  ? 

Have  not  different  pupils  different  ranges  of  thought,  so 
that  one  reproduces  apperceptive  notions  where  another  ob- 
tains none?  And  is  not  attention  different  in  spite  of  the 
good  intent  of  the  pupil  ?  Can  it  therefore  be  asserted  with  cer- 
tainty that  the  new  material  of  instruction  has  been  sufficiently 
prepared?  And  if  not,  what  advantage  has  the  new  method 
over  old  ones?  We  may  reply  that  the  discerning,  con- 
scientious teacher,  to  whom  every  soul  intrusted  to  him 
is  a  care,  by  means  of  solicitous  observation  of  the  individual 
pupils,  during  instruction  and  during  recreation,  by  means 
of  familiar  intercourse  with  them  on  the  play-ground  or  on 
excursions,  by  means  of  heartiest  sympathy  in  the  events  of 


208  APPERCEPTION. 

peculiar  interest  to  them,  would  certainly  be  able  to  under- 
stand a  large  part  of  the  child's  world  of  thought,  and  know 
how  to  individualize  a  great  deal  in  his  instruction.  He 
would  be  able  to  lay  hold  in  the  most  practical  way  upon  the 
child's  most  active  thoughts  and  inclinations.  Moreover  in 
the  events  of  the  preceding  lessons  and  in  school  excursions 
there  is  produced  a  very  rich  and  valuable  treasure  of  apper- 
ceptive ideas,  increasing  with  every  hour,  which  are  common 
to  all  the  pupils,  because  they  are  acquired  by  common  labor. 
And  even  supposing  that  varied  apperceptive  helps  in  acquir- 
ing the  new  knowledge  by  different  pupils  of  the  same  class 
are  offered,  what  difference  does  it  make  ?  If  only  the  mental 
appropriation  is  most  thoroughly  accomplished  by  the  pupil 
in  his  own  way  it  matters  not  by  what  means  it  is  done. 
But  whatever  is  especially  calculated  to  fix  the  ideas,  to 
assimilate  with  knowledge  already  possessed,  to  bring  what 
already  exists  in  the  mind  into  harmony  with  the  new  material 
before  the  mind,  to  awaken  apperceptive  notions,  will  be 
ratified  a  thousand  fold  by  experience.  Whenever  the 
lesson  starts  with  something  interesting  that  attracts  the 
attention  of  the  pupils  from  the  outset,  the  necessary  ap- 
perceptive helps  will  seldom  be  lacking,  far  more  seldom  at 
least  than  when  the  unknown  is  brought  forward  unex- 
pectedly and  without  aids  *  to  apperception.  The  prepara- 
tory discussion  will  experience  an  essential  limitation  and 
abridgement  in  such  cases  where  the  work  upon  the  immedi- 
ately preceding  lesson  has  aroused  in  the  pupil,  inquiry, 
expectation,  reflection  and  doubt  which  are  to  find  their 
solution,    explanation   and  fulfillment  in  the  new  material 

>No  one  will  assert  that  the  preparatory  discoasion  will  reach  its  pur- 
pose with  ail  the  children  of  a  class.  But  if  there  be  but  little  that  is  not 
understood,  and  that  by  only  a  few,  it  must  be  accepted  and  applied  as 
an  important  aid  in  method. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  209 

offered.  In  such  cases  there  is  already  found  in  the  fore- 
ground of  the  child's  consciousness  a  related  range  of  thought, 
and  therefore  sufTicient  helps  to  apperception  are  easily 
brought  forward  by  means  of  proper  questions.  The  pre- 
ceding applies  especially  to  the  advanced  classes.  The 
more  advanced  the  pupil,  the  shorter  the  preparatory  analyt- 
ical discussion  by  the  teacher,  the  more  it  may  be  left  to 
the  pupil  to  find  the  right  means  of  acquiring  the  new  for 
himself.  It  is  the  purpose  of  every  methodically  prepared 
lesson  gradually  to  raise  the  pupil  to  such  mental  indepen- 
dence, and  finally  make  the  "  analysis "  by  the  teacher 
superfluous. 

The  Herbart  School,  especially  Ziller,  has  emphasized, 
with  no  uncertain  sound,  the  necessity  of  a  preparatory 
step  (the  so-called  "analysis")  for  the  lesson,  and  they 
have  given  it  a  psychological  basis.  We  meet  indeed  oc- 
casional pedagogues  outside  of  this  school  who  make  similar 
requirements  in  teaching  the  lesson.  "Wangemann,  for  ex- 
ample (Handreichung  beim  ersten  Unterriclit  der  Jxleinen 
in  der  GotteserJcenntniss) ,  begins  every  biblical  story  with  a 
"preparation,"  of  which  he  gives  the  following  as  advan- 
tages gained  :  "  It  must  enable  the  child  upon  hearing  the 
biblical  story  the  first  time  to  comprehend  at  least  the  im- 
portant matters  perfectly.  It  will  prevent  the  engendering 
and  fixing  of  all  sorts  of  preposterous  and  remarkable  ideas 
in  the  mind  which  comes  from  listening  to  incomprehensible 
expressions.  The  preparation  must  do  decidedly  more  than 
seek  to  awaken  a  right  frame  of  mind.  It  must  seek  out 
the  conditions  and  relations  of  life,  relations  that  the  story 
under  consideration  introduces,  and  endeavor  to  bring  them 
into  the  world  in  which  the  child  lives,  hold  them  up  to  his 
view,  call  particular  attention  to  them,  and  elucidate  them,  in 
order  to  prepare  the  understanding  for  what  the  story  reveals 
later." 


210  APPERCEPTION. 

Curtmann  reconimemls  a  like  procedure  in  his  treatment  of 
the  Reading  Book  (Jjchrbuch  der  Erziehung  ttnd  des  Unter- 
richts),  in  which  he  would  have  every  selection  that  is  not 
easily  understood  preceded  by  an  explanatory  introduction. 
He  says,  "Before  the  child  begins  to  read,  it  must  know 
what  it  is  going  to  read  about.  The  pupil  must  read  with 
attention  and  with  interest  m  hich  the  teacher  has  excited  be- 
fore the  reading  begins.  The  difficulties  also,  which  would 
interfere  with  the  interest,  must  be  removed  beforehand. 
Everything  most  necessary  to  a  good  underetanding  of  the 
subject  should  be  explained  at  the  outset,  and  not  at  the 
end  when  the  best  impressions  are  effaced.  The  teacher 
must  connect  every  new  reading  lesson  with  the  sense  per- 
ceptions already  obtained  or  with  what  has  already  been 
read,  and  thereby  make  it  comprehensible." 

It  has  been  repeatedly  attempted,  especially  recently,  to 
reform  and  improve  the  old-fashioned  common  practice  ac- 
cording to  these  ideas.  But  there  are  nevertheless  but  com- 
paratively few  persons  who  place  themselves  definitely  and 
logically  in  favor  of  preparing  the  pupils  for  each  new  lesson, 
and  even  they  with  their  criticisms  challenge  the  manner  of 
carrying  out  such  preparation.  It  seems  most  extraordinary 
that  there  shall  be  a  procedure  in  instruction,  that  owes 
its  warrant  to  general  psychological  laws  and  that  studies 
the  need  of  each  pupil  narrowed  to  a  single  branch,  or 
to  a  definite  part  of  a  branch  (e.  g.  a  piece  of  poetry), 
that  it  is  considered  necessary  to  prepare  the  pupil  for  ap- 
perceptive notions  in  biblical  history  or  in  a  reading  lesson, 
while  in  other  subjects  of  instruction  such  preparation  may 
be  omitted.  We  are  liable  to  forget  that  the  appercep- 
tive process  remains  the  same  everywhere,  and  in  no  field  of 
knowledge  can  anything  new  be  appropriated  unless  there  are 
found  in  the  mind  of  the  child  well  grounded,  related  thoughts. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  211 

lu  most  cases  the  preparatory  discussion  should  not  make 
reference  to  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  lesson ;  this  will  be 
indicated  either  at  the  end  of  the  preparation  or  not  at  all, 
because  it  is  better  to  lead  the  child  unconsciously  to  the  end 
sought,  and  to  prepare  it  for  a  kind  of  surprise.  By  men- 
tioning the  end  sought  beforehand,  the  will  of  the  learner 
will  be  but  little  helped,  and  the  development  of  the  most 
interesting  experiences  of  the  child  will  be  lost.  This  seems 
to  be  beyond  dispute.  Many  believe  that  they  are  prepar- 
ing for  the  presentation  of  the  new  while  they  are  giving  the 
new  itself  in  the  preparatory  discussion.  They  seek,  for 
example,  to  make  the  maatery  of  an  epic  poem  easy  by  a 
simple  description,  while  they  present  the  thought  of  the 
poem  beforehand.  They  precede  the  presentation  of  a 
biblical  story  according  to  the  wording  of  the  biblical  text 
by  most  childish  "  preparatory  narration,"  which  is  supposed 
to  remove  the  difficulties  of  Luther's  translation.  Or  they 
bring  foi'Avard  in  the  preparatory  elucidation  certain  concepts, 
facts  and  examples  which  are  suggested  in  the  material  of 
instruction,  when  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  come  at  all 
within  the  limits  of  the  individual  experiences  of  the  child. 
They  usher  in  the  new  by  means  of  "introductions,"  which 
perhaps  in  certain  objective  respects  are  proper,  but  from  a 
pedagogical  standpoint  must  be  regarded  as  entirely  impracti- 
cable and  mistaken.  For  their  content  is  not  formed  by  old, 
familiar  ideas  of  the  pupil,  which  only  need  to  be  excited  in 
order  to  return  clear  and  living  into  consciousness,  but  new, 
unknown  ones,  with  which  the  mind  must  struggle  if  it 
masters  them. 

But  it  does  not  need  to  be  mentioned  that  ideas  which 
need  the  help  of  apperception  themselves  in  order  to  become 
fixed,  ideas  which,  because  of  momentary  restraint,  fall  into 
lasting  obscurity,  are  not  suited  to  work  out  a  strong,  apper- 


212  APPERCEPTION. 

ceptive  power.  It  is  not  learned  introductions  and  eloquent 
recitals  of  new,  unknown  experiences  that  smooth  the  way 
to  the  comprehension  of  the  new  easily  and  surely,  but  the 
help  must  spring  from  the  soul  of  the  pupil,  from  his  strong- 
est and  most  vivid  range  of  ideas,  if  an  assimilation  is  ever 
to  be  reached.  Therefore,  from  first  to  last,  that  form  of 
preparation  in  which  the  teacher  alone  takes  part,  which 
subjects  the  pupil  to  discourses  by  the  teacher  and  which 
the  pupil  must  silently  follow,  must  be  declared  inadmissible. 
For  it  is  not  the  teacher  but  the  learner  that  nmst  do  the 
principal  work ;  to  the  former  belongs  the  duty  of  bringing 
forward  the  most  important  apperceptive  helps.  But  a 
simple  examining  and  questioning,  that  merely  bring  out  a 
part  of  the  treasures  of  the  child's  knowledge,  hindering  his 
thought  activity,  will  by  no  means  answer  our  purpose. 

The  apperceptive  ideas  of  the  pupil  are  brought  out  the 
best  and  easiest  if  he  is  led  by  means  of  questions  to  express 
his  own  knowledge  freely  and  unhindered.  This  he  will  do 
in  a  connected  way  if  the  preparatory  discussion  takes  the 
form  of  a  familiar  conversation.  Then  the  dullest  mind  has 
time  to  act,  and  even  the  retiring  disposition  is  encouraged 
by  the  confidential  tone  of  conversation.  No  one  should  be 
omitted  in  the  relation  of  his  experience,  and  each,  according 
to  the  measure  of  his  knowledge,  will  add  something  to  the 
new  thought-structure.  Every  one  rejoices  that  his  own 
knowledge,  which  has  heretofore  been  smuggled  in  as  for- 
bidden ware  as  compared  with  the  word  of  the  teacher,  is 
recognized  and  respected,  and  each  looks  forward  to  every 
new  lesson  with  redoubled  interest.  This  condition  of  mind 
is  the  most  favorable  that  the  new  material  can  meet ;  the  ap- 
perceptive process  is  introduced  in  the  very  best  way  possible. 

The  instruction  must  now  pass  to  the  second  step,  the 
presentation  of   the  new  material.     This  consists  in  either 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  213 

relating  a  story  (to  small  children) ,  reading  a  selection  or  his- 
torical topic  (to  riper  pupils),  or  in  showing  and  carefully 
observing  a  natural  object,  a  geometrical  body,  an  exercise 
in  arithmetic  for  the  solution  of  a  problem,  a  geographical 
subject  exhibited  upon  the  board  or  sought  upon  a  map  and 
described,  an  incident  in  natural  science  brought  up  and  in- 
vestigated. It  is  important  so  to  adapt  and  apply  the  object 
to  be  apperceived  that  all  of  its  parts  which  linger  on  the 
threshold  of  consciousness  may  easily  and  surely  unite  with 
the  ideas  the  child  already  possesses.  It  is  clear  that  even 
well  prepared  matter  cannot  be  thoroughly  mastered  if  the 
ideas  are  forced  too  rapidly  upon  the  consciousness  of  the 
learner,  or  if  they  are  too  weakly  and  obscurely  presented. 
The  pupil  will  not  become  master  of  the  material  if  he  is 
overwhelmed  with  too  much  at  once,  if  the  teacher  fails  to 
linger  upon  difficult  points  with  necessary  stress,  if  the  mate- 
rial is  not  presented  in  proper  order  and  with  proper  clear- 
ness, and  if  the  attention  is  not  held.  The  more  time 
given  to  the  individual  members  or  parts  of  the  object  to  be 
studied  in  order  that  it  may  unfold  clearly  and  intelligently 
in  the  consciousness  of  the  children,  the  more  opportunity  the 
pupil  has  to  appropriate  the  presented  notions  that  are  to 
be  apperceived,  the  better  will  they  be  apperceived  and  the 
better  learned.  It  follows  therefore  that  the  amount  of  ma- 
terial given  must  be  measured  by  the  capacity  of  the  pupil,  so 
that  neither  too  much  nor  too  little  may  be  asked  of  him; 
such  material  must  be  properly  connected  in  order  that  he 
shall  not  receive  it  as  a  mass,  but  rather  that  it  may  be  fixed 
in  his  mind  according  to  the  law  of  successive  clearness, 
from  section  to  section,  from  item  to  item.  Thus  are  made  the 
necessary  pauses  which  give  opportunity  for  a  review  of  the 
ground  covered  and  which  allow  a  moment  of  reflection  to  fol- 
low regularly  a  state  of  deep  absorption  in  the  subject.     Let 


214  APPERCEPTION. 

short,  topical  stAtements  and  key-words  be  placed  on  the 
blackboard,  which  indicate  the  particular  points  on  which  at- 
tention must  be  fixed,  and  which  assist  in  retaining  the  idea. 
Finally,  the  separate  parts,  each  of  which  has  been  made 
prominent  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  must  be  united  and 
combined  into  a  unity  in  consciousness. 

"  The  change  from  absorption  to  reflection  must  take  place 
exactly  as  inhalation  follows  exhalation  in  physical  life ;  it 
is  the  process  of  mental  respiration."  Nowhere  has  our 
claim  a  greater  justification  than  in  the  beginning  of  a  science, 
or  in  elementary  instruction.  It  is  everywhere  recognized, 
and  indeed  it  has  become  a  proverb,  that  in  every  depart- 
ment of  human  knowledge,  the  beginning  is  the  most  difficult. 
It  is  true  that  there  are  but  few  ideas  in  the  child's  mind  with 
which  the  new  material  can  readily  assimilate ;  therefore  it 
needs  plenty  of  time  for  the  fusion  of  the  two  groups  of 
ideas  to  take  place,  and  because  of  this  the  assimilation  of 
the  new  and  unknown  is  at  first  so  uncertain  and  doubtful. 
If  one  should  liasteu  from .  absorption  to  absoqjtion^  or 
should  at  the  stage  where  the  child  learns  most  slowly,  in 
order  to  gain  time,  make  too  rapid  progress,  or  perhaps,  be- 
cause the  subject  is  interesting,  seek  to  give  the  greatest 
amount  of  material  at  one  time,  an  important  factor  would 
be  lacking  in  the  process  of  mental  respiration.  The  princi- 
pal pillare  of  the  structure  of  thought  now  forming  would  be 
undermined  and  only  superficial  knowledge  would  be  the 
result. 

Next  to  the  proper  arrangement  of  every  subject  to  be 
taught,  there  is  still  another  means  most  appropriate  to  assist 
in  a  thorough  fusion  of  the  new  with  the  present  store  of  ideas ; 
let  the  pupil  as  often  as  possible  strive  to  arrive  at  the  wished- 
for  knowledge  in  his  own,  self-chosen  way.  Let  him  attempt 
to  solve  the  arithmetical  exercise  or  the  problem  in  natural 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO  PEDAGOGY.  215 

science,  or  to  explain  an  extraordinary  phenomenon  in  his  own 
way ;  let  him  reflect  upon  the  voiceless  symbols  of  the  geo- 
graphical map ;  let  him  by  means  of  careful  observation  and 
independent  description  appropriate  to  himself  that  which 
the  teacher's  instruction  would  otherwise  give  him.  Let 
him  observe  for  himself  without  outside  help,  how  the  con- 
nection of  historical  facts,  the  causes  and  effects  of  certain 
events,  the  motives  and  characters  of  the  chief  persons  in- 
volved are  to  be  understood.  The  main  purpose  should  be 
separated  into  subordinate  purposes,  thereby  making  it 
possible  for  the  pupil  to  find  out  and  conclude  a  great  deal 
for  himself,  which  otherwise  must  be  told  or  shown  him.^ 

Of  course  he  will  not  always  choose  the  best  and  directest 
way,  but  certainly  it  will  be  the  easiest  way  for  him,  that 
is,  the  one  in  which  he  finds  the  greatest  number  of 
apperceptive  helps.  His  course  of  thought  will  need  in 
many  points  to  be  extended  and  corrected ;  but  it  has  the 
advantage  that  nothing  unknown  to  him  has  been  brought 
in,  nothing  that  he  does  not  possess,  and  it  takes  root  in  his 
store  of  ideas,  and  can  easily  be  examined  by  him  from 
every  point  of  view.  Even  if  the  pupil  is  able  to  appro- 
priate the  new  matter  only  imperfectly,  his  work  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  wholly  lost.  "He  has  at  least  obtained  a 
glance  at  the  material  by  means  of  this  preliminary  attempt 
at  free  presentation,  which,  when  he  has  a  more  correct 
method,  acts  as  a  help  to  the  memory."  Many  doubts  are 
resolved,  many  hindrances  removed,  and  so  many  related 
ideas  are  awakened,  that  the  new  facts  find  already  in  the 


*  "  Neither  discoveries  nor  inventions  are  made  in  the  school;  neither 
are  discoveries  or  inventions  brought  to  maturity  there,  but  the  pupils 
should  be  so  trained  as  to  discover  wh^  has  already  been  discovered, 
to  investigate  what  has  been  investigated,  to  seek  for  what  has  been 
found.' ' —  Lazabus. 


216  APPERCEPTION. 

miud  plenty  of  material  with  which  to  connect.  But  the 
teacher  must  guard  against  unnecessarily  narrowing  the 
thought-activities  of  the  pupil,  and  should  bring  him  for- 
ward by  means  of  "  suggestive  questions  "  (Scheinfragen) 
which  indeed  may  be  rich  in  content,  and  treat  of  the  most 
important  and  essential  things,  but  which  the  child  should 
find  out  for  himself.  The  teacher  will  seek  to  lead  him 
preferably  by  questions  which  give  sufficient  play  to  his  re- 
flection, as  for  example  :  What  must  now  take  place?  What 
is  the  next  step?  What  is  still  lacking?  "Material  help  will 
be  given  only  when  the  suggestive  questions  do  not  suffice ;  but 
when  used  they  must  be  so  comprehensible,  definite  and 
forceful  that  the  transition  takes  place  without  anticipating 
those  things  that  the  pupil  can  grasp  of  himself,  and  they 
must  be  helps  to  the  pupil  just  where  he  is  helpless." 

But  while  we  exercise  so  much  care  that  the  pupil  shall 
reach, the  end  sought  by  self-chosen  means,  if  we  bow  before 
superficial  adaptation,  whereby  the  new  material  is  simply 
committed  to  memory  without  comprehending,  we  retard 
(not  necessarily  make  more  difficult)  the  process  of  apper- 
ception for  the  purpose  of  gaining  time  and  adding  the  great- 
est possible  number  of  new  notions  at  the  expense  of  per- 
fect mastery  and  complete  assimilation  on  the  part  of  the 
pupil.  For  we  possess  nothing  surer  and  more  lasting, 
nothing  that  is  able  to  incite  the  volition,  like  that  which  we 
have  found  out  for  ourselves  by  our  own  powers,  and  have 
worked  out  alone.* 

'We  must  criticise  the  following  assertion  by  Palmer:  "  It  is  amis- 
taken  idea  that  the  child  receives  more  good  or  is  surer  of  a  thing  if  he 
has  found  out  the  truth  for  himself,  than  if  it  has  been  given  him  in  a 
thorough  manner  by  the  teacher."  On  the  contrary,  Schiller  says  ( ifber 
die  notwendigen  Orenzen  beim  Oehrauch  schoner  Formen):  "There  is  no 
way  for  the  results  of  thinking  to  reach  the  will  and  the  inner  life  of  the 
child  except  through  self-activity.  Nothing  but  that  which  has  already 
become  a  living  deed  within  us,  can  become  such  in  the  outer  world." 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  217 

We  have  indicated  above  tliat  one  of  the  objects  of  prep- 
aration is  to  excite  expectation  in  the  pupil,  which  will  be  a 
help  in  leading  him  to  the  mastery  of  the  lesson  for  himself. 
The  new  lesson  will  not  always  meet  such  expectations; 
it  will  in  many  points  undoubtedly  be  antagonistic  to 
the  apperceptive  notions  of  the  child.  It  would  be  easy  in 
such  cases  to  confirm  a  fickle  and  therefore  wrong  appercep- 
tion. "When  the  parts  of  the  new  material  that  contradict 
one  another  are  made  too  little  prominent,  and  those  ele- 
ments that  are  related  and  resemble  each  other  are  brought 
forward  too  rapidly  in  effecting  a  union,  the  antithesis  will 
be  eclipsed  and  will  not  find  a  place  in  consciousness.  Then 
the  learner  overlooks  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  les- 
son, and  his  conception  is  subjective  and  false,  or  at  least 
incomplete.  This  danger  is  sometimes  all  the  greater, 
the  more  thorough  the  preparatory  discussion  has  been,  the 
more  one  attempts  to  come  down  to  the  familiar,  individual 
range  of  thought  belonging  to  the  pupil,  and  to  find  ideas 
already  in  the  mind  with  which  the  new  ones  will  harmonize. 
But  this  danger  may  be  avoided  if  in  the  presentation  of  the 
lesson  the  antitheses  are  brought  out  sharply  and  definitely, 
if  the  teacher  lingers  longer  and  with  particular  emphasis 
upon  them,  and  if  the  pupil's  attention  is  especially  called 
to  them.  It  is  proper  also  to  delay  the  combination  of  the 
elements  of  the  related  ideas  until  the  antithetical  ones  have 
fully  come  into  consciousness  and  have  become  an  insepar- 
able part  of  the  assimilation ;  it  is  also  important  to  delay 
the  progress  of  apperception  in  a  measure,  in  order  that 
it  may  be  the  more  thorough  and  objective.  Accordingly, 
the  historical  story,  for- example,  will  produce  the  deeper  and 
more  correct  comprehension  of  historical  persons  and  events, 
the  better  the  present  is  transposed  into  past  times  and  past 
civilizations,  and  the  better  the  story  pictures  to  the  mind  of 


218  APPERCEPTION. 

the  child  the  prominent  peculiarities  of  an  historical  people  or 
race,  as  they  asserted  themselves  to  the  world  in  language, 
literature,  customs,  and  manner  of  living.  The  study  of 
historical  authors  is  recommended  to  maturer  youth  for  the 
same  reason ;  for  no  manual  of  instruction  can  show  the 
antithesis  between  our  modern  culture  and  that  of  the  past 
like  the  work  of  an  old  chronicler,  who  faithfully  pictures  the 
events  and  deeds,  the  views  of  life,  the  thoughts,  the 
feelings,  the  customs,  and  the  language  of  his  time. 

Greatest  care  must  be  exercised  in  natural  science  iij- 
struction,  in  the  investigation  and  experiments  concerning 
those  phenomena  which  in  every-day  life  are  surrounded  by 
false  and  baseless  notions,  — take,  for  example,  the  precepts 
that  our  peasants  follow,  the  fairy  tales  of  our  nurses  concern- 
ing certain  animals,  etc.  The  child,  of  course,  brings  these 
notions  with  him  when  he  enters  school.  The  same  caution 
is  needed  in  religious  instruction  with  reference  to  super- 
stitious notions,  customs  and  practices,  which  are  handed 
down  from  generation  to  geheration. 

The  presentation  of  the  new  material  closes  with  a  recap- 
itulation and  review  of  the  whole  by  the  pupil.  He  should 
now  show  by  a  systematic  reproduction  of  the  lesson  pre- 
sented that  he  has  fully  understood  the  subject.  "The 
best  test  that  a  person  has  understood  a  thing  is,  that 
he  can  reproduce  it  in  his  own  way,  with  his  own 
words"  (Herder).  So,  then,  if  the  separate  parte  of  the 
new  are  more  closely  united  by  many  repetitions,  the  entirety 
will  be  the  more  strongly  impressed  upon  the  mind.  To 
every  lesson  which  offers  something  new,  belongs  the  mis- 
sion of  making  a  definite,  well-defined  series  of  ideas  the 
inalienable  property  of  the  child.  But  the  formation  of  such 
a  fixed  series  of  ideas  would  be  furthered  but  little  if  the 
repetition  and  combination  of  the  material  learned  should 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  219 

proceed  in  the  form  of  repeated  questioning  and  analyz- 
ing of  such  material,  ?'.  e.,  if  the  pupil  is  not  required 
to  give  the  whole  matter  at  once,  but  is  allowed  to  give 
it  piecemeal.  Then,  under  the  most  favorable  circumstan- 
ces, "the  parts  in  his  hand,  he  may  hold  and  class,  but  the 
spiritual  link  is,  alas,  lost."  Then  apperception  would,  to 
all  outward  appearance,  never  reach  perfection.  We  always 
require,  therefore,  a  complete,  free  narration,  an  independent, 
connected  pi'esentation  of  what  is  learned.  We  allow  the 
pupil  to  speak  freely  and  without  hindrance,  without  inter- 
rupting his  course  of  thought  by  questions  or  suggestions. 
As  a  rule,  we  do  not  interfere  even  when  he  mixes  in  error 
or  forgets  important  things;  but  after  the  conclusion, of  his 
presentation,  we  ask  the  whole  class  to  rectify  errors,  supply 
deficiencies  and  correct  an  incomplete  rendering.  Further, 
we  must  avoid  forcing  the  pupils  to  comprehend  or  grasp 
the  whole  by  means  of  prepared  forms  of  expression  that  are 
not  clear  to  them.  For  example,  we  do  not  require  the  con- 
tent of  a  biblical  story  to  be  given  strictly  in  the  words  of 
the  sacred  writer,  if  the  child  does  not  choose  those  forms  of 
expression  of  his  own  accord.  For  by  reason  of  the  inti- 
mate connection  between  word  and  thought,  between  condi- 
tion of  mind  and  language,  which  do  not  correspond  to  his 
individual  thought  relations,  he  would  have  to  give  up  a 
large  part  of  his  apperceptions,  and  accept  expressions 
which  are  nothing  more  than  empty  words  to  him.  It 
is  far  more  important  that  the  child  should  express  him- 
self in  his  own  words,  in  the  common,  familiar  language 
of  the  people,  of  course  free  from  dialect,  rather  than  in 
unfamiliar  book-language ;  the  former  is  far  more  closely 
related  to  his  apperceptions.  We  even  permit  certain  pecu- 
liarities of  childish  expression,  if  they  are  not  ungrammatical, 
and  in  the  case  of  serious  mistakes  allow  only  a  brief,  explicit 


220  APPERCEPTION. 

correction  to  be  made.  For  a  smooth,  connected  presentation 
of  the  child's  own  thought  has,  in  our  eyes,  an  incomparably 
greater  value  than  a  discourse  interrupted  and  corrected  a 
hundred  times  ^by  the  teacher,  in  which  there  is  no  longer 
anything  original  or  characteristic  of  the  child,  but  a  few 
pretty  fonns  of  speech  that  the  child  has  committed  to 
memory  and  which  do  not  require  him  to  think. 

But  when  can  one  say  that  such  a  spontaneous  and  proper 
recitation  of  the  subject  taught  has  fulfilled  its  purpose? 
Certainly  not  until  it  is  thoroughly  understood  and  has  taken 
full  possession  of  the  heart  and  being  of  the  child.  There- 
fore it  behooves  us  to  guard  earnestly  against  premature 
reviews.  It  would  be,  for  example,  a  grave  error  if  one 
should  attempt  to  fix  the  content  of  a  description,  the  bare 
facts  of  a  biblical  story,  before  they  are  fully  underetood. 
Apperception  reaches  its  best  fulfilment  when  suggestive 
material  is  considered,  not  suddenly,  but  gradually,  and  it 
needs  plenty  of  time  for  this  purpose.  Skillful  questions 
and  hints  by  the  teacher  must  lead  the  child  to  correct  wrong 
perceptions,  to  clear  up  dark  places,  and  in  general,  to  im- 
press the  meaning,  and  the  moral  and  religious  truths  of  the 
topic.  And  then,  for  the  first  time,  when  apperception  is 
thoroughly  completed,  will  the  child  be  able  to  speak,  not 
from  memory,  but  out  of  the  depths  of  his  soul;  then  the 
words  will  flow  from  the  lips  easily  and  warmly  out  of  the 
abundance  of  tlie  heart.  But  when  the  text  is  being  im- 
pressed, before  it  is  fully  ingrafted  into  the  thoughts  and 
feelings  of  the  little  ones,  and  before  it  is  understood  in 
every  part,  many  will  be  able  to  give  neither  a  free  nor  a 
connected  statement  of  what  has  been  heard.  In  the  former 
case  there  would  be  empty  repetitions  from  memory  and  only 
partial  perception,  not  apperception  attained ;  in  a  word,  it 
would  be  mechanical   learning.     If  the   child  has   become 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  221 

accustomed  to  rely  upon  the  words  of  the  teacher  or  of  the 
book,  he  no  longer  feels  the  need  of  searching  out  the  deeper 
meaning  of  the  subject,  and  of  drawing  a  picture  of  it  for 
himself  by  means  of  full  and  lively  contemplation. 

If  the  principal  work,  the  statement  or  reproduction  of  the 
story,  ia  in  the  opinion  of  the  children  already  accomplished, 
the  succeeding  elucidation  will  find  indifferent  hearers  and 
unresponsive  hearts. 

With  the  oral  and  written  representation  of  the  thing 
learned,  the  process  of  assimilation,  as  it  appears,  is  finished, 
and  we  could  consequently  close  our  investigation  concern- 
ing special,  methodical  arrangements  for  the  purpose  of 
cordial  union  of  the  subject  and  object  of  apperception. 
But  instruction  generally  carries  the  treatment  of  the  new 
material  still  a  step  further ;  the  material  appropriation  of 
the  lesson  does  not  suffice.  The  instruction  seeks,  where  it 
is  possible,  to  place  the  pupil  in  possession  of  things  that 
are  universally  accepted  and  necessary,  of  general  laws  and 
truths  that  are  contained  in  the  material  treated.  The 
pupil  should  on  the  basis  of  the  individual  notions  already 
obtained,  and  of  his  concrete  experiences,  be  able  to  rise  to 
a  comprehension  of  the  ideas  as  they  are  systematically 
arranged  in  text-books.  Then  these  ideas  and  laws  lend  to 
the  mind  of  the  pupil  the  first  true  solidity  and  assurance ; 
they  complete  for  the  first  time  the  appropriation  of  the  un- 
known. They  are  at  the  same  time  the  organs  of  apper- 
ception, with  the  aid  of  which  new  experiences  can  be 
quickly  comprehended  and  rightly  judged.  It  has  to  do 
therefore  with  the  introduction  of  a  process  of  abstraction, 
and  since  this,  as  we  have  already  seen,  presents  only  a 
peculiar  kind  of  mental  acquisition,  so  the  process  of  apper- 
ception is  followed  by  a  second  process  of  the  same  char- 
acter, which  the  results  of  the  preceding  knowledge  appro- 


222  APPERCEPTION. 

printed,  changed  as  it  were  into  choicer,  finer  products,  and 
which  distinguish  the  primary  ideas  from  the  secondary.  We 
have  already  repeatedly  considered  these  apperceptive  pro- 
cesses, and  may  therefore  be  able  to  grasp  the  separate 
methodical  steps  that  are  necessary  for  their  introduction 
and  elaboration.  First  of  all  it  is  necessary  to  separate  the 
individual  notions  and  facts,  from  which  general  truths  are 
evolved,  from  all  other  material,  and  to  connect  them  with 
similar  perceptions.  These  can  be  derived  from  knowledge 
already  obtained  by  instruction,  as  well  as  from  the  other 
experiences  of  the  pupil.  Results  also  which  are  added 
through  one's  own  reflection  are  not  excluded.  But  in  every 
case  only  such  things  as  are  clearly  related  and  are  fully 
known  should  be  put  together.  Everything  possible  must 
not  be  brought  in  because  of  a  remote  similarity ;  but  only 
such  material  as  awakens  closely  connected  thoughts  in  the 
minds  of  the  children.  When  the  related  ideas  are  united 
and  have  been  carefully  compared  with  one  another,  a  mutual 
cessation  of  the  unessential,  opposing  characteristics  will 
surely  take  place ;  they  become  obscure  and  disappear  for 
that  reason  before  those  parts  of  the  structure  that  are 
common  to  all  ideas,  and  reach  a  high  degree  of  clearness 
and  strength  by  means  of  manifold  repetition.  Whatever 
within  the  circle  of  knowledge  is  brought  systematically  and 
with  special  plainness  into  consciousness  and  firmly  fixed 
in  proper  order,  constitutes  the  essential,  necessary  char- 
acteristics of  an  idea  or  the  content  of  a  general  law  or  a 
universal  judgment.  So  we  reach  the  universal  by  the 
way  of  combination,  of  association. 

The  concepts  obtained  from  concrete  objects  and  with 
which  they  are  still  more  or  less  connected,  will  be  distin- 
guished and  fixed  in  a  further  step,  that  of  systematizing  or 
combining.     The  oral  expression  for  the  result  of  the  new 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  223 

apperception  will  become  fixed,  and  it  "  will  be  brought  into 
properly  arranged,  systematic  connection  with  the  known 
material,  and  that  which  has  been  learned  will  be  thoroughly 
impressed  upon  the  mind."  In  this  way  the  pupil  gradually 
gains  by  his  own  effort  the  individual,  properly  arranged 
principles  that  the  text-books  present.  A  long  chain  of 
reasoning,  an  ingeniously  arranged,  logical  development  is 
not  needed  in  either  this  or  the  preceding  step.  For  it  is  to 
be  feared  that  the  pupil  who  is  led  unconsciously  through  a 
long,  logical  course  of  reasoning  to  a  certain  result,  will  lose 
his  desire  to  examine  the  reasons  on  which  it  is  based,  and 
also  the  connection  between  the  concept  and  the  fundamental 
notion  in  which  the  concept  takes  its  root. 

Or  suppose  the  pupil  is  really  able  independently  to 
repeat  the  ingenious,  logical  sequences  that  we  find  in  many 
(not  in  all)  categories.  So  long  as  he  is  not  able  to  do  that, 
he  is  not  master  of  the  subject.  Still,  perhaps,  the  logical 
evidence  of  the  concept  or  principle,  which  has  been  devel- 
oped, is  sufllcient  in  itself  so  that  the  pupil  is  able  to  dispense 
with  the  review  of  the  path  in  which  the  knowledge  was 
obtained.  Unfortunately  universal  concepts  and  judgments 
are  not  like  ripe  fruits,  which  must  be  picked  from  the  trees 
on  which  they  grow  in  order  to  preser\'e  and  utilize.  They 
are  mental  products,  which  cannot  be  conceived  aside  from 
the  ideas  out  of  which  they  sprang,  which  exist  only  in  and 
with  them,  which,  in  reality,  are  not  separated  but  only 
differentiated  from  them. 

A  concept,  a  general  truth,  is  our  real  possession  only 
when  we  are  vividly  conscious  of  the  concrete  facts  from 
which  it  has  been  derived,  or  other  similar  facts.  When  a 
logical  characteristic  or  the  exact  words  of  a  general  judg- 
ment have  escaped  us,  we  should  be  able  to  call  it  back  into 
consciousness  by  means  of  the  concrete  facts.     And  only  so 


224  APPERCEPTION. 

far  as  we  are  able  to  do  this  has  the  universal  any  logical 
evidence  for  us.*  The  words  of  Scripture,  "  The  prayer  of 
the  righteous  availeth  much,"  is  nothing  but  an  empty  form 
without  evidence  or  force  to  him  who  recalls  no  individual 
case  of  prayer  either  by  himself  or  others. 

If  now  the  teacher  omits  requiring  the  pupil  to  survey  the 
path  by  which  he  acquires  concepts,  and  carefully  to 
examine  the  connection  between  these  and  his  fundamental 
notions,  the  evidence  of  the  developed  principle  or  concept 
is  certainly  not  thoroughly  fixed  in  the  mind  of  the  pupil. 
But  in  order  to  avoid  this  danger,  and  to  enable  the  pupil  to 
produce  at  will  the  general  results  of  his  intellectual  work, 
by  methods  well  understood  by  him  and  in  which  he  has 
confidence,  or  at  least  to  maintain  the  concrele  foundations 
of  such  knowledge  in  the  mind,  the  development  of  the 
universal  must  not  be  attempted  by  means  of  a  long,  cleverly 
compounded  course  of  reasoning.  It  may  be  reached  by 
simple  means,  yet  without  too  little  thinking.  The  more 
thoroughly  the  pupil  has  appropriated  the  preliminary  con- 
crete culture-material,  and  the  more  related  notions  are 
associated  with  the  newly  gained  knowledge,  the  easier  the 
process  of  abstraction  is  incited  by  a  few  questions.  When 
the    pupil  hesitates,  it   is   better,  in  ninety-nine    cases  out 

>  The  direct  evidence  of  our  thinking  always  has  its  source  in 
immediate  sense-perception.  Therefore  the  translation  of  the  word 
"  Evidence  "  as  the  "  quality  of  being  visible  "  (Amchaulichkeit)  is  not 
far  out  of  the  way.  —  Wondt,  Logik,  p.  75. 

Instead  of  leading  the  child's  mind  far  beyond  the  immediate 
objective  world  into  the  world  of  abstract  ideas,  and  holding  it  there  as 
long  and  closely  as  possible,  teaching  must  rather  get  away  from 
abstractions  as  soon  as  possible  and  return  to  concrete  phenomena- 
Otherwise  the  longer  and  more  exclusively  the  children  wander  about 
among  concepts,  the  more  certainly  does  experience  prove  that  this  very 
cramming  process  leads  them  away  from  individual,  independent  think- 
ing, instead  of  assisting  them  in  it.  —  Pfistebeb,  Pddagog.  Psychologie, 
p.  246. 


ITS    APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  225 

of  a  hundred,  instead  of  a  series  of  questions  or  a  line  of 
reasoning,  to  go  back  to»his  fundamental  ideas  from  which 
the  concept  should  be  evolved.  This  in  all  probability  needs 
supplementing  and  correcting,  or,  perhaps,  fortifying  and 
explaining. 

The  process  of  abstraction  ends  with  the  establishing 
and  arranging  of  knowledge  into  a  system,  and  its  inculca- 
tion (with  reference  to  the  form  as  well).  It  may  now 
be  asked  whether  with  this  the  methodical  treatment 
of  the  material  of  instruction  has  reached  its  purpose, 
whether  the  appropriation  of  the  universal  and  the  abstract 
is  so  fully  attained,  that  all  that  remains,  namely  the  appli- 
cation and  practical  utilization  of  the  acquired  concepts, 
laws,  and  so  forth,  may  not  be  left  to  the  pupil.  Experience 
gathered  from  all  sides  has  proved,  that  among  the  very 
teachers  who  are  most  zealous  in  leading  their  pupils  to  a 
thorough  understanding  of  the  objects  employed  in  teaching, 
not  a  few  are  inclined  to  answer  this  question  affirmatively. 
They  believe  that  when  a  principle  is  made  clear,  its  use  is 
assured ;  they  believe  that  with  the  introduction  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter into  the  understanding  everything  is  completed, 
and  apperception  is  accomplished  in  the  best  manner.  This 
is  a  wide-spread  error  of  our  "  enlightened"  age,  under  the 
consequences  of  which  our  school  practice  greatly  suffers. 
One  goes  from  one  extreme  to  the  other :  while  formerly  a 
hard  and  soulless  method  of  teaching  laid  the  chief  stress 
upon  cramming  the  material  into  the  children  without  stop- 
ping to  ask  whether  it  was  understood,  in  our  time  the 
tendency  is  seriously  to  neglect  the  drilling  and  the  appli- 
cation of  the  lesson.  And  the  teacher  wIk)  does  his  duty 
in  this  matter,  is  in  danger  of  the  reproach,  "  mechanical 
training,"  "spirit-killing  grinding,"  "tiresome  reiteration," 
and  such  like  forceful  pedagogical  expressions.     On  the  other 


226  APPERCEPTION. 

hand  there  is  the  ever  returning  complaint  that  our  youth 
have  learned  indeed  much,  yet  know  but  little;  that  they 
possess  a  great  deal  of  knowledge,  but  limited  readiness  in 
its  use,  and  that  a  large  part  of  tlie  knowledge  they  get  is 
forgotten  as  soon  as  tliey  are  out  of  school.* 

The  application  of  universal  concepts  to  the  concrete 
seldom  comes  of  itself;  it  must  be  taught,  shown,  and 
practiced  in  every  branch  of  study.  "  That  you  understand 
a  thing  thoroughly  is  not  enough ;  it  must  be  at  your  tongue's 
end,  —  tlien  you  use  it  authoritatively." 

When  the  reviewing  and  applying  are  omitted,  when  the 
range  of  thought  is  constructed  without  being  united  in 
every  possible  way  with  the  other  groups  of  ideas,  the 
power  of  influencing  thoughts  subordinate  to  it  is  lost, 
no  matter  how  clear  the  range  of  thought  may  be  in  itself. 
Then  it  forms  as  it  were  an  upper  house  of  ideas  suffi- 
cient in  itself,  without  recognising  the  lower  house,  or 
taking  into  account  any  other  ideas.  It  thus  becomes 
clear  that  an  application  of  the  systematic  combination 
of  the  matter  learned  must  follow.  The  object  of  this  step 
is  not  to  go  over  the  work  repeatedly  and  in  every  conceiv- 
able way  in  order  that  it  may  be  easily  brought  into  use  at 
will,  but  to  bring  the  material  into  closest  relation  and 
liveliest  assimilation  with  the  pupil's  present  range  of  thought. 
It  must  enable  the  pupil  by  many  practical  examples  to 
discover  the  universal  in  the  concrete  material  of  all  branches 
of  knowledge,  to  comprehend  it  from  every  standpoint,  and 
thus  easily  pass  onward  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract. 
It  must  cause  him  as  often  as  possible  to  enter  new  fields  of 

'Perhaps  the  worst  thing  an  evil  genius  haa  presented  this  age  is 
"  BLnowledge  without  ability  to  use  it."  —  Pestalozzi,  Wie  Oerirud  etc., 
XII.  —  The  well-known  expression,  "Knowledge  is  power,"  is  only  half 
true.  A  much  better  rendering  would  be:  "Ability  to  do  (Konnen)  ia 
power." 


ITS  APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  227 

thought  through  concepts  and  rules  already  in  his  possession. 
It  must  lay  before  him  numerous,  judicious  problems  for 
solution,  and  require  in  oral  and  written  presentations  free 
application  of  the  knowledge  gained.  A  reverse  practice 
of  proceeding  from  the  universal  to  the  individual  is  also 
recommended.  What  we  demand  here  has  already  been 
practiced  in  a  certain  sense  for  a  long  time  in  one  branch, 
namely,  in  arithmetic.  In  this  it  never  occurs  to  any  to 
leave  the  application  of  a  rule  to  the  child ;  and  whoever 
should  attempt  it  would  soon  be  enlightened  by  the  complete 
failure  that  would  result.  One  may  well  wonder  that  like 
experiences  in  most  other  branches  have  not  called  forth 
equal  discernment,  and  the  same  procedure  as  in  arithmetic. 
For  it  is  beyond  question  that,  e.  g.,  in  moral  instruction, 
quite  as  little  as  in  arithmetic  may  general  principles  be  used 
with  the  pupil,  without  assuring  their  use  by  causing  their 
absorption  through  numerous  examples,  and  by  introduction 
into  such  relations  of  life  as  call  out  the  moral  judgment  of 
the  pupil. 

It  is  conceded  that  all  universal,  historical  truths,  all 
geometrical  theorems  and  physical  laws,  can  only  be  inalien- 
ably appropriated  when  tlie  instruction  leads  them  into  closest 
connection  with  living  questions  and  exigencies,  and  offers 
examples  from  the  practical  life  and  experience  of  the  child 
for  solution.  Every  subject  taught,  therefore,  should  have 
an  exercise  and  drill  book,  as  in  arithmetic ;  or  at  least  the 
application  of  the  material  learned  must  be  assured  by  means 
of  such  repetitions  as  are  made  in  teaching  mathematics. 
For  constant,  manifold  use  of  the  material  taught  not 
only  intensifies  the  clearness  of  it,  but  it  also  assimilates 
it  with  numerous  ranges  of  thought,  so  that  a  fluent  reproduc- 
tion is  assured.  It  brings  forward  the  plain,  comprehensible 
characteristics  which  the  pupil  again  and  again  recognizes  in 


228  APPERCEPTION. 

concrete  things.  It  makes  so  many  concrete  fields  subject 
to  the  universal  that  the  latter  is  supported  as  with  countless 
pillars,  and  is  retained  in  consciousness  by  a  rich  treasure 
of  strong  sense- perceptions.  In  a  word,  it  gives  to  apper- 
ception its  first  real  foundation.  In  this  manner  it  is  pro- 
vided that  the  newly  learned  facts  shall  not  remain  as  dead 
material  in  the  midst  of  acquired  notions,  but  shall  develop 
an  assured  activity  and  impulsive  power.  Knowledge  now 
becomes  power,  and  power  becomes  volition. 

When  the  pupil  does  not  put  away  his  school  thoughts 
with  his  school  implements,  but  likes  to  make  use  of  what  he 
has  learned  in  school  outside  of  it :  when,  for  example,  he 
borrows  the  characters  of  history  and  imitates  them  in  work 
and  play ;  when  he  carries  out  practically  what  he  has  learned 
in  natural  history ;  when  he  voluntarily  seeks  to  extend  and 
fix  what  he  has  learned,  by  observation  and  by  diligent  re- 
search ;  then  a  proper  mental  activity  has  been  attained, 
then  we  see  knowledge  that  is  in  the  very  best  way  to  be 
transposed  into  volition.  That  is  what  Goethe  meant  when 
he  said,  "  The  secret  of  teaching  consists  in  reducing  pro- 
blems to  postulates." 

There  are,  therefore,  five  methodical  steps  which  must  be 
taken  in  the  treatment  of  a  lesson.  The  preparation  (analy- 
sis), the  presentation  (synthesis),  the  combination  (associa- 
tion), the  recapitulation  (system),  and  the  application. 
They  indicate  the  method  by  which  a  complete  apperception 
of  the  culture-material  is  accomplished ;  first,  careful  obser- 
vation (steps  one  and  two),  then  proper  combination  (steps 
three  and  four),  and,  lastly,  practical  realization  of  the 
result  of  the  lesson  (fifth  step).  The  teacher  must  follow 
this  course,  as  a  rule,  although  freedom  is  allowed  him  in 
special  cases. 

Such  freedom  is  allowable,  for  example,  when  there  is  not 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  229 

sufBcient  time  in  a  lesson  to  present  all  the  material  as  a 
unit.  Then,  only  so  much  of  the  analytical  material  should 
be  introduced  in  the  preparation  as  is  necessary  for  the 
particular  new  material  brought  forward  in  this  recitation. 
In  this  case  the  analysis  will  not  appear  in  its  completeness, 
but  will  be  given  in  parts  as  is  needed  for  the  separate  topics, 
preparatory  to  synthesis.  We  could  proceed  in  like  manner 
when  the  great  variety  of  material  to  be  analyzed  threatens 
to  disturb  the  unity  of  the  analysis. 

If,  furthermore,  the  acquired  culture-material  is  so  rich  in 
generally  accepted  truths  that  it  gives  rise  to  more  than  one 
concept  or  one  rule,  a  single  concept  must  be  brought  to  full 
apperception  before  another  is  introduced.  In  this  way  the 
steps,  association,  system,  and  application,  will  be  employed 
several  times,  at  least  as  often  as  is  necessary  to  evolve  the 
universal  and  generally  accepted.^ 

This  requirement  presupposes  indeed  a  definite,  pedagogi- 
cally  correct  choice  in  the  subject-matter  of  instruction. 
For,  without  question,  encyclopaedic  presentations,  or  dis- 
connected topics  in  history,  do  not,  as  a  rule,  admit  of  a 
complete  combination  and  a  thorough  treatment  of  the  lesson 
according  to  the  formal  steps.  To  one  who  holds  inflexibly 
to  certain  lines  in  choice  of  material,  the  application  of  the 
formal  steps  will  easily  become  merely  a  routine.  The  correct 
result  can  only  be  attained  when  care  is  exercised  to  present 
to  the  pupil  an  entire  and  complete  view  of  the  whole  sub- 
ject. The  formal  steps  bring  forward  important,  valuable,  and 
connected  material,  which  should  be  separated  into  a  series 
of  "  methodical  units."     Under  these  units  is  included  not 

>  For  an  extended  treatment  of  these  topics,  see  McMiirry's  "  General 
Method,"  Public  School  Publishing  Company,  Bloomington,  Illinois,  or 
DeGarmo's  "  Essentials  of  Method,"  D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  Boston.  See 
filso  Rein's  "  Outlines  of  Pedagogics,"  C.  W.  Bardeen,  Syracuse,  N.  Y. 


230  APPERCEPTION. 

merely  a  part,  or  a  topic  of  some  subject,  but  a  concrete 
whole,  a  group  of  valuable  (internal  or  external)  percep- 
tions, which  contain  an  important  concept  or  a  universal 
truth.  Nor  does  it  suffice  to  group  favorite  subjects  and 
separate  them  into  topics,  but  attention  must  be  paid  to  the 
articulation  of  the  material,  considered  as  to  its  culture  con- 
tent, and  how  it  presents  itself  in  general  and  in  all  applicable 
cases.  The  requirement  as  to  the  treatment  of  the  material 
according  to  the  formal  steps  applies,  as  we  have  seen,  only 
for  subjects  in  which  a  new  concrete  culture-material  can  be 
intelligently  assimilated  and  its  elements  brought  forward 
towards  abstraction. 

Hence  it  follows  that  there  are  two  essential  limitations  in 
applying  our  general  principle.  In  the  first  place,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  the  subjects  of  general  review  and  examination, 
the  objects  studied  —  school  journeys,  in  so  far  as  the  obser- 
vations made  are  classified,  likewise  those  subjects  which 
require  technical  skill  in  their  acquirement,  do  not  require  so 
close  an  application  of  the  formal  steps.  For  here  it  does 
not  concern  the  knowledge  already  gained,  or  the  acquiring 
of  new  truths,  but  the  review  of  ideas,  or  of  bodily  activity. 

A  second  case  is  possible  when  a  lesson  offers,  indeed, 
new,  concrete  material,  but  composed  only  of  known,  well 
comprehended  elements.  A  piece  in  reading,  an  historical 
narration,  a  natural  history  or  geography  theme  often  brings 
simply  a  new  sense-perception  to  an  already  acquired  concept, 
a  confirmation  of  knowledge  already  possessed.  In  this  case 
it  would  manifestly  be  forcing  the  culture-material,  if  one 
should  insist  upon  the  use  of  all  the  five  formal  steps,  and 
should  associate,  systematize  and  apply  where  there  is  noth- 
ing new  to  abstract.  It  is  then  sufficient  to  allow  the  pupils 
to  recognize  what  is  valid  in  the  concrete,  but  for  the  rest  to 
conclude  the  methodical  treatment,  with  a  thoughtful  com- 


ITS    APPLICATION   TO    PEDAGOGY.  231 

bination  of  the  new  material.  Or  the  new  material  may  firet 
be  explained,  and  then,  when  one  or  more  related  topics  or 
branches  are  brought  in  and  appropriated,  in  the  same 
manner  related  third,  fourth  and  fifth  steps  may  follow  the 
several  syntheses. 

When,  finally,  material  for  teaching  is  offered  that  is  rich 
in  concepts  rather  than  sense-perceptions,  i.  ?.,  in  abstract 
form  suitable  for  teaching,  the  question  of  methodical  unity 
cannot  enter;  for  the  latter  always  arises  from  concrete 
material.  A  text  of  scripture,  an  article  of  the  catechism, 
a  sacred  hymn,  cannot  be  treated  according  to  the  formal 
steps.  They  will,  in  most  cases,  need  to  be  united  to 
one  of  the  units  of  historical  or  religious  instruction,  which 
prepares  for  a  correct  understanding  of  them.  "When  the 
child  has  grasped  the  real  content  on  the  basis  of  a  rich 
material  obtained  by  sense-perception,  when  he  succeeds  in 
fixing  the  content  by  means  of  the  steps  of  the  system,  these 
steps  give  the  knowledge  obtained  a  classical  form,  or  they 
serve  him  as  an  authoritative  confirmation.  But  how  is  it 
when  they  arise  only  after  instruction  in  biblical  history? 
Many  paits  of  the  Bible  must  necessarily  be  subjects  for 
special  lessons  after  the  common-school  course  (with  us 
Sunday-school)  is  ended ;  take,  for  example,  many  important 
chapters  from  the  Epistles. 

The  pupil  should  be  able,  when  he  enters  upon  the  practical 
duties  of  life,  by  diligent  and  intelligent  reading  of  the 
scriptures,  to  extend  his  knowledge  and  find  strength  and 
comfort  iu  the  hour  of  sorrow  and  temptation.  Systematic 
instruction  in  the  catechism  will  have  an  important  place  in 
the  course  of  study.  But  what  enters  here  as  abstract  con- 
tent of  instruction  should  not  be  developed  by  the  method  of 
observation  and  abstraction  according  to  the  formal  steps, 
but  it  should  be  presented  to  the  pupil  directly ;  he  should 


232  APPERCEPTION. 

be  able  to  help  himself  under  direction  of  the  teacher,  aided 
by  a  rich  treasure  of  religious  views  and  experiences,  and 
he  will  learn  to  understand  and  grasp  the  truth  for  himself. 
By  this  means  he  will  show  that  the  persons  and  deeds  of 
sacred  history  have  life  and  power  in  his  soul.  And  so  he 
applies  in  a  single  step  of  method  what  he  has  learned 
in  religious  conviction  and  insight  in  all  the  preceding  years. 

To  sum  up :  when  the  teaching  presents  no  new,  concrete 
culture-material  for  conscious  appropriation,  or  when  this 
material  contains  no  new  general  elements,  the  formal 
steps  cannot  be  followed. 

As  in  the  case  of  culture-material,  so  the  general  accept- 
ance of  the  formal  steps  experiences  a  limitation  with 
respect  to  the  ability  of  different  children  to  acquire. 

We  have  seen  that  the  complete  assimilation  of  matter 
to  be  learned  involves  a  double  process  of  apperception ; 
that  it  ends  in  a  process  of  abstraction,  a  process  of  con- 
densation of  what  has  been  newly  learned  in  general 
notions  and  general  truths.  The  formal  steps  are  together 
intended  to  secure  the  carrying  out  of  this  process  to  com- 
pletion. But  the  pupil  in  the  lower  grades  of  the  public 
school  is  but  little  disposed  or  prepared  to  perform  the  act 
of  logical  abstraction.  His  strength  and  interest  are  still  so 
taken  up  with  the  reception  of  new  ideas,  the  number  of  his 
definite  perceptions  of  the  various  classes  represented  in  the 
different  spheres  of  experience  is  still  so  insufficient,  that  to 
demand  of  him  the  formation  of  general  notions  —  even 
though    it   be    but   in  the  form  of   psychological  ideas'  — 

'  The  author  refers  here  to  the  distinction  between  "  logical  "  and 
"  psychological  "  ideas,  the  former  being  ideas  representing  the  essential 
character  of  the  several  particulars  inyolved,  while  "  pyschological  "  ideas 
are  unscientific  generalizations,  in  wliirh  the  process  of  abstraction  has 
not  been  completed,  leaving  therefore  in  the  abstraction  itill  many  un- 
essential qualities.  — Trant. 


ITS   APPLICATION  TO   PEDAGOGY.  233 

would  be  for  the  most  part  to  demand  in  vain  a  very  unfa- 
miliar labor.  Generalization  must  not  he  premature  ;  it  must 
always  come  out  as  ripe  fruit  from  a  fullness  of  similar  concrete 
experiences.  It  is  not  to  he  developed  artificially,  if  it  is 
not  to  remain  an  empty  word,  a  plant  without  roots.  It 
should  not  appear  until  the  richness  of  the  material  of  in- 
struction and  the  very  variety  of  what  is  learned  compel 
the  combination  and  arrangement  of  the  essential  elements  in 
a  generalization.  The  pupil  in  the  lower  grades  must 
accordingly  be  spared  the  effort  of  abstraction.  The  pro- 
cess of  apperception  will  always  be  brought  to  an  end  with 
the  first  division,  that  is,  with  providing  for  the  thorough 
observation  and  understanding  of  the  new  matter  for  its  own 
sake.  The  essential  and  significant  elements  of  it  are  to  be 
specially  emphasized,  even  if  only  as  a  particular  observa- 
tion, and  the  pupils  are  gently  to  be  led  to  join  that  which 
is  learned  with  similar  concepts,  forming  groups  or  series 
according  to  the  measure  of  the  pupil's  experience.  Finally, 
the  teacher  should  seek  by  varied  exercises  to  insure  the  great- 
est possible  readiness  in  gaining  these  desired  results  of  in- 
struction. In  this  way  there  is  secured  a  gradual  preparation 
for  later  abstraction  in  the  same  field,  for  the  comprehension 
of  the  ideal  and  universally  valid  principles  involved  in  the 
material  of  instruction ;  thus  the  pupil  learns  by  and  by  to 
proceed  from  the  first  less  complete  apperception  to  that 
which  is  more  thorough  and  perfect. 

Such  is  also  the  case  in  certain  instances  even  with  the 
more  mature  scholar.  For  even  he  is  not  always  able  to 
draw  out  at  once  the  treasure  of  ideal  and  universally  valid 
principles  presented  in  the  concrete  material  of  instruction. 
When  he  first  begins  to  work  his  way  into  a  new  field  of 
knowledge,  where  fundamental  principles,  the  beginnings  of  a 
new  study,  are  involved — as  in  the  case  of  a  new  language 


234  APPERCEPTION. 

—  the  pupil  will  be  able  only  with  difficulty  to  proceed  to 
the  logical  comprehension  of  the  subject.  He  has,  as  yet,  at 
his  command  too  few  definite  and  similar  facts  to  be  able  to 
determine,  by  a  process  of  abstraction,  the  logical  content  of 
all  subject-matter  of  instruction.  Here,  likewise,  the  teacher 
will  be  obliged  —  for  the  beginning,  at  least  —  to  give  up 
the  complete  carrying  out  of  the  process  of  apperception. 
In  that  case  the  elaboration  of  the  material  of  instruction 
ends  with  the  acquisition  of  series  and  groups  of  ideas, 
as,  for  example,  of  the  traits  of  an  historical  person,  a  series 
of  dates,  a  group  of  grammatical  forms,  the  description  of  a 
country,  the  drawing  of  mountains  and  river  valleys  —  and 
it  must  be  reserved  to  a  later  consideration  to  unite  these 
results  with  others  into  a  higher  form  of  knowledge. 

It  might  be  urged  against  us  that  in  this  way  the  culture- 
content  of  the  material  for  instruction  is  but  imperfectly 
appropriated,  in  so  far  as  the  pupil  does  not  rise  to  an  ideal 
comprehension  of  that  content.  But  while  the  necessary  ma- 
turity and  experience  required  for  such  comprehension  are 
undoubtedly  lacking  to  the  scholar  in  the  lower  grade,  while 
he  still  prefers  to  think  in  sense-perceptions,  and  the  mere 
reception  and  uniting  of  the  elements  of  a  new  sphere  of 
knowledge  demand  the  full  mental  power  of  the  more  mature 
scholar,  we  must, — whether  willingly  or  not  —  take  this 
fact  into  account,  and  not  for  the  sake  of  a  stiff  formula 
introduce  system  and  application  where  there  is  nothing,  as 
yet,  to  abstract. 

Besides,  it  is  quite  possible,  while  traversing  only  a  part 
of  the  two  processes  of  apperception,  to  secure  the  appro- 
priation by  the  pupil  of  the  important  elements  of  the 
material  of  instruction  according  to  his  power  of  apprehen- 
sion at  the  time.  When,  for  example,  we  direct  the  mind 
of  the  child  from  concrete   facte  of  Sacred  History  to  an 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  235 

intimation  of  the  goodness  and  wisdom  of  God,  when  the 
pupil  is  led  clearly  to  comprehend  and  fix  in  mind  the  ethical 
traits  which  command  our  approbation  in  the  historical 
person,  when  in  the  consideration  of  a  subject  in  geography 
or  natural  history,  we  bring  out  certain  typical  properties 
into  sharp  relief,  or  in  language  lessons  place  related  forms 
side  by  side,  in  all  these  cases  we  make  the  scholar  distinctly 
conscious  of  the  essential,  significant,  and  universally  valid 
elements  of  the  material  of  instruction,  even  if  only  in  the 
form  of  an  observation.  When  now  the  instruction  in  each 
department  produces  more  and  more  such  valuable  typical 
observations  and  joins  them  together  in  groups  and  series, 
when  finally  these  become  so  numerous  as  to  lead  to  their 
union  in  a  general  notion  or  a  general  truth,  then,  at  length, 
all  those  concrete  departments  of  experience  which  belong  to 
the  generalization,  without  being  traversed  in  a  process  of 
abstraction,  acquire  for  the  pupil  increased  clearness  and 
significance,  through  their  relation  to  that  generalization. 
So  the  thorough  assimilation  of  former  materials  of  instruc- 
tion is  accomplished  by  retroactive  apperception,  and  the 
culture-value  which  they  hold  is  secured  to  the  pupil  in  a 
natural  way  —  without  over-haste  or  premature  generalizing. 
A  second  elaboration  of  the  same  material  of  instruction,  as 
demanded  by  the  theory  of  concentric  circles,^  is  then 
unnecessary. 

But  some  objector  may  ask :  If  abstraction  is  banished 

*  The  theory  of  concentric  circles  or  concentric  instruction  is  to  be 
clearly  distinguished  from  the  Herbartian  doctrine  of  concentration. 
According  to  the  concentric  circles,  the  pupil  is  made  to  study  the  same 
historical  period  repeatedly  in  successive  years,  going  each  time  more 
deeply  into  the  subject  and  mastering  more  details.  The  Herbartians 
devote  successive  years  to  successive  historic.il  periods,  and  in  each  year 
of  the  course  concentrate  the  instruction  in  other  lines  —  geography, 
natural  history,  language,  etc.,  around  the  historical  material  as  the  heart 
of  the  whole  course.  —  Trans. 


236  APPERCEPTION. 

from  a  part  of  instruction,  what  remains  of  the  "  principle" 
of  the  formal  steps  ?  If  instruction  covers,  strictly  speaking, 
only  the  first  three  steps,  does  it  not  give  up  for  tlie  most 
part  the  determination  and  application  of  generalizations  in 
the  steps  of  system  and  metho<l?  Certainly,  and  it  is  pre- 
cisely this  that  constitutes  the  second  limitation,  to  which 
the  universality  of  the  formal  steps  is  subject. 

To  be  sure,  the  formation  and  impression  of  groups  and 
series  of  ideas  might  be  regarded  a  step  of  system,  and 
going  over  the  same  in  a  different  order  (as  takes  place  for 
instance  in  the  application  of  orthographical  series  in  compo- 
sitions or  dictations  on  examination)  as  a  step  of  method, 
since  there  certainly  exists  a  certain  resemblance  between 
these  mental  activities  and  the  regular  carrying  out  of  the 
process  of  abstraction.  And  so  Ziller  and  likewise  Rein  are 
accustomed  throughout  to  describe  as  "  system"  a  series  of 
numbers,  the  drawing  of  the  mountains  of  a  country  or  the 
map  of  a  battlefield,  the  arrangement  of  the  matter  treated 
in  history,  a  series  of  dates,  and  the  like,'  which  are  to  be 
treated  in  a  more  advanced  grade  as  expressing  general 
notions.  But  an  historical  table,  a  drawing,  a  graphic 
presentation  of  the  historical  matter,  a  geographical  descrip- 
tion, are  neither  expressions  of  general  notions  nor  anything 
universally  valid  and  necessary.  They  are  acquired  as  some- 
thing very  individual,  not  by  way  of  abstraction.  But  Ziller 
makes  it  an  essential  characteristic  of  the  elaboration  of  a 
methodical  unit  according  to  the  formal  steps  that  the  general 
notions  and  univereally  valid  elements  involved  in  material  of 
instruction  be  appropriated  by  the  scholar  through  a  process  of 
abstraction.  It  follows  that,  whenever  one  must  be  limited 
to  the  acquisition  of  series  and  groups  of  ideas,  the  steps 

<  Ziller,  MateriaU4n,  etc.,  pp.  113, 125, 137.    Bein,  Pickel  and  Scbellor, 
6.  Sehuljahr,  second  edition,  pp.  59,  6i. 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  237 

of  system  and  method  in  the  strict  sense  are  out  of  the 
question ;  the  complete  carrying  out  of  the  formal  steps  is 
then  impossible,  provided  the  original  notion  of  those  steps 
is  otherwise  to  be  maintained.  It  answers  fully  to  the 
psychological  facts  if,  at  the  age  when  general  notions  are 
not  to  be  abstracted,  but  only  a  preparation  for  them  to  be 
made,  the  elaboration  of  the  matter  of  instruction  be  brought 
to  a  close  with  the  many-sided  union  of  its  principal  elements. 
Certain  general  characteristics,  typical  concepts,  belong  to 
the  elements  so  brought  into  union.  This  course  indicates, 
by  the  description  of  the  methodic  activity  involved,  that  a  per- 
fect abstracting  appropriation  is  not  yet  possible  or  intended. 

Such  a  course  is  to  be  recommended  moreover  on  one  other 
ground.  The  complete  carrying  out  of  the  formal  steps  frotn 
the  lowest  to  the  highest  class  is  justified  only  when  the  notion 
of  system  is  changed  according  to  the  need,  that  is,  when  we 
understand  by  the  word  at  one  time  general  notions  and  what 
is  universally  valid,  at  another  only  dispositions  and  material 
for  the  making  of  general  notions.  But  in  this  way  the 
theory  appears  vacillating  and  indefinite.  The  beginner 
adheres  to  Ziller's  exposition  of  the  theory  according  to  which 
a  process  of  abstraction  is  always  to  be  introduced,  and 
accordingly  applies  abstraction  even  to  the  material  of  the 
first  school-year.  How  much  painful  artificiality,  how  much 
unchildlike  reflection  and  precocious  thinking,  how  many 
worthless  combinations  of  concepts  can  be  brought  to  pass 
in  this  manner,  is  not  far  to  seek,  and  is  unfortunately  fully 
attested  by  experience.  But  such  misunderstandings  may  be 
avoided  if  the  idea  of  system  be  taken  in  only  one,  and  that 
the  strict  original  meaning  of  the  term,  if  it  be  borne  in  mind 
that,  according  to  Herbart,  "  the  earlier  instruction  cannot 
give  us  system  in  the  higher  sense."  ^ 

'  Padag.  Schriften,  I.,  406. 


238  APPERCEPTION. 

We  have  seen  that  in  many  cases  either  the  material  of 
instruction  or  the  limited  mental  grasp  of  the  scholar  at  the 
time  does  not  admit  of  a  deeper  apperception,  the  derivation 
of  universally  valid  and  general  principles ;  that  in  these 
cases  the  carrying  out  of  a  process  of  abstraction,  such  as 
the  steps  of  sj'stem  and  metho<l  demand,  will  not  be  at- 
tempted; and  that  the  teacher  will  then  limit  himself  to 
securing  the  intelligent  comprehension  of  the  concrete  facts 
and  their  combination  among  themselves  as  well  as  with 
related  concepts. 

But  the  more  clearly  conscious  one  becomes  of  the  pre- 
suppositions and  the  limitations  under  which  alone  the 
application  of  the  formal  steps  is  allowable  and  useful,  so 
much  the  more  will  one  rid  one's  self  of  the  notion  that  they 
are  a  mould  in  which  Herbart  and  Ziller  have  attempted  to 
mechanize  the  whole  of  instruction.*  What  do  they  do  but 
give  rule  and  order  to  the  act  of  instruction  in  accordance 
with  a  universally  recognized  law  of  the  human  mind?  Or 
is  it  not  a  fact  that  a  thorough  apperception  of  the  material 
of  instruction  takes  place  only  when  instruction  proceeds 
from  the  external  or  internal  observation  of  the  child, 
proceeds  from  this  to  abstract  thought,  in  order,  finally,  to 
insure  the  right  application  of  the  results  of  such  thought  in 
practical  exercises.  Now  this  methodical  procedure,  which 
the  nature  of  the  human  mind  prescribes  for  us,  is  also  the 
method  of  the  formal  steps.  It  proposes  nothing  more  than 
to  secure  to  the  scholar  a  natural  and  thorough  appropriation 
of  the  material  of  instruction.     Where  more  or  other  than 

'  The  most  current  expression  which  this  preconception  linds  is  the 
assertion  that  it  is  demanded  that  every  recitation  hour  should  be  con- 
ducted according  to  the  "  scheme  "  of  the  formal  steps.  That  was  never, 
so  far  as  we  know,  demanded  by  Ziller  or  Ilerbart,  and  can  very  seldom 
take  place,  for  the  reason  that  the  thorough  appropriation  of  a  unit  of 
instruction  demands,  as  a  rule,  more  than  one  recitation  hour. 


ITS  APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  239 

that  goes  on  under  this  rubric,  it  is  the  letter  and  not 
the  spirit  of  the  formal  steps  that  rules.  But  it  cannot  be 
charged  against  the  formal  steps  as  a  fault,  that  the  theory 
prescribes  a  definite  succession  in  the  acts  of  instruction,  or 
that  it  does  not  leave  it  to  caprice  to  decide  which  of  them 
precedes  and  which  follows.  The  freedom  of  caprice  is 
rightly  an  object  of  hatred  in  all  spheres  of  human  knowl- 
edge and  volition ;  should  it  be  allowed  in  Pedagogy,  this 
youngest  of  the  sciences  ?  Certainly  not.  For  the  rule  was 
recognized  even  in  earlier  times  for  the  safe  guidance  of  the 
process  of  learning  in  more  than  one  subject,  as  Diirpfeld 
has  clearly  shown  :^  From  observation  to  thought,  from 
thought  to  application  !  And  every  capable  teacher  continues 
to  hold  fast  to  this  succession  of  steps.  According  to  this 
it  appears  that  Ziller  erred  only  in  proposing  five  steps, 
(strictly  speaking  only  four!)  in  place  of  the  customary 
three.  To  follow  those  three  is  right  and  good ;  but  to 
accept  five  steps,  and  those  bearing  some  strange  names,  is 
inconsistent  with  the  freedom  of  the  teacher.  Such  is  the 
objection  that  one  hears. ^  If  such  is  the  case  the  whole 
contention  regarding  the  "hateful"  steps  runs  out,  as  it 
seems  to  us,  in  the  case  of  most  opponents,  into  an  idle 
strife  about  words.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  show  that  the 
five  formal  steps  may  be  easily  referred  back  to  the  familiar 
trinity  of  stages  of  learning,  "When  Ziller,  likewise  prompted 
by  a  deeper  insight  into  the  process  of  mental  appropriation, 
preferred  to  separate  the  act  of  observation  and  of  abstract 
thought  into  two  partial  steps,  it  was  simply  with  the  purpose 
of  offering  to  the  teacher  as  definite  and  practically  fruitful 
directions  as  was  possible  for  the  sure  carrying  out  of  the 
process  of  apperception  in  the  child.     He  was  not  concerned 

*  Der  didaktische  Materialismus,  p.  161  ff. 

*  Sherfig:  Der  Begriff  der  BUdung,  1885,  p.  56. 


240  APPERCEPTION. 

with  setting  up  an  entirely  new  teaching  process,  but  with 
rounding  out  old  established  rules  and  rendering  them 
more  comprehensive.  It  was  not  that  what  was  known 
to  everyone  was  presented  "  only  in  slightly  different 
words " ;  but  rather  what  was  old  was  presented  in  a 
new,  that  is,  an  improved  and  enlarged  form.  But  the 
original  conception  of  the  act  of  learning  as  a  process  of 
apperception  is  a  new  thmg  in  the  Herbart-Ziller  theory; 
the  arrangement  of  recognized  measures  of  instruction  in  a 
strictly  ordered  series  of  steps  of  method,  answering  to  the 
course  of  the  process  of  learning,  is  new ;  the  introduction  of 
analysis  as  a  first  step  to  the  appropriation  of  the  material  of 
insti-uction  is  new ;  and  finally  the  founding  of  all  these  ped- 
agogic demands  on  a  clear  psychological  insight  is  also  new. 
To  instmct  according  to  the  formal  steps  means,  then,  to 
do  persistently  and  with  conscious  purpose  what  remained 
otherwise  given  over  to  a  happy  intuition.^ 

*  It  is  not  seldom  held  by  ezperieaced  practical  tesu;her8,  against  the 
elaboration  of  the  culture-material  according  to  the  formal  steps,  that 
they  demand  too  much  time  and  do  not  permit  the  mastering  of  the  task 
assigned.  We  are  far  from  entering  a  plea  for  a  useless  lingering  upon 
imimportant  matters,  a  wearisome  prolixity  in  the  introduction  or  the 
presentation  of  the  subject,  such  as  the  spiritless  imitation  of  the  formal 
steps  may  often  bring  with  it.  We  also  purpose  to  secure  to  the  children 
each  hour  the  feeling  of  vigorous  progress  in  the  realm  of  mind.  But 
when  the  over-pressure  in  the  material  for  instruction  assigned  to  each 
separate  year  of  the  course  does  not  permit  a  thorough  appropriation  of 
the  things  taught,  it  certainly  does  not  follow  from  that  fact  that  the 
formal  steps  are  unpractical.  Much  more  is  it  advised  in  that  case  so  to 
limit  the  things  taught  that  they  can  be  imparted  in  such  manner  as  to 
mould  |he  pupil's  mind.  Less  would  be  more  —  that  certainly  holds 
good  iu  the  case  of  many  of  our  courses  of  study.  For  in  truth  the 
teacher  who  advances  slowly  but  thoroughly,  goes  further  than  one  who 
is  so  anxious  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  task  assigned  that  he  cannot 
attain  to  a  quiet,  warm-hearted  elaboration  of  the  instruction-material. 

"  The  way  of  Order,  even  if  it  goes  a  crooked  course,  is  no  side-path." 
—  Schiller's  Piccolomini,  I.,  4. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  241 

We  are  at  the  end  of  our  investigation.  It  undertook  to 
present  the  evidence  that  all  learning  is,  in  the  main,  an 
apperception,  and  that,  accordingly,  it  is  the  chief  problem 
of  the  teacher  regularly, and  surely  to  introduce  the  process 
of  mental  appropriation  on  the  part  of  the  scholar,  and,  as 
far  as  possible,  to  carry  it  through  to  the  end.  This  demand 
extends,  as  we  have  seen,  to  nearly  all  spheres  of  instruc- 
tion; it  involves  the  weightiest  principles  of  didactics. 
Those  universal  imperatives,  for  example,  in  which  one 
branch  of  the  newer  pedagogy  is  accustomed  to  formulate  its 
theory  —  such  sayings  as  "  from  the  known  to  the  unknown," 
"from  the  near  to  the  remote,"  "from  the  easy  to  the 
difficult,"  —  may  be  referred  back,  as  far  as  they  contain 
truth,  to  the  requirement,  "  Provide  for  easy  and  thorough 
apperception " ;  and  they  are  valid  only  to  the  degree  in 
which  they  answer  to  this  principle.^  For  the  strong,  apper- 
ceiving  concepts  of  the  child  are  solely  and  alone  the  known 
to  which  the  unknown  is  to  be  united,  the  near  with  reference 
to  the  remote,  the  easy  leading  up  to  the  more  difficult. 
Whatever  does  not  belong  to  these  aids  to  apperception 
remains  strange  to  the  pupil,  no  matter  how  near  it  may  be 
to  him  in  time  and  space,  or  how  simple  and  easy  it  may 
seem ;  it  cannot,  in  any  way,  promote  the  appropriation  of 
the  new. 

Accordingly,  in  seeking  to  derive  the  general  didactic 
rules  from  one  leading  principle,  and  in  setting  forth  the 
process  of  apperception  as  the  content  of  the  act  of  learning 
and  the  chief  end  and  aim  of  the  act  of  teaching,  we  believe 


*  Although  attention  has  already  been  called  from  the  most  diverse 
points  of  view —  for  example,  even,  by  Diesterweg,  to  the  fact  that  these 
sayings  have  only  relative  value,  yet  they  still  belong  to  those  favorite 
pedagogic  watchwords  and  half-true  sayings  that  are  most  frequently 
used  —  and  most  often  misunderstood. 


242  APPERCEPTION. 

we  are  able  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  scientific  pedagogy  in 
a  higher  degree,  and  gain  a  deeper  insight  into  the  weightiest 
problems  of  method  than  if  we  set  out  to  formulate  a  series 
of  imperatives  which  mutually  include  one  another  and  none 
of  which  can  be  separated  in  logical  strictness  from  the 
other. ^  And  as  our  theory  so  also  can  our  pedagogic 
practice  make  a  gain  through  such  a  peculiar  conception  of 
the  problem  of  instruction.  It  is  said :  Every  method  is 
good  which  leads  to  the  end,  and  the  value  of  a  process  of 
instruction  is  measured  simply  by  the  knowledge  and  skill 
which  the  pupil  is  led  by  this  means  to  acquire.  This, 
however,  is  a  false  and  one-sided  conception.  How  often 
the  outward  success  of  a  method  is  bought  by  a  wholly 
unnecessary  expenditure  of  time  and  strength ;  how  often  all 
pleasure  and  joy  in  the  subject  of  instruction  is  quite  driven 
away  from  the  child  by  a  tedious  process  of  teaching !  Such 
a  "good "  method,  on  which  all  his  life  long  the  scholar  will 
look  back  only  with  discomfort,  reaches  the  desired  end  only 
in  appearance,  while  in  reality  it  leads  the  pupil  far  astray ; 
for  it  robs  him  of  living  interest,  that  indispensable  con- 
dition of  further  effort,  without  which  any  real,  lasting 
success  of  instruction  is  out  of  the  question.  So  the  import- 
ant thing  is  not  exclusively  that  something  be  appropriated, 
but  how  the  appropriation  takes  place.     Not  every  way  that 

'  Compare,  for  example,  the  following  nine  principles  of  instruction,  as 
Lindner  {AUgemeine  Unterrichtslehre,  sixth  edition,  pp.  82-101)  lays  them 
down  side  by  side:  Instruct  naturally,  psychologically,  through  observa- 
tion, in  a  manner  to  be  easily  comprehended,  formatively,  attractively, 
for  lasting  results,  practically,  and  in  the  instruction  lead  the  scholar  on 
to  self-activity.  Die  Schulerziehungszlehre  of  Schwarz  and  Curtmann 
in  the  eighth  edition,  edited  by  Freiensehner,  even  brings  the  number  of 
such  general  principles  of  instruction  up  to  twenty-four.  Here  one  seeks 
in  vain  for  the  logical  ground  of  division,  the  distinguishing  characteris- 
tics, by  which  the  ideas  named  may  be  clearly  and  sharply  separated  from 
one  another. 


ITS   APPLICATION   TO   PEDAGOGY.  243 

leads  to  the  desired  end  is  expedient,  but  only  that  one 
which  attains  the  end  by  the  easiest  way,  and  that  most 
suited  to  the  nature  of  the  scholar.  Now,  such  an  easy, 
level  way  we  believe  we  have  described  in  these  pages. 
"We  indicated  above  how  much  apperception  unloads  the 
mind,  and  how  much  strength  it  saves  the  mind  in  conse- 
quence. In  preparing  with  the  utmost  care  for  that  process, 
in  removing  obstacles  which  would  oppose  themselves  to  any 
intimate  blending  of  the  subject  and  the  object  of  the  act  of 
appropriation,  in  carrying  out  the  process  of  apperception 
once  begun  to  certain  and  full  completion  by  a  strictly 
methodical  treatment  of  each  unit  of  instruction,  we  un- 
doubtedly aid  essentially  in  rendering  the  act  of  learning 
less  difficult.  We  protect  the  individuality  of  the  pupil  in  so 
far  as  we  allow  him  by  the  aid  of  his  own  familiar  concepts 
to  comprehend  what  is  new  and  unfamiliar.  We  promote 
his  self-activity  as  often  as  we  allow  him  to  attain  the  pro- 
posed end  either  wholly  or  in  part  by  ways  of  his  own 
choosing ;  we  heighten  the  joy  of  learning  by  enlisting  his 
own  inmost  thoughts  and  feelings  in  the  instruction,  and  so 
insure  the  many-sided  application  of  what  is  taught.  We 
will  not  make  apperception  easy  in  the  sense  employed  by' 
the  philanthropinists ;  we  do  not  advocate  a  kind  of  learning 
that  is  all  play.  Work  itself  becomes  pleasure  to  the  pupil 
as  soon  as  he  becomes  acquainted  with  the  aids  to  the 
mastery  of  new  knowledge  which  slumber  within  him.  But 
on  this  delight  of  learning  we  set  the  highest  value ;  for  it 
conceals  in  itself  the  germ  of  true  interest.  What  comes  easy 
to  the  pupil,  at  the  same  tinle  increasing  his  strength  —  that 
wins  his  heart,  and  continues  for  a  long  time,  perhaps  to  the 
end  of  life,  to  be  an  object  of  his  liveliest  desire.  Such 
delight  "  is  the  heaven  under  which  everything  flourishes  — 
except  poison." 


244  APPERCEPTION. 

And  we  strive  after  one  thing  more.  When  we,  from 
principle,  oflfer  the  pupil  nothing  new  in  instruction  without 
having  first  called  up  old,  familiar  concepts  within  him, 
when  we  seek  in  the  steps  of  association  and  application  to 
establish  a  many-sided  and  intimate  connection  of  what  has 
been  newly  learned  with  the  other  spheres  of  thought,  we 
plainly  prevent  the  isolation  and  division  of  the  separate 
thoughts  and  promote  the  formation  of  rich,  well-united 
concept  groups.  But  the  richer  a  group  is,  the  more  fre- 
quently it  offers  occasion  for  calling  it  back  into  conscious- 
ness, and  the  more  frequently  it  is  repeated,  the  greater 
becomes  the  ease  with  which  it  returns.  Further,  in  insisting 
on  presenting  the  matter  of  instruction  divided  into  sections 
of  suitable  length,  and  the  regular  alternation  of  learning 
and  thinking,  in  prompting  the  pupil  to  rise  from  numerous 
particular  concepts  by  means  of  comparison  and  abstraction 
to  general  notions,  and  with  the  help  of  these  to  master 
the  concrete  material  of  experience,  we  provide  for  the  logical 
articulation  and  elaboration  of  the  branches  of  his  knowledge. 
But  the  richer,  better  articulated,  and  more  easily  repro- 
duced a  concept  group  is,  the  greater  is  its  power  and 
•the  influence  which  it  exercises  on  other  groups,  tlie  better 
suited  it  appears  to  be  to  act  in  its  turn  as  an  apperceiving 
mass  on  new  incoming  concepts.  So  as  the  thought 
material  is  acquired,  for  the  most  part,  by  the  way  of 
apperception,  it  serves  again  at  the  same  time  to  introduce 
new  processes  of  assimilation ;  the  product  of  appercep- 
tion becomes  a  means  of  apperception.  But  this  aptitude 
of  the  concepts  and  general  notions  for  apperception  is  the 
best  gift  that  the  school  can  confer  on  the  pupil  for  the 
journey  through  life.  The  problem  of  the  school  is  not 
to  be  sought  for  in  making  the  pupil  ready  for  life, 
BO  that  he  should  have  nothing  further  to  learn ;    it  can- 


ITS   APPLICATION    TO    PEDAGOGY.  245 

not  do  that.  Much  rather  can  and  will  instruction  prepare 
the  scholar  only  to  find  his  way  with  the  help  of  what  he  has 
learned  in  the  domains  of  knowledge,  feeling,  and  volition, 
and  to  appropriate  the  new  things  which  the  school  of  life 
gives  him  to  learn  through  old,  familiar  acquirements.  If  the 
pupil  succeeds  in  this ;  if  he  presses  boldly  on  in  the  path 
of  knowledge ;  if  his  aesthetic  ideals,  his  religious  principles, 
and  ethical  maxims  prove  so  strong  and  lively  that  even 
under  the  most  difficult  circumstances  he  knows  how  to 
distinguish  the  beautiful  from  the  common  and  ugly,  the 
divine  from  the  ungodly,  the  morally  good  from  the  bad,  and 
even  in  complicated  cases  to  find  the  right,  then  instruction 
has  accomplished  enough,  and  fairly  contributed  its  part 
in  the  sei'vice  of  education  to  the  formation  of  a  morally 
vigorous  character. 


PART    III. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  APPERCEP- 
TION. 


The  idea  of  apperception  is  not  a  result  of  modern  psy- 
chology ;  it  is  no  artificial  expression  invented  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  well  known  pedagogical  truisms  a  new, 
learned,  philosophic  garment.  Far  from  it:  it  has  a  history 
of  its  own.  A  look  into  its  historical  development  will  not 
only  dispel  that  prejudice,  but  essentially  aid  in  the  compre- 
hension of  the  theory  of  apperception. 

A.      The  Idea  of  Apperception  with  Leibnitz. 

The  first  who  applied  the  idea  of  apperception  in  philoso- 
phy was  Leibnitz.  He  arrived  at  it  in  his  investigation  of 
the  nature  and  chief  activities  of  the  human  soul.  The  latter 
is  to  him  a  simple,  indivisible  substance  (monad),  whose 
life  consists  chiefly  in  continual  change  or  transition  from 
one  perception  to  another.  These  perceptions,  or  inner 
conditions,  it  is  true,  reflect  the  outer  world  with  its  occur- 
rences, but  they  are  caused  by  these  neither  directly  nor 
indirectly ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  created  freely  and 
independently  by  the  soul,  according  to  its  "  inner  prin- 
ciple" and  from  its  own  stores.  They  correspond ,  however, 
without  exception  to  those  outer  occurrences  because  the 
omniscient  Go<l  has  previously  so  arranged  the  order  of  the 


HISTORY    OF    THE    IDEA   OF    APPERCEPTION.  247 

discursive  conceptions  and  once  for  all  so  established 
them,  that  they  are  always  in  harmony  with  things  external 
(Pre-established  Harmony) .  Hence  if  the  soul  produces 
perceptions  every  moment,  it  does  not  follow  that  it  has 
conceptions  always  equally  valuable,  that  is,  equally  strong 
and  distinct.  There  are  innumerable  perceptions  of  which 
we  do  not  become  conscious,  because  these  impressions  are 
either  too  insignificant,  or  too  numerous,  or  even  too  uni- 
form. (We  do  not  pay  further  attention  for  instance  to  the 
movements  of  a  mill  or  a  waterfall,  if  by  habit  they 
have  become  commonplace.)  They  are  on  the  same  level 
with  perceptions  formed  during  swoon,  dizziness,  stupor 
or  dreamless  sleep.  These  weak  perceptions  (whose  efficacy 
must  not  be  underrated,  since  all  actions  performed  with- 
out deliberation,  as  well  as  habits  and  passions,  depend 
upon  them)  lack  distinct  consciousness  and  remembrance. 
So  long  as  we  do  not  rise  above  them,  our  souls  do  not 
perceptibly  differ  from  those  simple  monads  that  have  only 
perceptions  —  like  the  plants  and  lower  animals. 

But  man  has  also  stronger  ideas,  he  produces  perceptions 
of  which  he  is  distinctly  conscious  and  which  therefore  are 
indelibly  imprinted  upon  his  memory.  They  may  be  de- 
signated in  contradistinction  to  the  weak  perceptions  as 
sensations  (Leibnitz  :  ^'■sentiments")  or  apperceptions.  They 
are  the  results  of  strong  impressions,  or  of  combination  and 
accumulation  of  numerous  weak  perceptions  which  in  them- 
selves were  not  apperceived.  For  of  all  our  perceptions, 
even  of  the  weak  ones,  none  are  lost,  and  the  distinct  ones 
arise  gradually  from  perceptions  too  indistinct  to  be  noticed. 
Every  distinct  idea  comprises  an  infinite  -number  of  confused 
perceptions.  These  distinct  perceptions  coupled  with  memory 
do  not  belong  to  man  exclusively ;  the  animal  has  them  loo, 
hence  it  is  credited,  like  ouiselves,  with  having  a  &oul. 


248  APPERCEPTION. 

Man  alone  is  able  to  reach  a  higher  stage  in  the  activity 
of  conceiving,  the  step  of  reflexive  cognition ;  at  this  stage 
he  not  only  grasps  things  external,  by  means  of  more  per- 
fect perceptions,  but  he  also  comprehends  their  inner  con- 
nection, ^'' connaissance  dea  causes";  he  recognizes  and  un- 
derstands necessary  and  eternal  truths,  as  we  find  them 
recorded  in  science,  the  divine  plan  according  to  which  all 
things  are  arranged.  And  finally,  while  directing  his  atten- 
tion to  occurrences  taking  place  in  his  own  soul,  he  rises  to  a 
recognition  of  his  own  self,  to  a  conception  of  his  egoy  to 
self -consciousness.  This  conscious  grasp  of  the  content  of 
thought  Leibnitz  designates  in  his  later  works  by  the  term 
APPERCEPTION  in  coutradistiuction  to  mere  perception.  It  is 
the  characteristic  of  rational  souls  or  minds  —  (esprits) . 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  seen  that  with  Leibnitz  the  idea 
of  apperception  is  inconstant.  First,  he  gives  it  the  signi- 
ficance of  consciousness,  or  conscious  distinct  conceiving, 
following  the  common  usage  of  language  according  to  which 
^ ^  apercevoir"  =  io  perceive,  *' s'a^erceuoir  "=  to  observe, 
or  notice.  Then  again,  he  defines  it  as  * '  la  connaissance 
reflexive,"  a  thinking,  grasping  of  the  contents  of  a  concep- 
tion caused  by  ai-bitary  attention,  the  reflective  cognition  of 
our  inner  states.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  one  definition 
belongs  exclusively  to  a  former,  the  other  to  a  later,  period  of 
his  activity  as  an  author.  For  although  in  his  ' '  Mouad- 
ology  "  and  his  "  Principles  of  Nature,"  the  second  definition 
is  much  more  prominent,  allusions  to  the  former  definition 
are  by  no  means  wanting,  while  on  the  other  hand  in  his 
"  New  Essays"  some  remarks  prepare  the  way  for  his  later 
definition  of  the  idea. 

While  thus  the  philosopher's  view  concerning  the  true 
essence  of  apperception  is  left  obscure,  no  doubt  can  be 
entertained  about  one  important  characteristic.     According 


HISTORY   OF   THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  249 

to  Leibnitz  the  soul  creates  its  conceptions  not  only  out  of 
itself  and  by  its  own  means,  but  also  independently  of  ex- 
ternal inducement  or  motive.  Hence  to  apperception  as  a 
kind  of  conceiving  may  be  assigned  the  characteristic  of 
absolute  spontaneity.  This  follows  necessarily  from  his 
supposition  of  a  pre-established  harmony.  However,  in 
this  Leibnitz  did  not  consistently  adhere  to  his  original 
view.  If  the  soul  reflects  the  universe  like  a  living  mirror 
according  to  its  level  and  point  of  view,  if  it  be  purely 
passive  in  perceiving,  and  if  its  acts  of  cognition  are  at 
least  partly  dependent  upon  the  senses,  in  other  words, 
dependent  upon  the  nature  of  things  external  as  well  as 
upon  the  essence  of  the  mind,  then  absolute  spontaneity  of 
its  action  of  conceiving  cannot  be  said  to  be  in  harmony 
with  it.  If  we  further  consider  that  distinct  ideas  according 
to  Leibnitz  arise  gradually  from  weaker  ones,  and  that  they, 
generally  speaking,  are  called  forth  and  created  with  the 
aid  of  preceding  conditions  in  the  soul,  it  follows  that  the 
activity  of  apperception  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  depend- 
ent on  the  contents  of  the  soul  already  present.  It  takes 
place  under  the  determining  influence  of  those  contents. 
Hence  Leibnitz's  views  concerning  apperception  may  be 
grouped  as  follows : 

( 1 . )  By  apperception  we  understand  distinct,  conscious 
conception  coupled  with  remembrance,  as  well  as  thinking, 
reflexive  comprehension  of  the  contents  of  our  own  mental 
states,  in  fact,  inner  perception,  or  self-obser\-ation. 

(2).  It  exerts  itself  as  spontaneous  activity,  dependent, 
however,  upon  the  determining  influence  of  the  existing 
contents  of  the  soul. 

The  first  of  these  two  thoughts  seems  to  have  found 
general  recognition  even  with  philosophers  who  did  not  share 
his  hypothesis   of  a   pre-established   harmony.     Thus,   for 


250  APPERCEPTION. 

instance,  Christian  Wolf  (1C78-1754)  designated  perception 
as  observing  an  object,  and  apperception  as  becoming 
conscious  of  a  perception.  And  Herder  says,  ' '  all  sensations 
that  rise  to  a  certain  distinctness  become  apperception, 
thought;  the  soul  knows  that  it  perceives." 

On  the  other  baud,  the  spontaneity  of  apperception  has 
been  adhered  to  by  Kant ;  he  emphasizes  it  as  an  essential 
characteristic  of  the  idea.  His  theory  of  apperception,  which 
occupies  a  prominent  position  in  his  system  of  philosophic 
criticism,  may  now  enlist  our  attention. 

B.     Kant's  Theory  of  Apperception. 

In  his  memorable  work  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason" 
(1781),  Kant  places  at  the  beginning  of  his  investigations  the 
question,  "  What  are  the  sources  of  all  human  knowledge?  " 
He  finds  that  at  first  the  senses  (outer  and  inner),  by  virtue 
of  their  receptivity  for  outer  impressions  derived  from 
things,  and  from  inner  experiences  of  the  emotions,  offer  the 
raw,  formless  material  of  cognitions.  These,  in  themselves 
confused  impressions  and  percepts  are,  with  the  aid  of 
imagination,  arranged  by  being  fitted  into  forms  of  space 
and  time  already  existing  in  the  soul ;  thus  they  are  raised  to 
sense-perceptions  '  (Anschaimngen) .  But,  in  order  that 
these  may  obtain  the  significance  of  objects,  certain  inborn, 
pure  notions  of  the  understanding  are  added,  with  which  all 
sense-perceptions  must  agree,  to  form  an  inner  connection 
between  them.  The  perception  and  cognition  of  experiences 
acquired  by  means  of  sense-perceptions,  through  the  pure  no- 
tions of  understanding,  constitute,  really,  a  judging,  a  con- 
necting of  different  pictures  according  to  their  contents,  a  com- 
bining of  the  (given)  manifold  in  our  cognition,  a  synthesis. 
The  unity  of  this  manifold  is  accomplished  in  thought  in  wbat 
he  calls  the  categories.     (Thus,  for  instance,  we  think  the 


HISTORY   OF   THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  251 

percepts  of  lightning  and  thunder  necessarily  together  in 
the  idea  of  cause  and  effect,  causality  being  regarded  as  a 
category  of  the  mind.)  What  these  pure  notions  of  the 
understanding  are,  that  is,  independent  of  all  experience  and 
free  of  all  emotions,  is  seen  from  the  functions  of  the 
active  mind.  There  are  as  many  pure  notions  of  the  under- 
standing, or  categories,  as  there  are  kinds  of  judgments. 
Kant's  table  of  categories,  which  places  them  under  the 
higher  units  of  quantity,  quality,  relation  and  modality, 
offers  a  complete  list  (See  Watson's  Selections  from  Kant^ 
pp.  51-2). 

Hence,  there  are  two  sources  of  human  knowledge : 
experience,  which  offers  the  material  of  sense-perception  or 
percepts,  and  our  self-active  mind,  which  forms  it  into 
cognitions  or  ideas.  Two  faculties  correspond  with  these 
sources :  the  faculty  to  receive  sensations  or  percepts 
(receptivity  of  the  senses),  and  the  faculty  to  call  forth 
ideas  or  concepts  (spontaneity  of  the  understanding) .  Hence 
the  outer  and  inner  experiences  are  not  the  only  sources  of 
cognition,  as  Locke  thought ;  but  previous  to  all  impressions 
are,  a  priori,  the  pure  conceptions  of  space  and  time,  as  well 
as  the  pure  notions  of  the  understanding,  which  we  add  to 
the  experiences  as  something  inborn,  or  native,  to  the  mind. 

However,  this  presentation  meets  formidable  difficulties. 
According  to  Kant,  the  categories  perform  the  labor  of 
connecting  manifold  phenomena  into  cognitions,  thus,  and 
only  thus,  making  experiences  possible.  But  if  these 
notions  of  the  understanding,  a  priori,  exist  previous  to, 
and  outside  of  all  experience,  if  they  are  not  created  by  it, 
and  have  nothing  in  common  with  it  —  how  can  they  refer 
to  it,  and  how  can  we  say  that  they  tirst  make  experience 
possible?  The  answer  is:  all  cognition  rests,  as  we  saw, 
upon  the  connection  of  the  manifold  into  a  necessary  unity, 


252  APPERCEPTION. 

that  is  to  say,  upon  synthesis.  The  connection  of  the 
manifold  can  never  occur  through  the  senses,  and  can,  there- 
fore, not  be  contained  in  the  pure  form  of  sense-perception. 
Experience,  it  is  true,  tells  us  that  two  percepts  (like 
thunder  and  lightning)  are  acquired  at  the  same  time,  but 
that  they  should  necessarily  be  thought  as  belonging  together, 
it  does  not  teach.  Hence,  synthesis  is  not  given  in  the 
object  of  perception,  but  as  accomplished  by  its  subject ;  it 
is  the  action  of  a  spontaneous  power  of  conceiving,  i.  e.,  of 
the  understanding.  The  pure  notions  of  the  understanding 
are,  therefore,  necessarily  to  be  added  to  impressions  or 
percepts  from  the  outer  world,  because  only  with  their  aid 
is  synthesis,  that  is,  cognition,  possible. 

But  what  is  the  final  reason  why  the  understanding 
recognizes  in  a  judgment  the  unity  of  different  notions? 
Why  should  I  be  obliged  to  thimk  the  manifold  in  experience 
necessary,  for  instance,  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect? 
What  makes  possible  and  effects  the  connection  of  repre- 
sentations (ideas)  according  to  the  categories?  It  is  a  fact, 
that  all  manifold  of  sense-perception  has  a  necessary  relation 
to  the  "  I  think  "  in  the  same  subject  in  which  this  manifold 
is  found.  The  manifold  elements  contained  in  one  concept,  I 
recognize  wholly  as  mine.  They  are  so,  however,  because 
they  belong  to  one  and  the  same  self-consciousness.  In  so 
far  as  they  all  belong  to  one  unchangeable  ego,  they  consti- 
tute one  idea.  But  herein  lie  the  reason  and  the  possibility 
of  their  necessary  combination.  Because  I  combine  them 
in  one  self-consciousness,  I  recognize  their  inner  connection, 
and  I  am  conscious  a  priori  of  their  unity,  or  their  neces- 
sary synthesis.  The  relation  of  our  concepts  to  one  and  the 
same  ego,  or  self-consciousness  (which  is  expressed  in  this, 
that  the  "  I  think"  accompanies,  or  may  accompany  all  my 
ideas  and  concepts),  makes  possible  a  priori  all  sjmthesis, 


HISTORY   OF  THE  IDEA  OP  APPERCEPTION.  253 

all  thinking  cognition  of  experience.  However,  we  are  not 
coerced  by  our  experience,  that  is,  by  the  matter  of  our 
impressions  (percepts)  to  this  reflexive  connection ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  is  an  act  of  spontaneity,  that  is,  of  the  soul's 
activity,  wholly  self-dependent,  and  independent  of  exterior 
influences. 

Spontaneous  activity,  then,  which  combines  in  self-con- 
sciousness the  various  impressions  and  ideas  offered  through 
the  senses,  is  called  "  Apperception  "  ^  by  Kant.  It  is  also 
expressed  as  self -consciousness. 

Indeed,  apperception,  as  characterized  in  the  foregoing,  is 
pure,  original,  transcendental ;  that  is,  it  is  that  self-con- 
sciousness which  accompanies,  or  may  accompany,  our  ideas 
with  "I  think."  It  is  designated  as  original,  because  it 
exists  before  all  experience ;  as  pure  and  transcendental, 
because  as  spontaneous  activity  it  does  not  depend  upon  the 
matter  of  our  perceptions.  Their  unity  is  founded  in  this, 
that  man  recognizes  all  his  ideas  as  his,  that  is,  belonging  to 
one  and  the  same  unchangeable  subject  (the  pure  ego) .  Hence 
unity  of  original  apperception  is  synonymous  with  conscious- 
ness of  the  synthesis  of  ideas  or  their  elements.  The  under- 
standing is  nothing  else  than  the  faculty  to  combine  a  priori, 
and  to  bring  the  manifold  of  given  ideas  under  the  unity  of 
apperception. 

From  this,  the  fundamental  importance  of  pure  apper- 
ception for  Kant's  theory  of  cognition  becomes  plain.  If 
the  unity  of  different  ideas  is  recognized  in  their  relation  to 
self-consciousness,  that  is,  through  the  unity  of  apperception, 
the  latter  is  the  requisite  of  all  judgment,  of  all  cognitions. 
It  not  only  connects  ideas,  but  gives  this  connection  the 
characteristic  of  necessity. 

*  See  Watson's  Selections  from  Kant,  p.  G5. 


254  APPERCEPTION, 

Its  pre-supposition  is,  as  we  saw,  the  notion  of  the  pure 
ego,  that  self-consciousness  which,  according  to  Kant,  does 
not  develop  gradually  by  means  of  and  along  with  experience 
from  without,  but  precedes  it  from  the  beginning,  and  ac- 
companies all  of  our  ideas.  He  calls  it  the  transcendental 
self-consciousness  which  lies  beyond  all  outer  experience, 
because  the  unity  of  original  apperception  tells  us  nothing 
about  the  nature  of  the  pure  ego. 

But,  besides  this  transcendental,  there  is  also  an  empirical 
self-consciousness ;  besides  the  pure  ego,  an  empirical  ego  to 
which  also  we  refer  our  ideas.  This  latter,  however,  changes 
its  content  in  the  course  of  human  life  quite  often,  and  is, 
on  account  of  its  changeableness,  not  able  to  produce  an 
abiding  identical  self.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  relation 
of  the  concepts  to  the  empirical  consciousness,  or  the  em- 
pirical apperception,  cannot  effect  truly,  correct  cognitions. 
It  chiefly  obeys  the  laws  of  association  and  hence  forms  only 
accidental,  not  necessary  combinations  of  ideas. 

When  a  child,  for  instance,  notices  lightning  and  thunder 
as  phenomena,  one  of  which  follows  the  other  in  time,  without 
knowing  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  it  performs  an  act 
of  empirical  apperception. 

All  differing  empirical  consciousness  must,  in  oi'der  that  I 
may  attribute  it  to  myself,  be  connected  in  a  single  self-con- 
sciousness. Hence  all  empirical  consciousness  has  a  necessary 
relation  to  a  transcendental  consciousness,  namely,  that  of 
myself  as  the  original  apperception.  Hence,  also,  the  em- 
pirical apperception  pre-supposes  the  other,  and  is  derived 
from  it. 

It  is  plain  then,  that  Kant's  idea  of  apperception  unites  all 
the  characteristics  which  we  found  in  Leibnitz's  theory :  — 
The  logical  connection  of  ideas,  the  thinking  of  general  and 
necessary  truths,  the  reflexive  comprehension  of  our  inner 


HISTORY   OF   THE    IDEA   OF    APPERCEPTION.  255 

processes,  their  relation  to  our  ego  called  forth  by  sponta- 
neous activity  of  the  soul.  But  that  which  with  Leibnitz 
was  only  hinted  obscurely  is  here  expressed  very  clearly. 
What  were  there  considered  parallel  expressions  of  one  and 
the  same  activity,  are  here  combined  to  a  strict  logical  unity. 
The  thinking  of  necessary  truths  is  not  a  form  of  appercep- 
tion differing  from  others,  as,  for  instance,  observation  or  per- 
ception, or  relation  of  our  concepts  to  self-consciousness,  but 
it  is  the  sequence  of  the  latter.  The  idea  of  the  pure  ego  is 
not  considered  the  possible  result,  but  the  necessary  pre- 
supposition of  apperception.  In  this  is  found  at  the  same 
time  the  chief  difference  between  Kant's  and  Leibnitz's  ideas. 
Leibnitz  considers  apperception  the  fruit  of  an  extensive 
development  of  the  soul.  As  distinct  ideas  are  formed  from 
unconscious  impressions  or  perceptions,  so  from  a  combina- 
tion of  strong  ideas  apperception  will  arise,  and  the  self-con- 
sciousness thus  gained  lifts  the  soul  to  a  rational  being  or 
spirit.  Kant  does  not  recognize  such  a  development  of  our 
mental  life.  According  to  him,  the  pure  ego,  or  self-con- 
sciousness, is  the  original  possession  of  the  soul  and  the 
transcendental  apperception  is  that  activity  of  the  under- 
standing which  proves  active  from  the  very  beginning  in 
perceiving  and  representing  or  conceiving  objects.  The 
ability  to  apperceive  in  this  sense  is  not  acquired  gradually 
by  mental  labor,  nor  is  it  founded  upon  well-arranged  contents 
of  the  soul,  but  is  given  previous  to  all  experience  from  the 
outer  world ;  it  alone  makes  possible  the  higher  activities  of 
the  mind,  thinking  and  cognition. 

C.      2Vie  Idea  of  Apjyerception  tvith  Ilerbart. 

Herbart  undertook  a  development  of  the  theory  of  apper- 
ception in  an  essentially  different  direction.  He,  too,  started 
from  certain  thoughts  of  Leibnitz.     "While  Leibnitz  thought 


256  APPERCEPTION. 

apperception  to  be  a  result  of  mental  building-up  of  many 
weak  perceptions  into  ideas,  Herbart  asks,  in  what  manner 
weak  impressions  or  ideas  can  be  raised  to  a  higher  degree 
of  consciousness.  He  consequently  investigates  the  condi- 
tions of  apperception  as  given  in  the  contents  of  the  soul 
already  existing,  in  order  to  penetrate  deeper  into  the  nature 
of  the  process.  And  there  he  finds  that  ideas  are  apperceived 
(that  is  brought  to  greater  lucidity)  only  when  they  them- 
selves become  objects  of  a  new  act  of  perceiving,  when  other 
series  of  ideas  notice  them,  so  to  speak,  and  combine  them 
with  themselves.  He  points  this  out  at  first  in  the  appercep- 
tion of  outer  sensation  or  impressions.  In  other  words,  it 
takes  ideas  to  apperceive  ideas. 

Every  simple  or  complete  perception  (or  sensation)  which 
enters  6onsciousness  through  the  gates  of  the  senses,  acts 
upon  the  ideas  present  as  a  stimulus.  It  repels  everything 
contrary  to  it  that  may  be  present  in  consciousness,  and 
recalls  all  similar  things,  which  now  rise  with  all  their  con- 
nections. This  complex  perception  (or  sensation)  iuvades 
several  older  groups  or  series  simultaneously,  and  thus  in- 
duces new  conditions  of  fusion  or  arrest.  While  thus  it  causes 
a  lively  notion  of  the  ideas,  it  may  be  compared  with  a  light, 
casting  its  rays  all  around  it.  The  stimulated  mass  of  ideas 
raised  simultaneously,  resembles  an  arched  vault  extending 
in  all  directions  from  a  centre.  As  long  as  this  arching 
continues,  the  central  perception  has,  by  virtue  of  its  stimu- 
lating power,  the  controlling  influence  in  consciousness. 
But  the  more  it  checks  all  less  similar  ideas,  that  were  called 
up  as  opposites,  the  more  they  recede,  and  allow  older,  quite 
similar  ideas  to  rise,  favored  as  they  are,  and  gradually 
form  the  point  of  the  arch ;  this  becomes  the  more  raised  or 
pointed  the  longer  the  entire  process  lasts.  Now  when  a 
fusion  of  the  new  perception   (sensation)   takes  pl.nce  with 


HISTORY    OF   THE    IDEA    OF   APPERCEPTION.  257 

those  ideas  reproduced  anew,  and  standing  high  in  con- 
sciousness, the  latter  assert  or  maintain  superiority  (controll- 
ing influence).  For  the  ideas  coming  from  within  are,  by 
virtue  of  their  connections,  stronger  than  the  single  new 
percept;  especially  since  it  diminishes  in  power  after  its 
stimulating  effect  is  lost.  The  new  perception  must  suffer, 
being  placed  in  rank  and  file  ;  it  is  made  an  acquisition  of  the 
older  series  of  ideas. 

The  same  relation,  pre-supposed  between  sensations  or 
percepts  and  older  ideas,  may  be  repeated  between  the 
weaker  and  stronger  notions  reproduced,  or  called  up.  A 
weaker  series  of  ideas,  one  which  is  loss  deeply  rooted  with- 
in the  entire  horizon  of  thought,  may  be  excited  and  de- 
veloped in  its  own  way  in  the  mind.  Through  it  a  related 
mass  of  thought  is  called  back,  i.  e.,  one  stronger  and 
deeper-lyiug.  At  first  the  former,  more  excited  series  of 
ideas  presses  back  the  second  series  witli  reference  to  its 
opposing  elements.  This  second  series  is  thus  brought  to  a 
tension  and  presses  upward  all  the  more  powerfully.  Now  it 
shapes  the  first  series  in  accordance  with  its  own  form, 
holding  it,  as  it  were,  by  its  similar  and  fusing  elements, 
repelling  it  at  other  points.  Here  we  have  an  acquisition 
of  ideas  which  may  be  designated,  iu  contradistinction  to 
outer,  as  inner  apperception ;  or,  better,  as  apperception  of 
inner  perception.  This  is,  with  Herbart,  as  his  examples 
prove,  almost  without  exception,  congruent  with  inner  per- 
ception or  self-observation.  For  he  sees  one  of  the  chief 
objects  of  apperception  iu  this,  that  it  euables  us  to  notice 
our  own  inner  conditions,  so  that  affections  and  passions 
may  not  surprise  us,  or  lead  us  to  hasty  actions,  but 
empower  us  to  make  a  strict  moral  criticism  of  self. 

Hence  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  conditions  under  which 
such  apperception  can  take  place  securely  and  successfully. 


258  APPERCEPTION. 

Physiological  checks  and  irritable  temperament  are  not 
favorable  to  apperception.  Perceptions  which  are  to  be  ap- 
perceived  must  be  neither  too  new,  nor  too  strange ;  neither 
too  weak,  nor  too  volatile.  The  new  percept  must  be  met 
by  a  sufficient  number  of  apperceiving  ideas,  that  is,  such  as 
offer  enough  points  of  contact  with  the  new,  and  are  sufficiently 
strong,  and  cross  the  threshold  of  consciousness  at  the 
proper  time.  Above  all,  the  apperceiving  notions  cannot  be 
raw,  chaotic,  or  only  loosely  connected  masses,  but  must  be 
well  perfected  series  of  ideas.  J^specially  the  ideas  ruling 
them,  namely,  judgments  and  maxims,  possess  a  strong 
apperceiving  power.  The  most  general  ideas  are  called 
categories  by  Herbart.  He  distinguishes  categories  of 
outer  apperception,  which  serve  in  the  acquisition  of  outer 
obsen'ation,  and  categories  of  inner  apperception,  with  the 
aid  of  which  we  understand  the  states  of  our  own  soul,  and 
those  of  others.  The  former  categories  refer  to  objects  of 
the  outer  world,  the  latter  to  what  happens  in  our  own  con- 
sciousness. The  categories  of  outer  apperception  are  the 
well  known  general  notions  of  Kant ;  those  of  the  inner  de- 
signate either  feeling  or  knowledge,  either  volition  or  action. 
Speaking,  especially  conversation,  exercises  a  prominent 
influence  upon  their  development  and  application.  In  con- 
versation we  are  occupied  with  what  is  absent  and  past,  not 
with  observation  or  perception,  but  with  ideas  (the  residuum 
or  resultant  of  observations) .  The  burden  of  immediate,  sen- 
suous presence  is  thereby  removed,  a  burden  which  oppresses 
tl»e  animal  continually.  Conversation  induces  man  to  pre- 
serve inner  states  in  his  memory  longer  and  to  recall  them 
oftener  by  occupying  the  mind  with  things  past  and  absent. 
A  consequence  of  this  is,  that  the  older  ideas  can  enter  into 
new  combinations ;  and  it  is  through  these  combinations  that 
they  are  turned  into  very  much  stronger  powers.     Speaking 


HISTORY   OF   THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  259 

is  labor.  The  entire  thought  to  be  expressed  must  constantly 
hover  before  the  speaker,  and  apperceive  to  the  speaker 
the  different  words  with  which  tlie  thought  is  to  be  clothed 
before  they  are  uttered.  When  the  speech  is  ended,  the 
same  happens  with  the  series  of  words  or  sentences :  —  It 
is  caught  up,  us  it  were,  and  apperceived  by  that  mass  of 
ideas  to  which  it  corresponds.  Thus  through  conversation 
arises  a  systematic  combination  and  fusion  of  notions  to 
ruling  ideas,  which,  as  categories,  act  apperceivingly  upon 
the  objects  of  experience.  The  categories  of  inner  apper- 
ception especially  enable  man  to  obsei-ve  and  distinguish 
what  takes  place  in  himself  or  others.  While  thus  they 
bring  about  a  consciousness  of  the  inner  world,  they  contri- 
bute essentially  to  the  development  of  a  purer  and  more  dis- 
tinct concept  of  the  ego. 

It  is  Herbart's  merit  to  have  defined  the  various  processes 
in  the  act  of  apperceiving,  and  thus  to  have  given  the  idea 
of  apperception  a  greater  distinctness.  The  supposition  of 
Leibnitz,  that  apperception  might  be  dependent  upon  condi- 
tions of  the  soul  already  existing,  had  not  been  noticed 
further  by  Kant ;  since  the  subject  of  transcendental  apper- 
ception, the  pure  ego,  was  to  be  taken  as  the  emptiest  of  all 
concepts,  the  empirical  contents  of  the  soul  were  not  con- 
sidered sufficiently  in  his  theory.  As  Herbart  took  up  again 
that  thought  of  Leibnitz  and  searched  for  the  conditions  of 
apperception,  he  recognized  and  emphasized,  first,  tlie  im- 
portance of  that  residue  of  ideas  acquired  in  the  course  of 
life,  that  is,  its  importance  for  the  acquisition  of  new  impres- 
sions and  experiences.  Since  Herbart's  investigation,  it  is 
taken  for  a  fact,  that  our  outer  and  inner  perceptions,  without 
exception,  take  place  with  the  assistance  of  older  related  ideas, 
the  contents  of  which  are  determinative  for  the  new  perception. 
With  that,  the  definition  of  apperception  as  a,  resultant  of 


260  APPERCEPTION. 

gradual  development  of  the  mind  is  given.  For  if  appercep- 
tion is  absolutely  dependent  upon  the  nature  of  the  store  of 
ideas  acquired ;  if  man  apperceives  correctly  or  incorrectlj', 
superficiallj'  or  thoroughly,  iu  harmony  with  the  contents  and 
order  of  the  scries  of  ideas  dominating  his  mind,  the  strength 
and  the  extent  of  his  apperception  grow  with  the  increase  and 
perfection  of  those  groups  of  thought.  It  is  entirely  out  of 
the  question  to  consider  spontaneous  activity  of  the  mind,  t. 
e.,  actions  independent  of  empirical  contents  and  not  being 
capable  of  development.  Herbart  refutes  such  an  assumption 
directly:  "Apperception,  or  inner  perception,  takes  place 
only  when  the  conditions  allow  it.  There  is  no  room  what- 
ever for  the  lawless  play  of  transcendental  freedom." 

However,  in  his  polemic  against  the  supposition  of  an 
inborn  faculty  of  apperception,  he  seems  to  overlook  that  the 
process  of  mental  acquisition  does  not  only  set  combinations 
of  ideas  into  motion,  but  that  to  its  successful  termination 
certain  emotional  conditions  and  acts  of  volition  must 
contribute.  When,  for  instance,  he  speaks  of  ascending 
apperceived  ideas  as  being  guided  or  checked  in  their  motions 
by  more  powerful  masses  of  thought,  it  would  seem  more 
reasonable  to  attribute  to  volition  this  interference  with  the 
series  of  concepts.  In  active  apperception,  awakened  by 
definite  feelings  that  are  coupled  with  the  contents  of  con- 
cepts, volition  calls  up  assistance  which,  without  it,  might 
come  too  late ;  it  accelerates  the  arching  and  pointing  of  the 
thought  by  narrowing  the  circle  of  ideas  that  have  been 
preserved  iu  consciousness.  Without  activity  of  emotion 
and  volition  no  strong  apperception  seems  to  take  place  —  a 
fact  which  may  have  given  rise  to  the  appearance  of  complete 
si)ontaneity  of  the  process  in  the  sense  of  Kant. 

Herbart's  assertion,  that  apperception  conforms  exclusively 
to  older  concepts  which  are  superior  in  strength  to  the  new 


HISTORY   OF   THE  IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  261 

one,  has  found  opposition.  Especially  is  it  Staude,^  who 
points  out  the  precarious  consequences  of  so  narrow  a  view. 
It  certainly  was  not  Herbart  who  underrated  the  formative 
influences  which  at  times,  and  under  certain  circumstances,  a 
new  perception  may  exercise  upon  older  apperceiving  groups 
of  thought.  When,  for  instance,  he  says  that  certain  per- 
ceptions could  cause  a  decomposition  and  new  formation  of 
ideas,  or  a  correction  of  firmly  rooted  combinations  of  ideas ; 
when  he  emphasizes  the  importance  of  conversation  for  the 
systematic  connection  and  solidification  of  ideas  through 
'apperception,  we  may  take  this  as  evidence  of  his  not  under- 
rating the  importance  of  the  apperceived  ideas.  This  some- 
what narrow  definition  of  the  law  of  apperception  seems 
to  have  its  foundation  in  the  confusion  of  two  ideas.  Her- 
bart, as  a  rule,  does  not  distinguish,  as  we  have  seen,  the  ap- 
perception of  inner  perception  from  self-obsen'ation  (the  inner 
sense) .  Such  a  confusion  is  the  result  of  the  double  signifi- 
cance which  has  always  been  attributed  to  the  idea  of  inner 
perception.  We  understand  by  that,  as  is  well  known,  ob- 
jective representation  of  absent  things  or  events  by  the  aid 
of  reproductive  imagination,  as  well  as  perception  of  inner 

*  He  says:  "  If  this  law  alone  were  determinative,  every  human  being 
would  have  acquired  a  finished  and  perfect  development,  and  the  question, 
how  he  arrived  at  this  degree  of  perfection,  would  remain  unanswered. 
For  everything  that  may  be  offered  to  his  soul  by  inner  or  outer  per- 
ception would  simply  be  fitted  into  the  contents  of  the  soul  already 
existing,  and  become  organically  coimected  with  it  in  that  changed  form, 
without  being  able  to  do  more  than  merely  strengthen  these  contents. 
But  the  intellectual  education  of  man  consists  only  to  a  small  extent 
in  confirming  the  finished  contents  of  the  soul  already  existing,  and  much 
more  in  providing  it  with  new  cognitions.  Hence,  in  order  to  facilitate 
a  real  progress  in  man,  the  younger  percept  mu^■t,  abandoning  its 
exclusively  passive  role,  be  able  to  act  upon  the  older  ones ;  and,  at  times 
an  entirely  (?)  new  concept  must  be  able  to  spring  up  in  the  soul  which 
previously  could  be  found  neither  over  nor  under  th^  threshold  of  con- 
sciousness "  (Wundt's  Philos.  Htudien,  p.  166), 


262  APPERCEPTION. 

conditions,  i.  e.,  self-observation.  There,  it  is  becoming 
conscious  of  the  thing  perceived ;  here,  of  the  act  of  perceiv- 
ing :  there,  it  is  a  perceiving  of  facts  of  outer  and  inner  ex- 
perience ;  here,  it  is  a  perceiving  of  purely  inner  states. 
The  activity  of  the  one  kind  of  inner  perception  can  change 
to  that  of  the  other  kind  without  difliculty.  As  Herbart 
directed  his  attention  to  the  apperception  of  inner  perception, 
that  is,  the  acquisition  of  reproduced  ideas,  he  seems  to  have 
been  led  unconsciously  to  the  related  theme  of  self-observa- 
tion by  the  empirical  material  offered.  His  examples  of  inner 
apperception  have  almost  all  reference  to  cases  in  which' 
one's  inner  conditions  or  actions,  affections,  passions,  outer 
conduct,  etc.,  are  subjected  to  self -judgment.  A  man  ex- 
amines an  idea  with  regard  to  its  value,  recognizes  and 
governs  himself  in  his  affections,  and  measures  his  actions 
by  the  standard  of  his  maxims ;  while  a  child  having  no 
principles,  or  a  poet  in  the  condition  of  enthusiasm,  cannot 
apperceive  his  thoughts  and  actions.  In  cases  of  mental  ac- 
quisition, it  is  true,  apperception  and  self-obsei-vation  are 
always  intertwined,  since  man  through  ethical  ideas  and 
judgments  apperceives  ideas  which  concern  his  own  volition 
and  action.  Hence  the  erroneous  supposition  lies  near,  that 
things  which  are  given  simultaneously  must  also  belong  to- 
gether logically,  i.  e.,  that  self-observation  accompanies 
apperception  not  only  in  some  cases,  but  always.  But  self- 
observation  presupposes  a  strong  superior  mass  of  thought 
which  comes  to  meet  the  new  perception  in  order  to  assimilate 
it.  From  this  Herbart  derived  the  general  fact,  that  inner 
apperception  conforms  to  older,  deeply-rooted  concepts. 
He  never  asserted  the  same  of  outer  apperception,  and  cer- 
tainly never  intended  to  do  so. 

Though  after  what  has  been  said,  it  is  clear  that  Herbart' s 
theory  of  apperception  needs  coiTection  and  completion  in 


HISTORY  OF   THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  263 

several  points,  on  the  other  hand  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
it  is  very  well  capable  of  such  correction  and  perfection. 
A  stronger  emphasis  upon  the  acts  of  emotion  and  volition  in 
the  process  of  apperception  and  their  relation  to  the  ego,  for 
instance,  might  as  little  contradict  its  essence  as  a  sharper 
distinction  between  the  idea  of  intentional  inner  observation 
and  that  of  apperception  would.  That  which  distinguishes 
advantageously  Herbart's  view  from  the  views  of  Leibnitz 
and  Kant,  is  its  far-reaching  applicability  and  practical 
importance  in  the  field  of  empirical  facts.  More  than  one 
chapter  of  psychology  has  found  a  much  desired  lucidity 
through  it ;  namely,  not  only  the  lower  processes  of  cognition 
"as  they  take  place  in  common  life,"  but  also  the  higher 
mental  activities  are  made  clear  by  means  of  Herbart's 
views  of  apperception. 

Most  psychologists  of  the  Herbartian  school  have  treated 
the  problem  of  apperception  in  a  similar  manner.  We 
mention  only  Drobisch,  Schilling,  ^'olkmaun,  Striimpell, 
Zimmermann,  Lindner,  Drbal.  To  Volkmaun  belongs  the 
merit  of  having  been  the  first  who  strictly  separated  the 
ideas  of  apperception  and  self-observation.  The  idea  of 
apperception  has  since  Herbart  found  the  most  fruitful  ap- 
plication in  pedagogics  through  Ziller.  His  explanation  of 
"  acquisitive  attention  "  casts  a  brighter  light  over  the  condi- 
tions and  course  of  the  process  of  learning,  and  over 
didactic  maxims  resulting  therefrom. 

A  further  development  of  Herbart's  theory  of  apperception 
has  been  attempted  by  Lazarus  and  Steiuthal,  particularly 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  philosophy  of  language. 

D.      The  Idea  of  Apperception  with  Lazarn.t. 

As  in  every  material  or  mental  activity,  so  in  the  process 
of  apperception,  two  processes  must  be  distinguished :  that 


264  APPERCEPTION. 

of  action  and  that  of  reaction.  Every  reaction  is  determined 
on  the  one  side  by  the  nature  of  the  action  upon  which  it  reacts ; 
on  the  other  side  by  nature  itself,  that  is,  by  the  original  or 
acquired  nature  of  the  reacting  being.  Thus  every  percep- 
tion must  be  dependent  upon  the  nature  of  the  stimulating 
object,  and  upon  the  nature  of  the  soul  as  a  perceiving  being. 
But  the  soul  may  react,  yielding  a  sense-impression  in  two 
ways :  first,  according  to  (by  virtue  of)  its  original  nature, 
then  according  to  (by  virtue  of)  the  nature  acquired  by  its 
previous  activity.  In  the  former  case  the  result  is  a  percep- 
tion ;  in  the  latter,  an  apperception.  Both  are  always  found 
together  in  the  process  of  perceiving ;  they  may  be  distin- 
guished as  to  content,  but  not  as  to  time.  Every  perception 
is  also  an  apperception,  that  is,  a  reaction  of  the  soul,  filled, 
more  or  less,  with  the  contents  of  former  processes.  The 
soul,  as  a  sensient  being,  perceives  according  to  its  original 
nature,  while  at  the  same  time  it  apperceives  according  to  the 
elements  acquired  through  earlier  actions.  An  apperception 
is  not  added  to  complete  a  perception,  but  perception  is 
formed  under  the  assisting  and  essentially  determining 
influence  of  apperception. 

Hence,  we  complete,  correct  and  sharpen  the  sensations, 
and  add,  in  perceiving  outer  objects,  by  means  of  appercep- 
tion, what  is  not  given  through  the  senses.  In  delusions  of 
the  senses  and  in  illusions  we  meet  the  secret  activity  of 
apperception. 

But  apperception  is  of  particular  importance  for  the 
linguistic  development  of  the  individual  as  well  as  of  entire 
nations.  The  creation  of  language  took  place  with  the 
continual  assistance  of  apperception.  At  the  beginning, 
man  was  without  language,  subject  to  the  irritating  impres- 
sions of  the  outer  world,  responding  to  them  only  with 
emotions.     But  the  reactions  of  his  soul  against  the  sensual 


HISTORY   OF  THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  265 

impressions,  especially  when  excitation  of  his  feelings  was 
coupled  with  them,  increased  to  reflex-movements,  that  is,  to 
sounds,  which,  then,  were  expressions  of  sense-perceptions 
that  gave  rise  to  emotions.  In  this  process  of  sound- 
generation  is  expressed  a  tendency  to  equalize  the  force  of 
impression  by  expression ;  to  relieve,  as  it  were,  the  soul  as 
well  as  the  organism  of  the  mass  of  impressions  received. 
The  sound  expressed  in  consequence  of  an  outer  impression 
was  perceived  internally  and  united  with  the  idea  of  the 
object  perceived  into  a  complex  formation ;  that  is,  into  a 
unity  of  impression  and  expression.  When  a  sound  created 
by  the  same  man,  or  other  men,  repeatedly  returned,  it  was 
understood  and  interpreted,  that  is  to  say,  it  awakened  with 
the  aid  of  a  reproduction  of  sound  a  representation  of  the 
thing ;  the  sound  became  a  linguistic  utterance ;  perception 
became  apperception. 

Thus  it  happened  that  in  the  first  or  pathognomonic  step  of 
linguistic  development  with  interjections  or  exclamations  of 
emotion ;  thus  also  in  the  second  or  buomato-poetic  (name- 
creating)  step  with  expressions  of  sound-imitation,  that 
which  man  himself  had  put  into  these  sounds  at  their 
creation,  he  now  hears  again  and,  apperceiviug,  recognizes. 

More  clearly  than  in  the  creation  of  this  so-called  outer 
form  of  language  is  noticeable  the  activity  of  the  acquired 
contents  of  the  soul  in  another  kind  of  language  formation. 
When,  for  instance,  the  Greeks  and  Romans  designated  the 
ox  (Rind)  "/^oiv,"  ^jos,  they  evidently  meant  to  say  "the 
boo-making  "  animal ;  that  is,  they  saw  the  whole  animal  in 
this  single  quality,  in  the  tone  of  its  voice.  Among  all  the 
different  kinds  of  sense-perception  which  combined  to  create 
the  idea  of  that  animal,  this  one  is  most  prominent ;  its 
name  therefore  was  transferred  to  the  entire  concept.  Thus 
it  came  about  that  a  word  designates  the  whole  thing,  whc^e 


266  APPERCEPTION. 

name  in  reality  expresses  only  one  quality.  Whenever  the 
concept  ox  was  connected  with  that  word,  apperception  of  a 
new  sensation  through  an  older,  linguistically  fixed  one,  took 
place.  This  one-sided  relation  to  man  of  a  many-sided 
object  fixed  by  language,  Lazarus  calls  the  inner  form  of 
language.  This  inner  form  of  language  made  itself  felt 
most  strongly  in  the  third  step  of  language  formation,  which 
may  be  called  the  characterizing  step.  At  this  step  no  new 
elements  of  language  (word-roots  and  root-words)  were 
generated,  but  men  endeavored  to  make  new  forms  with  the 
store  of  words  obtained,  and  to  fit  all  new  perceptions 
into  older  related  groups  and  forms.  Here  the  apperceiving 
strength  of  the  existing  store  of  language  proved  most 
effective  and  fruitful.  In  the  same  way  in  which,  formerly, 
in  entire  nations  the  creation  of  language  proceeded,  the 
individual  of  to-day  has  to  proceed  in  learning  a  language. 
Even  the  child  of  to-day  has  to  create  language  like  man  in 
prehistoric  ages,  self-actively,  according  to  the  laws  of 
apperception. 

The  course  of  apperception  naturally  is  dependent  upon 
the  nature  of  apperceived  or  apperceiving  ideas  and  those 
accompanying  them.  The  subject  of  apperception,  especially, 
may  consist  of  separate,  simple,  or  complex  ideas,  as  well  as 
of  forms  of  thought  and  contents  of  thought.  The  latter 
arise  through  solidification  of  concepts ;  as,  for  instance, 
when  the  essential  characteristics  of  numerous  related  objects 
are  combined  into  one  idea ;  or  the  contents  of  an  essay  into 
a  logical  outline  ;  or  the  separate  features,  events  and  actions 
of  a  historical  person  in  a  brief  but  complete  characteriza- 
tion. Ideas  and  laws,  methods  of  thinking  and  working, 
maxims  of  action,  rules  of  art,  are,  so  to  8j)eak,  the  psychical 
organs,  througii  which  the  individual  thing  that  has  reference 
to  4hem  is  apperceived. 


HISTORY   OF  THE   IDEA   OF  APPERCEPTION.  267 

However,  they  act  not  only  through  their  contents,  but  just 
as  much  through  the  accompanying  conditions  of  the  soul. 
Not  only  that  takes  hold  of  a  new  impression  which,  in  a 
moment  of  mental  acquisition,  fills  consciousness,  but  there 
are  also  unconscious  elements  active  in  the  process  of  apper- 
ception which,  with  the  contents  of  consciousness,  form  one 
group  or  series.  This  happens  especially  where,  instead  of 
the  contents  of  a  group  of  thoughts,  only  an  idea  representing 
it  acts  apperceivingly  in  consciousness.  In  the  act  of 
thinking,  in  art  work,  or  inventing,  the  conscious  action  of 
the  mind  is  constantly  assisted  and  determined  by  reverber- 
ating unconscious  ideas.  Indeed,  to  the  latter  may  even  be 
credited  the  real  creation,  the  thinking,  finding,  establishing. 
Only  the  intention  of  creating  and  the  resolution  to  do  so,  on 
the  one  side,  and  the  complete  success  on  the  other,  become 
distinct  in  consciousness.  The  real  process  of  apperception, 
or  the  creation  of  the  new  formations  takes  place  uncon- 
sciously. 

Finally  it  must  be  remembered  that,  both  for  form  and 
course  of  apperception,  the  feelings  and  tendencies  which 
move  the  soul  are  of  importance.  Our  wishes  and  cares,  our 
affections  and  needs,  our  longings  and  desires,  guide  and 
determine  our  perception  of  things  and  events.  In  the 
grandest  creations  of  the  human  mind,  the  soul's  mood 
proves  to  be  the  most  influential  force  for  the  direction  and 
order  of  apperception. 

The  idea  of  apperception  has  experienced  an  essential 
addition  through  Lazarus.  With  Herbart  it  was  confined 
chiefly  to  such  cases  in  which  the  acquisition  of  the  new  is 
preceded  by  excitation  of  the  circle  of  thought,  that  is,  a 
contemplative,  lingering  obsen'ation,  an  arching  and  pointing 
of  concepts ;  but  more  exact  investigation  showed  that 
apperception  can  take  place  even  without  such  intentional 


268  APPERCEPTION. 

guidance  of  the  movements  of  ideas.  Not  only  in  the 
moment  of  continuous  reflection  and  profound  thought,  but 
also  in  the  seemingly  simplest  processes  of  intellectual  life, 
we  are  apperceivingly  active.  Hence,  generally  speaking, 
apperception  may  be  considered  as  a  reaction  of  the  soul 
(filled  with  contents)  against  outer  and  inner  perception. 

In  emphatically  calling  attention  to  the  importance  of 
unconscious  ideas,  as  well  as  to  that  of  feelings  and  af- 
fections, words  and  volition,  for  the  process  of  appercep- 
tion, Lazarus  offers  a  valuable  addition  to  Ilerbart's  view. 
For  the  forces  that,  in  the  act  of  apperceiving,  awaken  and 
guide  the  masses  of  ideas  are  the  secret  powers  of  the 
emotional  soul  (^Gemiith)  ;  to  understand  them  means  to 
recognize  the  deepest  motives  and  causes  of  apperception. 

E.     The  Idea  of  Apperception  with  Steinthal. 

Every  perception  is  a  process  performed  between  two 
psychical  factors  or  elemelits.  That  which  is  first  given  is 
the  primary  stimulation  of  the  mind,  a  weak,  imperfect 
product,  caused  by  sense-action;  a  product  in  which  sub- 
jective and  objective  things  are  not  yet  separated,  and  which 
gives  no  cognition  of  the  exterior  object  that  caused  the 
excitation.  Hence  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  either  a  sensation 
or  a  perception.  A  second  more  important  element  is  com- 
bined with  it,  namely,  a  memory-image  of  the  same,  or  a 
similar  object  of  observation.  This  aids  in  interpreting  and 
understanding  the  primary  action  of  the  soul,  by  being  fused 
with  it.  An  idea,  or  a  group  of  ideas  already  in  possession 
of  the  mind,  apperceives  the  new  impression.  From  the 
combination  of  both  arises  a  product  of  cognition,  perception. 

It  is  not  the  apperceptive  group  of  ideas  that  brings  a  per- 
ception to  consciousness,  for  either  may,  or  may  not,  have 
the  favor  of  consciousness.     Apperception  is  not  added  to  a 


HISTORY   OF   THE    IDEA    OF   APPERCEPTION.  269 

perception,  but  the  latter  is  the  product  of  the  former;  it  is 
that  which  is  perceived. 

As  in  the  origin  of  the  simplest  perceptions,  so  in  the  for- 
mation and  repetition  of  complex  ideas,  concepts  and  no- 
tions, and  in  the  creation  of  the  most  ingenious  idea, — ap- 
perception is  active.  In  every  case,  however,  it  is  the 
moving  of  two  masses  of  perceptions  toward  each  other  for 
the  purpose  of  generating  a  cognition ;  it  is  the  essence  of 
spiritual  processes  upon  which  cognition  is  invariably  based. 
It  is  supported  invariably  by  elementary  psychical  processes  ; 
but  it  includes  them  in  special  combinations.  For  instance, 
we  have  seen  that  it  depends  upon  fusion ;  but  the  lat- 
ter idea  does  not  by  any  means  contain  all  the  character- 
istics which  we  find  in  the  idea  of  apperception.  If,  for 
instance,  we  recognize  a  beloved  person,  the  sense-impres- 
sion is  apperceived  by  a  long  chain  of  ideas,  feelings  and 
desires  arising  in  the  memory.  It  is  thereby  perfected  and 
formed  into  a  definite  object.  Recognition  does  not  merely 
mean  to  be  conscious  that  the  person  present  is  the  one 
known  or  loved  by  us,  but  the  entire  condition  of  our  mind 
at  the  moment  of  seeing  the  person  again  after  a  long 
absence  is  what  we  coldly  call  ' '  recognition."  It  is  not 
a  theoretical  act,  not  merely  cognition,  which  we  exercise, 
but  an  action  of  life,  a  function  of  our  being.  Such  apper- 
ception shows  us  that  we  are  incapable  of  defining  exactly 
iu  every  case  all  the  factors  active  in  the  process  of  apper- 
ception; hence  it  follows,  that  to  a  certain  degree  the  defini- 
tion of  apperception  nuist  forever  remain  obscure. 

Of  the  masses  of  ideas  which,  for  the  purpose  of  genera- 
ting cognitions,  move  toward  each  other,  the  one  may  be 
called  the  subject,  the  other  the  object  of  apperception.  A 
glance  at  the  psychological  relation  existing  between  them 
may  make  the  distinction  clearer. 


270  APPERCEPTION. 

In  most  cases  the  subject  of  apperception  consists  ot 
older  ideas  already  existing,  that  is,  the  soul  brings  to  the 
process  of  apperception  an  '•'•  a  priori^*  element,  which,  as 
the  active  and  more  powerful  agent,  determines  the  direc- 
tion and  success  of  the  entire  process.  But  what  gives  it 
this  superiority  over  the  newly  acquired  perception?  It  is 
its  strong  sensibility,  the  faculty  of  returning  to  conscious- 
ness easily,  and  forming  new  connections  with  other  ideas. 
Such  sensibility  and  mobility  are,  as  a  rule,  qualities  of 
rich,  well-articulated  groups  that  are  reproduced  regularly, 
series  of  concepts  which,  for  instance,  refer  to  one's  profes- 
sion, one's  mode  of  life,  one's  every-day  occupation.  Every 
person  has  one  or  more  such  groups  that  exercise  an  espe- 
cially strong  power  of  apperception  and  which,  therefore, 
are  called  the  "  ruling  ideas." 

However,  their  efficiency  is  not  exclusive :  we  apperceive 
often  enough  with  weaker  or  even  with  the  weakest  ideas,  if 
they  are  most  congruent  with  the  impression  received.  We 
may  therefore  say  in  general :  That  group  always  apper- 
ceives  which,  either  absolutely  or  only  for  the  special  case, 
proves  the  most  powerful.  A  chief  condition  of  the  rela- 
tive  power  of  the  ideas  is  interest,  that  is,  the  readiness 
of  a  group  of  ideas  for  apperceiving  activity,  which  readi- 
ness depends  upon  the  pleasure,  felt  or  expected,  in  the 
application  of  its  power.  Interest  awakens  attention,  that 
is,  willingness  causes  readiness  for  mental  acquisition. 
But  it  should  not  be  left  unnoticed  that  unconscious,  sym- 
pathetic ideas,  as  well  as  moods  which  govern  the  mind  at 
the  moment,  may  aid  a  group  of  ideas  in  its  apperceiving 
power. 

If  thus  in  general  the  ^^  a  priori"  element  is  felt  to  be 
the  stronger  in  apperception,  in  certain  cases  it  may  be  that 
a  new  impression  itself  transforms  and  enriches  our  apjier- 


HISTORY   OF  THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  271 

ceiving  groups  during  the  process  of  apperception.  Hence, 
under  certain  conditions  the  object  of  apperception  may 
be  the  more  powerful  element  which  determines  both  direc- 
tion and  result  of  mental  acquisition. 

Like  the  psychological  relation  of  the  two  factors,  so  the 
logical  relation  may  be  reviewed.  The  following  kinds  of 
apperception  may  be  distinguished. 

1.  If  object  and  subject  of  apperception  are  perfectly 
alike,  that  is,  if  the  impression  corresponds  to  a  picture  in 
the  memory,  both  will  be  fused,  not  only  with  reference  to 
the  cognition,  but  also  with  reference  to  the  conditions  of 
the  mind  under  which  the  process  takes  place.  This  is  iden- 
tifying apperception. 

2.  While  at  times  individual  things  are  apperceived  by 
individual  ideas,  at  other  times  the  individual  is  acquired 
by  the  general,  the  idea  of  a  single  being  by  the  idea  of 
the  species,  the  idea  of  the  species  by  the  class,  order,  and  so 
on.  This  classifying  or  subsuming  apperception  embraces 
all  classifying  and  arranging,  all  proving  and  inferring,  all 
aesthetic  and  ethical  judgment. 

3.  Often  a  definite  fact  may  be  classified  among  certain 
ideas  when  one  is  incapable  of  harmonizing  it  with  related 
groups  of  tiioughts  that  are  the  seat  of  lively  emotions  and 
desires.  When,  for  instance,  a  person  dies  whom  we  have 
loved,  we  understand  the  event  well  enough ;  but  we  cannot 
reconcile  ourselves  with  it,  cannot  bring  it  into  harmony 
with  the  condition  of  the  soul ;  that  is,  we  cannot  apperceive 
it.  When  at  last  an  adjustment  takes  place  between  the 
opposing  groups  of  ideas,  it  is  not  a  case  of  subordination 
or  superiority,  but  a  case  of  co-oi^dination  of  ideas,  that  is,  the 
proper  relation  is  found  between  co-ordinate  ideas  or  such 
as  belong  to  different  classes.  This  is  the  object  of  harmo- 
nizing apperception. 


272  APPERCEPTION. 

4.  The  creative  or  formative  apperception,  finally,  is 
found  in  all  those  combinations  on  which  the  progress  of 
science  is  based,  in  the  creations  of  our  poets  and  artists,  in 
the  thinking  process  of  induction  and  deduction,  in  the 
guessing  of  riddles,  but  also  in  illusions  and  hallucinations. 
There  is  one  circumstance  which  is  peculiarly  its  own, 
namely,  that  in  every  case  it  first  creates  the  apperceiving 
factor. 

Steinthal,  like  Lazarus,  endeavored  to  give  the  idea  of 
apperception  a  new  setting.  But  while  placing  all  activity 
of  the  discerning  soul  under  the  spacious  roof  of  his  formula, 
he  includes  psychological  processes  in  it  which  ought  not  to 
be  placed  at  par  with  the  peculiar  action  of  mental  acquisi- 
tion, although  they,  like  apperception,  serve  in  effecting 
cognition.  On  the  other  hand,  one  misses  in  his  definition 
certain  characteristics  which  he  himself  attributes  to  apper- 
ception as  essentials :  namely,  that  apperception  is  more 
than  a  mere  fusion  of  ideas  with  ideas  or  of  percepts  with 
concepts,  and  that  in  the  motion  of  masses  of  ideas  lively 
emotions  and  affections  participate,  are  not  stated  in  the 
definition ;  it  leaves  us  also  in  the  dark  as  to  how  the  masses 
of  ideas  moving  to  meet  each  other  go  about  generating 
cognition.  Evidently,  then,  the  widening  of  the  idea  of 
apperception  has  injured  its  distinctness  and  clearness. 

F.     Apperception  Defined  by  Modern  Non-Herhartian 

PsychoUxfists. 

In  the  works  of  modem  psychologists  outside  the  Herbar- 
tian  school  we  meet  the  term  "  apperception "  but  rarely. 
But  the  process  designated  by  the  term  is  not  unknown 
to  them.  Following  Herbart,  almost  unanimously  they 
take  it  to  be  a  fusion  of  similar  ideas.  Thus  Beneke's 
' '  traces "    are   what    remain   of    psychical    processes   that 


HISTORY   OF   THE  IDEA  OF   APPERCEPTION.  273 

have  vanished  from  consciousness,  and  these  traces  serve  in 
securing  the  acquisition  of  new  perceptions. 

In  a  similar  manner  Theo.  Waitz  speaks  of  •"  residua," 
remainders,  or  after-effects,  of  perceptions  in  the  mind, 
"  by  which  all  subsequent  conditions  of  the  mind  are  modi- 
fied." In  earliest  childhood  it  is,  as  he  thinks,  a  general 
feeling,  that  is,  "a  confused  mass  caused  by  simultaneous- 
ness  of  different  impressions,  which  apperceives  all  separate 
specific  sense  impressions."  In  later  years  "no  pure  and 
isolated  perception  can  take  place,  because  the  mind  is 
always  preoccupied  by  a  great  number  of  remainders  of 
previous  processes,"  with  which  the  new  perception  has  "  to 
make  terms." 

Dittes  defines  apperception  as  a  sense-action  or  percep- 
tion, which  arises  through  the  addition  of  formations  already 
existing  in  the  mind  to  new  impressions  or  perceptions. 

Erdmann  distinguishes  also  perception  and  apperception, 
in  so  far  as  he  calls  the  "  acquisitive  perceiving  "  Anschauenj 
in  contradistinction  to  mere  seeing,  or  perceiving.  That 
which  is  totally  strange  is  only  an  object ;  this  is  perceived, 
not  '■'•  angeschant."  In  an  '■^  Anschauvng,"  however,  that 
which  is  objectively  perceived  contains  contributions  from 
the  mind  itself. 

Imm.  Herm.  Fichte  distinguishes  three  factors  in  the 
process  of  perception:  (1)  sensation,  (2)  distinguishing 
and  combining  of  sensations,  and  (3)  their  recognition. 
In  this  last  named  action,  by  which  "  a  single  perception  is 
put  into  relation  to  a  common  picture  already  existing,  and 
thus  recognized,"  we  find  apperception  again.  It  is  that 
action  which  fits  individual  percepts  into  related  groups  of 
concepts. 

According  to  Lotze,  there  are  conscious  sensations  the 
contents  of  which  are  lost  in  the  hasty  change  of  the  mind's 


274  APPERCEPTION. 

states,  because  no  definite  concept  of  our  own  life  comes  to 
meet  it  witli  which  it  might  associate,  and  in  whose  boun- 
daries it  might  unalterably  take  its  proper  i)lace.  Such  a 
sensation  is  a  perception,  in  contradistinction  to  apperception, 
by  means  of  which  we  become  conscious  of  sense-action. 
''We  apperceive  those  impressions  which  we  bring  into  com- 
prehensible connection  with  our  empirical  ego,  and  whose 
relation  to  former  events,  as  well  as  their  value  for  the 
further  development  of  our  personality,  we  feel  and  treasure 
up  for  subsequent  remem])rance."  The  extent  and  com- 
pleteness which  the  idea  of  self  possesses  every  moment  in 
the  course  of  our  thoughts,  determines  the  indefinite  variety 
of  degrees  of  j)erfection  with  which  a  perception  is  received 
in  consciousness,  i.  e.,  with  which  it  is  apperceived.  "  For 
the  concept  of  the  ego  that  comes  to  meet  it  is  not  eveiy- 
where  the  same  ;  often  poor  and  w  ithout  content  it  combines 
the  new  impression  with  but  few,  and  perhaps,  indifferent 
features  of  our  own  being;  the  impression  is  not  recognized 
in  the  intellectual  value  it  possesses  for  the  entirety  of  our 
life.  The  most  significant  percei)tions  are  often  lost  in  con- 
sequence of  the  condition  of  our  temperament  at  the  moment, 
while  at  other  times  their  importance  is  instantly  noticed. 
If  this  variability  of  perception  were  confined  to  the  theo- 
retical contents  of  the  impressions,  a  later  reproduction 
under  more  favorable  circumstances  might  adjust  the  want 
in  the  first  impression;  but  this  variability  becomes  fatal, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  extended  over  resolutions  and  actions 
(Medical  PsycholfMjy^  j).  504). 

From  Leibnitz's  thought,  as  we  have  seen,  two  trends  have 
issued  in  the  history  of  the  idea  of  apperception.  The  view 
represented  by  Kant  considers  the  process  of  apperception 
as  the  expression  of  an  inborn  spontaneous  activity,  while 
the  Uerbartian  school  emphasizes  more  the  effects  of  accumu- 


HISTORY   OF   THE    IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  275 

lated  contents  of  the  soul,  acquired  during  the  course  of 
mental  development.  While  the  latter  school  of  philosophers 
is  particularly  engaged  in  extending  and  applying  the  idea  of 
apperception,  Kant's  attempt  to  base  all  apperception  upon 
pure  self-consciousness  remained  isolated.  Only  in  recent 
years  the  thought  of  a  spontaneous  activity  of  apperception 

—  "with  the  omission  of  Kant's  metaphysical  presuppositions 

—  has  been  taken  up  again  and  developed  into  an  indepen- 
dent theory  of  apperception.  The  last  chapter  of  our  his- 
tory shall  be  devoted  to  it. 

G.   Wundt's   Theory  of  Apperception. 

The  ideas  which  at  a  given  moment  exist  in  consciousness 
differ  with  regard  to  their  distinctness.  The  majority  of 
them,  less  distinct,  recede  behind  ideas,  or  conceiving  ele- 
ments, that  are  distinguished  by  special  clearness.  This 
fact  has  been  compared  with  the  similar  phenomenon  which 
is  observed  in  the  act  of  seeing.  The  pictures  of  outer  ob- 
jects which  are  formed  on  the  retina  are  most  distinct  at  the 
point  called  the  focus ;  their  clearness  diminishes  more  and 
more,  the  farther  away  they  are  from  that  point.  Now 
taking  consciousness,  figuratively  speaking,  as  an  inner  see- 
ing, it  may  be  said  that  all  concepts  present  at  one  moment 
are  within  the  field  of  vision  [Blickfeld)  of  consciousness, 
while  only  one  is  in  the  focus  (Blickj)unkt)  of  consciousness. 
The  entrance  of  an  image  into  the  field  of  vision  is  defined 
as  perception;  its  entrance  into  the  focus  of  vision  as  ap- 
perception. 

Hence,  apperception  is  shown  in  the  high  degree  of  clear- 
ness acquired  by  a  concept  or  image ;  but  at  the  same  time 
a  definite  psychical  action  which  causes  this  result  is  neces- 
saiy  :  namely,  this  —  the  image,  being  present  with  others  in 
consciousness  as  a  percept,  is  seized  upon  and  brought  to 


276  APPERCEPTION. 

greater  clearness  by  attentiou.  But  attention  is  nothing 
else  than  an  act  of  the  will.  For  the  will  must  be  defined 
as  a  conceiving  activity  in  consciousness,  which  activity  in 
the  course  of  our  inner  states  acts  determinativcly,  and  calls 
forth  corresponding  outer  movements.  Hence,  apperception 
is  an  act  of  volition,  a  determination  of  the  will  upon  the 
ideas.  No  apperception  without  activity  of  the  will !  And 
it  is  always  the  one  will  which  is  expressed  in  all  forms  of 
apperception.  "Apperception  is  the  activity  of  our  will  in 
the  realm  of  our  ideas,  and  only  in  this  activity  do  we  our- 
selves feel  the  unity  of  our  volition."  Therefore  Wundt 
thinks,  with  Leibnitz  and  Kant,  that  apperception  is  the 
foundation  of  our  self-consciousness. 

It  is  plain,  then,  that  so  fundamental  a  psychical  function 
must  exercise  a  far-reaching  control  in  the  realm  of  thought. 
Without  apperception  our  concepts  would  resemble  scattered 
members  wanting  a  unifying  element;  they  would  be  in- 
capable of  entering  into  association  with  one  another.  For 
it  is  an  erroneous  supposition  that  percepts  and  concepts 
are  combined  by  means  of  their  contents,  or  their  inner  and 
outer  relations.  That  which  combines  them  is  apperception. 
Indeed,  apperception  raises  them  to  the  rank  of  inner  func- 
tions. Apperception  is  felt  directly  as  an  inner  activity 
"  from  which  we  transfer  the  character  of  inner  actions 
upon  the  contents  of  that  which  is  apperceived.  The  ideas 
themselves  appear  to  us  as  inner  actions,  although  we  re- 
main conscious  of  the  fact  that  this  character  can  be  attrib- 
uted only  to  their  apperception."  With  reference  to  this 
fact  Wundt  calls  apperception  briefly  "conceiving  activity." 
It  is,  therefore,  both  an  action  of  j)roduction  (conception) 
and  volition  (since,  according  to  Wundt,  feeling  is  to  be 
traced  back  to  volition),  or  the  sum  and  substance  of  an 
inner   activity.     So   long  as  apperception    is  active  in  the 


HISTORY   OF  THE   IDEA   OF   APPERCEPTION.  277 

field  of  associative  combinatious  of  ideas,  so  long  as  it  con- 
tributes to  the  formation  of  elementary  mental  structures, 
i.  e.,  complexions  and  complications,  groups  and  series  of 
ideas,  its  character  as  an  action  of  volition  does  not  appear. 
Here,  ideas  are  apperceivingly  combined  without  one's  be- 
coming conscious  of  the  assistance  of  the  will.  Wundt  at- 
tributes this  to  the  fact  that  here  the  will  is  determined 
univocally  {eindeutig)  by  perceptions  entering  conscious- 
ness, that  is  to  say,  one  perception  is  so  distinguished  by 
intensity,  or  its  emotional  tone,  that  apperce[)tion  of  others 
is  quite  out  of  the  question.  Hence,  we  think  that  we  are 
guided  by  outer  influences,  or  by  our  reproductions  and  not 
by  our  will.  We  have  here  a  form  of  apperception  which 
we  may  call  passive  apperception. 

It  is  different  in  that  action  of  apperception  which  on  the 
basis  of  associative  combination  of  concepts  proceeds  to  the 
formation  of  ideas,  judgments  and  conclusions.  This  action 
moves  chiefly  in  the  regions  of  thought  and  imagination. 
Here,  apperception  is  not  guided  univocally  by  ideas  that 
are  raised  by  association,  but  several  ideas  are  at  its  dis- 
posal among  which  it  can  choose.  And  "it  chooses  the 
proper  ones  by  means  of  an  activity  which  is  determined 
causally  by  the  entire  historical  development  of  conscious- 
ness." In  this  action  we  become  distinctly  conscious  of 
apperception  as  an  inner  action,  or  will.  It  is  therefore 
called  active  apperception. 

We  become  conscious  of  the  process  of  apperceinion 
chiefly  through  the  sensation  of  tension  which  accompanies 
it,  especially  in  a  case  of  reflection,  or  a  case  of  expecta- 
tion. This  leads  us  to  the  physiological  processes  connected 
with  it.  According  to  the  thorough  and  most  interesting 
investigations  of   Wundt,  the  following  physiological  func- 


278  APPERCEPTION. 

tions  are  to  be  distinguished  in  the  apperception  of  an  ex- 
pected sense-impression :  — 

1.  Transmission  of  the  sensory  excitation  from  the 
sense-organ  to  the  brain. 

2.  Excitation  of  the  sensory  centere  (at  the  moment  of 
psychical  reaction,  entrance  of  the  sensation  into  the  field  of 
vision  of  consciousness  =  perception) . 

3.  Transmission  of  the  sensory  excitation  to  the  apper- 
ception centere,  i.  e.,  the  fore  part  of  the  cerebrum;  return 
of  the  excitation  to  the  sensory-centers  whereby  a  strength- 
ening of  the  percept  is  caused,  and  to  the  region  of  volun- 
tary muscles  whereby  a  tension  of  certain  muscles  is  occa- 
sioned (entrance  of  the  percept  into  the  focus  of  conscious- 
ness ==  apperception). 

It  is  particularly  this  tension  of  muscles  which  in  cases  of 
intense  apperception  causes  a  feeling  of  exertion.  When 
paying  attention  to  outer  sense-impressions  a  tension  is  no- 
ticed in  the  respective  sense-organ  (eye,  ear) .  While  trying 
to  recollect  certain  memory-images,  this  feeling  of  tension 
recedes  to  those  parts  of  the  head  surrounding  the  brain. 
In  both  cases  it  is  a  feeling  of  inervation  of  the  muscles 
caused  by  a  real  tension,  and  is  therefore  accompanied  by 
sensations  of  touch. 

The  theory  of  Wundt,  sketched  in  the  foregoing  lines,  ex- 
pressly claims  the  merit  of  having  proved  the  spontaneity  of 
apperception,  and  having  in  opi>osition  to  Ilerbart,  empha- 
sized it  anew.  It  connects  with  a  thought  of  Leibnitz's  and 
Kant's  theory  without  clinging  to  it  in  its  crude  form.  For 
while  Leibnitz's  *' soul-monad"  creates  ^^  sua  sponte"  its 
ideas  independently  of  events  and  phenomena  of  the  outer 
world ;  and  while  Kant's  activity  of  apperception  is  only  in- 
duced by  outer  and  inner  experience,  but  not  determined  in 
its  contents,  Wundt  shows  that  the  will  appeare  in  the  pro- 


HISTORY   OF   THE   IDEA   OF    APPERCEPTION.  279 

cess  of  apperception  in  accordance  witli  certain  motives 
which  determine  its  direction.  He  therefore  asserts  no  ab- 
solute, but  merely  a  relative  spontaneity  of  the  will.  At 
any  rate,  all  apperception  is  traced  back  to  its  spontaneous 
activity.  Numerous  facts  seem  to  speak  in  favor  of  this 
supposition.  In  all  cases  where  mental  acquisition  takes 
place  only  after  surmounting  special  difficulties  —  since  a 
thinking,  lingering  reflection  and  a  wavering  between  dif- 
ferent series  of  reproduction  precede  it  —  there  the  action  of 
the  will  regulating,  as  it  were,  the  course  of  perceptions,  can 
be  demonstrated.  And  the  farther  the  intellectual  develop- 
ment of  man  progresses,  the  more  important  becomes  the 
function  of  those  apperceptions  that  are  brought  about  by 
the  assistance,  and  under  the  guidance,  of  the  .will. 


Education. 

"  Thou  that  teachest  another,  teachest  thou  pot  thystlf?  " 

ppOR  American  Schools  and  American  Scliolarship  there  is  no 
more  healthful  sign  than  the  newly-awakened  interest  of  teach- 
ers in  all  that  pertains  to  successful  work  and  personal  culture.  At 
the  outset  of  this  great  and  wide-spread  movement  in  favor  of  better 
methods  and  worthier  results,  it  was  but  natural  that  the  practical  side 
01  education  should  be  treated  out  of  all  proportion,  while  its  theoreti- 
cal and  historical  aspects  should  be  somewhat  overlooked.  But  if 
education  is  to  become  a  science  and  teaching  to  be  practised  as  an 
art,  one  means  to  this  end  is  to  gather  and  examine  what  has  been 
done  by  those  who  have  been  engaged  therein,  and  whose  position  and 
success  have  given  them  a  right  to  be  heard.  Another  and  not  less 
potent  means  is,  to  gain  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  psychological 
basis  of  the  teacher's  work,  and  a  familiar  acquaintance  with  the 
methods  which  rest  upon  correct  psychological  principles.  As  con- 
tributions of  inestimable  value  to  the  history,  the  philosophy,  and  the 
practice  of  education,  we  take  pleasure  in  calling  the  attention  of 
teachers  to  our  books  on  Education,  mentioned  in  the  following  pages. 
It  is  our  purpose  to  add  from  time  to  time  such  books  as  have  con- 
tributed or  may  contribute  so  much  toward  the  solution  of  educational 
problems  as  to  make  them  indispensable  to  every  true  teacher's  library. 

The  following  good  words,  and  also  the  opinions  quoted 
under  the  several  volumes,  are  an  earnest  of  the  appre- 
ciation in  which  the  enterprise  is  held :  — 


Dr.  Wm.  T.  Harris,  Concord,  Mass.  : 
I  do  not  think  that  you  have  ever  printed 
a  book  on  education  that  is  not  worthy 
to  go  on  any  teacher's  reading-list,  and 
the  best  list.  {March  a6,  1886.) 

J.  W.  Steams,  Prof,  of  the  Science 

and  Art  of  Teaching,  Univ.  of  Wis. : 

Allow  me  to  say  that  the  list  of  books 

which  you  are  publishing  for  aic  use  of 

10^ 


teachers  seems  to  me  of  exceptional  ex- 
cellence. I  have  watched  the  growth  of 
the  list  with  increasing  pleasure,  and  I 
feel  that  you  have  done  a  service  of  great 
value  to  teachers.  K^tiy  a6,  1886.) 

N.  M.  Butler,  Pres.  of  New  Y(wk 
City  Coll.  for  Training  of  Teachers :  I 
am  greatly  interested  in  your  series  of 
pedagogical  publications. 


I04 


EDUCATION/. 


CofHpayres  History  of  Pedagogy. 

Translated  and  Edited  by  W.  H.  Payne,  Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Nash- 
ville and  President  of  the  Peabody  Normal  College;  with  Introduction,  Notes, 
References,  and  an  Index.  Cloth.  6i8  pages.  Retail  price,  J1.75.  Special 
price  for  class  use. 

IN  one  volume  of  moderate  size  the  reader  will  find  an  interesting^ 
instructive,  and  comprehensive  account  of  all  the  greater  move- 
ments in  the  history  of  human  thought  as  it  bears  on  education.  The 
great  need  of  the  teacher  is  breadth  of  view,  and  an  adequate  survey 
of  the  whole  field  of  educational  activity,  and  these  wholesome  and 
necessary  endowments  can  come  only  from  a  study  of  the  history  of 
education.  For  this  high  purpose  it  is  safe  to  say  that  there  is  no 
other  book  in  any  language  which  has  the  excellences  of  Compayr^'s 
History  of  Pedagogy. 


W.  T.  Harris,  U.  S.  ComW  of  Edu- 
cation, Washington  :  It  is  indispensable 
among  histories  of  education. 

G.  Stanley  Hall,   Pres.  of  Clark 

Univ.,  Worcester,  Mass. :  It  is  the  best 
and  most  comprehensive  universal  history 
of  education  in  English.  The  translator 
has  added  valuable  notes. 

Irwin  Sbepard,  Pres.  of  State  Nor- 
mal School,  Winona,  Minn.:  We  adopted 
immediately  upon  its  publication,  and  are 
now  using  it  with  great  satisfaction  in  a 
class  of  sixty  members.  Through  the  aid 
of  this  book,  the  subject  has  assumed  a 
new  interest  and  importance  to  all  our 
tMchers  and  students. 

Oabriel  Campayrd,  Chambres  des 
Diputis,  Paris:  Votre  traduction  me 
parait  excellente  et  je  vous  remercie  des 
soins  que  vous  y  avez  mis.  J'ai  grand 
olaisir  i  me  relire  dans  votre  langue, 
d'autant  que  vous  n'avez  rien  n6glig6 
pour  I'impressioii  matirielle. 

J.  W,  Stearns,  Prof,  of  the  Science 
and  Art  0/  Teaching,  Univ.  of  Wis.  :  It 
will,  I  believe,  serve  to  increase  interest  in 
the  history  of  educational  thought  and  ex- 
perience,— an  end  greatly  to  be  desired. 


M.  A.  Newell,  Statt  Supt.  of  Educa- 
tion, Baltimore,  Md.:  It  is  a  very  valuable 
addition  to  our  pedagogic  literature ;  it  is 
as  brief  as  the  breadth  of  the  subject  would 
allow,  and  is  comprehensive  and  philo- 
sophical. The  notes  and  index  added  by 
Professor  Payne  very  much  increase  tlv 
value  of  the  work. 

E.  H.  "RyxaseW.Prin.  of  State  Normal 
School,  Worcester,  Mass.:  I  say  unhesi- 
tatingly that  it  is  a  very  valuable  edition 
to  the  list  of  first-rate  books  for  teachen 
I  have  put  it  into  the  hands  of  our  senior 
class,  and  have  recommended  it  to  our 
graduates. 

N.  M.  Butler,  Prin.  of  N.  Y.  ColL 
for  Training  of  Teachers:  It  should  be  ia 
the  hands  of  every  teacher,  every  normal- 
school  student,  and  on  the  list  of  every 
"  reading  circle."  I  predict  for  the  book 
the  greatest  success,  for  it  deserves  it. 

B.  B.  Hlerbee,  late  State  Supt.of  Pub- 
lic Instruction,  Harrisburg,  Penn. :  I 
hope  it  may  be  introduced  into  all  the  nor- 
mal schools  of  this  State,  and  give  a  di^ 
nified  Impetus  to  studies  of  such  character, 
so  much  needed  and  so  valuable. 


EDUCATION'. 


105 


Compayre's  Lectures  on  Pedagogy. 

Translated  and  Edited  by  W.  H.  Payne,  Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Nash- 
ville and  President  of  the  Peabody  Normal  College.  Cloth.  500  pages.  Retail 
price,  i?i.75.    Special  price  for  class  use. 

THIS  is  a  companion  volume  to  tlie  Author's  History  of  Peda- 
gogy and  is  characterized  by  the  qualities  that  are  so  conspic- 
uous in  the  earlier  volume ;  it  is  comprehensive,  clear,  accurate,  and 
is  written  with  rare  critical  insight.  To  have  an  original  and  superior 
mind  elaborate  a  systematic  theory  of  education  out  of  the  best  his- 
toric material  accessible,  and  present  as  its  complement  a  revised 
series  of  methods,  would  be  thought  an  invaluable  service  to  the 
teaching  profession,  but  this  is  precisely  what  M.  Compayre  has 
done  in  this  charming  volume.  It  is  the  most  original  and  satisfac- 
tory manual  for  teachers  that  has  ever  appeared  in  English, 


Jas.  MacAlister,  Supt.  of  Public 
Schools,  Philadelphia,  Pa. :  I  liave  known 
the  book  ever  since  it  appeared,  and  re- 
gard it  as  the  best  work  in  existence  on 
the  Theory  and  Practice  of  Education. 

Thomas  J.  Morgan,  recently  Prin. 
State  Norinal  School,  Providence,  R.  I. : 
It  seems  to  me  the  best  book  on  the  sub- 
ject which  has  yet  been  published  in 
America. 

H.  B.  Twltmeyer,  Coll.  of  Northern 
III.,  Dakota,  III. :  It  is  the  best  r6sum6  I 
have  ever  seen  on  the  study  and  practice 
of  teaching. 

Richard  Edwards,  Supt.  Public 
'nstruction,  Springfield,  III. :  1  value  the 


book  very  highly  indeed,  and  think  it  will 
have  great  effect  in  uplifting  the  profes- 
sion of  teachers  in  this  country, 

W,  W.  Parsons,  Pres.  Ind.  State 
Normal  School:  1  pronounce  it  an  excel- 
lent popular  treatise  on  the  Science  of 
Education.  I  consider  it  a  valuable  addi- 
tion to  our  professional  literature. 

Christian  Union :  Especially  in- 
genious is  the  chapter  upon  the  education 
of  the  attention;  that,  too,  upon  the  cul- 
ture of  the  memory  is  of  great  practical 
value.  We  should  like  to  put  this  work 
into  the  hands  of  every  instructor,  whether 
parent  or  teacher. 


Psychology  Applied  to  Education. 

By  Gabriel  CoMPAVRk.     Translated  by  \Vm.   H.  Payne,  Chancellor  of  the 
University  of  Nashville.     Cloth.     225  pages.     Retail  price,  90  cents. 

IN  the  statement  of  doctrine  and  application,  this  manual  is  profound 
without  being  obscure,  and  simple  without  being  commonplace. 
There  are  thousands  of  teachers  who  have  neither  the  taste  nor  the 
leisure  to  master  the  details  of  educational  science,  nor  even  to  read  the 
profounder  treatises,  but  who  are  anxious  to  find  a  rational  basis  for 
their  art ;  for  such  there  is  no  book  that  can  be  commended  so  highly. 


EDUCATION.  107 


Apperception . 

A  Monograph  on  Psychology  and  Pedagogy.  By  Dr.  Karl  Langb.  Tranv 
lated  by  the  following  named  members  of  the  Herbart  Club:  Elmer  E.  Brown, 
Charles  I)e  Garmo,  Mrs.  Eudora  Hailmann,  Florence  Hall,  George  F.  James, 
L.  R.  Klemm,  Ossian  H.  Lang,  Herman  T.  Lukens,  Charles  A.  McMurry, 
Frank  McMurry,  Theo.  B.  Noss,  Levi  L.  Seeley,  Margaret  K.  Smith,  and  edited 
by  Charles  De  Garmo,  President  of  Swarthmore  College.  Cloth.  279  pages. 
Retail  price,  Ji.oo. 

THIS  is  perhaps  the  most  popular  scientific  monograph  on  education 
that  has  appeared  in  Germany  in  recent  times.  It  has  the  rare 
merit  of  being  at  once  thoroughly  scientific  and  intensely  interesting 
and  concrete.  Not  a  little  of  its  value  arises  from  the  fact  that  it 
approaches  the  problems  of  education  along  the  highway  that  teachers 
must  actually  pass  in  order  to  solve  them.  Its  standpoint  is,  in  brief, 
the  living,  developing  mind  of  the  child  itself.  Apperception  is  a 
single  word  comprehending  the  whole  complex  of  processes  known  as 
mental  assimilation.  It  is  here  considered  in  its  original  nature,  and 
in  its  application  to  instruction  and  moral  training,  both  as  regards  the 
developing  child,  its  interests,  powers,  and  mental  stores,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  selection,  arrangement,  and  methodical  treatment  of 
the  subject-matter  of  instructidn,  on  the  other.  The  scientific  value 
of  the  volume  is  enhanced  by  a  somewhat  extended  chapter  on  the 
history  of  the  term  Apperception,  found  at  the  close  of  the  book. 
The  prediction  is  not  unwarranted  that  this  unpretentious  monograph 
will  awaken  more  universal  interest  and  stimulate  more  educational 
thoughts  than  any  other  single  work  that  has  been  issued  in  the 
United  States  during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  for  it  ushers  in  a 
new  epoch  in  the  popular  study  of  education  in  this  country,  that  of 
scientific  treatment  enriched  by  a  vast  wealth  of  concrete,  interesting 
material.  In  it  science  has  become  popular  treatment,  and  popular 
treatment  scientific  exposition. 


Edward  T.  Pierce.  Prin.  of  Nor- 
mal School,  Los  Angeles,  Cal.:  I  am 
more  than  pleased  with  the  book.  It  is  a 
fascinating  book  to  a  teacher  who  is 
searching  after  truth.  I  shall  not  only 
recommend  it  to  teachers,  but  urge  them 
to  get  the  book.  (Nov.  25,  1893.) 

li.  R.  Klemm,  of  tht  Bureau  of  Edu- 


cation, Washington,  D.  C:  There  are  few 
educational  books  on  the  American  mar- 
ket that  come  up  to  this  in  usefulness. 
It  has  qualities  which  will  make  it  « 
favorite  text-book  in  Normal  Schools  and 
other  pedagogical  institutions.  The  little 
book  will  be  hailed  with  delight,  and  justly 
so,  by  the  great  number  of  teachers. 

{Aug.  23,  1893.) 


io8  EDUCATION. 


Manual  of  Empirical  Psychology. 

An  authorized  translation  from  the  German  of  Dr.  G.  A.  Lindner,  by  Charles 
De  Garmo,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Modem  Languages  in  Stale  Normal  Univei* 
sity,  111.    Cloth.    274  pages.    Price  by  mail,  J 1. 10.    Introduction  price,  ?i. 00. 

THIS  is  the  best  Manual  of  Psychology  ever  prepared  from  the 
Herbartian  standpoint,  which,  briefly  characterized,  is  the 
standpoint  of  pedagogics.  No  other  school  of  psychologists  have 
thrown  so  much  light  upon  the  solution  of  the  problems  arising  in  the 
instruction  and  training  of  youth ;  and  no  other  author  of  this  school 
has  been  so  successful  as  Lindner  in  compact  yet  comprehensive  and 
intelligible  statement  of  psychological  facts  and  principles.  The  book 
is  what  its  name  indicates,  a  psychology  arising  from  the  given  data 
of  experience;  yet  there  is  no  psychology  in  English  which  does  so 
much  toward  arousing  an  intelligent  interest  in  the  advanced  depart- 
ments of  rational  psychology  and  philosophy  in  general. 

That  an  effective  educational  psychology  must  be  based  upon  a 
concrete  experience,  rather  than  upon  the  a  priori  forms  of  mind  ij 
reasonably  evident,  but  Lindner  is  more  than  a  mere  recorder  of  eX' 
perience.  He  unfolds  his  subject  as  a  true  inductive  science,  never 
losing  sight  of  the  organic  development  of  mental  life.  This  gives 
him  a  great  pedagogical  significance.  Again,  he  is  always  interesting. 
His  explanations  are  lucid,  pointed,  and  self-consistent,  while  every 
department  of  science  and  of  experience  has  yielded  its  choicest  facts 
to  enrich  the  contents  of  the  book. 

The  work  is  especially  recommended  for  normal  schools,    reading 
circles,  and  higher  institutions  of  learning. 

W.  H,  Oouncill,  Prin.  State  Nor- 
mal and  Industrial  School,  Ala.:  The 
work  possesses  every  merit  necessary  to 


Q.   Stanley  Hall,  Pres.  of  Clark 

Univ.,  Worcester,  Mass.  :  The  practical 
applicability  of  this  stand-point  and  book 
makes  its  merits. 

Q.  Williamson  Smith,  Pres.  of 
Trinity  Coll.,  Hartford,  Conn. :  It  is  an 
original  work,  on  well  conceived  principles 
and  carried  on  by  methods  of  induction 
approved  by  all. 

F.  Louis  Soldan,  Prin.  St.  Louis 
Normal  and  high  School:  Lindner's 
Psychology  is  one  of  the  best  works,  if  not 
the  best,  of  the  vigorous  school  to  which 
he  belongs.       The  translation  is  an  im' 


give  it  a  jiermanent  place  among  the  high* 
est  order  of  text  books. 

Q.  S.  Albee,  Pres.  State  Normal 
School,  Oshkosh,  Wis. :  Only  the  most 
original  and  realistic  teachers  have  been 
able  to  obtain  results  in  class  work  which 
lifted  the  study  of  psychology  above  con- 
tempt. This  key-note  of  the  best  and 
most  definitely  true  teaching  appears  upon 
nearly  every  page  of  Lindner.  The  author 
may  congratulate  himself  that  his  Ameri* 


provement  on  the  originaL  i  aux  editor  was  a  dear- minded  psychologia^ 


EDUCATION. 


109 


The  Essentials  of  Method. 

Revised  Edition.  A  discussion  of  the  essential  forms  of  right  method  in  teach- 
ing by  Charles  De  Garmo,  Ph.  D.,  President  of  Swarthmore  College.  Cloth. 
133  pages,     Retail  price,  65  cents.     Special  price  for  class  use. 

THIS  little  volume  is  an  initial  work  in  the  science  of  methods,  no 
attempt  of  its  kind  having  previously  been  made  in  English.  It 
assumes,  therefore,  an  importance  and  significance  which  are  not 
measured  by  its  size  or  price. 

It  comprises  three  parts:  i.  The  psychological  basis.  This  con- 
sists mostly  of  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  individual  and  the 
general  notion,  and  of  the  true  nature  of  mental  assimilation,  or  ap- 
prehension :  2 .  The  necessary  stages  of  rational  methods  as  deter- 
mined by  the  psychological  basis.  We  have  here  an  exposition  of  the 
functions  of  observation,  of  generalization  and  of  the  application  of 
generalizations  in  fixing  and  utilizing  knowledge  ;  3.  Practical  illustra- 
tions, showing  how  the  teacher  may  consciously  observe  these  stages 
in  his  daily  work  in  the  school  room.  The  Revised  Edition  gives  both 
a  popular  and  a  scientific  explanation  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  Apper- 
ception. 

Experience  shows  that  the  txx>k  is  admirably  adapted  to  training* 
classes  in  normal  schools,  and  to  city  or  village  reading  circles, 
while  no  live  teacher  can  afford  to  remain  partially  or  wholly  uncon- 
cious  of  what  it  reveals. 


J.  W.  Stearne,  Ph.D.,  Pro/,  of  Pt- 
dagcgy,  in  Wisconsin  State  Univ. :  It  is 
the  first  real  step  toward  the  development 
of  a  science  of  methods  in  this  country. 

B.  A.  Hinsdale,  Prof,  of  Pedagogy, 
Univ.  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor:  A  very 
good  book  iiuked  for  students  of  educa- 
tional science.  I  show  my  opinion  of  it 
by  putting  it  on  a  short  list  of  books  that 
I  recommend  to  teachers. 

T.  H.  Balliet,  Su/t.  of  Schools, 
Springfield,  Mass.:  I  think  it  has  as 
much  sound  thought  to  the  square  inch  as 
anything  I  know  of  in  pedagogics. 

G^«o.  Morris  Philips,  Ph.D.,  Prin. 
State  Normal  School,  West  Chester,  Pa.: 
An  unusually  excellent  little  book ;  there 
can  be  no  question  of  its  merit. 


J.  O,  Greenoviffh,  Prin.  of  West- 
field  Normal  School,  Mass. :  A  small 
book  but  a  great  work.  One  of  the  best 
pedagogical  books  ever  published  in  the 
English  language. 

M.  Li.  Seymour,  Prof,  in  State  Nor. 
mal  School,  Chico,  Cal. :  It  is  a  book 
without  a  peer  or  rival  in  the  discussion 
of  the  underlying  principles  of  methods  in 
teaching.  //  should  be  the  daily  compan- 
ion of  every  teacher  until  fully  assimi' 
lated. 

R.  O.  Boone,  Prof,  of  Pedagogy, 
Univ.  of  Ind. :  It  seems  to  me  very  sug- 
gestive and  along  right  lines  as  counteract- 
ing the  wide-spread  tendency  to  adopt  d^ 
vice  and  formula.  It  promises  teachers  « 
rich  return  for  the  most  careful  oerusaL 


/I2 


EDUCATION. 


The  Science  of  Education, 

Translated  from  the  German  of  Herbart  by  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Felkin.    With  va 
introduction  by  Oscar  Browning.    268  pages.     Cloth.     Retail  price,  Ji.oo. 

T  T  ERBART  began  the  study  of  education  and  of  the  human  mind  as 
'VV  a  private  tutor  of  boys  of  gentle  birth  and  nurture  intended  to 
receive  the  higher  education.  His  experiences,  therefore  —  and  with 
him  theory  and  practice  always  went  hand  in  hand  —  are  of  especial 
value  to  teachers  in  public  schools. 

"  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Felkin  deserve  the  thanks  of  all  who  are  interested 
in  education  by  making  these  writings  of  Herbart  accessible  to  English 
readers.  They  have  accomplished  their  work  with  the  greatest  care 
and  self-denying  zeal.  The  translation  is  as  readable  as  is  consistent 
with  an  exact  rendering  of  the  original.  If  it  is  carefully  studied,  as  it 
ought  to  be,  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  understanding  it.  Their  in- 
troduction is  probably  the  best  account  of  Herbart  which  has  appeared 
in  our  tongue."  —  From  Mr.  Brownings  Introduction, 


L.  R.  Klemm,  of  the  Bureau  of 
Education,  Washington,  D.  C:  It  is  with 
pardonable  admiration  for  your  "  pluck  " 
that  1  lay  down  Ilerbart's  Science  of  edu- 
cation after  a  thorough  examination.  I 
say  "  pluck,"  because  it  certainly  needs  a 
good  deal  of  aggressive  courage  to  offer 
the  teachers  of  America  such  a  work  for 
professional  study.  The  book  is  happily 
introduced  by  the  chapter  on  the  life  of 
Herbart,  his  philosophy  and  principles  of 
education,  and  the  two  analyses  by  the 
translators.  They  offer  a  very  convenient 
key  to  the  treasures  of  Herbart's  book. 
1  like  the  translation ;  have  compared 
whole  pages  with  the  original,  and  am 
well  pleased.  It  is  a  very  creditable  work. 
As  a  member  of  the  profession  of  teachers, 
I  offer  you  my  gratitude  for  this  publica- 
tion. (Sept.  25,  1893.) 

S.  O.  Williams,  Professor  of  Phi- 
losophy, Cornell  University,  Ithaca, 
N.Y.:  1  have  read  the  book  carefully  and 
compared  portions  with  the  original,  and 
1  feel  that  you  deserve  the  thanks  of 
English    speaking    teachers    for  placing 


within  their  reach  the  work  of  this  leader  of 
modern  German  pedagogic  thought.  The 
translation  is  so  neat  and  so  true  to  the 
original  that  it  not  infrequently  makes 
the  concise  and  somewhat  poetic  diction 
of  the  author  more  readily  comprehensible 
than  the  original.  {Oct.  16, 1893.) 

Educational  Courant,  Louisville, 
Ky.:  It  is  a  work  that  no  educator  can 
afford  not  to  read  and  study.  The  volume 
will  influence  our  theory  and  practice  for 
years  to  come,  and  he  who  remains  ig- 
norant of  its  contents  can  justly  be  ac- 
cused of  wilful  ignorance  of  what  most 
intimately  concerns  him. 

Science,  New  York:  Following  the 
entertaining  sketch  of  Herbart's  life  the 
translators  have  given  a  review  of  Her- 
bart's philosophy,  together  with  a  synop- 
sis of  the  two  works  which  follow  and 
form  the  principal  portion  of  the  book. 
The  review  has  evidently  been  written  from 
a  thorough  acquaintance  with  Herbart's 
writings  and  is  an  additional  aid  to  our  un* 
derstanding  of  his  principles. 


"4 


EDUCATION. 


Rosmini's  Method  in  Education. 


Translated  from  the  Italian  of  Antonio  Rosmini  Serbati  by  Mrs.  William 
Grey,  whose  name  has  been  widely  known  in  England  for  many  years  past  as 
a  leader  in  the  movement  for  the  higher  education  of  women.  Cloth.  3S9  pages. 
Retail  price,  $1.50. 

THIS  is  a  work  of  singular  interest  for  the  educational  world,  and 
especially  for  all  those  who  desire  to  place  education  on  a 
scientific  basis. 

It  is  an  admirable  exposition  of  the  method  of  presenting  knowl- 
edge to  the  human  mind  in  accordance  with  the  natural  laws  of  its 
development ;  and  the  disciples  of  Froebel  will  find  in  it  not  only  a 
perfectly  independent  confirmation,  but  the  true  psychological  estimate 
of  the  principles  of  Froebel's  kindergarten  system.  We  believe  that 
this  translation  of  the  work  of  the  great  Italian  thinker  will  prove  a 
boon  to  all  English-speaking  lovers  of  true  education. 


Thomas  Davidson  :  It  is  the  most 
important  pedagogical  work  ever  written. 

J.  W.  Stearns,  Prof,  of  Science  and 
Art  of  Teaching,  Univ.  of  Wisconsin  : 
No  one  who  cares  to  understand  the  psy- 
chological grounds  upon  which  right 
primary  methods  must  rest  can  afford  to 
pass  this  book  by.  It  is  a  dear,  simple, 
and  methodical  inquiry  into  the  develop)- 
ment  of  the  infant  mind,  and  the  kind  of 
knowledge  adapted  to  the  different  stages 
of  its  growth,  and  ought  to  be  at  once  re- 
ceived with  favor  by  American  teachers. 

I  shall  take  great  pleasure  in-  calling 
the  attention  of  my  classes  to  this  book, 
and  to  the  Ibt  published  by  your  house, 
which  seems  to  me  composed  of  very  val- 
uable works. 

Mary  Sheldon  Barnes,  formerly 
Prof,  of  History  in  Wellesley  Coll.^Mass. : 
This  is  a  very  exceptional  work,  in  that  it 
is  at  the  same  time  philosophical  and 
practical.  I  feel  as  if,  in  the  midst  of  all 
the  fragmentary,  erratic,  commonplace 
stuff  that  is  usually  relegated  to  the  name 
of  Pedagogies,  something  worthy,  clear, 
and  intellectually  inspiring  had  at  length 


stand  it  thoroughly  from  cover  to  cover } 
for  while  1  may  not  always  agree  with  it, 
still  it  will  compel  me  to  define  more 
clearly  just  what  I  do  think  —  a  most  val- 
uable intellectual  service. 

The  Nation:  The  book  shows  the 
influence  of  psychology  in  determining  all 
methods  of  pedagog)',  and  moves  towards 
the  practical  spirit  of  modern  times  in  that 
it  has  no  speculative  problems  to  solve, 
and  no  special  intellectual  ends  like  those 
of  philosophy  to  condition  the  mode  of 
education  it  defends. 

New  York  World:  His  ideal  of  life 
is  so  high,  his  motives  are  everywhere  so 
noble,  that  the  very  perusal  of  his  book 
will  be  itself  a  sort  of  education  to  parents 
and  teachers.  And  we  should  say  that 
no  parent  or  teacher  Iiaving  at  heart  the 
highest  good  of  the  children  committed  to 
his  care  can  afford  to  be  without  this  book. 
It  will  impress  those  who  read  it  with  the 
importance  of  education  and  of  its  far- 
reaching  power,  and  render  teachers  earn- 
est in  neir  work.  The  translation  is  well 
done.  Mrs.  Grey,  who,  a  most  excellent 
Italian  scholar,  has  come  to  the  work  with 


appeared.    For  myself,  I  wish  to  under- 1  every  advanUge. 


EDUCATION.  117 


The  Student's  Froebel. 

By  William  H.  Herford,  late  member  of  the  Universities  of  Bonn,  Berlin, 
and  Zurich.     Cloth.     128  pages.     Retail  price,  75  cents. 

THE  purpose  of  this  little  book,  as  stated  by  the  editor  in  hisprefece, 
is  to  give  young  people,  who  are  seriously  preparing  themselves 
to  become  teachers,  a  brief  yet  full  account  of  Froebel's  Theory  of 
Education ;  his  practice  or  plans  of  method  is  reserved  for  a  second 
part.  This  book  is  adapted  from  Froebel's  Education  of  Humanity 
(Z>/(?  Erziehung  der  Menschheit^,  published  in  1826.  The  editor  has 
tried  to  give  what  is  Froebel's  own  in  English  as  close  as  possible  to 
the  very  words  of  his  author.  The  book,  in  addition  to  an  Introduc- 
tion treating  of  the  subject  in  general,  has  chapters  on  The  Nursling, 
The  Child,  The  Boy,  and  The  School,  and  summaries  of  the  teachings. 

The  Psychology  of  Childhood. 

By  Frederick  Tracy,  Fellow  in  Clark  University,  with  Introduction  by  Presi- 
dent G.  Stanley  Hall.     Octavo.     Paper.     Retail  price,  75  cents. 

THE  author  has  in  this  work  undertaken  to  present  as  concisely,  yet 
as  completely,  as  possible,  the  results  of  the  systematic  study  of 
children,  and  has  included  everything  of  importance  that  can  be  found. 
Some  of  its  special  features  are  thus  summarized :  —  (i)  It  is  the  first 
general  treatise,  covering  the  whole  field  of  child  psychology.  (2)  It 
aims  to  contain  a  complete  summary,  up  to  date,  of  all  work  done  in 
this  field.  (3)  The  work  contains  a  large  amount  of  material,  the  re- 
sults of  the  author's  own  observations  on  children  as  well  as  those  of 
perhaps  a  score  of  very  reliable  observers.  (4)  The  subject  of  child- 
language  has  been  gone  into  with  especial  thoroughness,  from  an  en- 
tirely new  and  original  standpoint,  and  with  very  gratifying  results. 
(5)  A  very  exhaustive  bibliography,  containing,  it  is  believed,  every- 
thing of  value  that  has  ever  been  written  on  this  subject,  is  appended. 


J.  Clark  Murray,  Prof,  of  Philo- 
sophy, McGill  University,  Montreal,  Ca- 
nada: In  English  we  have  certainly  no 
original  work  on  tlie  psychology  of  child 
hood  to  compare  with  it,  and  even  among 
translations  from  German  and  French  there 
is  none  which  shows  such  a  mastery  of  the 
whole  subject.  {Nvv.  14,  1893.) 


Earl  Barnes,  Department  of  Edu- 
cation, Leland  Stanford  Jr.  University, 
Cal. :  No  book  has  come  from  the  press 
during  the  past  year  which  I  have  been 
so  glad  to  see  as  this  one.  For  iW  of  us 
who  are  carrying  on  courses  in  the  psychol- 
ogy of  children  it  will  prove  an  invaluable 
aid.  (JVoi:  23,  1893.) 


Education. 


Compayr^'S  History  of  Pedagogy.      "  The  best  and  most  comprehensire  hutory  of 

Kducation  in  English."  —  Dr.  G.  S.  Hall.    $1-75. 
Compayr^'s  Lectures  on  Teaching.      "  Tlie  best  book  in  existence  on  the  theory  and 
practice  of  education."  —  Supt.  MacAlister,  Philadelphia.     I1.75. 

Compayr^'s  Psychology  Applied  to  Education.    A  dear  and  concise  suument 

of  doctrine  and  application  on  the  science  and  art  of  teaching.     90  cts. 
De  GarmO's  Essentials  of  Method.      A  practical  expositjon  of  methods  with  illustnu 

tive  outlines  of  common  school  studies.     65  cts, 
De  Garmo's   Lindner's   Psychology.      The  best   Manual  ever  prepared  from   the 

Herbartian  standpoint.     ^100. 
Gill's  Systems  of  Education.      "  it  treats  ably  of  the  Lancaster  and  Bell  movement 

in  education,  —  a  very  important  phase."  —  Dr.  W.  T.  Harkis.     >i.25. 

Hall's  Bibliography  of  Pedagogical  Literature.     Covers  every  department  of 

education.     Interleaved,  *?2. 00.     $1.50. 
Herford'S  Student's  Froebel.      The  purpose  of  this  little  book  i«  to  give  young  people 
preparing  to  teach  a  brief  yet  full  account  of  Froebel's  Theory  of  Education.     75  cts. 

Malleson's  Early  Training  of  Children.    "The  best  book  for  mothers  I  ever 

read."  —  Elizabeth  P.  Peabodv.     75  cts. 

Marwedel's  Conscious  Motherhood.   The  unfolding  of  the  child's  mind  in  the 

cradle,  nursery  and  Kindergarten.     ^3.00. 
Newsholme's  School  Hygiene.     Already  in  use  in  the  leading  training  colleges  in 
England.     75  cts. 

Peabody's  Home,  Kindergarten,  and  Primary  School.  "The  best  book  out- 
side of  the  Bible  that  I  ever  read."  — A  Leading  Teacher.     $1.00. 

PestalOZZi's  Leonard  and  Gertrude.  "  if  we  except  '  Emile '  only,  no  more  im- 
portant educational  book  has  appeared  for  a  century  and  a  half  than  '  Leonard  and  Ger- 
trude.'"—  T)u  Nation.     90  cts. 

RadestOCk's  Habit  in  Education.  "  it  will  prove  a  rare  '  find '  to  teachers  who  are 
seeking  to  ground  themselves  in  the  philosophy  of  their  art."  —  E.  H.  Russell,  Worces- 
ter Normal  School.     75  cts. 

Richter's  Levana  ;  or,  The  Doctrine  of  Education.     "  A  spirited  and  scholarly 

book."  — Prof.  W.  H.  Pavnb.     $1.40. 
ROSmini'S  Method  in  Education.     "  The  most  imporUnt   pedagogical  work   ever 
written."  —  Thomas  Davidson.    $1.50. 

Rousseau's  Emile.      "  Perhaps  the  roost  influential  book  ever  written  on  the  subject  of 

Education." — R.  H.  Quick.     90  cts. 
Methods  of  Teaching  Modem  Lang^ges.      Papers  on  the  value  and  on  methods 

of  teaching  German  and  French,  by  prominent  instructors.     90  cts. 

Sanford's  Laboratory  Course  in  Physiological  Psychology.     The  course 

includes  experiments  upon  the  Dermal  Senses,  Static  and   Kinxsthctic  Senses,  Taste, 
Smell,  Hearing,  Vision,  Psychophysic.     In  Press. 

Lange's  Apperception :  A  monograph  on  Psychology  and  Pedagogy.  Trans- 
lated by  the  members  of  the  Herbart  Club,  under  the  direction  of  President  Charles 
D'tGarmo,  of  Swarthmore  College,     fi.oo. 

Herbart'S  Science  of  Education.  Translated  by  Mr.  and  tAxt.  Felken  with  a  pref- 
ace by  Oscar  Browning.     $1.00. 

Tracy's  Psychology  of  Childhood.  ThU  is  the  first  ^/x^ro/ treatise  covering  in  a 
scientific  manner  the  whole  field  of  child  psychology.     Octavo.     Paper.     75  cts. 

Sent  by  mail,  postpaid,  on  receipt  of  price. 

D.    C.    HEATH    &    CO.,    PUBLISHERS, 

BOSTON.        NEW  YORK.        CHICAGO. 


32] 
L3 


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